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1658 lines
52 KiB
1658 lines
52 KiB
package agent |
|
|
|
import ( |
|
"encoding/json" |
|
"errors" |
|
"fmt" |
|
"log" |
|
"net" |
|
"net/http" |
|
"path/filepath" |
|
"strconv" |
|
"strings" |
|
"time" |
|
|
|
"github.com/mitchellh/mapstructure" |
|
|
|
"github.com/hashicorp/go-memdb" |
|
"github.com/mitchellh/hashstructure" |
|
|
|
"github.com/hashicorp/consul/acl" |
|
cachetype "github.com/hashicorp/consul/agent/cache-types" |
|
"github.com/hashicorp/consul/agent/checks" |
|
"github.com/hashicorp/consul/agent/config" |
|
"github.com/hashicorp/consul/agent/debug" |
|
"github.com/hashicorp/consul/agent/local" |
|
"github.com/hashicorp/consul/agent/structs" |
|
token_store "github.com/hashicorp/consul/agent/token" |
|
"github.com/hashicorp/consul/api" |
|
"github.com/hashicorp/consul/ipaddr" |
|
"github.com/hashicorp/consul/lib" |
|
"github.com/hashicorp/consul/lib/file" |
|
"github.com/hashicorp/consul/logger" |
|
"github.com/hashicorp/consul/types" |
|
"github.com/hashicorp/logutils" |
|
"github.com/hashicorp/serf/coordinate" |
|
"github.com/hashicorp/serf/serf" |
|
"github.com/prometheus/client_golang/prometheus" |
|
"github.com/prometheus/client_golang/prometheus/promhttp" |
|
) |
|
|
|
type Self struct { |
|
Config interface{} |
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DebugConfig map[string]interface{} |
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Coord *coordinate.Coordinate |
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Member serf.Member |
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Stats map[string]map[string]string |
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Meta map[string]string |
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} |
|
|
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func (s *HTTPServer) AgentSelf(resp http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) (interface{}, error) { |
|
// Fetch the ACL token, if any, and enforce agent policy. |
|
var token string |
|
s.parseToken(req, &token) |
|
rule, err := s.agent.resolveToken(token) |
|
if err != nil { |
|
return nil, err |
|
} |
|
if rule != nil && !rule.AgentRead(s.agent.config.NodeName) { |
|
return nil, acl.ErrPermissionDenied |
|
} |
|
|
|
var cs lib.CoordinateSet |
|
if !s.agent.config.DisableCoordinates { |
|
var err error |
|
if cs, err = s.agent.GetLANCoordinate(); err != nil { |
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return nil, err |
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} |
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} |
|
|
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config := struct { |
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Datacenter string |
|
NodeName string |
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NodeID string |
|
Revision string |
|
Server bool |
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Version string |
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}{ |
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Datacenter: s.agent.config.Datacenter, |
|
NodeName: s.agent.config.NodeName, |
|
NodeID: string(s.agent.config.NodeID), |
|
Revision: s.agent.config.Revision, |
|
Server: s.agent.config.ServerMode, |
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Version: s.agent.config.Version, |
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} |
|
return Self{ |
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Config: config, |
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DebugConfig: s.agent.config.Sanitized(), |
|
Coord: cs[s.agent.config.SegmentName], |
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Member: s.agent.LocalMember(), |
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Stats: s.agent.Stats(), |
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Meta: s.agent.State.Metadata(), |
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}, nil |
|
} |
|
|
|
// enablePrometheusOutput will look for Prometheus mime-type or format Query parameter the same way as Nomad |
|
func enablePrometheusOutput(req *http.Request) bool { |
|
if format := req.URL.Query().Get("format"); format == "prometheus" { |
|
return true |
|
} |
|
return false |
|
} |
|
|
|
func (s *HTTPServer) AgentMetrics(resp http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) (interface{}, error) { |
|
// Fetch the ACL token, if any, and enforce agent policy. |
|
var token string |
|
s.parseToken(req, &token) |
|
rule, err := s.agent.resolveToken(token) |
|
if err != nil { |
|
return nil, err |
|
} |
|
if rule != nil && !rule.AgentRead(s.agent.config.NodeName) { |
|
return nil, acl.ErrPermissionDenied |
|
} |
|
if enablePrometheusOutput(req) { |
|
if s.agent.config.Telemetry.PrometheusRetentionTime < 1 { |
|
resp.WriteHeader(http.StatusUnsupportedMediaType) |
|
fmt.Fprint(resp, "Prometheus is not enabled since its retention time is not positive") |
|
return nil, nil |
|
} |
|
handlerOptions := promhttp.HandlerOpts{ |
|
ErrorLog: s.agent.logger, |
|
ErrorHandling: promhttp.ContinueOnError, |
|
} |
|
|
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handler := promhttp.HandlerFor(prometheus.DefaultGatherer, handlerOptions) |
|
handler.ServeHTTP(resp, req) |
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return nil, nil |
|
} |
|
return s.agent.MemSink.DisplayMetrics(resp, req) |
|
} |
|
|
|
func (s *HTTPServer) AgentReload(resp http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) (interface{}, error) { |
|
// Fetch the ACL token, if any, and enforce agent policy. |
|
var token string |
|
s.parseToken(req, &token) |
|
rule, err := s.agent.resolveToken(token) |
|
if err != nil { |
|
return nil, err |
|
} |
|
if rule != nil && !rule.AgentWrite(s.agent.config.NodeName) { |
|
return nil, acl.ErrPermissionDenied |
|
} |
|
|
|
// Trigger the reload |
|
errCh := make(chan error, 0) |
|
select { |
|
case <-s.agent.shutdownCh: |
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("Agent was shutdown before reload could be completed") |
|
case s.agent.reloadCh <- errCh: |
|
} |
|
|
|
// Wait for the result of the reload, or for the agent to shutdown |
|
select { |
|
case <-s.agent.shutdownCh: |
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("Agent was shutdown before reload could be completed") |
|
case err := <-errCh: |
|
return nil, err |
|
} |
|
} |
|
|
|
func buildAgentService(s *structs.NodeService, proxies map[string]*local.ManagedProxy) api.AgentService { |
|
weights := api.AgentWeights{Passing: 1, Warning: 1} |
|
if s.Weights != nil { |
|
if s.Weights.Passing > 0 { |
|
weights.Passing = s.Weights.Passing |
|
} |
|
weights.Warning = s.Weights.Warning |
|
} |
|
as := api.AgentService{ |
|
Kind: api.ServiceKind(s.Kind), |
|
ID: s.ID, |
|
Service: s.Service, |
|
Tags: s.Tags, |
|
Meta: s.Meta, |
|
Port: s.Port, |
|
Address: s.Address, |
|
EnableTagOverride: s.EnableTagOverride, |
|
CreateIndex: s.CreateIndex, |
|
ModifyIndex: s.ModifyIndex, |
|
Weights: weights, |
|
} |
|
|
|
if as.Tags == nil { |
|
as.Tags = []string{} |
|
} |
|
if as.Meta == nil { |
|
as.Meta = map[string]string{} |
|
} |
|
// Attach Unmanaged Proxy config if exists |
|
if s.Kind == structs.ServiceKindConnectProxy { |
|
as.Proxy = s.Proxy.ToAPI() |
|
// DEPRECATED (ProxyDestination) - remove this when removing ProxyDestination |
|
// Also set the deprecated ProxyDestination |
|
as.ProxyDestination = as.Proxy.DestinationServiceName |
|
} |
|
|
|
// Attach Connect configs if they exist. We use the actual proxy state since |
|
// that may have had defaults filled in compared to the config that was |
|
// provided with the service as stored in the NodeService here. |
|
if proxy, ok := proxies[s.ID+"-proxy"]; ok { |
|
as.Connect = &api.AgentServiceConnect{ |
|
Proxy: &api.AgentServiceConnectProxy{ |
|
ExecMode: api.ProxyExecMode(proxy.Proxy.ExecMode.String()), |
|
Command: proxy.Proxy.Command, |
|
Config: proxy.Proxy.Config, |
|
Upstreams: proxy.Proxy.Upstreams.ToAPI(), |
|
}, |
|
} |
|
} else if s.Connect.Native { |
|
as.Connect = &api.AgentServiceConnect{ |
|
Native: true, |
|
} |
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} |
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return as |
|
} |
|
|
|
func (s *HTTPServer) AgentServices(resp http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) (interface{}, error) { |
|
// Fetch the ACL token, if any. |
|
var token string |
|
s.parseToken(req, &token) |
|
|
|
services := s.agent.State.Services() |
|
if err := s.agent.filterServices(token, &services); err != nil { |
|
return nil, err |
|
} |
|
|
|
proxies := s.agent.State.Proxies() |
|
|
|
// Convert into api.AgentService since that includes Connect config but so far |
|
// NodeService doesn't need to internally. They are otherwise identical since |
|
// that is the struct used in client for reading the one we output here |
|
// anyway. |
|
agentSvcs := make(map[string]*api.AgentService) |
|
|
|
// Use empty list instead of nil |
|
for id, s := range services { |
|
agentService := buildAgentService(s, proxies) |
|
agentSvcs[id] = &agentService |
|
} |
|
|
|
return agentSvcs, nil |
|
} |
|
|
|
// GET /v1/agent/service/:service_id |
|
// |
|
// Returns the service definition for a single local services and allows |
|
// blocking watch using hash-based blocking. |
|
func (s *HTTPServer) AgentService(resp http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) (interface{}, error) { |
|
// Get the proxy ID. Note that this is the ID of a proxy's service instance. |
|
id := strings.TrimPrefix(req.URL.Path, "/v1/agent/service/") |
|
|
|
// DEPRECATED(managed-proxies) - remove this whole hack. |
|
// |
|
// Support managed proxies until they are removed entirely. Since built-in |
|
// proxy will now use this endpoint, in order to not break managed proxies in |
|
// the interim until they are removed, we need to mirror the default-setting |
|
// behavior they had. Rather than thread that through this whole method as |
|
// special cases that need to be unwound later (and duplicate logic in the |
|
// proxy config endpoint) just defer to that and then translate the response. |
|
if managedProxy := s.agent.State.Proxy(id); managedProxy != nil { |
|
// This is for a managed proxy, use the old endpoint's behavior |
|
req.URL.Path = "/v1/agent/connect/proxy/" + id |
|
obj, err := s.AgentConnectProxyConfig(resp, req) |
|
if err != nil { |
|
return obj, err |
|
} |
|
proxyCfg, ok := obj.(*api.ConnectProxyConfig) |
|
if !ok { |
|
return nil, errors.New("internal error") |
|
} |
|
// These are all set by defaults so type checks are just sanity checks that |
|
// should never fail. |
|
port, ok := proxyCfg.Config["bind_port"].(int) |
|
if !ok || port < 1 { |
|
return nil, errors.New("invalid proxy config") |
|
} |
|
addr, ok := proxyCfg.Config["bind_address"].(string) |
|
if !ok || addr == "" { |
|
return nil, errors.New("invalid proxy config") |
|
} |
|
localAddr, ok := proxyCfg.Config["local_service_address"].(string) |
|
if !ok || localAddr == "" { |
|
return nil, errors.New("invalid proxy config") |
|
} |
|
// Old local_service_address was a host:port |
|
localAddress, localPortRaw, err := net.SplitHostPort(localAddr) |
|
if err != nil { |
|
return nil, err |
|
} |
|
localPort, err := strconv.Atoi(localPortRaw) |
|
if err != nil { |
|
return nil, err |
|
} |
|
|
|
reply := &api.AgentService{ |
|
Kind: api.ServiceKindConnectProxy, |
|
ID: proxyCfg.ProxyServiceID, |
|
Service: managedProxy.Proxy.ProxyService.Service, |
|
Port: port, |
|
Address: addr, |
|
ContentHash: proxyCfg.ContentHash, |
|
Proxy: &api.AgentServiceConnectProxyConfig{ |
|
DestinationServiceName: proxyCfg.TargetServiceName, |
|
DestinationServiceID: proxyCfg.TargetServiceID, |
|
LocalServiceAddress: localAddress, |
|
LocalServicePort: localPort, |
|
Config: proxyCfg.Config, |
|
Upstreams: proxyCfg.Upstreams, |
|
}, |
|
} |
|
return reply, nil |
|
} |
|
|
|
// Maybe block |
|
var queryOpts structs.QueryOptions |
|
if parseWait(resp, req, &queryOpts) { |
|
// parseWait returns an error itself |
|
return nil, nil |
|
} |
|
|
|
// Parse the token |
|
var token string |
|
s.parseToken(req, &token) |
|
|
|
// Parse hash specially. Eventually this should happen in parseWait and end up |
|
// in QueryOptions but I didn't want to make very general changes right away. |
|
hash := req.URL.Query().Get("hash") |
|
|
|
return s.agentLocalBlockingQuery(resp, hash, &queryOpts, |
|
func(ws memdb.WatchSet) (string, interface{}, error) { |
|
|
|
svcState := s.agent.State.ServiceState(id) |
|
if svcState == nil { |
|
resp.WriteHeader(http.StatusNotFound) |
|
fmt.Fprintf(resp, "unknown proxy service ID: %s", id) |
|
return "", nil, nil |
|
} |
|
|
|
svc := svcState.Service |
|
|
|
// Setup watch on the service |
|
ws.Add(svcState.WatchCh) |
|
|
|
// Check ACLs. |
|
rule, err := s.agent.resolveToken(token) |
|
if err != nil { |
|
return "", nil, err |
|
} |
|
if rule != nil && !rule.ServiceRead(svc.Service) { |
|
return "", nil, acl.ErrPermissionDenied |
|
} |
|
|
|
var connect *api.AgentServiceConnect |
|
var proxy *api.AgentServiceConnectProxyConfig |
|
|
|
if svc.Connect.Native { |
|
connect = &api.AgentServiceConnect{ |
|
Native: svc.Connect.Native, |
|
} |
|
} |
|
|
|
if svc.Kind == structs.ServiceKindConnectProxy { |
|
proxy = svc.Proxy.ToAPI() |
|
} |
|
|
|
var weights api.AgentWeights |
|
if svc.Weights != nil { |
|
err := mapstructure.Decode(svc.Weights, &weights) |
|
if err != nil { |
|
return "", nil, err |
|
} |
|
} |
|
|
|
// Calculate the content hash over the response, minus the hash field |
|
reply := &api.AgentService{ |
|
Kind: api.ServiceKind(svc.Kind), |
|
ID: svc.ID, |
|
Service: svc.Service, |
|
Tags: svc.Tags, |
|
Meta: svc.Meta, |
|
Port: svc.Port, |
|
Address: svc.Address, |
|
EnableTagOverride: svc.EnableTagOverride, |
|
Weights: weights, |
|
Proxy: proxy, |
|
Connect: connect, |
|
} |
|
|
|
rawHash, err := hashstructure.Hash(reply, nil) |
|
if err != nil { |
|
return "", nil, err |
|
} |
|
|
|
// Include the ContentHash in the response body |
|
reply.ContentHash = fmt.Sprintf("%x", rawHash) |
|
|
|
return reply.ContentHash, reply, nil |
|
}) |
|
} |
|
|
|
func (s *HTTPServer) AgentChecks(resp http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) (interface{}, error) { |
|
// Fetch the ACL token, if any. |
|
var token string |
|
s.parseToken(req, &token) |
|
|
|
checks := s.agent.State.Checks() |
|
if err := s.agent.filterChecks(token, &checks); err != nil { |
|
return nil, err |
|
} |
|
|
|
// Use empty list instead of nil |
|
for id, c := range checks { |
|
if c.ServiceTags == nil { |
|
clone := *c |
|
clone.ServiceTags = make([]string, 0) |
|
checks[id] = &clone |
|
} |
|
} |
|
|
|
return checks, nil |
|
} |
|
|
|
func (s *HTTPServer) AgentMembers(resp http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) (interface{}, error) { |
|
// Fetch the ACL token, if any. |
|
var token string |
|
s.parseToken(req, &token) |
|
|
|
// Check if the WAN is being queried |
|
wan := false |
|
if other := req.URL.Query().Get("wan"); other != "" { |
|
wan = true |
|
} |
|
|
|
segment := req.URL.Query().Get("segment") |
|
if wan { |
|
switch segment { |
|
case "", api.AllSegments: |
|
// The zero value and the special "give me all members" |
|
// key are ok, otherwise the argument doesn't apply to |
|
// the WAN. |
|
default: |
|
resp.WriteHeader(http.StatusBadRequest) |
|
fmt.Fprint(resp, "Cannot provide a segment with wan=true") |
|
return nil, nil |
|
} |
|
} |
|
|
|
var members []serf.Member |
|
if wan { |
|
members = s.agent.WANMembers() |
|
} else { |
|
var err error |
|
if segment == api.AllSegments { |
|
members, err = s.agent.delegate.LANMembersAllSegments() |
|
} else { |
|
members, err = s.agent.delegate.LANSegmentMembers(segment) |
|
} |
|
if err != nil { |
|
return nil, err |
|
} |
|
} |
|
if err := s.agent.filterMembers(token, &members); err != nil { |
|
return nil, err |
|
} |
|
return members, nil |
|
} |
|
|
|
func (s *HTTPServer) AgentJoin(resp http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) (interface{}, error) { |
|
// Fetch the ACL token, if any, and enforce agent policy. |
|
var token string |
|
s.parseToken(req, &token) |
|
rule, err := s.agent.resolveToken(token) |
|
if err != nil { |
|
return nil, err |
|
} |
|
if rule != nil && !rule.AgentWrite(s.agent.config.NodeName) { |
|
return nil, acl.ErrPermissionDenied |
|
} |
|
|
|
// Check if the WAN is being queried |
|
wan := false |
|
if other := req.URL.Query().Get("wan"); other != "" { |
|
wan = true |
|
} |
|
|
|
// Get the address |
|
addr := strings.TrimPrefix(req.URL.Path, "/v1/agent/join/") |
|
if wan { |
|
_, err = s.agent.JoinWAN([]string{addr}) |
|
} else { |
|
_, err = s.agent.JoinLAN([]string{addr}) |
|
} |
|
return nil, err |
|
} |
|
|
|
func (s *HTTPServer) AgentLeave(resp http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) (interface{}, error) { |
|
// Fetch the ACL token, if any, and enforce agent policy. |
|
var token string |
|
s.parseToken(req, &token) |
|
rule, err := s.agent.resolveToken(token) |
|
if err != nil { |
|
return nil, err |
|
} |
|
if rule != nil && !rule.AgentWrite(s.agent.config.NodeName) { |
|
return nil, acl.ErrPermissionDenied |
|
} |
|
|
|
if err := s.agent.Leave(); err != nil { |
|
return nil, err |
|
} |
|
return nil, s.agent.ShutdownAgent() |
|
} |
|
|
|
func (s *HTTPServer) AgentForceLeave(resp http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) (interface{}, error) { |
|
// Fetch the ACL token, if any, and enforce agent policy. |
|
var token string |
|
s.parseToken(req, &token) |
|
rule, err := s.agent.resolveToken(token) |
|
if err != nil { |
|
return nil, err |
|
} |
|
if rule != nil && !rule.AgentWrite(s.agent.config.NodeName) { |
|
return nil, acl.ErrPermissionDenied |
|
} |
|
|
|
addr := strings.TrimPrefix(req.URL.Path, "/v1/agent/force-leave/") |
|
return nil, s.agent.ForceLeave(addr) |
|
} |
|
|
|
// syncChanges is a helper function which wraps a blocking call to sync |
|
// services and checks to the server. If the operation fails, we only |
|
// only warn because the write did succeed and anti-entropy will sync later. |
|
func (s *HTTPServer) syncChanges() { |
|
if err := s.agent.State.SyncChanges(); err != nil { |
|
s.agent.logger.Printf("[ERR] agent: failed to sync changes: %v", err) |
|
} |
|
} |
|
|
|
func (s *HTTPServer) AgentRegisterCheck(resp http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) (interface{}, error) { |
|
var args structs.CheckDefinition |
|
// Fixup the type decode of TTL or Interval. |
|
decodeCB := func(raw interface{}) error { |
|
return FixupCheckType(raw) |
|
} |
|
if err := decodeBody(req, &args, decodeCB); err != nil { |
|
resp.WriteHeader(http.StatusBadRequest) |
|
fmt.Fprintf(resp, "Request decode failed: %v", err) |
|
return nil, nil |
|
} |
|
|
|
// Verify the check has a name. |
|
if args.Name == "" { |
|
resp.WriteHeader(http.StatusBadRequest) |
|
fmt.Fprint(resp, "Missing check name") |
|
return nil, nil |
|
} |
|
|
|
if args.Status != "" && !structs.ValidStatus(args.Status) { |
|
resp.WriteHeader(http.StatusBadRequest) |
|
fmt.Fprint(resp, "Bad check status") |
|
return nil, nil |
|
} |
|
|
|
// Construct the health check. |
|
health := args.HealthCheck(s.agent.config.NodeName) |
|
|
|
// Verify the check type. |
|
chkType := args.CheckType() |
|
err := chkType.Validate() |
|
if err != nil { |
|
resp.WriteHeader(http.StatusBadRequest) |
|
fmt.Fprint(resp, fmt.Errorf("Invalid check: %v", err)) |
|
return nil, nil |
|
} |
|
|
|
// Get the provided token, if any, and vet against any ACL policies. |
|
var token string |
|
s.parseToken(req, &token) |
|
if err := s.agent.vetCheckRegister(token, health); err != nil { |
|
return nil, err |
|
} |
|
|
|
// Add the check. |
|
if err := s.agent.AddCheck(health, chkType, true, token, ConfigSourceRemote); err != nil { |
|
return nil, err |
|
} |
|
s.syncChanges() |
|
return nil, nil |
|
} |
|
|
|
func (s *HTTPServer) AgentDeregisterCheck(resp http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) (interface{}, error) { |
|
checkID := types.CheckID(strings.TrimPrefix(req.URL.Path, "/v1/agent/check/deregister/")) |
|
|
|
// Get the provided token, if any, and vet against any ACL policies. |
|
var token string |
|
s.parseToken(req, &token) |
|
if err := s.agent.vetCheckUpdate(token, checkID); err != nil { |
|
return nil, err |
|
} |
|
|
|
if err := s.agent.RemoveCheck(checkID, true); err != nil { |
|
return nil, err |
|
} |
|
s.syncChanges() |
|
return nil, nil |
|
} |
|
|
|
func (s *HTTPServer) AgentCheckPass(resp http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) (interface{}, error) { |
|
checkID := types.CheckID(strings.TrimPrefix(req.URL.Path, "/v1/agent/check/pass/")) |
|
note := req.URL.Query().Get("note") |
|
|
|
// Get the provided token, if any, and vet against any ACL policies. |
|
var token string |
|
s.parseToken(req, &token) |
|
if err := s.agent.vetCheckUpdate(token, checkID); err != nil { |
|
return nil, err |
|
} |
|
|
|
if err := s.agent.updateTTLCheck(checkID, api.HealthPassing, note); err != nil { |
|
return nil, err |
|
} |
|
s.syncChanges() |
|
return nil, nil |
|
} |
|
|
|
func (s *HTTPServer) AgentCheckWarn(resp http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) (interface{}, error) { |
|
checkID := types.CheckID(strings.TrimPrefix(req.URL.Path, "/v1/agent/check/warn/")) |
|
note := req.URL.Query().Get("note") |
|
|
|
// Get the provided token, if any, and vet against any ACL policies. |
|
var token string |
|
s.parseToken(req, &token) |
|
if err := s.agent.vetCheckUpdate(token, checkID); err != nil { |
|
return nil, err |
|
} |
|
|
|
if err := s.agent.updateTTLCheck(checkID, api.HealthWarning, note); err != nil { |
|
return nil, err |
|
} |
|
s.syncChanges() |
|
return nil, nil |
|
} |
|
|
|
func (s *HTTPServer) AgentCheckFail(resp http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) (interface{}, error) { |
|
checkID := types.CheckID(strings.TrimPrefix(req.URL.Path, "/v1/agent/check/fail/")) |
|
note := req.URL.Query().Get("note") |
|
|
|
// Get the provided token, if any, and vet against any ACL policies. |
|
var token string |
|
s.parseToken(req, &token) |
|
if err := s.agent.vetCheckUpdate(token, checkID); err != nil { |
|
return nil, err |
|
} |
|
|
|
if err := s.agent.updateTTLCheck(checkID, api.HealthCritical, note); err != nil { |
|
return nil, err |
|
} |
|
s.syncChanges() |
|
return nil, nil |
|
} |
|
|
|
// checkUpdate is the payload for a PUT to AgentCheckUpdate. |
|
type checkUpdate struct { |
|
// Status us one of the api.Health* states, "passing", "warning", or |
|
// "critical". |
|
Status string |
|
|
|
// Output is the information to post to the UI for operators as the |
|
// output of the process that decided to hit the TTL check. This is |
|
// different from the note field that's associated with the check |
|
// itself. |
|
Output string |
|
} |
|
|
|
// AgentCheckUpdate is a PUT-based alternative to the GET-based Pass/Warn/Fail |
|
// APIs. |
|
func (s *HTTPServer) AgentCheckUpdate(resp http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) (interface{}, error) { |
|
var update checkUpdate |
|
if err := decodeBody(req, &update, nil); err != nil { |
|
resp.WriteHeader(http.StatusBadRequest) |
|
fmt.Fprintf(resp, "Request decode failed: %v", err) |
|
return nil, nil |
|
} |
|
|
|
switch update.Status { |
|
case api.HealthPassing: |
|
case api.HealthWarning: |
|
case api.HealthCritical: |
|
default: |
|
resp.WriteHeader(http.StatusBadRequest) |
|
fmt.Fprintf(resp, "Invalid check status: '%s'", update.Status) |
|
return nil, nil |
|
} |
|
|
|
total := len(update.Output) |
|
if total > checks.BufSize { |
|
update.Output = fmt.Sprintf("%s ... (captured %d of %d bytes)", |
|
update.Output[:checks.BufSize], checks.BufSize, total) |
|
} |
|
|
|
checkID := types.CheckID(strings.TrimPrefix(req.URL.Path, "/v1/agent/check/update/")) |
|
|
|
// Get the provided token, if any, and vet against any ACL policies. |
|
var token string |
|
s.parseToken(req, &token) |
|
if err := s.agent.vetCheckUpdate(token, checkID); err != nil { |
|
return nil, err |
|
} |
|
|
|
if err := s.agent.updateTTLCheck(checkID, update.Status, update.Output); err != nil { |
|
return nil, err |
|
} |
|
s.syncChanges() |
|
return nil, nil |
|
} |
|
|
|
// agentHealthService Returns Health for a given service ID |
|
func agentHealthService(serviceID string, s *HTTPServer) (int, string, api.HealthChecks) { |
|
checks := s.agent.State.Checks() |
|
serviceChecks := make(api.HealthChecks, 0) |
|
for _, c := range checks { |
|
if c.ServiceID == serviceID || c.ServiceID == "" { |
|
// TODO: harmonize struct.HealthCheck and api.HealthCheck (or at least extract conversion function) |
|
healthCheck := &api.HealthCheck{ |
|
Node: c.Node, |
|
CheckID: string(c.CheckID), |
|
Name: c.Name, |
|
Status: c.Status, |
|
Notes: c.Notes, |
|
Output: c.Output, |
|
ServiceID: c.ServiceID, |
|
ServiceName: c.ServiceName, |
|
ServiceTags: c.ServiceTags, |
|
} |
|
serviceChecks = append(serviceChecks, healthCheck) |
|
} |
|
} |
|
status := serviceChecks.AggregatedStatus() |
|
switch status { |
|
case api.HealthWarning: |
|
return http.StatusTooManyRequests, status, serviceChecks |
|
case api.HealthPassing: |
|
return http.StatusOK, status, serviceChecks |
|
default: |
|
return http.StatusServiceUnavailable, status, serviceChecks |
|
} |
|
} |
|
|
|
func returnTextPlain(req *http.Request) bool { |
|
if contentType := req.Header.Get("Accept"); strings.HasPrefix(contentType, "text/plain") { |
|
return true |
|
} |
|
if format := req.URL.Query().Get("format"); format != "" { |
|
return format == "text" |
|
} |
|
return false |
|
} |
|
|
|
// AgentHealthServiceByID return the local Service Health given its ID |
|
func (s *HTTPServer) AgentHealthServiceByID(resp http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) (interface{}, error) { |
|
// Pull out the service id (service id since there may be several instance of the same service on this host) |
|
serviceID := strings.TrimPrefix(req.URL.Path, "/v1/agent/health/service/id/") |
|
if serviceID == "" { |
|
return nil, &BadRequestError{Reason: "Missing serviceID"} |
|
} |
|
services := s.agent.State.Services() |
|
proxies := s.agent.State.Proxies() |
|
for _, service := range services { |
|
if service.ID == serviceID { |
|
code, status, healthChecks := agentHealthService(serviceID, s) |
|
if returnTextPlain(req) { |
|
return status, CodeWithPayloadError{StatusCode: code, Reason: status, ContentType: "text/plain"} |
|
} |
|
serviceInfo := buildAgentService(service, proxies) |
|
result := &api.AgentServiceChecksInfo{ |
|
AggregatedStatus: status, |
|
Checks: healthChecks, |
|
Service: &serviceInfo, |
|
} |
|
return result, CodeWithPayloadError{StatusCode: code, Reason: status, ContentType: "application/json"} |
|
} |
|
} |
|
notFoundReason := fmt.Sprintf("ServiceId %s not found", serviceID) |
|
if returnTextPlain(req) { |
|
return notFoundReason, CodeWithPayloadError{StatusCode: http.StatusNotFound, Reason: fmt.Sprintf("ServiceId %s not found", serviceID), ContentType: "application/json"} |
|
} |
|
return &api.AgentServiceChecksInfo{ |
|
AggregatedStatus: api.HealthCritical, |
|
Checks: nil, |
|
Service: nil, |
|
}, CodeWithPayloadError{StatusCode: http.StatusNotFound, Reason: notFoundReason, ContentType: "application/json"} |
|
} |
|
|
|
// AgentHealthServiceByName return the worse status of all the services with given name on an agent |
|
func (s *HTTPServer) AgentHealthServiceByName(resp http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) (interface{}, error) { |
|
// Pull out the service name |
|
serviceName := strings.TrimPrefix(req.URL.Path, "/v1/agent/health/service/name/") |
|
if serviceName == "" { |
|
return nil, &BadRequestError{Reason: "Missing service Name"} |
|
} |
|
code := http.StatusNotFound |
|
status := fmt.Sprintf("ServiceName %s Not Found", serviceName) |
|
services := s.agent.State.Services() |
|
result := make([]api.AgentServiceChecksInfo, 0, 16) |
|
proxies := s.agent.State.Proxies() |
|
for _, service := range services { |
|
if service.Service == serviceName { |
|
scode, sstatus, healthChecks := agentHealthService(service.ID, s) |
|
serviceInfo := buildAgentService(service, proxies) |
|
res := api.AgentServiceChecksInfo{ |
|
AggregatedStatus: sstatus, |
|
Checks: healthChecks, |
|
Service: &serviceInfo, |
|
} |
|
result = append(result, res) |
|
// When service is not found, we ignore it and keep existing HTTP status |
|
if code == http.StatusNotFound { |
|
code = scode |
|
status = sstatus |
|
} |
|
// We take the worst of all statuses, so we keep iterating |
|
// passing: 200 < warning: 429 < critical: 503 |
|
if code < scode { |
|
code = scode |
|
status = sstatus |
|
} |
|
} |
|
} |
|
if returnTextPlain(req) { |
|
return status, CodeWithPayloadError{StatusCode: code, Reason: status, ContentType: "text/plain"} |
|
} |
|
return result, CodeWithPayloadError{StatusCode: code, Reason: status, ContentType: "application/json"} |
|
} |
|
|
|
func (s *HTTPServer) AgentRegisterService(resp http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) (interface{}, error) { |
|
var args structs.ServiceDefinition |
|
// Fixup the type decode of TTL or Interval if a check if provided. |
|
decodeCB := func(raw interface{}) error { |
|
rawMap, ok := raw.(map[string]interface{}) |
|
if !ok { |
|
return nil |
|
} |
|
|
|
// see https://github.com/hashicorp/consul/pull/3557 why we need this |
|
// and why we should get rid of it. |
|
config.TranslateKeys(rawMap, map[string]string{ |
|
"enable_tag_override": "EnableTagOverride", |
|
// Managed Proxy Config |
|
"exec_mode": "ExecMode", |
|
// Proxy Upstreams |
|
"destination_name": "DestinationName", |
|
"destination_type": "DestinationType", |
|
"destination_namespace": "DestinationNamespace", |
|
"local_bind_port": "LocalBindPort", |
|
"local_bind_address": "LocalBindAddress", |
|
// Proxy Config |
|
"destination_service_name": "DestinationServiceName", |
|
"destination_service_id": "DestinationServiceID", |
|
"local_service_port": "LocalServicePort", |
|
"local_service_address": "LocalServiceAddress", |
|
// SidecarService |
|
"sidecar_service": "SidecarService", |
|
|
|
// DON'T Recurse into these opaque config maps or we might mangle user's |
|
// keys. Note empty canonical is a special sentinel to prevent recursion. |
|
"Meta": "", |
|
// upstreams is an array but this prevents recursion into config field of |
|
// any item in the array. |
|
"Proxy.Config": "", |
|
"Proxy.Upstreams.Config": "", |
|
"Connect.Proxy.Config": "", |
|
"Connect.Proxy.Upstreams.Config": "", |
|
|
|
// Same exceptions as above, but for a nested sidecar_service note we use |
|
// the canonical form SidecarService since that is translated by the time |
|
// the lookup here happens. Note that sidecar service doesn't support |
|
// managed proxies (connect.proxy). |
|
"Connect.SidecarService.Meta": "", |
|
"Connect.SidecarService.Proxy.Config": "", |
|
"Connect.SidecarService.Proxy.Upstreams.config": "", |
|
}) |
|
|
|
for k, v := range rawMap { |
|
switch strings.ToLower(k) { |
|
case "check": |
|
if err := FixupCheckType(v); err != nil { |
|
return err |
|
} |
|
case "checks": |
|
chkTypes, ok := v.([]interface{}) |
|
if !ok { |
|
continue |
|
} |
|
for _, chkType := range chkTypes { |
|
if err := FixupCheckType(chkType); err != nil { |
|
return err |
|
} |
|
} |
|
} |
|
} |
|
return nil |
|
} |
|
if err := decodeBody(req, &args, decodeCB); err != nil { |
|
resp.WriteHeader(http.StatusBadRequest) |
|
fmt.Fprintf(resp, "Request decode failed: %v", err) |
|
return nil, nil |
|
} |
|
|
|
// Verify the service has a name. |
|
if args.Name == "" { |
|
resp.WriteHeader(http.StatusBadRequest) |
|
fmt.Fprint(resp, "Missing service name") |
|
return nil, nil |
|
} |
|
|
|
// Check the service address here and in the catalog RPC endpoint |
|
// since service registration isn't synchronous. |
|
if ipaddr.IsAny(args.Address) { |
|
resp.WriteHeader(http.StatusBadRequest) |
|
fmt.Fprintf(resp, "Invalid service address") |
|
return nil, nil |
|
} |
|
|
|
// Get the node service. |
|
ns := args.NodeService() |
|
if ns.Weights != nil { |
|
if err := structs.ValidateWeights(ns.Weights); err != nil { |
|
resp.WriteHeader(http.StatusBadRequest) |
|
fmt.Fprint(resp, fmt.Errorf("Invalid Weights: %v", err)) |
|
return nil, nil |
|
} |
|
} |
|
if err := structs.ValidateMetadata(ns.Meta, false); err != nil { |
|
resp.WriteHeader(http.StatusBadRequest) |
|
fmt.Fprint(resp, fmt.Errorf("Invalid Service Meta: %v", err)) |
|
return nil, nil |
|
} |
|
|
|
// Run validation. This is the same validation that would happen on |
|
// the catalog endpoint so it helps ensure the sync will work properly. |
|
if err := ns.Validate(); err != nil { |
|
resp.WriteHeader(http.StatusBadRequest) |
|
fmt.Fprintf(resp, err.Error()) |
|
return nil, nil |
|
} |
|
|
|
// Verify the check type. |
|
chkTypes, err := args.CheckTypes() |
|
if err != nil { |
|
resp.WriteHeader(http.StatusBadRequest) |
|
fmt.Fprint(resp, fmt.Errorf("Invalid check: %v", err)) |
|
return nil, nil |
|
} |
|
for _, check := range chkTypes { |
|
if check.Status != "" && !structs.ValidStatus(check.Status) { |
|
resp.WriteHeader(http.StatusBadRequest) |
|
fmt.Fprint(resp, "Status for checks must 'passing', 'warning', 'critical'") |
|
return nil, nil |
|
} |
|
} |
|
|
|
// Verify the sidecar check types |
|
if args.Connect != nil && args.Connect.SidecarService != nil { |
|
chkTypes, err := args.Connect.SidecarService.CheckTypes() |
|
if err != nil { |
|
return nil, &BadRequestError{ |
|
Reason: fmt.Sprintf("Invalid check in sidecar_service: %v", err), |
|
} |
|
} |
|
for _, check := range chkTypes { |
|
if check.Status != "" && !structs.ValidStatus(check.Status) { |
|
return nil, &BadRequestError{ |
|
Reason: "Status for checks must 'passing', 'warning', 'critical'", |
|
} |
|
} |
|
} |
|
} |
|
|
|
// Get the provided token, if any, and vet against any ACL policies. |
|
var token string |
|
s.parseToken(req, &token) |
|
if err := s.agent.vetServiceRegister(token, ns); err != nil { |
|
return nil, err |
|
} |
|
|
|
// See if we have a sidecar to register too |
|
sidecar, sidecarChecks, sidecarToken, err := s.agent.sidecarServiceFromNodeService(ns, token) |
|
if err != nil { |
|
return nil, &BadRequestError{ |
|
Reason: fmt.Sprintf("Invalid SidecarService: %s", err)} |
|
} |
|
if sidecar != nil { |
|
// Make sure we are allowed to register the sidecar using the token |
|
// specified (might be specific to sidecar or the same one as the overall |
|
// request). |
|
if err := s.agent.vetServiceRegister(sidecarToken, sidecar); err != nil { |
|
return nil, err |
|
} |
|
// We parsed the sidecar registration, now remove it from the NodeService |
|
// for the actual service since it's done it's job and we don't want to |
|
// persist it in the actual state/catalog. SidecarService is meant to be a |
|
// registration syntax sugar so don't propagate it any further. |
|
ns.Connect.SidecarService = nil |
|
} |
|
|
|
// Get any proxy registrations |
|
proxy, err := args.ConnectManagedProxy() |
|
if err != nil { |
|
resp.WriteHeader(http.StatusBadRequest) |
|
fmt.Fprintf(resp, err.Error()) |
|
return nil, nil |
|
} |
|
|
|
// If we have a proxy, verify that we're allowed to add a proxy via the API |
|
if proxy != nil && !s.agent.config.ConnectProxyAllowManagedAPIRegistration { |
|
return nil, &BadRequestError{ |
|
Reason: "Managed proxy registration via the API is disallowed."} |
|
} |
|
|
|
// Add the service. |
|
if err := s.agent.AddService(ns, chkTypes, true, token, ConfigSourceRemote); err != nil { |
|
return nil, err |
|
} |
|
// Add proxy (which will add proxy service so do it before we trigger sync) |
|
if proxy != nil { |
|
if err := s.agent.AddProxy(proxy, true, false, "", ConfigSourceRemote); err != nil { |
|
return nil, err |
|
} |
|
} |
|
// Add sidecar. |
|
if sidecar != nil { |
|
if err := s.agent.AddService(sidecar, sidecarChecks, true, sidecarToken, ConfigSourceRemote); err != nil { |
|
return nil, err |
|
} |
|
} |
|
s.syncChanges() |
|
return nil, nil |
|
} |
|
|
|
func (s *HTTPServer) AgentDeregisterService(resp http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) (interface{}, error) { |
|
serviceID := strings.TrimPrefix(req.URL.Path, "/v1/agent/service/deregister/") |
|
|
|
// Get the provided token, if any, and vet against any ACL policies. |
|
var token string |
|
s.parseToken(req, &token) |
|
if err := s.agent.vetServiceUpdate(token, serviceID); err != nil { |
|
return nil, err |
|
} |
|
|
|
// Verify this isn't a proxy |
|
if s.agent.State.Proxy(serviceID) != nil { |
|
return nil, &BadRequestError{ |
|
Reason: "Managed proxy service cannot be deregistered directly. " + |
|
"Deregister the service that has a managed proxy to automatically " + |
|
"deregister the managed proxy itself."} |
|
} |
|
|
|
if err := s.agent.RemoveService(serviceID, true); err != nil { |
|
return nil, err |
|
} |
|
|
|
s.syncChanges() |
|
return nil, nil |
|
} |
|
|
|
func (s *HTTPServer) AgentServiceMaintenance(resp http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) (interface{}, error) { |
|
// Ensure we have a service ID |
|
serviceID := strings.TrimPrefix(req.URL.Path, "/v1/agent/service/maintenance/") |
|
if serviceID == "" { |
|
resp.WriteHeader(http.StatusBadRequest) |
|
fmt.Fprint(resp, "Missing service ID") |
|
return nil, nil |
|
} |
|
|
|
// Ensure we have some action |
|
params := req.URL.Query() |
|
if _, ok := params["enable"]; !ok { |
|
resp.WriteHeader(http.StatusBadRequest) |
|
fmt.Fprint(resp, "Missing value for enable") |
|
return nil, nil |
|
} |
|
|
|
raw := params.Get("enable") |
|
enable, err := strconv.ParseBool(raw) |
|
if err != nil { |
|
resp.WriteHeader(http.StatusBadRequest) |
|
fmt.Fprintf(resp, "Invalid value for enable: %q", raw) |
|
return nil, nil |
|
} |
|
|
|
// Get the provided token, if any, and vet against any ACL policies. |
|
var token string |
|
s.parseToken(req, &token) |
|
if err := s.agent.vetServiceUpdate(token, serviceID); err != nil { |
|
return nil, err |
|
} |
|
|
|
if enable { |
|
reason := params.Get("reason") |
|
if err = s.agent.EnableServiceMaintenance(serviceID, reason, token); err != nil { |
|
resp.WriteHeader(http.StatusNotFound) |
|
fmt.Fprint(resp, err.Error()) |
|
return nil, nil |
|
} |
|
} else { |
|
if err = s.agent.DisableServiceMaintenance(serviceID); err != nil { |
|
resp.WriteHeader(http.StatusNotFound) |
|
fmt.Fprint(resp, err.Error()) |
|
return nil, nil |
|
} |
|
} |
|
s.syncChanges() |
|
return nil, nil |
|
} |
|
|
|
func (s *HTTPServer) AgentNodeMaintenance(resp http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) (interface{}, error) { |
|
// Ensure we have some action |
|
params := req.URL.Query() |
|
if _, ok := params["enable"]; !ok { |
|
resp.WriteHeader(http.StatusBadRequest) |
|
fmt.Fprint(resp, "Missing value for enable") |
|
return nil, nil |
|
} |
|
|
|
raw := params.Get("enable") |
|
enable, err := strconv.ParseBool(raw) |
|
if err != nil { |
|
resp.WriteHeader(http.StatusBadRequest) |
|
fmt.Fprintf(resp, "Invalid value for enable: %q", raw) |
|
return nil, nil |
|
} |
|
|
|
// Get the provided token, if any, and vet against any ACL policies. |
|
var token string |
|
s.parseToken(req, &token) |
|
rule, err := s.agent.resolveToken(token) |
|
if err != nil { |
|
return nil, err |
|
} |
|
if rule != nil && !rule.NodeWrite(s.agent.config.NodeName, nil) { |
|
return nil, acl.ErrPermissionDenied |
|
} |
|
|
|
if enable { |
|
s.agent.EnableNodeMaintenance(params.Get("reason"), token) |
|
} else { |
|
s.agent.DisableNodeMaintenance() |
|
} |
|
s.syncChanges() |
|
return nil, nil |
|
} |
|
|
|
func (s *HTTPServer) AgentMonitor(resp http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) (interface{}, error) { |
|
// Fetch the ACL token, if any, and enforce agent policy. |
|
var token string |
|
s.parseToken(req, &token) |
|
rule, err := s.agent.resolveToken(token) |
|
if err != nil { |
|
return nil, err |
|
} |
|
if rule != nil && !rule.AgentRead(s.agent.config.NodeName) { |
|
return nil, acl.ErrPermissionDenied |
|
} |
|
|
|
// Get the provided loglevel. |
|
logLevel := req.URL.Query().Get("loglevel") |
|
if logLevel == "" { |
|
logLevel = "INFO" |
|
} |
|
|
|
// Upper case the level since that's required by the filter. |
|
logLevel = strings.ToUpper(logLevel) |
|
|
|
// Create a level filter and flusher. |
|
filter := logger.LevelFilter() |
|
filter.MinLevel = logutils.LogLevel(logLevel) |
|
if !logger.ValidateLevelFilter(filter.MinLevel, filter) { |
|
resp.WriteHeader(http.StatusBadRequest) |
|
fmt.Fprintf(resp, "Unknown log level: %s", filter.MinLevel) |
|
return nil, nil |
|
} |
|
flusher, ok := resp.(http.Flusher) |
|
if !ok { |
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("Streaming not supported") |
|
} |
|
|
|
// Set up a log handler. |
|
handler := &httpLogHandler{ |
|
filter: filter, |
|
logCh: make(chan string, 512), |
|
logger: s.agent.logger, |
|
} |
|
s.agent.LogWriter.RegisterHandler(handler) |
|
defer s.agent.LogWriter.DeregisterHandler(handler) |
|
notify := resp.(http.CloseNotifier).CloseNotify() |
|
|
|
// Send header so client can start streaming body |
|
resp.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK) |
|
|
|
// 0 byte write is needed before the Flush call so that if we are using |
|
// a gzip stream it will go ahead and write out the HTTP response header |
|
resp.Write([]byte("")) |
|
flusher.Flush() |
|
|
|
// Stream logs until the connection is closed. |
|
for { |
|
select { |
|
case <-notify: |
|
s.agent.LogWriter.DeregisterHandler(handler) |
|
if handler.droppedCount > 0 { |
|
s.agent.logger.Printf("[WARN] agent: Dropped %d logs during monitor request", handler.droppedCount) |
|
} |
|
return nil, nil |
|
case log := <-handler.logCh: |
|
fmt.Fprintln(resp, log) |
|
flusher.Flush() |
|
} |
|
} |
|
} |
|
|
|
type httpLogHandler struct { |
|
filter *logutils.LevelFilter |
|
logCh chan string |
|
logger *log.Logger |
|
droppedCount int |
|
} |
|
|
|
func (h *httpLogHandler) HandleLog(log string) { |
|
// Check the log level |
|
if !h.filter.Check([]byte(log)) { |
|
return |
|
} |
|
|
|
// Do a non-blocking send |
|
select { |
|
case h.logCh <- log: |
|
default: |
|
// Just increment a counter for dropped logs to this handler; we can't log now |
|
// because the lock is already held by the LogWriter invoking this |
|
h.droppedCount++ |
|
} |
|
} |
|
|
|
func (s *HTTPServer) AgentToken(resp http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) (interface{}, error) { |
|
if s.checkACLDisabled(resp, req) { |
|
return nil, nil |
|
} |
|
|
|
// Fetch the ACL token, if any, and enforce agent policy. |
|
var token string |
|
s.parseToken(req, &token) |
|
rule, err := s.agent.resolveToken(token) |
|
if err != nil { |
|
return nil, err |
|
} |
|
if rule != nil && !rule.AgentWrite(s.agent.config.NodeName) { |
|
return nil, acl.ErrPermissionDenied |
|
} |
|
|
|
// The body is just the token, but it's in a JSON object so we can add |
|
// fields to this later if needed. |
|
var args api.AgentToken |
|
if err := decodeBody(req, &args, nil); err != nil { |
|
resp.WriteHeader(http.StatusBadRequest) |
|
fmt.Fprintf(resp, "Request decode failed: %v", err) |
|
return nil, nil |
|
} |
|
|
|
if s.agent.config.ACLEnableTokenPersistence { |
|
// we hold the lock around updating the internal token store |
|
// as well as persisting the tokens because we don't want to write |
|
// into the store to have something else wipe it out before we can |
|
// persist everything (like an agent config reload). The token store |
|
// lock is only held for those operations so other go routines that |
|
// just need to read some token out of the store will not be impacted |
|
// any more than they would be without token persistence. |
|
s.agent.persistedTokensLock.Lock() |
|
defer s.agent.persistedTokensLock.Unlock() |
|
} |
|
|
|
// Figure out the target token. |
|
target := strings.TrimPrefix(req.URL.Path, "/v1/agent/token/") |
|
switch target { |
|
case "acl_token", "default": |
|
s.agent.tokens.UpdateUserToken(args.Token, token_store.TokenSourceAPI) |
|
|
|
case "acl_agent_token", "agent": |
|
s.agent.tokens.UpdateAgentToken(args.Token, token_store.TokenSourceAPI) |
|
|
|
case "acl_agent_master_token", "agent_master": |
|
s.agent.tokens.UpdateAgentMasterToken(args.Token, token_store.TokenSourceAPI) |
|
|
|
case "acl_replication_token", "replication": |
|
s.agent.tokens.UpdateReplicationToken(args.Token, token_store.TokenSourceAPI) |
|
|
|
default: |
|
resp.WriteHeader(http.StatusNotFound) |
|
fmt.Fprintf(resp, "Token %q is unknown", target) |
|
return nil, nil |
|
} |
|
|
|
if s.agent.config.ACLEnableTokenPersistence { |
|
tokens := persistedTokens{} |
|
|
|
if tok, source := s.agent.tokens.UserTokenAndSource(); tok != "" && source == token_store.TokenSourceAPI { |
|
tokens.Default = tok |
|
} |
|
|
|
if tok, source := s.agent.tokens.AgentTokenAndSource(); tok != "" && source == token_store.TokenSourceAPI { |
|
tokens.Agent = tok |
|
} |
|
|
|
if tok, source := s.agent.tokens.AgentMasterTokenAndSource(); tok != "" && source == token_store.TokenSourceAPI { |
|
tokens.AgentMaster = tok |
|
} |
|
|
|
if tok, source := s.agent.tokens.ReplicationTokenAndSource(); tok != "" && source == token_store.TokenSourceAPI { |
|
tokens.Replication = tok |
|
} |
|
|
|
data, err := json.Marshal(tokens) |
|
if err != nil { |
|
s.agent.logger.Printf("[WARN] agent: failed to persist tokens - %v", err) |
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("Failed to marshal tokens for persistence: %v", err) |
|
} |
|
|
|
if err := file.WriteAtomicWithPerms(filepath.Join(s.agent.config.DataDir, tokensPath), data, 0600); err != nil { |
|
s.agent.logger.Printf("[WARN] agent: failed to persist tokens - %v", err) |
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("Failed to persist tokens - %v", err) |
|
} |
|
} |
|
|
|
s.agent.logger.Printf("[INFO] agent: Updated agent's ACL token %q", target) |
|
return nil, nil |
|
} |
|
|
|
// AgentConnectCARoots returns the trusted CA roots. |
|
func (s *HTTPServer) AgentConnectCARoots(resp http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) (interface{}, error) { |
|
var args structs.DCSpecificRequest |
|
if done := s.parse(resp, req, &args.Datacenter, &args.QueryOptions); done { |
|
return nil, nil |
|
} |
|
|
|
raw, m, err := s.agent.cache.Get(cachetype.ConnectCARootName, &args) |
|
if err != nil { |
|
return nil, err |
|
} |
|
defer setCacheMeta(resp, &m) |
|
|
|
// Add cache hit |
|
|
|
reply, ok := raw.(*structs.IndexedCARoots) |
|
if !ok { |
|
// This should never happen, but we want to protect against panics |
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("internal error: response type not correct") |
|
} |
|
defer setMeta(resp, &reply.QueryMeta) |
|
|
|
return *reply, nil |
|
} |
|
|
|
// AgentConnectCALeafCert returns the certificate bundle for a service |
|
// instance. This supports blocking queries to update the returned bundle. |
|
func (s *HTTPServer) AgentConnectCALeafCert(resp http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) (interface{}, error) { |
|
// Get the service name. Note that this is the name of the service, |
|
// not the ID of the service instance. |
|
serviceName := strings.TrimPrefix(req.URL.Path, "/v1/agent/connect/ca/leaf/") |
|
|
|
args := cachetype.ConnectCALeafRequest{ |
|
Service: serviceName, // Need name not ID |
|
} |
|
var qOpts structs.QueryOptions |
|
|
|
// Store DC in the ConnectCALeafRequest but query opts separately |
|
// Don't resolve a proxy token to a real token that will be |
|
// done with a call to verifyProxyToken later along with |
|
// other security relevant checks. |
|
if done := s.parseWithoutResolvingProxyToken(resp, req, &args.Datacenter, &qOpts); done { |
|
return nil, nil |
|
} |
|
args.MinQueryIndex = qOpts.MinQueryIndex |
|
args.MaxQueryTime = qOpts.MaxQueryTime |
|
|
|
// Verify the proxy token. This will check both the local proxy token |
|
// as well as the ACL if the token isn't local. The checks done in |
|
// verifyProxyToken are still relevant because a leaf cert can be cached |
|
// verifying the proxy token matches the service id or that a real |
|
// acl token still is valid and has ServiceWrite is necessary or |
|
// that cached cert is potentially unprotected. |
|
effectiveToken, _, err := s.agent.verifyProxyToken(qOpts.Token, serviceName, "") |
|
if err != nil { |
|
return nil, err |
|
} |
|
args.Token = effectiveToken |
|
|
|
raw, m, err := s.agent.cache.Get(cachetype.ConnectCALeafName, &args) |
|
if err != nil { |
|
return nil, err |
|
} |
|
defer setCacheMeta(resp, &m) |
|
|
|
reply, ok := raw.(*structs.IssuedCert) |
|
if !ok { |
|
// This should never happen, but we want to protect against panics |
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("internal error: response type not correct") |
|
} |
|
setIndex(resp, reply.ModifyIndex) |
|
|
|
return reply, nil |
|
} |
|
|
|
// GET /v1/agent/connect/proxy/:proxy_service_id |
|
// |
|
// Returns the local proxy config for the identified proxy. Requires token= |
|
// param with the correct local ProxyToken (not ACL token). |
|
func (s *HTTPServer) AgentConnectProxyConfig(resp http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) (interface{}, error) { |
|
// Get the proxy ID. Note that this is the ID of a proxy's service instance. |
|
id := strings.TrimPrefix(req.URL.Path, "/v1/agent/connect/proxy/") |
|
|
|
// Maybe block |
|
var queryOpts structs.QueryOptions |
|
if parseWait(resp, req, &queryOpts) { |
|
// parseWait returns an error itself |
|
return nil, nil |
|
} |
|
|
|
// Parse the token - don't resolve a proxy token to a real token |
|
// that will be done with a call to verifyProxyToken later along with |
|
// other security relevant checks. |
|
var token string |
|
s.parseTokenWithoutResolvingProxyToken(req, &token) |
|
|
|
// Parse hash specially since it's only this endpoint that uses it currently. |
|
// Eventually this should happen in parseWait and end up in QueryOptions but I |
|
// didn't want to make very general changes right away. |
|
hash := req.URL.Query().Get("hash") |
|
|
|
return s.agentLocalBlockingQuery(resp, hash, &queryOpts, |
|
func(ws memdb.WatchSet) (string, interface{}, error) { |
|
// Retrieve the proxy specified |
|
proxy := s.agent.State.Proxy(id) |
|
if proxy == nil { |
|
resp.WriteHeader(http.StatusNotFound) |
|
fmt.Fprintf(resp, "unknown proxy service ID: %s", id) |
|
return "", nil, nil |
|
} |
|
|
|
// Lookup the target service as a convenience |
|
target := s.agent.State.Service(proxy.Proxy.TargetServiceID) |
|
if target == nil { |
|
// Not found since this endpoint is only useful for agent-managed proxies so |
|
// service missing means the service was deregistered racily with this call. |
|
resp.WriteHeader(http.StatusNotFound) |
|
fmt.Fprintf(resp, "unknown target service ID: %s", proxy.Proxy.TargetServiceID) |
|
return "", nil, nil |
|
} |
|
|
|
// Validate the ACL token - because this endpoint uses data local to a single |
|
// agent, this function is responsible for all enforcement regarding |
|
// protection of the configuration. verifyProxyToken will match the proxies |
|
// token to the correct service or in the case of being provide a real ACL |
|
// token it will ensure that the requester has ServiceWrite privileges |
|
// for this service. |
|
_, isProxyToken, err := s.agent.verifyProxyToken(token, target.Service, id) |
|
if err != nil { |
|
return "", nil, err |
|
} |
|
|
|
// Watch the proxy for changes |
|
ws.Add(proxy.WatchCh) |
|
|
|
hash, err := hashstructure.Hash(proxy.Proxy, nil) |
|
if err != nil { |
|
return "", nil, err |
|
} |
|
contentHash := fmt.Sprintf("%x", hash) |
|
|
|
// Set defaults |
|
config, err := s.agent.applyProxyConfigDefaults(proxy.Proxy) |
|
if err != nil { |
|
return "", nil, err |
|
} |
|
|
|
// Only merge in telemetry config from agent if the requested is |
|
// authorized with a proxy token. This prevents us leaking potentially |
|
// sensitive config like Circonus API token via a public endpoint. Proxy |
|
// tokens are only ever generated in-memory and passed via ENV to a child |
|
// proxy process so potential for abuse here seems small. This endpoint in |
|
// general is only useful for managed proxies now so it should _always_ be |
|
// true that auth is via a proxy token but inconvenient for testing if we |
|
// lock it down so strictly. |
|
if isProxyToken { |
|
// Add telemetry config. Copy the global config so we can customize the |
|
// prefix. |
|
telemetryCfg := s.agent.config.Telemetry |
|
telemetryCfg.MetricsPrefix = telemetryCfg.MetricsPrefix + ".proxy." + target.ID |
|
|
|
// First see if the user has specified telemetry |
|
if userRaw, ok := config["telemetry"]; ok { |
|
// User specified domething, see if it is compatible with agent |
|
// telemetry config: |
|
var uCfg lib.TelemetryConfig |
|
dec, err := mapstructure.NewDecoder(&mapstructure.DecoderConfig{ |
|
Result: &uCfg, |
|
// Make sure that if the user passes something that isn't just a |
|
// simple override of a valid TelemetryConfig that we fail so that we |
|
// don't clobber their custom config. |
|
ErrorUnused: true, |
|
}) |
|
if err == nil { |
|
if err = dec.Decode(userRaw); err == nil { |
|
// It did decode! Merge any unspecified fields from agent config. |
|
uCfg.MergeDefaults(&telemetryCfg) |
|
config["telemetry"] = uCfg |
|
} |
|
} |
|
// Failed to decode, just keep user's config["telemetry"] verbatim |
|
// with no agent merge. |
|
} else { |
|
// Add agent telemetry config. |
|
config["telemetry"] = telemetryCfg |
|
} |
|
} |
|
|
|
reply := &api.ConnectProxyConfig{ |
|
ProxyServiceID: proxy.Proxy.ProxyService.ID, |
|
TargetServiceID: target.ID, |
|
TargetServiceName: target.Service, |
|
ContentHash: contentHash, |
|
ExecMode: api.ProxyExecMode(proxy.Proxy.ExecMode.String()), |
|
Command: proxy.Proxy.Command, |
|
Config: config, |
|
Upstreams: proxy.Proxy.Upstreams.ToAPI(), |
|
} |
|
return contentHash, reply, nil |
|
}) |
|
} |
|
|
|
type agentLocalBlockingFunc func(ws memdb.WatchSet) (string, interface{}, error) |
|
|
|
// agentLocalBlockingQuery performs a blocking query in a generic way against |
|
// local agent state that has no RPC or raft to back it. It uses `hash` parameter |
|
// instead of an `index`. The resp is needed to write the `X-Consul-ContentHash` |
|
// header back on return no Status nor body content is ever written to it. |
|
func (s *HTTPServer) agentLocalBlockingQuery(resp http.ResponseWriter, hash string, |
|
queryOpts *structs.QueryOptions, fn agentLocalBlockingFunc) (interface{}, error) { |
|
|
|
// If we are not blocking we can skip tracking and allocating - nil WatchSet |
|
// is still valid to call Add on and will just be a no op. |
|
var ws memdb.WatchSet |
|
var timeout *time.Timer |
|
|
|
if hash != "" { |
|
// TODO(banks) at least define these defaults somewhere in a const. Would be |
|
// nice not to duplicate the ones in consul/rpc.go too... |
|
wait := queryOpts.MaxQueryTime |
|
if wait == 0 { |
|
wait = 5 * time.Minute |
|
} |
|
if wait > 10*time.Minute { |
|
wait = 10 * time.Minute |
|
} |
|
// Apply a small amount of jitter to the request. |
|
wait += lib.RandomStagger(wait / 16) |
|
timeout = time.NewTimer(wait) |
|
} |
|
|
|
for { |
|
// Must reset this every loop in case the Watch set is already closed but |
|
// hash remains same. In that case we'll need to re-block on ws.Watch() |
|
// again. |
|
ws = memdb.NewWatchSet() |
|
curHash, curResp, err := fn(ws) |
|
if err != nil { |
|
return curResp, err |
|
} |
|
// Return immediately if there is no timeout, the hash is different or the |
|
// Watch returns true (indicating timeout fired). Note that Watch on a nil |
|
// WatchSet immediately returns false which would incorrectly cause this to |
|
// loop and repeat again, however we rely on the invariant that ws == nil |
|
// IFF timeout == nil in which case the Watch call is never invoked. |
|
if timeout == nil || hash != curHash || ws.Watch(timeout.C) { |
|
resp.Header().Set("X-Consul-ContentHash", curHash) |
|
return curResp, err |
|
} |
|
// Watch returned false indicating a change was detected, loop and repeat |
|
// the callback to load the new value. If agent sync is paused it means |
|
// local state is currently being bulk-edited e.g. config reload. In this |
|
// case it's likely that local state just got unloaded and may or may not be |
|
// reloaded yet. Wait a short amount of time for Sync to resume to ride out |
|
// typical config reloads. |
|
if syncPauseCh := s.agent.syncPausedCh(); syncPauseCh != nil { |
|
select { |
|
case <-syncPauseCh: |
|
case <-timeout.C: |
|
} |
|
} |
|
} |
|
} |
|
|
|
// AgentConnectAuthorize |
|
// |
|
// POST /v1/agent/connect/authorize |
|
// |
|
// Note: when this logic changes, consider if the Intention.Check RPC method |
|
// also needs to be updated. |
|
func (s *HTTPServer) AgentConnectAuthorize(resp http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) (interface{}, error) { |
|
// Fetch the token |
|
var token string |
|
s.parseToken(req, &token) |
|
|
|
// Decode the request from the request body |
|
var authReq structs.ConnectAuthorizeRequest |
|
if err := decodeBody(req, &authReq, nil); err != nil { |
|
return nil, BadRequestError{fmt.Sprintf("Request decode failed: %v", err)} |
|
} |
|
|
|
authz, reason, cacheMeta, err := s.agent.ConnectAuthorize(token, &authReq) |
|
if err != nil { |
|
return nil, err |
|
} |
|
setCacheMeta(resp, cacheMeta) |
|
|
|
return &connectAuthorizeResp{ |
|
Authorized: authz, |
|
Reason: reason, |
|
}, nil |
|
} |
|
|
|
// connectAuthorizeResp is the response format/structure for the |
|
// /v1/agent/connect/authorize endpoint. |
|
type connectAuthorizeResp struct { |
|
Authorized bool // True if authorized, false if not |
|
Reason string // Reason for the Authorized value (whether true or false) |
|
} |
|
|
|
// AgentHost |
|
// |
|
// GET /v1/agent/host |
|
// |
|
// Retrieves information about resources available and in-use for the |
|
// host the agent is running on such as CPU, memory, and disk usage. Requires |
|
// a operator:read ACL token. |
|
func (s *HTTPServer) AgentHost(resp http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) (interface{}, error) { |
|
// Fetch the ACL token, if any, and enforce agent policy. |
|
var token string |
|
s.parseToken(req, &token) |
|
rule, err := s.agent.resolveToken(token) |
|
if err != nil { |
|
return nil, err |
|
} |
|
|
|
if rule != nil && !rule.OperatorRead() { |
|
return nil, acl.ErrPermissionDenied |
|
} |
|
|
|
return debug.CollectHostInfo(), nil |
|
}
|
|
|