mirror of https://github.com/v2ray/v2ray-core
1007 lines
29 KiB
Go
1007 lines
29 KiB
Go
// Copyright 2009 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
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// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
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// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
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package qtls
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import (
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"bytes"
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"crypto"
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"crypto/ecdsa"
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"crypto/rsa"
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"crypto/subtle"
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"crypto/x509"
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"errors"
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"fmt"
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"io"
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"net"
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"strconv"
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"strings"
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"sync/atomic"
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)
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type clientHandshakeState struct {
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c *Conn
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serverHello *serverHelloMsg
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hello *clientHelloMsg
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suite *cipherSuite
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masterSecret []byte
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session *ClientSessionState
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// TLS 1.0-1.2 fields
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finishedHash finishedHash
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// TLS 1.3 fields
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keySchedule *keySchedule13
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privateKey []byte
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}
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func makeClientHello(config *Config) (*clientHelloMsg, error) {
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if len(config.ServerName) == 0 && !config.InsecureSkipVerify {
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return nil, errors.New("tls: either ServerName or InsecureSkipVerify must be specified in the tls.Config")
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}
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nextProtosLength := 0
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for _, proto := range config.NextProtos {
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if l := len(proto); l == 0 || l > 255 {
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return nil, errors.New("tls: invalid NextProtos value")
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} else {
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nextProtosLength += 1 + l
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}
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}
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if nextProtosLength > 0xffff {
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return nil, errors.New("tls: NextProtos values too large")
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}
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hello := &clientHelloMsg{
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vers: config.maxVersion(),
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compressionMethods: []uint8{compressionNone},
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random: make([]byte, 32),
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ocspStapling: true,
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scts: true,
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serverName: hostnameInSNI(config.ServerName),
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supportedCurves: config.curvePreferences(),
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supportedPoints: []uint8{pointFormatUncompressed},
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nextProtoNeg: len(config.NextProtos) > 0,
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secureRenegotiationSupported: true,
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delegatedCredential: config.AcceptDelegatedCredential,
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alpnProtocols: config.NextProtos,
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extendedMSSupported: config.UseExtendedMasterSecret,
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}
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possibleCipherSuites := config.cipherSuites()
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hello.cipherSuites = make([]uint16, 0, len(possibleCipherSuites))
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NextCipherSuite:
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for _, suiteId := range possibleCipherSuites {
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for _, suite := range cipherSuites {
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if suite.id != suiteId {
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continue
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}
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// Don't advertise TLS 1.2-only cipher suites unless
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// we're attempting TLS 1.2.
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if hello.vers < VersionTLS12 && suite.flags&suiteTLS12 != 0 {
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continue NextCipherSuite
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}
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// Don't advertise TLS 1.3-only cipher suites unless
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// we're attempting TLS 1.3.
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if hello.vers < VersionTLS13 && suite.flags&suiteTLS13 != 0 {
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continue NextCipherSuite
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}
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hello.cipherSuites = append(hello.cipherSuites, suiteId)
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continue NextCipherSuite
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}
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}
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_, err := io.ReadFull(config.rand(), hello.random)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, errors.New("tls: short read from Rand: " + err.Error())
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}
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if hello.vers >= VersionTLS12 {
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hello.supportedSignatureAlgorithms = supportedSignatureAlgorithms
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}
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if hello.vers >= VersionTLS13 {
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// Version preference is indicated via "supported_extensions",
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// set legacy_version to TLS 1.2 for backwards compatibility.
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hello.vers = VersionTLS12
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hello.supportedVersions = config.getSupportedVersions()
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hello.supportedSignatureAlgorithms = supportedSignatureAlgorithms13
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hello.supportedSignatureAlgorithmsCert = supportedSigAlgorithmsCert(supportedSignatureAlgorithms13)
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if config.GetExtensions != nil {
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hello.additionalExtensions = config.GetExtensions(typeClientHello)
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}
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}
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return hello, nil
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}
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// c.out.Mutex <= L; c.handshakeMutex <= L.
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func (c *Conn) clientHandshake() error {
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if c.config == nil {
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c.config = defaultConfig()
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}
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c.setAlternativeRecordLayer()
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// This may be a renegotiation handshake, in which case some fields
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// need to be reset.
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c.didResume = false
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hello, err := makeClientHello(c.config)
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if c.handshakes > 0 {
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hello.secureRenegotiation = c.clientFinished[:]
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}
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var session *ClientSessionState
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var cacheKey string
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sessionCache := c.config.ClientSessionCache
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// TLS 1.3 has no session resumption based on session tickets.
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if c.config.SessionTicketsDisabled || c.config.maxVersion() >= VersionTLS13 {
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sessionCache = nil
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}
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if sessionCache != nil {
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hello.ticketSupported = true
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}
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// Session resumption is not allowed if renegotiating because
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// renegotiation is primarily used to allow a client to send a client
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// certificate, which would be skipped if session resumption occurred.
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if sessionCache != nil && c.handshakes == 0 {
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// Try to resume a previously negotiated TLS session, if
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// available.
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cacheKey = clientSessionCacheKey(c.conn.RemoteAddr(), c.config)
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candidateSession, ok := sessionCache.Get(cacheKey)
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if ok {
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// Check that the ciphersuite/version used for the
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// previous session are still valid.
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cipherSuiteOk := false
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for _, id := range hello.cipherSuites {
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if id == candidateSession.cipherSuite {
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cipherSuiteOk = true
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break
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}
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}
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versOk := candidateSession.vers >= c.config.minVersion() &&
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candidateSession.vers <= c.config.maxVersion()
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if versOk && cipherSuiteOk {
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session = candidateSession
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}
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}
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}
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if session != nil {
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hello.sessionTicket = session.sessionTicket
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// A random session ID is used to detect when the
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// server accepted the ticket and is resuming a session
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// (see RFC 5077).
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hello.sessionId = make([]byte, 16)
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if _, err := io.ReadFull(c.config.rand(), hello.sessionId); err != nil {
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return errors.New("tls: short read from Rand: " + err.Error())
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}
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}
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hs := &clientHandshakeState{
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c: c,
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hello: hello,
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session: session,
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}
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var clientKS keyShare
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if c.config.maxVersion() >= VersionTLS13 {
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// Create one keyshare for the first default curve. If it is not
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// appropriate, the server should raise a HRR.
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defaultGroup := c.config.curvePreferences()[0]
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hs.privateKey, clientKS, err = c.generateKeyShare(defaultGroup)
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if err != nil {
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c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
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return err
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}
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hello.keyShares = []keyShare{clientKS}
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// middlebox compatibility mode, provide a non-empty session ID
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hello.sessionId = make([]byte, 16)
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if _, err := io.ReadFull(c.config.rand(), hello.sessionId); err != nil {
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return errors.New("tls: short read from Rand: " + err.Error())
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}
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}
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if err = hs.handshake(); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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// If we had a successful handshake and hs.session is different from
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// the one already cached - cache a new one
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if sessionCache != nil && hs.session != nil && session != hs.session && c.vers < VersionTLS13 {
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sessionCache.Put(cacheKey, hs.session)
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}
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return nil
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}
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// Does the handshake, either a full one or resumes old session.
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// Requires hs.c, hs.hello, and, optionally, hs.session to be set.
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func (hs *clientHandshakeState) handshake() error {
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c := hs.c
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// send ClientHello
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if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, hs.hello.marshal()); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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msg, err := c.readHandshake()
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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var ok bool
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if hs.serverHello, ok = msg.(*serverHelloMsg); !ok {
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c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
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return unexpectedMessageError(hs.serverHello, msg)
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}
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if err = hs.pickTLSVersion(); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if err = hs.pickCipherSuite(); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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var isResume bool
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if c.vers >= VersionTLS13 {
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hs.keySchedule = newKeySchedule13(hs.suite, c.config, hs.hello.random)
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hs.keySchedule.write(hs.hello.marshal())
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hs.keySchedule.write(hs.serverHello.marshal())
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} else {
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isResume, err = hs.processServerHello()
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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hs.finishedHash = newFinishedHash(c.vers, hs.suite)
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// No signatures of the handshake are needed in a resumption.
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// Otherwise, in a full handshake, if we don't have any certificates
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// configured then we will never send a CertificateVerify message and
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// thus no signatures are needed in that case either.
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if isResume || (len(c.config.Certificates) == 0 && c.config.GetClientCertificate == nil) {
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hs.finishedHash.discardHandshakeBuffer()
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}
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hs.finishedHash.Write(hs.hello.marshal())
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hs.finishedHash.Write(hs.serverHello.marshal())
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}
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c.buffering = true
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if c.vers >= VersionTLS13 {
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if err := hs.doTLS13Handshake(); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if _, err := c.flush(); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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} else if isResume {
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if err := hs.establishKeys(); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if err := hs.readSessionTicket(); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if err := hs.readFinished(c.serverFinished[:]); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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c.clientFinishedIsFirst = false
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if err := hs.sendFinished(c.clientFinished[:]); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if _, err := c.flush(); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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} else {
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if err := hs.doFullHandshake(); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if err := hs.establishKeys(); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if err := hs.sendFinished(c.clientFinished[:]); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if _, err := c.flush(); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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c.clientFinishedIsFirst = true
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if err := hs.readSessionTicket(); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if err := hs.readFinished(c.serverFinished[:]); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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}
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c.didResume = isResume
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c.phase = handshakeConfirmed
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atomic.StoreInt32(&c.handshakeConfirmed, 1)
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c.handshakeComplete = true
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return nil
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}
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func (hs *clientHandshakeState) pickTLSVersion() error {
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vers, ok := hs.c.config.pickVersion([]uint16{hs.serverHello.vers})
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if !ok || vers < VersionTLS10 {
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// TLS 1.0 is the minimum version supported as a client.
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hs.c.sendAlert(alertProtocolVersion)
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return fmt.Errorf("tls: server selected unsupported protocol version %x", hs.serverHello.vers)
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}
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hs.c.vers = vers
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hs.c.haveVers = true
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return nil
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}
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func (hs *clientHandshakeState) pickCipherSuite() error {
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if hs.suite = mutualCipherSuite(hs.hello.cipherSuites, hs.serverHello.cipherSuite); hs.suite == nil {
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hs.c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure)
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return errors.New("tls: server chose an unconfigured cipher suite")
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}
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// Check that the chosen cipher suite matches the protocol version.
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if hs.c.vers >= VersionTLS13 && hs.suite.flags&suiteTLS13 == 0 ||
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hs.c.vers < VersionTLS13 && hs.suite.flags&suiteTLS13 != 0 {
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hs.c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure)
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return errors.New("tls: server chose an inappropriate cipher suite")
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}
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hs.c.cipherSuite = hs.suite.id
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return nil
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}
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// processCertsFromServer takes a chain of server certificates from a
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// Certificate message and verifies them.
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func (hs *clientHandshakeState) processCertsFromServer(certificates [][]byte) error {
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c := hs.c
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certs := make([]*x509.Certificate, len(certificates))
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for i, asn1Data := range certificates {
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cert, err := x509.ParseCertificate(asn1Data)
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if err != nil {
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c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate)
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return errors.New("tls: failed to parse certificate from server: " + err.Error())
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}
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certs[i] = cert
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}
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if !c.config.InsecureSkipVerify {
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opts := x509.VerifyOptions{
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Roots: c.config.RootCAs,
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CurrentTime: c.config.time(),
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DNSName: c.config.ServerName,
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Intermediates: x509.NewCertPool(),
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}
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for i, cert := range certs {
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if i == 0 {
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continue
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}
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opts.Intermediates.AddCert(cert)
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}
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var err error
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c.verifiedChains, err = certs[0].Verify(opts)
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if err != nil {
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c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate)
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return err
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}
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}
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if c.config.VerifyPeerCertificate != nil {
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if err := c.config.VerifyPeerCertificate(certificates, c.verifiedChains); err != nil {
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c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate)
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return err
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}
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}
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switch certs[0].PublicKey.(type) {
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case *rsa.PublicKey, *ecdsa.PublicKey:
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break
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default:
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c.sendAlert(alertUnsupportedCertificate)
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return fmt.Errorf("tls: server's certificate contains an unsupported type of public key: %T", certs[0].PublicKey)
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}
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c.peerCertificates = certs
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return nil
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}
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// processDelegatedCredentialFromServer unmarshals the delegated credential
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// offered by the server (if present) and validates it using the peer
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// certificate and the signature scheme (`scheme`) indicated by the server in
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// the "signature_scheme" extension.
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func (hs *clientHandshakeState) processDelegatedCredentialFromServer(serialized []byte, scheme SignatureScheme) error {
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c := hs.c
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var dc *delegatedCredential
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var err error
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if serialized != nil {
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// Assert that the DC extension was indicated by the client.
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if !hs.hello.delegatedCredential {
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c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
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return errors.New("tls: got delegated credential extension without indication")
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}
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// Parse the delegated credential.
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dc, err = unmarshalDelegatedCredential(serialized)
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if err != nil {
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c.sendAlert(alertDecodeError)
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return fmt.Errorf("tls: delegated credential: %s", err)
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}
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}
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if dc != nil && !c.config.InsecureSkipVerify {
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if v, err := dc.validate(c.peerCertificates[0], c.config.time()); err != nil {
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c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
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return fmt.Errorf("delegated credential: %s", err)
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} else if !v {
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c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
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return errors.New("delegated credential: signature invalid")
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} else if dc.cred.expectedVersion != hs.c.vers {
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c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
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return errors.New("delegated credential: protocol version mismatch")
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} else if dc.cred.expectedCertVerifyAlgorithm != scheme {
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c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
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return errors.New("delegated credential: signature scheme mismatch")
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}
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}
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c.verifiedDc = dc
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return nil
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}
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func (hs *clientHandshakeState) doFullHandshake() error {
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c := hs.c
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msg, err := c.readHandshake()
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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certMsg, ok := msg.(*certificateMsg)
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if !ok || len(certMsg.certificates) == 0 {
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c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
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return unexpectedMessageError(certMsg, msg)
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}
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hs.finishedHash.Write(certMsg.marshal())
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if c.handshakes == 0 {
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// If this is the first handshake on a connection, process and
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// (optionally) verify the server's certificates.
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if err := hs.processCertsFromServer(certMsg.certificates); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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} else {
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// This is a renegotiation handshake. We require that the
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// server's identity (i.e. leaf certificate) is unchanged and
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// thus any previous trust decision is still valid.
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//
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// See https://mitls.org/pages/attacks/3SHAKE for the
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// motivation behind this requirement.
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if !bytes.Equal(c.peerCertificates[0].Raw, certMsg.certificates[0]) {
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c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate)
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return errors.New("tls: server's identity changed during renegotiation")
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}
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}
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msg, err = c.readHandshake()
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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cs, ok := msg.(*certificateStatusMsg)
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if ok {
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// RFC4366 on Certificate Status Request:
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// The server MAY return a "certificate_status" message.
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if !hs.serverHello.ocspStapling {
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// If a server returns a "CertificateStatus" message, then the
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// server MUST have included an extension of type "status_request"
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// with empty "extension_data" in the extended server hello.
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c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
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return errors.New("tls: received unexpected CertificateStatus message")
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}
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hs.finishedHash.Write(cs.marshal())
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if cs.statusType == statusTypeOCSP {
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c.ocspResponse = cs.response
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}
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msg, err = c.readHandshake()
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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}
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keyAgreement := hs.suite.ka(c.vers)
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// Set the public key used to verify the handshake.
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pk := c.peerCertificates[0].PublicKey
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skx, ok := msg.(*serverKeyExchangeMsg)
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if ok {
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hs.finishedHash.Write(skx.marshal())
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|
|
err = keyAgreement.processServerKeyExchange(c.config, hs.hello, hs.serverHello, pk, skx)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
msg, err = c.readHandshake()
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
var chainToSend *Certificate
|
|
var certRequested bool
|
|
certReq, ok := msg.(*certificateRequestMsg)
|
|
if ok {
|
|
certRequested = true
|
|
hs.finishedHash.Write(certReq.marshal())
|
|
|
|
if chainToSend, err = hs.getCertificate(certReq); err != nil {
|
|
c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
msg, err = c.readHandshake()
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
shd, ok := msg.(*serverHelloDoneMsg)
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
|
|
return unexpectedMessageError(shd, msg)
|
|
}
|
|
hs.finishedHash.Write(shd.marshal())
|
|
|
|
// If the server requested a certificate then we have to send a
|
|
// Certificate message, even if it's empty because we don't have a
|
|
// certificate to send.
|
|
if certRequested {
|
|
certMsg = new(certificateMsg)
|
|
certMsg.certificates = chainToSend.Certificate
|
|
hs.finishedHash.Write(certMsg.marshal())
|
|
if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, certMsg.marshal()); err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
preMasterSecret, ckx, err := keyAgreement.generateClientKeyExchange(c.config, hs.hello, pk)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
if ckx != nil {
|
|
hs.finishedHash.Write(ckx.marshal())
|
|
if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, ckx.marshal()); err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
c.useEMS = hs.serverHello.extendedMSSupported
|
|
hs.masterSecret = masterFromPreMasterSecret(c.vers, hs.suite, preMasterSecret, hs.hello.random, hs.serverHello.random, hs.finishedHash, c.useEMS)
|
|
|
|
if err := c.config.writeKeyLog("CLIENT_RANDOM", hs.hello.random, hs.masterSecret); err != nil {
|
|
c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
|
|
return errors.New("tls: failed to write to key log: " + err.Error())
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if chainToSend != nil && len(chainToSend.Certificate) > 0 {
|
|
certVerify := &certificateVerifyMsg{
|
|
hasSignatureAndHash: c.vers >= VersionTLS12,
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
key, ok := chainToSend.PrivateKey.(crypto.Signer)
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("tls: client certificate private key of type %T does not implement crypto.Signer", chainToSend.PrivateKey)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
signatureAlgorithm, sigType, hashFunc, err := pickSignatureAlgorithm(key.Public(), certReq.supportedSignatureAlgorithms, hs.hello.supportedSignatureAlgorithms, c.vers)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
// SignatureAndHashAlgorithm was introduced in TLS 1.2.
|
|
if certVerify.hasSignatureAndHash {
|
|
certVerify.signatureAlgorithm = signatureAlgorithm
|
|
}
|
|
digest, err := hs.finishedHash.hashForClientCertificate(sigType, hashFunc, hs.masterSecret)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
signOpts := crypto.SignerOpts(hashFunc)
|
|
if sigType == signatureRSAPSS {
|
|
signOpts = &rsa.PSSOptions{SaltLength: rsa.PSSSaltLengthEqualsHash, Hash: hashFunc}
|
|
}
|
|
certVerify.signature, err = key.Sign(c.config.rand(), digest, signOpts)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
hs.finishedHash.Write(certVerify.marshal())
|
|
if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, certVerify.marshal()); err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
hs.finishedHash.discardHandshakeBuffer()
|
|
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (hs *clientHandshakeState) establishKeys() error {
|
|
c := hs.c
|
|
|
|
clientMAC, serverMAC, clientKey, serverKey, clientIV, serverIV :=
|
|
keysFromMasterSecret(c.vers, hs.suite, hs.masterSecret, hs.hello.random, hs.serverHello.random, hs.suite.macLen, hs.suite.keyLen, hs.suite.ivLen)
|
|
var clientCipher, serverCipher interface{}
|
|
var clientHash, serverHash macFunction
|
|
if hs.suite.cipher != nil {
|
|
clientCipher = hs.suite.cipher(clientKey, clientIV, false /* not for reading */)
|
|
clientHash = hs.suite.mac(c.vers, clientMAC)
|
|
serverCipher = hs.suite.cipher(serverKey, serverIV, true /* for reading */)
|
|
serverHash = hs.suite.mac(c.vers, serverMAC)
|
|
} else {
|
|
clientCipher = hs.suite.aead(clientKey, clientIV)
|
|
serverCipher = hs.suite.aead(serverKey, serverIV)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
c.in.prepareCipherSpec(c.vers, serverCipher, serverHash)
|
|
c.out.prepareCipherSpec(c.vers, clientCipher, clientHash)
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (hs *clientHandshakeState) serverResumedSession() bool {
|
|
// If the server responded with the same sessionId then it means the
|
|
// sessionTicket is being used to resume a TLS session.
|
|
return hs.session != nil && hs.hello.sessionId != nil &&
|
|
bytes.Equal(hs.serverHello.sessionId, hs.hello.sessionId)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (hs *clientHandshakeState) processServerHello() (bool, error) {
|
|
c := hs.c
|
|
|
|
if hs.serverHello.compressionMethod != compressionNone {
|
|
c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
|
|
return false, errors.New("tls: server selected unsupported compression format")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if c.handshakes == 0 && hs.serverHello.secureRenegotiationSupported {
|
|
c.secureRenegotiation = true
|
|
if len(hs.serverHello.secureRenegotiation) != 0 {
|
|
c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure)
|
|
return false, errors.New("tls: initial handshake had non-empty renegotiation extension")
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if c.handshakes > 0 && c.secureRenegotiation {
|
|
var expectedSecureRenegotiation [24]byte
|
|
copy(expectedSecureRenegotiation[:], c.clientFinished[:])
|
|
copy(expectedSecureRenegotiation[12:], c.serverFinished[:])
|
|
if !bytes.Equal(hs.serverHello.secureRenegotiation, expectedSecureRenegotiation[:]) {
|
|
c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure)
|
|
return false, errors.New("tls: incorrect renegotiation extension contents")
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if hs.serverHello.extendedMSSupported {
|
|
if hs.hello.extendedMSSupported {
|
|
c.useEMS = true
|
|
} else {
|
|
// server wants to calculate master secret in a different way than client
|
|
c.sendAlert(alertUnsupportedExtension)
|
|
return false, errors.New("tls: unexpected extension (EMS) received in SH")
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
clientDidNPN := hs.hello.nextProtoNeg
|
|
clientDidALPN := len(hs.hello.alpnProtocols) > 0
|
|
serverHasNPN := hs.serverHello.nextProtoNeg
|
|
serverHasALPN := len(hs.serverHello.alpnProtocol) > 0
|
|
|
|
if !clientDidNPN && serverHasNPN {
|
|
c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure)
|
|
return false, errors.New("tls: server advertised unrequested NPN extension")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if !clientDidALPN && serverHasALPN {
|
|
c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure)
|
|
return false, errors.New("tls: server advertised unrequested ALPN extension")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if serverHasNPN && serverHasALPN {
|
|
c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure)
|
|
return false, errors.New("tls: server advertised both NPN and ALPN extensions")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if serverHasALPN {
|
|
c.clientProtocol = hs.serverHello.alpnProtocol
|
|
c.clientProtocolFallback = false
|
|
}
|
|
c.scts = hs.serverHello.scts
|
|
|
|
if !hs.serverResumedSession() {
|
|
return false, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if hs.session.useEMS != c.useEMS {
|
|
return false, errors.New("differing EMS state")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if hs.session.vers != c.vers {
|
|
c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure)
|
|
return false, errors.New("tls: server resumed a session with a different version")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if hs.session.cipherSuite != hs.suite.id {
|
|
c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure)
|
|
return false, errors.New("tls: server resumed a session with a different cipher suite")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Restore masterSecret and peerCerts from previous state
|
|
hs.masterSecret = hs.session.masterSecret
|
|
c.peerCertificates = hs.session.serverCertificates
|
|
c.verifiedChains = hs.session.verifiedChains
|
|
return true, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (hs *clientHandshakeState) readFinished(out []byte) error {
|
|
c := hs.c
|
|
|
|
c.readRecord(recordTypeChangeCipherSpec)
|
|
if c.in.err != nil {
|
|
return c.in.err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
msg, err := c.readHandshake()
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
serverFinished, ok := msg.(*finishedMsg)
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
|
|
return unexpectedMessageError(serverFinished, msg)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
verify := hs.finishedHash.serverSum(hs.masterSecret)
|
|
if len(verify) != len(serverFinished.verifyData) ||
|
|
subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(verify, serverFinished.verifyData) != 1 {
|
|
c.sendAlert(alertDecryptError)
|
|
return errors.New("tls: server's Finished message was incorrect")
|
|
}
|
|
hs.finishedHash.Write(serverFinished.marshal())
|
|
copy(out, verify)
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (hs *clientHandshakeState) readSessionTicket() error {
|
|
if !hs.serverHello.ticketSupported {
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
c := hs.c
|
|
msg, err := c.readHandshake()
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
sessionTicketMsg, ok := msg.(*newSessionTicketMsg)
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
|
|
return unexpectedMessageError(sessionTicketMsg, msg)
|
|
}
|
|
hs.finishedHash.Write(sessionTicketMsg.marshal())
|
|
|
|
hs.session = &ClientSessionState{
|
|
sessionTicket: sessionTicketMsg.ticket,
|
|
vers: c.vers,
|
|
cipherSuite: hs.suite.id,
|
|
masterSecret: hs.masterSecret,
|
|
serverCertificates: c.peerCertificates,
|
|
verifiedChains: c.verifiedChains,
|
|
useEMS: c.useEMS,
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (hs *clientHandshakeState) sendFinished(out []byte) error {
|
|
c := hs.c
|
|
|
|
if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeChangeCipherSpec, []byte{1}); err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
if hs.serverHello.nextProtoNeg {
|
|
nextProto := new(nextProtoMsg)
|
|
proto, fallback := mutualProtocol(c.config.NextProtos, hs.serverHello.nextProtos)
|
|
nextProto.proto = proto
|
|
c.clientProtocol = proto
|
|
c.clientProtocolFallback = fallback
|
|
|
|
hs.finishedHash.Write(nextProto.marshal())
|
|
if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, nextProto.marshal()); err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
finished := new(finishedMsg)
|
|
finished.verifyData = hs.finishedHash.clientSum(hs.masterSecret)
|
|
hs.finishedHash.Write(finished.marshal())
|
|
if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, finished.marshal()); err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
copy(out, finished.verifyData)
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// tls11SignatureSchemes contains the signature schemes that we synthesise for
|
|
// a TLS <= 1.1 connection, based on the supported certificate types.
|
|
var tls11SignatureSchemes = []SignatureScheme{ECDSAWithP256AndSHA256, ECDSAWithP384AndSHA384, ECDSAWithP521AndSHA512, PKCS1WithSHA256, PKCS1WithSHA384, PKCS1WithSHA512, PKCS1WithSHA1}
|
|
|
|
const (
|
|
// tls11SignatureSchemesNumECDSA is the number of initial elements of
|
|
// tls11SignatureSchemes that use ECDSA.
|
|
tls11SignatureSchemesNumECDSA = 3
|
|
// tls11SignatureSchemesNumRSA is the number of trailing elements of
|
|
// tls11SignatureSchemes that use RSA.
|
|
tls11SignatureSchemesNumRSA = 4
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
func (hs *clientHandshakeState) getCertificate(certReq *certificateRequestMsg) (*Certificate, error) {
|
|
c := hs.c
|
|
|
|
var rsaAvail, ecdsaAvail bool
|
|
for _, certType := range certReq.certificateTypes {
|
|
switch certType {
|
|
case certTypeRSASign:
|
|
rsaAvail = true
|
|
case certTypeECDSASign:
|
|
ecdsaAvail = true
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if c.config.GetClientCertificate != nil {
|
|
var signatureSchemes []SignatureScheme
|
|
|
|
if !certReq.hasSignatureAndHash {
|
|
// Prior to TLS 1.2, the signature schemes were not
|
|
// included in the certificate request message. In this
|
|
// case we use a plausible list based on the acceptable
|
|
// certificate types.
|
|
signatureSchemes = tls11SignatureSchemes
|
|
if !ecdsaAvail {
|
|
signatureSchemes = signatureSchemes[tls11SignatureSchemesNumECDSA:]
|
|
}
|
|
if !rsaAvail {
|
|
signatureSchemes = signatureSchemes[:len(signatureSchemes)-tls11SignatureSchemesNumRSA]
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
signatureSchemes = certReq.supportedSignatureAlgorithms
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return c.config.GetClientCertificate(&CertificateRequestInfo{
|
|
AcceptableCAs: certReq.certificateAuthorities,
|
|
SignatureSchemes: signatureSchemes,
|
|
})
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// RFC 4346 on the certificateAuthorities field: A list of the
|
|
// distinguished names of acceptable certificate authorities.
|
|
// These distinguished names may specify a desired
|
|
// distinguished name for a root CA or for a subordinate CA;
|
|
// thus, this message can be used to describe both known roots
|
|
// and a desired authorization space. If the
|
|
// certificate_authorities list is empty then the client MAY
|
|
// send any certificate of the appropriate
|
|
// ClientCertificateType, unless there is some external
|
|
// arrangement to the contrary.
|
|
|
|
// We need to search our list of client certs for one
|
|
// where SignatureAlgorithm is acceptable to the server and the
|
|
// Issuer is in certReq.certificateAuthorities
|
|
findCert:
|
|
for i, chain := range c.config.Certificates {
|
|
if !rsaAvail && !ecdsaAvail {
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for j, cert := range chain.Certificate {
|
|
x509Cert := chain.Leaf
|
|
// parse the certificate if this isn't the leaf
|
|
// node, or if chain.Leaf was nil
|
|
if j != 0 || x509Cert == nil {
|
|
var err error
|
|
if x509Cert, err = x509.ParseCertificate(cert); err != nil {
|
|
c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
|
|
return nil, errors.New("tls: failed to parse client certificate #" + strconv.Itoa(i) + ": " + err.Error())
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
switch {
|
|
case rsaAvail && x509Cert.PublicKeyAlgorithm == x509.RSA:
|
|
case ecdsaAvail && x509Cert.PublicKeyAlgorithm == x509.ECDSA:
|
|
default:
|
|
continue findCert
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if len(certReq.certificateAuthorities) == 0 {
|
|
// they gave us an empty list, so just take the
|
|
// first cert from c.config.Certificates
|
|
return &chain, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for _, ca := range certReq.certificateAuthorities {
|
|
if bytes.Equal(x509Cert.RawIssuer, ca) {
|
|
return &chain, nil
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// No acceptable certificate found. Don't send a certificate.
|
|
return new(Certificate), nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// clientSessionCacheKey returns a key used to cache sessionTickets that could
|
|
// be used to resume previously negotiated TLS sessions with a server.
|
|
func clientSessionCacheKey(serverAddr net.Addr, config *Config) string {
|
|
if len(config.ServerName) > 0 {
|
|
return config.ServerName
|
|
}
|
|
return serverAddr.String()
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// mutualProtocol finds the mutual Next Protocol Negotiation or ALPN protocol
|
|
// given list of possible protocols and a list of the preference order. The
|
|
// first list must not be empty. It returns the resulting protocol and flag
|
|
// indicating if the fallback case was reached.
|
|
func mutualProtocol(protos, preferenceProtos []string) (string, bool) {
|
|
for _, s := range preferenceProtos {
|
|
for _, c := range protos {
|
|
if s == c {
|
|
return s, false
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return protos[0], true
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// hostnameInSNI converts name into an appropriate hostname for SNI.
|
|
// Literal IP addresses and absolute FQDNs are not permitted as SNI values.
|
|
// See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6066#section-3.
|
|
func hostnameInSNI(name string) string {
|
|
host := name
|
|
if len(host) > 0 && host[0] == '[' && host[len(host)-1] == ']' {
|
|
host = host[1 : len(host)-1]
|
|
}
|
|
if i := strings.LastIndex(host, "%"); i > 0 {
|
|
host = host[:i]
|
|
}
|
|
if net.ParseIP(host) != nil {
|
|
return ""
|
|
}
|
|
for len(name) > 0 && name[len(name)-1] == '.' {
|
|
name = name[:len(name)-1]
|
|
}
|
|
return name
|
|
}
|