|
|
|
@ -39,14 +39,24 @@ prior versions do not provide a token. This is handled by the special "anonymous
|
|
|
|
|
token. If no token is provided, the rules associated with the anonymous token are
|
|
|
|
|
automatically applied: this allows policy to be enforced on legacy clients.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ACLs can also act in either a whitelist or blacklist mode depending
|
|
|
|
|
on the configuration of
|
|
|
|
|
[`acl_default_policy`](/docs/agent/options.html#acl_default_policy). If the
|
|
|
|
|
default policy is to deny all actions, then token rules can be set to whitelist
|
|
|
|
|
specific actions. In the inverse, the allow all default behavior is a blacklist
|
|
|
|
|
where rules are used to prohibit actions. By default, Consul will allow all
|
|
|
|
|
actions.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#### ACL Datacenter
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Enforcement is always done by the server nodes. All servers must be configured
|
|
|
|
|
to provide an [`acl_datacenter`](/docs/agent/options.html#acl_datacenter) which
|
|
|
|
|
enables ACL enforcement but also specifies the authoritative datacenter. Consul does not
|
|
|
|
|
replicate data cross-WAN and instead relies on [RPC forwarding](/docs/internals/architecture.html)
|
|
|
|
|
to support Multi-Datacenter configurations. However, because requests can be made
|
|
|
|
|
enables ACL enforcement but also specifies the authoritative datacenter. Consul
|
|
|
|
|
relies on [RPC forwarding](/docs/internals/architecture.html) to support
|
|
|
|
|
Multi-Datacenter configurations. However, because requests can be made
|
|
|
|
|
across datacenter boundaries, ACL tokens must be valid globally. To avoid
|
|
|
|
|
replication issues, a single datacenter is considered authoritative and stores
|
|
|
|
|
all the tokens.
|
|
|
|
|
consistency issues, a single datacenter is considered authoritative and stores
|
|
|
|
|
the canonical set of tokens.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
When a request is made to a server in a non-authoritative datacenter server, it
|
|
|
|
|
must be resolved into the appropriate policy. This is done by reading the token
|
|
|
|
@ -55,7 +65,9 @@ from the authoritative server and caching the result for a configurable
|
|
|
|
|
of caching is that the cache TTL is an upper bound on the staleness of policy
|
|
|
|
|
that is enforced. It is possible to set a zero TTL, but this has adverse
|
|
|
|
|
performance impacts, as every request requires refreshing the policy via a
|
|
|
|
|
cross-datacenter WAN call.
|
|
|
|
|
cross-datacenter WAN RPC call.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#### Outages and ACL Replication
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
The Consul ACL system is designed with flexible rules to accommodate for an outage
|
|
|
|
|
of the [`acl_datacenter`](/docs/agent/options.html#acl_datacenter) or networking
|
|
|
|
@ -66,114 +78,46 @@ choices to tune behavior. It is possible to deny or permit all actions or to ign
|
|
|
|
|
cache TTLs and enter a fail-safe mode. The default is to ignore cache TTLs
|
|
|
|
|
for any previously resolved tokens and to deny any uncached tokens.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ACLs can also act in either a whitelist or blacklist mode depending
|
|
|
|
|
on the configuration of
|
|
|
|
|
[`acl_default_policy`](/docs/agent/options.html#acl_default_policy). If the
|
|
|
|
|
default policy is to deny all actions, then token rules can be set to whitelist
|
|
|
|
|
specific actions. In the inverse, the allow all default behavior is a blacklist
|
|
|
|
|
where rules are used to prohibit actions. By default, Consul will allow all
|
|
|
|
|
actions.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
### Blacklist mode and `consul exec`
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
If you set [`acl_default_policy`](/docs/agent/options.html#acl_default_policy)
|
|
|
|
|
to `deny`, the `anonymous` token won't have permission to read the default
|
|
|
|
|
`_rexec` prefix; therefore, Consul agents using the `anonymous` token
|
|
|
|
|
won't be able to perform [`consul exec`](/docs/commands/exec.html) actions.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Here's why: the agents need read/write permission to the `_rexec` prefix for
|
|
|
|
|
[`consul exec`](/docs/commands/exec.html) to work properly. They use that prefix
|
|
|
|
|
as the transport for most data.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
You can enable [`consul exec`](/docs/commands/exec.html) from agents that are not
|
|
|
|
|
configured with a token by allowing the `anonymous` token to access that prefix.
|
|
|
|
|
This can be done by giving this rule to the `anonymous` token:
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
```javascript
|
|
|
|
|
key "_rexec/" {
|
|
|
|
|
policy = "write"
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
```
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Alternatively, you can, of course, add an explicit
|
|
|
|
|
[`acl_token`](/docs/agent/options.html#acl_token) to each agent, giving it access
|
|
|
|
|
to that prefix.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
### Blacklist mode and Service Discovery
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
If your [`acl_default_policy`](/docs/agent/options.html#acl_default_policy) is
|
|
|
|
|
set to `deny`, the `anonymous` token will be unable to read any service
|
|
|
|
|
information. This will cause the service discovery mechanisms in the REST API
|
|
|
|
|
and the DNS interface to return no results for any service queries. This is
|
|
|
|
|
because internally the API's and DNS interface consume the RPC interface, which
|
|
|
|
|
will filter results for services the token has no access to.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
You can allow all services to be discovered, mimicing the behavior of pre-0.6.0
|
|
|
|
|
releases, by configuring this ACL rule for the `anonymous` token:
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
```
|
|
|
|
|
service "" {
|
|
|
|
|
policy = "read"
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
```
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Note that the above will allow access for reading service information only. This
|
|
|
|
|
level of access allows discovering other services in the system, but is not
|
|
|
|
|
enough to allow the agent to sync its services and checks into the global
|
|
|
|
|
catalog during [anti-entropy](/docs/internals/anti-entropy.html).
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
The most secure way of handling service registration and discovery is to run
|
|
|
|
|
Consul 0.6+ and issue tokens with explicit access for the services or service
|
|
|
|
|
prefixes which are expected to run on each agent.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
### Blacklist mode and Events
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Similar to the above, if your
|
|
|
|
|
[`acl_default_policy`](/docs/agent/options.html#acl_default_policy) is set to
|
|
|
|
|
`deny`, the `anonymous` token will have no access to allow firing user events.
|
|
|
|
|
This deviates from pre-0.6.0 builds, where user events were completely
|
|
|
|
|
unrestricted.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Events have their own first-class expression in the ACL syntax. To restore
|
|
|
|
|
access to user events from arbitrary agents, configure an ACL rule like the
|
|
|
|
|
following for the `anonymous` token:
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
```
|
|
|
|
|
event "" {
|
|
|
|
|
policy = "write"
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
```
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
As always, the more secure way to handle user events is to explicitly grant
|
|
|
|
|
access to each API token based on the events they should be able to fire.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
### Blacklist mode and Prepared Queries
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
After Consul 0.6.3, significant changes were made to ACLs for prepared queries,
|
|
|
|
|
including a new `query` ACL policy. See [Prepared Query ACLs](#prepared_query_acls) below for more details.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
### Blacklist mode and Keyring Operations
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Consul 0.6 and later supports securing the encryption keyring operations using
|
|
|
|
|
ACL's. Encryption is an optional component of the gossip layer. More information
|
|
|
|
|
about Consul's keyring operations can be found on the [keyring
|
|
|
|
|
command](/docs/commands/keyring.html) documentation page.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
If your [`acl_default_policy`](/docs/agent/options.html#acl_default_policy) is
|
|
|
|
|
set to `deny`, then the `anonymous` token will not have access to read or write
|
|
|
|
|
to the encryption keyring. The keyring policy is yet another first-class citizen
|
|
|
|
|
in the ACL syntax. You can configure the anonymous token to have free reign over
|
|
|
|
|
the keyring using a policy like the following:
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
```
|
|
|
|
|
keyring = "write"
|
|
|
|
|
```
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Encryption keyring operations are sensitive and should be properly secured. It
|
|
|
|
|
is recommended that instead of configuring a wide-open policy like above, a
|
|
|
|
|
per-token policy is applied to maximize security.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
### Bootstrapping ACLs
|
|
|
|
|
<a name="replication"></a>
|
|
|
|
|
Consul 0.7 added an ACL Replication capability that can allow non-authoritative
|
|
|
|
|
datacenter servers to resolve even uncached tokens. This is enabled by setting an
|
|
|
|
|
[`acl_replication_token`](/docs/agent/options.html#acl_replication_token) in the
|
|
|
|
|
configuration on the servers in the non-authoritative datacenters. With replication
|
|
|
|
|
enabled, the servers will maintain a replica of the authoritative datacenter's full
|
|
|
|
|
set of ACLs on the non-authoritative servers.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Replication occurs with a background process that looks for new ACLs approximately
|
|
|
|
|
every 30 seconds. Replicated changes are written at a rate that's throttled to
|
|
|
|
|
100 updates/second, so it may take several minutes to perform the initial sync of
|
|
|
|
|
a large set of ACLs.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
If there's a partition or other outage affecting the authoritative datacenter,
|
|
|
|
|
and the [`acl_down_policy`](/docs/agent/options.html#acl_down_policy)
|
|
|
|
|
is set to "extend-cache", tokens will be resolved during the outage using the
|
|
|
|
|
replicated set of ACLs. An [ACL replication status](http://localhost:4567/docs/agent/http/acl.html#acl_replication_status)
|
|
|
|
|
endpoint is available to monitor the health of the replication process.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Locally-resolved ACLs will be cached using the [`acl_ttl`](/docs/agent/options.html#acl_ttl)
|
|
|
|
|
setting of the non-authoritative datacenter, so these entries may persist in the
|
|
|
|
|
cache for up to the TTL, even after the authoritative datacenter comes back online.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ACL replication can also be used to migrate ACLs from one datacenter to another
|
|
|
|
|
using a process like this:
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
1. Enable ACL replication in all datacenters to allow continuation of service
|
|
|
|
|
during the migration, and to populate the target datacenter. Verify replication
|
|
|
|
|
is healthy and caught up to the current ACL index in the target datacenter
|
|
|
|
|
using the [ACL replication status](http://localhost:4567/docs/agent/http/acl.html#acl_replication_status)
|
|
|
|
|
endpoint.
|
|
|
|
|
2. Turn down the old authoritative datacenter servers.
|
|
|
|
|
3. Rolling restart the servers in the target datacenter and change the
|
|
|
|
|
`acl_datacenter` configuration to itself. This will automatically turn off
|
|
|
|
|
replication and will enable the datacenter to start acting as the authoritative
|
|
|
|
|
datacenter, using its replicated ACLs from before.
|
|
|
|
|
3. Rolling restart the servers in other datacenters and change their `acl_datacenter`
|
|
|
|
|
configuration to the target datacenter.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#### Bootstrapping ACLs
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Bootstrapping the ACL system is done by providing an initial [`acl_master_token`
|
|
|
|
|
configuration](/docs/agent/options.html#acl_master_token) which will be created
|
|
|
|
@ -187,8 +131,7 @@ for all servers. Once this is done, restart the current leader to force a leader
|
|
|
|
|
## Rule Specification
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
A core part of the ACL system is a rule language which is used to describe the policy
|
|
|
|
|
that must be enforced. Consul supports ACLs for both [K/Vs](/intro/getting-started/kv.html)
|
|
|
|
|
and [services](/intro/getting-started/services.html).
|
|
|
|
|
that must be enforced.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Key policies are defined by coupling a prefix with a policy. The rules are enforced
|
|
|
|
|
using a longest-prefix match policy: Consul picks the most specific policy possible. The
|
|
|
|
@ -309,7 +252,108 @@ This is equivalent to the following JSON input:
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
```
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
## Services and Checks with ACLs
|
|
|
|
|
## Building ACL Policies
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#### Blacklist mode and `consul exec`
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
If you set [`acl_default_policy`](/docs/agent/options.html#acl_default_policy)
|
|
|
|
|
to `deny`, the `anonymous` token won't have permission to read the default
|
|
|
|
|
`_rexec` prefix; therefore, Consul agents using the `anonymous` token
|
|
|
|
|
won't be able to perform [`consul exec`](/docs/commands/exec.html) actions.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Here's why: the agents need read/write permission to the `_rexec` prefix for
|
|
|
|
|
[`consul exec`](/docs/commands/exec.html) to work properly. They use that prefix
|
|
|
|
|
as the transport for most data.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
You can enable [`consul exec`](/docs/commands/exec.html) from agents that are not
|
|
|
|
|
configured with a token by allowing the `anonymous` token to access that prefix.
|
|
|
|
|
This can be done by giving this rule to the `anonymous` token:
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
```javascript
|
|
|
|
|
key "_rexec/" {
|
|
|
|
|
policy = "write"
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
```
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Alternatively, you can, of course, add an explicit
|
|
|
|
|
[`acl_token`](/docs/agent/options.html#acl_token) to each agent, giving it access
|
|
|
|
|
to that prefix.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#### Blacklist mode and Service Discovery
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
If your [`acl_default_policy`](/docs/agent/options.html#acl_default_policy) is
|
|
|
|
|
set to `deny`, the `anonymous` token will be unable to read any service
|
|
|
|
|
information. This will cause the service discovery mechanisms in the REST API
|
|
|
|
|
and the DNS interface to return no results for any service queries. This is
|
|
|
|
|
because internally the API's and DNS interface consume the RPC interface, which
|
|
|
|
|
will filter results for services the token has no access to.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
You can allow all services to be discovered, mimicing the behavior of pre-0.6.0
|
|
|
|
|
releases, by configuring this ACL rule for the `anonymous` token:
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
```
|
|
|
|
|
service "" {
|
|
|
|
|
policy = "read"
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
```
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Note that the above will allow access for reading service information only. This
|
|
|
|
|
level of access allows discovering other services in the system, but is not
|
|
|
|
|
enough to allow the agent to sync its services and checks into the global
|
|
|
|
|
catalog during [anti-entropy](/docs/internals/anti-entropy.html).
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
The most secure way of handling service registration and discovery is to run
|
|
|
|
|
Consul 0.6+ and issue tokens with explicit access for the services or service
|
|
|
|
|
prefixes which are expected to run on each agent.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#### Blacklist mode and Events
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Similar to the above, if your
|
|
|
|
|
[`acl_default_policy`](/docs/agent/options.html#acl_default_policy) is set to
|
|
|
|
|
`deny`, the `anonymous` token will have no access to allow firing user events.
|
|
|
|
|
This deviates from pre-0.6.0 builds, where user events were completely
|
|
|
|
|
unrestricted.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Events have their own first-class expression in the ACL syntax. To restore
|
|
|
|
|
access to user events from arbitrary agents, configure an ACL rule like the
|
|
|
|
|
following for the `anonymous` token:
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
```
|
|
|
|
|
event "" {
|
|
|
|
|
policy = "write"
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
```
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
As always, the more secure way to handle user events is to explicitly grant
|
|
|
|
|
access to each API token based on the events they should be able to fire.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#### Blacklist mode and Prepared Queries
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
After Consul 0.6.3, significant changes were made to ACLs for prepared queries,
|
|
|
|
|
including a new `query` ACL policy. See [Prepared Query ACLs](#prepared_query_acls) below for more details.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#### Blacklist mode and Keyring Operations
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Consul 0.6 and later supports securing the encryption keyring operations using
|
|
|
|
|
ACL's. Encryption is an optional component of the gossip layer. More information
|
|
|
|
|
about Consul's keyring operations can be found on the [keyring
|
|
|
|
|
command](/docs/commands/keyring.html) documentation page.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
If your [`acl_default_policy`](/docs/agent/options.html#acl_default_policy) is
|
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set to `deny`, then the `anonymous` token will not have access to read or write
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to the encryption keyring. The keyring policy is yet another first-class citizen
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in the ACL syntax. You can configure the anonymous token to have free reign over
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the keyring using a policy like the following:
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```
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keyring = "write"
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```
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Encryption keyring operations are sensitive and should be properly secured. It
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is recommended that instead of configuring a wide-open policy like above, a
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per-token policy is applied to maximize security.
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#### Services and Checks with ACLs
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Consul allows configuring ACL policies which may control access to service and
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check registration. In order to successfully register a service or check with
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@ -330,7 +374,7 @@ methods of configuring ACL tokens to use for registration events:
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[HTTP API](/docs/agent/http.html) for operations that require them.
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<a name="discovery_acls"></a>
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## Restricting service discovery with ACLs
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#### Restricting service discovery with ACLs
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In Consul 0.6, the ACL system was extended to support restricting read access to
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service registrations. This allows tighter access control and limits the ability
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@ -413,7 +457,7 @@ Capturing ACL Tokens is analogous to
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Token is similar to the complementary `SECURITY INVOKER` attribute.
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<a name="prepared_query_acl_changes"></a>
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#### ACL Implementation Changes
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#### ACL Implementation Changes for Prepared Queries
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Prepared queries were originally introduced in Consul 0.6.0, and ACL behavior remained
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unchanged through version 0.6.3, but was then changed to allow better management of the
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