- External Users: People who are accessing applications running on K8s (e.g. a web site served by webserver running in a container on K8s), but who do not have K8s API access.
- K8s Users : People who access the K8s API (e.g. create K8s API objects like Pods)
- K8s Project Admins: People who manage access for some K8s Users
- Application Path - attack by sending network messages from the internet to the IP/port of any application running on K8s. May exploit weakness in application or misconfiguration of K8s.
- K8s API Path - attack by sending network messages to any K8s API endpoint.
- Insider Path - attack on K8s system components. Attacker may have privileged access to networks, machines or K8s software and data. Software errors in K8s system components and administrator error are some types of threat in this category.
This document is primarily concerned with K8s API paths, and secondarily with Internal paths. The Application path also needs to be secure, but is not the focus of this document.
- Offering K8s API as a service, or offering a Paas or Saas built on K8s
- May already offer web services, and need to integrate with existing customer account concept, and existing authentication, accounting, auditing, and security policy infrastructure.
- May want to leverage K8s User accounts and accounting to manage their User accounts (not a priority to support this use case.)
- Precise and accurate accounting of resources needed. Resource controls needed for hard limits (Users given limited slice of data) and soft limits (Users can grow up to some limit and then be expanded).
- There may be companies that want to offer their existing services (Build, CI, A/B-test, release automation, etc) for use with K8s. There should be some story for this case.
- Simple profile: like single-user mode. Make it easy to evaluate K8s without lots of configuring accounts and policies. Protects from unauthorized users, but does not partition authorized users.
- Enterprise profile: Provide mechanisms needed for large numbers of users. Defense in depth. Should integrate with existing enterprise security infrastructure.
K8s distribution should include templates of config, and documentation, for simple and enterprise profiles. System should be flexible enough for knowledgeable users to create intermediate profiles, but K8s developers should only reason about those two Profiles, not a matrix.
Features in this doc are divided into "Initial Feature", and "Improvements". Initial features would be candidates for version 1.00.
-`userAccount` has a UID which is immutable. This is used to associate users with objects and to record actions in audit logs.
-`userAccount` has a name which is a string and human readable and unique among userAccounts. It is used to refer to users in Policies, to ensure that the Policies are human readable. It can be changed only when there are no Policy objects or other objects which refer to that name. An email address is a suggested format for this field.
-`userAccount` is not related to the unix username of processes in Pods created by that userAccount.
A `userAccount` is not a Unix user account. The fact that a pod is started by a `userAccount` does not mean that the processes in that pod's containers run as a Unix user with a corresponding name or identity.
- The unix accounts available in a container, and used by the processes running in a container are those that are provided by the combination of the base operating system and the Docker manifest.
- Kubernetes doesn't enforce any relation between `userAccount` and unix accounts.
Improvements:
- Kubelet allocates disjoint blocks of root-namespace uids for each container. This may provide some defense-in-depth against container escapes. (https://github.com/docker/docker/pull/4572)
- requires docker to integrate user namespace support, and deciding what getpwnam() does for these uids.
- any features that help users avoid use of privileged containers (https://github.com/GoogleCloudPlatform/kubernetes/issues/391)
K8s will have a have a `namespace` API object. It is similar to a Google Compute Engine `project`. It provides a namespace for objects created by a group of people co-operating together, preventing name collisions with non-cooperating groups. It also serves as a reference point for authorization policies.
-`labels` (see [docs/labels.md](/docs/labels.md)) should be used to distinguish pods, users, and other objects that cooperate towards a common goal but are different in some way, such as version, or responsibilities.
-`namespace`s prevent name collisions between uncoordinated groups of people, and provide a place to attach common policies for co-operating groups of people.
- Include a built-in authentication system with no configuration required to use in single-user mode, and little configuration required to add several user accounts, and no https proxy required.
- Allow for authentication to be handled by a system external to Kubernetes, to allow integration with existing to enterprise authorization systems. The kubernetes namespace itself should avoid taking contributions of multiple authorization schemes. Instead, a trusted proxy in front of the apiserver can be used to authenticate users.
- Avoid mixing authentication and authorization, so that authorization policies be centrally managed, and to allow changes in authentication methods without affecting authorization code.
- Authentication in apiserver can be disabled by flag, to allow testing without authorization enabled, and to allow use of an authenticating proxy. In this mode, a query parameter or header added by the proxy will identify the caller.
- Allow for a range of maturity levels, from single-user for those test driving the system, to integration with existing to enterprise authorization systems.
- Allow for centralized management of users and policies. In some organizations, this will mean that the definition of users and access policies needs to reside on a system other than k8s and encompass other web services (such as a storage service).
- Allow processes running in K8s Pods to take on identity, and to allow narrow scoping of permissions for those identities in order to limit damage from software faults.
- Have Authorization Policies exposed as API objects so that a single config file can create or delete Pods, Controllers, Services, and the identities and policies for those Pods and Controllers.
- Be separate as much as practical from Authentication, to allow Authentication methods to change over time and space, without impacting Authorization policies.
The API Server will be the Enforcement Point for Policy. For each API call that it receives, it will construct the Attributes needed to evaluate the policy (what user is making the call, what resource they are accessing, what they are trying to do that resource, etc) and pass those attributes to a Decision Point. The Decision Point code evaluates the Attributes against all the Policies and allows or denies the API call. The system will be modular enough that the Decision Point code can either be linked into the APIserver binary, or be another service that the apiserver calls for each Decision (with appropriate time-limited caching as needed for performance).
Policy objects may be applicable only to a single namespace or to all namespaces; K8s Project Admins would be able to create those as needed. Other Policy objects may be applicable to all namespaces; a K8s Cluster Admin might create those in order to authorize a new type of controller to be used by all namespaces, or to make a K8s User into a K8s Project Admin.)
The API should have a `quota` concept (see https://github.com/GoogleCloudPlatform/kubernetes/issues/442). A quota object relates a namespace (and optionally a label selector) to a maximum quantity of resources that may be used (see [resources.md](/docs/resources.md)).
- allow one namespace to charge the quota for one or more other namespaces. This would be controlled by a policy which allows changing a billing_namespace= label on an object.
- allow quota to be set by namespace owners for (namespace x label) combinations (e.g. let "webserver" namespace use 100 cores, but to prevent accidents, don't allow "webserver" namespace and "instance=test" use more than 10 cores.
- tools to help write consistent quota config files based on number of minions, historical namespace usages, QoS needs, etc.
