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1659 lines
52 KiB
1659 lines
52 KiB
package agent
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import (
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"encoding/json"
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"errors"
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"fmt"
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"log"
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"net"
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"net/http"
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"path/filepath"
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"strconv"
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"strings"
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"time"
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"github.com/mitchellh/mapstructure"
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"github.com/hashicorp/go-memdb"
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"github.com/mitchellh/hashstructure"
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"github.com/hashicorp/consul/acl"
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cachetype "github.com/hashicorp/consul/agent/cache-types"
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"github.com/hashicorp/consul/agent/checks"
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"github.com/hashicorp/consul/agent/config"
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"github.com/hashicorp/consul/agent/debug"
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"github.com/hashicorp/consul/agent/local"
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"github.com/hashicorp/consul/agent/structs"
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token_store "github.com/hashicorp/consul/agent/token"
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"github.com/hashicorp/consul/api"
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"github.com/hashicorp/consul/ipaddr"
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"github.com/hashicorp/consul/lib"
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"github.com/hashicorp/consul/lib/file"
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"github.com/hashicorp/consul/logger"
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"github.com/hashicorp/consul/types"
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"github.com/hashicorp/logutils"
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"github.com/hashicorp/serf/coordinate"
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"github.com/hashicorp/serf/serf"
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"github.com/prometheus/client_golang/prometheus"
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"github.com/prometheus/client_golang/prometheus/promhttp"
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)
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type Self struct {
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Config interface{}
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DebugConfig map[string]interface{}
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Coord *coordinate.Coordinate
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Member serf.Member
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Stats map[string]map[string]string
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Meta map[string]string
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}
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func (s *HTTPServer) AgentSelf(resp http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) (interface{}, error) {
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// Fetch the ACL token, if any, and enforce agent policy.
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var token string
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s.parseToken(req, &token)
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rule, err := s.agent.resolveToken(token)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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if rule != nil && !rule.AgentRead(s.agent.config.NodeName) {
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return nil, acl.ErrPermissionDenied
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}
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var cs lib.CoordinateSet
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if !s.agent.config.DisableCoordinates {
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var err error
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if cs, err = s.agent.GetLANCoordinate(); err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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}
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config := struct {
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Datacenter string
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NodeName string
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NodeID string
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Revision string
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Server bool
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Version string
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}{
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Datacenter: s.agent.config.Datacenter,
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NodeName: s.agent.config.NodeName,
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NodeID: string(s.agent.config.NodeID),
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Revision: s.agent.config.Revision,
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Server: s.agent.config.ServerMode,
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Version: s.agent.config.Version,
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}
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return Self{
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Config: config,
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DebugConfig: s.agent.config.Sanitized(),
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Coord: cs[s.agent.config.SegmentName],
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Member: s.agent.LocalMember(),
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Stats: s.agent.Stats(),
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Meta: s.agent.State.Metadata(),
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}, nil
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}
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// enablePrometheusOutput will look for Prometheus mime-type or format Query parameter the same way as Nomad
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func enablePrometheusOutput(req *http.Request) bool {
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if format := req.URL.Query().Get("format"); format == "prometheus" {
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return true
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}
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return false
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}
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func (s *HTTPServer) AgentMetrics(resp http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) (interface{}, error) {
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// Fetch the ACL token, if any, and enforce agent policy.
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var token string
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s.parseToken(req, &token)
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rule, err := s.agent.resolveToken(token)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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if rule != nil && !rule.AgentRead(s.agent.config.NodeName) {
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return nil, acl.ErrPermissionDenied
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}
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if enablePrometheusOutput(req) {
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if s.agent.config.Telemetry.PrometheusRetentionTime < 1 {
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resp.WriteHeader(http.StatusUnsupportedMediaType)
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fmt.Fprint(resp, "Prometheus is not enabled since its retention time is not positive")
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return nil, nil
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}
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handlerOptions := promhttp.HandlerOpts{
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ErrorLog: s.agent.logger,
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ErrorHandling: promhttp.ContinueOnError,
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}
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handler := promhttp.HandlerFor(prometheus.DefaultGatherer, handlerOptions)
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handler.ServeHTTP(resp, req)
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return nil, nil
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}
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return s.agent.MemSink.DisplayMetrics(resp, req)
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}
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func (s *HTTPServer) AgentReload(resp http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) (interface{}, error) {
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// Fetch the ACL token, if any, and enforce agent policy.
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var token string
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s.parseToken(req, &token)
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rule, err := s.agent.resolveToken(token)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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if rule != nil && !rule.AgentWrite(s.agent.config.NodeName) {
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return nil, acl.ErrPermissionDenied
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}
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// Trigger the reload
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errCh := make(chan error, 0)
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select {
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case <-s.agent.shutdownCh:
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("Agent was shutdown before reload could be completed")
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case s.agent.reloadCh <- errCh:
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}
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// Wait for the result of the reload, or for the agent to shutdown
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select {
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case <-s.agent.shutdownCh:
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("Agent was shutdown before reload could be completed")
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case err := <-errCh:
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return nil, err
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}
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}
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func buildAgentService(s *structs.NodeService, proxies map[string]*local.ManagedProxy) api.AgentService {
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weights := api.AgentWeights{Passing: 1, Warning: 1}
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if s.Weights != nil {
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if s.Weights.Passing > 0 {
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weights.Passing = s.Weights.Passing
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}
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weights.Warning = s.Weights.Warning
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}
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as := api.AgentService{
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Kind: api.ServiceKind(s.Kind),
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ID: s.ID,
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Service: s.Service,
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Tags: s.Tags,
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Meta: s.Meta,
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Port: s.Port,
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Address: s.Address,
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EnableTagOverride: s.EnableTagOverride,
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CreateIndex: s.CreateIndex,
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ModifyIndex: s.ModifyIndex,
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Weights: weights,
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}
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if as.Tags == nil {
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as.Tags = []string{}
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}
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if as.Meta == nil {
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as.Meta = map[string]string{}
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}
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// Attach Unmanaged Proxy config if exists
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if s.Kind == structs.ServiceKindConnectProxy {
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as.Proxy = s.Proxy.ToAPI()
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// DEPRECATED (ProxyDestination) - remove this when removing ProxyDestination
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// Also set the deprecated ProxyDestination
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as.ProxyDestination = as.Proxy.DestinationServiceName
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}
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// Attach Connect configs if they exist. We use the actual proxy state since
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// that may have had defaults filled in compared to the config that was
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// provided with the service as stored in the NodeService here.
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if proxy, ok := proxies[s.ID+"-proxy"]; ok {
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as.Connect = &api.AgentServiceConnect{
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Proxy: &api.AgentServiceConnectProxy{
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ExecMode: api.ProxyExecMode(proxy.Proxy.ExecMode.String()),
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Command: proxy.Proxy.Command,
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Config: proxy.Proxy.Config,
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Upstreams: proxy.Proxy.Upstreams.ToAPI(),
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},
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}
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} else if s.Connect.Native {
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as.Connect = &api.AgentServiceConnect{
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Native: true,
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}
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}
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return as
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}
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func (s *HTTPServer) AgentServices(resp http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) (interface{}, error) {
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// Fetch the ACL token, if any.
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var token string
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s.parseToken(req, &token)
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services := s.agent.State.Services()
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if err := s.agent.filterServices(token, &services); err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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proxies := s.agent.State.Proxies()
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// Convert into api.AgentService since that includes Connect config but so far
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// NodeService doesn't need to internally. They are otherwise identical since
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// that is the struct used in client for reading the one we output here
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// anyway.
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agentSvcs := make(map[string]*api.AgentService)
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// Use empty list instead of nil
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for id, s := range services {
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agentService := buildAgentService(s, proxies)
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agentSvcs[id] = &agentService
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}
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return agentSvcs, nil
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}
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// GET /v1/agent/service/:service_id
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//
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// Returns the service definition for a single local services and allows
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// blocking watch using hash-based blocking.
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func (s *HTTPServer) AgentService(resp http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) (interface{}, error) {
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// Get the proxy ID. Note that this is the ID of a proxy's service instance.
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id := strings.TrimPrefix(req.URL.Path, "/v1/agent/service/")
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// DEPRECATED(managed-proxies) - remove this whole hack.
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//
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// Support managed proxies until they are removed entirely. Since built-in
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// proxy will now use this endpoint, in order to not break managed proxies in
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// the interim until they are removed, we need to mirror the default-setting
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// behavior they had. Rather than thread that through this whole method as
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// special cases that need to be unwound later (and duplicate logic in the
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// proxy config endpoint) just defer to that and then translate the response.
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if managedProxy := s.agent.State.Proxy(id); managedProxy != nil {
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// This is for a managed proxy, use the old endpoint's behavior
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req.URL.Path = "/v1/agent/connect/proxy/" + id
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obj, err := s.AgentConnectProxyConfig(resp, req)
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if err != nil {
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return obj, err
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}
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proxyCfg, ok := obj.(*api.ConnectProxyConfig)
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if !ok {
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return nil, errors.New("internal error")
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}
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// These are all set by defaults so type checks are just sanity checks that
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// should never fail.
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port, ok := proxyCfg.Config["bind_port"].(int)
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if !ok || port < 1 {
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return nil, errors.New("invalid proxy config")
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}
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addr, ok := proxyCfg.Config["bind_address"].(string)
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if !ok || addr == "" {
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return nil, errors.New("invalid proxy config")
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}
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localAddr, ok := proxyCfg.Config["local_service_address"].(string)
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if !ok || localAddr == "" {
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return nil, errors.New("invalid proxy config")
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}
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// Old local_service_address was a host:port
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localAddress, localPortRaw, err := net.SplitHostPort(localAddr)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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localPort, err := strconv.Atoi(localPortRaw)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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reply := &api.AgentService{
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Kind: api.ServiceKindConnectProxy,
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ID: proxyCfg.ProxyServiceID,
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Service: managedProxy.Proxy.ProxyService.Service,
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Port: port,
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Address: addr,
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ContentHash: proxyCfg.ContentHash,
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Proxy: &api.AgentServiceConnectProxyConfig{
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DestinationServiceName: proxyCfg.TargetServiceName,
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DestinationServiceID: proxyCfg.TargetServiceID,
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LocalServiceAddress: localAddress,
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LocalServicePort: localPort,
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Config: proxyCfg.Config,
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Upstreams: proxyCfg.Upstreams,
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},
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}
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return reply, nil
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}
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// Maybe block
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var queryOpts structs.QueryOptions
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if parseWait(resp, req, &queryOpts) {
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// parseWait returns an error itself
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return nil, nil
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}
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// Parse the token
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var token string
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s.parseToken(req, &token)
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// Parse hash specially. Eventually this should happen in parseWait and end up
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// in QueryOptions but I didn't want to make very general changes right away.
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hash := req.URL.Query().Get("hash")
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return s.agentLocalBlockingQuery(resp, hash, &queryOpts,
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func(ws memdb.WatchSet) (string, interface{}, error) {
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svcState := s.agent.State.ServiceState(id)
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if svcState == nil {
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resp.WriteHeader(http.StatusNotFound)
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fmt.Fprintf(resp, "unknown proxy service ID: %s", id)
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return "", nil, nil
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}
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svc := svcState.Service
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|
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// Setup watch on the service
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ws.Add(svcState.WatchCh)
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|
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// Check ACLs.
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rule, err := s.agent.resolveToken(token)
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if err != nil {
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return "", nil, err
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}
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if rule != nil && !rule.ServiceRead(svc.Service) {
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return "", nil, acl.ErrPermissionDenied
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}
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var connect *api.AgentServiceConnect
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var proxy *api.AgentServiceConnectProxyConfig
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if svc.Connect.Native {
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connect = &api.AgentServiceConnect{
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Native: svc.Connect.Native,
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}
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}
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if svc.Kind == structs.ServiceKindConnectProxy {
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proxy = svc.Proxy.ToAPI()
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}
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var weights api.AgentWeights
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if svc.Weights != nil {
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err := mapstructure.Decode(svc.Weights, &weights)
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if err != nil {
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return "", nil, err
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}
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}
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|
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// Calculate the content hash over the response, minus the hash field
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reply := &api.AgentService{
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Kind: api.ServiceKind(svc.Kind),
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ID: svc.ID,
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Service: svc.Service,
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Tags: svc.Tags,
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Meta: svc.Meta,
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Port: svc.Port,
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Address: svc.Address,
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EnableTagOverride: svc.EnableTagOverride,
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Weights: weights,
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Proxy: proxy,
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Connect: connect,
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}
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rawHash, err := hashstructure.Hash(reply, nil)
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if err != nil {
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return "", nil, err
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}
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|
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// Include the ContentHash in the response body
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reply.ContentHash = fmt.Sprintf("%x", rawHash)
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|
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return reply.ContentHash, reply, nil
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})
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}
|
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|
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func (s *HTTPServer) AgentChecks(resp http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) (interface{}, error) {
|
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// Fetch the ACL token, if any.
|
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var token string
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s.parseToken(req, &token)
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checks := s.agent.State.Checks()
|
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if err := s.agent.filterChecks(token, &checks); err != nil {
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return nil, err
|
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}
|
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|
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// Use empty list instead of nil
|
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for id, c := range checks {
|
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if c.ServiceTags == nil {
|
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clone := *c
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clone.ServiceTags = make([]string, 0)
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checks[id] = &clone
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}
|
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}
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return checks, nil
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}
|
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|
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func (s *HTTPServer) AgentMembers(resp http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) (interface{}, error) {
|
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// Fetch the ACL token, if any.
|
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var token string
|
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s.parseToken(req, &token)
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|
|
|
// Check if the WAN is being queried
|
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wan := false
|
|
if other := req.URL.Query().Get("wan"); other != "" {
|
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wan = true
|
|
}
|
|
|
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segment := req.URL.Query().Get("segment")
|
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if wan {
|
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switch segment {
|
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case "", api.AllSegments:
|
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// The zero value and the special "give me all members"
|
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// key are ok, otherwise the argument doesn't apply to
|
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// the WAN.
|
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default:
|
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resp.WriteHeader(http.StatusBadRequest)
|
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fmt.Fprint(resp, "Cannot provide a segment with wan=true")
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return nil, nil
|
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}
|
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}
|
|
|
|
var members []serf.Member
|
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if wan {
|
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members = s.agent.WANMembers()
|
|
} else {
|
|
var err error
|
|
if segment == api.AllSegments {
|
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members, err = s.agent.delegate.LANMembersAllSegments()
|
|
} else {
|
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members, err = s.agent.delegate.LANSegmentMembers(segment)
|
|
}
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if err := s.agent.filterMembers(token, &members); err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
return members, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (s *HTTPServer) AgentJoin(resp http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) (interface{}, error) {
|
|
// Fetch the ACL token, if any, and enforce agent policy.
|
|
var token string
|
|
s.parseToken(req, &token)
|
|
rule, err := s.agent.resolveToken(token)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
if rule != nil && !rule.AgentWrite(s.agent.config.NodeName) {
|
|
return nil, acl.ErrPermissionDenied
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Check if the WAN is being queried
|
|
wan := false
|
|
if other := req.URL.Query().Get("wan"); other != "" {
|
|
wan = true
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Get the address
|
|
addr := strings.TrimPrefix(req.URL.Path, "/v1/agent/join/")
|
|
if wan {
|
|
_, err = s.agent.JoinWAN([]string{addr})
|
|
} else {
|
|
_, err = s.agent.JoinLAN([]string{addr})
|
|
}
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (s *HTTPServer) AgentLeave(resp http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) (interface{}, error) {
|
|
// Fetch the ACL token, if any, and enforce agent policy.
|
|
var token string
|
|
s.parseToken(req, &token)
|
|
rule, err := s.agent.resolveToken(token)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
if rule != nil && !rule.AgentWrite(s.agent.config.NodeName) {
|
|
return nil, acl.ErrPermissionDenied
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if err := s.agent.Leave(); err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
return nil, s.agent.ShutdownAgent()
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (s *HTTPServer) AgentForceLeave(resp http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) (interface{}, error) {
|
|
// Fetch the ACL token, if any, and enforce agent policy.
|
|
var token string
|
|
s.parseToken(req, &token)
|
|
rule, err := s.agent.resolveToken(token)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
if rule != nil && !rule.AgentWrite(s.agent.config.NodeName) {
|
|
return nil, acl.ErrPermissionDenied
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
addr := strings.TrimPrefix(req.URL.Path, "/v1/agent/force-leave/")
|
|
return nil, s.agent.ForceLeave(addr)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// syncChanges is a helper function which wraps a blocking call to sync
|
|
// services and checks to the server. If the operation fails, we only
|
|
// only warn because the write did succeed and anti-entropy will sync later.
|
|
func (s *HTTPServer) syncChanges() {
|
|
if err := s.agent.State.SyncChanges(); err != nil {
|
|
s.agent.logger.Printf("[ERR] agent: failed to sync changes: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (s *HTTPServer) AgentRegisterCheck(resp http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) (interface{}, error) {
|
|
var args structs.CheckDefinition
|
|
// Fixup the type decode of TTL or Interval.
|
|
decodeCB := func(raw interface{}) error {
|
|
return FixupCheckType(raw)
|
|
}
|
|
if err := decodeBody(req, &args, decodeCB); err != nil {
|
|
resp.WriteHeader(http.StatusBadRequest)
|
|
fmt.Fprintf(resp, "Request decode failed: %v", err)
|
|
return nil, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Verify the check has a name.
|
|
if args.Name == "" {
|
|
resp.WriteHeader(http.StatusBadRequest)
|
|
fmt.Fprint(resp, "Missing check name")
|
|
return nil, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if args.Status != "" && !structs.ValidStatus(args.Status) {
|
|
resp.WriteHeader(http.StatusBadRequest)
|
|
fmt.Fprint(resp, "Bad check status")
|
|
return nil, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Construct the health check.
|
|
health := args.HealthCheck(s.agent.config.NodeName)
|
|
|
|
// Verify the check type.
|
|
chkType := args.CheckType()
|
|
err := chkType.Validate()
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
resp.WriteHeader(http.StatusBadRequest)
|
|
fmt.Fprint(resp, fmt.Errorf("Invalid check: %v", err))
|
|
return nil, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Get the provided token, if any, and vet against any ACL policies.
|
|
var token string
|
|
s.parseToken(req, &token)
|
|
if err := s.agent.vetCheckRegister(token, health); err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Add the check.
|
|
if err := s.agent.AddCheck(health, chkType, true, token, ConfigSourceRemote); err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
s.syncChanges()
|
|
return nil, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (s *HTTPServer) AgentDeregisterCheck(resp http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) (interface{}, error) {
|
|
checkID := types.CheckID(strings.TrimPrefix(req.URL.Path, "/v1/agent/check/deregister/"))
|
|
|
|
// Get the provided token, if any, and vet against any ACL policies.
|
|
var token string
|
|
s.parseToken(req, &token)
|
|
if err := s.agent.vetCheckUpdate(token, checkID); err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if err := s.agent.RemoveCheck(checkID, true); err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
s.syncChanges()
|
|
return nil, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (s *HTTPServer) AgentCheckPass(resp http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) (interface{}, error) {
|
|
checkID := types.CheckID(strings.TrimPrefix(req.URL.Path, "/v1/agent/check/pass/"))
|
|
note := req.URL.Query().Get("note")
|
|
|
|
// Get the provided token, if any, and vet against any ACL policies.
|
|
var token string
|
|
s.parseToken(req, &token)
|
|
if err := s.agent.vetCheckUpdate(token, checkID); err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if err := s.agent.updateTTLCheck(checkID, api.HealthPassing, note); err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
s.syncChanges()
|
|
return nil, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (s *HTTPServer) AgentCheckWarn(resp http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) (interface{}, error) {
|
|
checkID := types.CheckID(strings.TrimPrefix(req.URL.Path, "/v1/agent/check/warn/"))
|
|
note := req.URL.Query().Get("note")
|
|
|
|
// Get the provided token, if any, and vet against any ACL policies.
|
|
var token string
|
|
s.parseToken(req, &token)
|
|
if err := s.agent.vetCheckUpdate(token, checkID); err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if err := s.agent.updateTTLCheck(checkID, api.HealthWarning, note); err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
s.syncChanges()
|
|
return nil, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (s *HTTPServer) AgentCheckFail(resp http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) (interface{}, error) {
|
|
checkID := types.CheckID(strings.TrimPrefix(req.URL.Path, "/v1/agent/check/fail/"))
|
|
note := req.URL.Query().Get("note")
|
|
|
|
// Get the provided token, if any, and vet against any ACL policies.
|
|
var token string
|
|
s.parseToken(req, &token)
|
|
if err := s.agent.vetCheckUpdate(token, checkID); err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if err := s.agent.updateTTLCheck(checkID, api.HealthCritical, note); err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
s.syncChanges()
|
|
return nil, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// checkUpdate is the payload for a PUT to AgentCheckUpdate.
|
|
type checkUpdate struct {
|
|
// Status us one of the api.Health* states, "passing", "warning", or
|
|
// "critical".
|
|
Status string
|
|
|
|
// Output is the information to post to the UI for operators as the
|
|
// output of the process that decided to hit the TTL check. This is
|
|
// different from the note field that's associated with the check
|
|
// itself.
|
|
Output string
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// AgentCheckUpdate is a PUT-based alternative to the GET-based Pass/Warn/Fail
|
|
// APIs.
|
|
func (s *HTTPServer) AgentCheckUpdate(resp http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) (interface{}, error) {
|
|
var update checkUpdate
|
|
if err := decodeBody(req, &update, nil); err != nil {
|
|
resp.WriteHeader(http.StatusBadRequest)
|
|
fmt.Fprintf(resp, "Request decode failed: %v", err)
|
|
return nil, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
switch update.Status {
|
|
case api.HealthPassing:
|
|
case api.HealthWarning:
|
|
case api.HealthCritical:
|
|
default:
|
|
resp.WriteHeader(http.StatusBadRequest)
|
|
fmt.Fprintf(resp, "Invalid check status: '%s'", update.Status)
|
|
return nil, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
total := len(update.Output)
|
|
if total > checks.BufSize {
|
|
update.Output = fmt.Sprintf("%s ... (captured %d of %d bytes)",
|
|
update.Output[:checks.BufSize], checks.BufSize, total)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
checkID := types.CheckID(strings.TrimPrefix(req.URL.Path, "/v1/agent/check/update/"))
|
|
|
|
// Get the provided token, if any, and vet against any ACL policies.
|
|
var token string
|
|
s.parseToken(req, &token)
|
|
if err := s.agent.vetCheckUpdate(token, checkID); err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if err := s.agent.updateTTLCheck(checkID, update.Status, update.Output); err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
s.syncChanges()
|
|
return nil, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// agentHealthService Returns Health for a given service ID
|
|
func agentHealthService(serviceID string, s *HTTPServer) (int, string, api.HealthChecks) {
|
|
checks := s.agent.State.Checks()
|
|
serviceChecks := make(api.HealthChecks, 0)
|
|
for _, c := range checks {
|
|
if c.ServiceID == serviceID || c.ServiceID == "" {
|
|
// TODO: harmonize struct.HealthCheck and api.HealthCheck (or at least extract conversion function)
|
|
healthCheck := &api.HealthCheck{
|
|
Node: c.Node,
|
|
CheckID: string(c.CheckID),
|
|
Name: c.Name,
|
|
Status: c.Status,
|
|
Notes: c.Notes,
|
|
Output: c.Output,
|
|
ServiceID: c.ServiceID,
|
|
ServiceName: c.ServiceName,
|
|
ServiceTags: c.ServiceTags,
|
|
}
|
|
serviceChecks = append(serviceChecks, healthCheck)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
status := serviceChecks.AggregatedStatus()
|
|
switch status {
|
|
case api.HealthWarning:
|
|
return http.StatusTooManyRequests, status, serviceChecks
|
|
case api.HealthPassing:
|
|
return http.StatusOK, status, serviceChecks
|
|
default:
|
|
return http.StatusServiceUnavailable, status, serviceChecks
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func returnTextPlain(req *http.Request) bool {
|
|
if contentType := req.Header.Get("Accept"); strings.HasPrefix(contentType, "text/plain") {
|
|
return true
|
|
}
|
|
if format := req.URL.Query().Get("format"); format != "" {
|
|
return format == "text"
|
|
}
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// AgentHealthServiceByID return the local Service Health given its ID
|
|
func (s *HTTPServer) AgentHealthServiceByID(resp http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) (interface{}, error) {
|
|
// Pull out the service id (service id since there may be several instance of the same service on this host)
|
|
serviceID := strings.TrimPrefix(req.URL.Path, "/v1/agent/health/service/id/")
|
|
if serviceID == "" {
|
|
return nil, &BadRequestError{Reason: "Missing serviceID"}
|
|
}
|
|
services := s.agent.State.Services()
|
|
proxies := s.agent.State.Proxies()
|
|
for _, service := range services {
|
|
if service.ID == serviceID {
|
|
code, status, healthChecks := agentHealthService(serviceID, s)
|
|
if returnTextPlain(req) {
|
|
return status, CodeWithPayloadError{StatusCode: code, Reason: status, ContentType: "text/plain"}
|
|
}
|
|
serviceInfo := buildAgentService(service, proxies)
|
|
result := &api.AgentServiceChecksInfo{
|
|
AggregatedStatus: status,
|
|
Checks: healthChecks,
|
|
Service: &serviceInfo,
|
|
}
|
|
return result, CodeWithPayloadError{StatusCode: code, Reason: status, ContentType: "application/json"}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
notFoundReason := fmt.Sprintf("ServiceId %s not found", serviceID)
|
|
if returnTextPlain(req) {
|
|
return notFoundReason, CodeWithPayloadError{StatusCode: http.StatusNotFound, Reason: fmt.Sprintf("ServiceId %s not found", serviceID), ContentType: "application/json"}
|
|
}
|
|
return &api.AgentServiceChecksInfo{
|
|
AggregatedStatus: api.HealthCritical,
|
|
Checks: nil,
|
|
Service: nil,
|
|
}, CodeWithPayloadError{StatusCode: http.StatusNotFound, Reason: notFoundReason, ContentType: "application/json"}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// AgentHealthServiceByName return the worse status of all the services with given name on an agent
|
|
func (s *HTTPServer) AgentHealthServiceByName(resp http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) (interface{}, error) {
|
|
// Pull out the service name
|
|
serviceName := strings.TrimPrefix(req.URL.Path, "/v1/agent/health/service/name/")
|
|
if serviceName == "" {
|
|
return nil, &BadRequestError{Reason: "Missing service Name"}
|
|
}
|
|
code := http.StatusNotFound
|
|
status := fmt.Sprintf("ServiceName %s Not Found", serviceName)
|
|
services := s.agent.State.Services()
|
|
result := make([]api.AgentServiceChecksInfo, 0, 16)
|
|
proxies := s.agent.State.Proxies()
|
|
for _, service := range services {
|
|
if service.Service == serviceName {
|
|
scode, sstatus, healthChecks := agentHealthService(service.ID, s)
|
|
serviceInfo := buildAgentService(service, proxies)
|
|
res := api.AgentServiceChecksInfo{
|
|
AggregatedStatus: sstatus,
|
|
Checks: healthChecks,
|
|
Service: &serviceInfo,
|
|
}
|
|
result = append(result, res)
|
|
// When service is not found, we ignore it and keep existing HTTP status
|
|
if code == http.StatusNotFound {
|
|
code = scode
|
|
status = sstatus
|
|
}
|
|
// We take the worst of all statuses, so we keep iterating
|
|
// passing: 200 < warning: 429 < critical: 503
|
|
if code < scode {
|
|
code = scode
|
|
status = sstatus
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if returnTextPlain(req) {
|
|
return status, CodeWithPayloadError{StatusCode: code, Reason: status, ContentType: "text/plain"}
|
|
}
|
|
return result, CodeWithPayloadError{StatusCode: code, Reason: status, ContentType: "application/json"}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (s *HTTPServer) AgentRegisterService(resp http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) (interface{}, error) {
|
|
var args structs.ServiceDefinition
|
|
// Fixup the type decode of TTL or Interval if a check if provided.
|
|
decodeCB := func(raw interface{}) error {
|
|
rawMap, ok := raw.(map[string]interface{})
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// see https://github.com/hashicorp/consul/pull/3557 why we need this
|
|
// and why we should get rid of it.
|
|
config.TranslateKeys(rawMap, map[string]string{
|
|
"enable_tag_override": "EnableTagOverride",
|
|
// Managed Proxy Config
|
|
"exec_mode": "ExecMode",
|
|
// Proxy Upstreams
|
|
"destination_name": "DestinationName",
|
|
"destination_type": "DestinationType",
|
|
"destination_namespace": "DestinationNamespace",
|
|
"local_bind_port": "LocalBindPort",
|
|
"local_bind_address": "LocalBindAddress",
|
|
// Proxy Config
|
|
"destination_service_name": "DestinationServiceName",
|
|
"destination_service_id": "DestinationServiceID",
|
|
"local_service_port": "LocalServicePort",
|
|
"local_service_address": "LocalServiceAddress",
|
|
// SidecarService
|
|
"sidecar_service": "SidecarService",
|
|
|
|
// DON'T Recurse into these opaque config maps or we might mangle user's
|
|
// keys. Note empty canonical is a special sentinel to prevent recursion.
|
|
"Meta": "",
|
|
// upstreams is an array but this prevents recursion into config field of
|
|
// any item in the array.
|
|
"Proxy.Config": "",
|
|
"Proxy.Upstreams.Config": "",
|
|
"Connect.Proxy.Config": "",
|
|
"Connect.Proxy.Upstreams.Config": "",
|
|
|
|
// Same exceptions as above, but for a nested sidecar_service note we use
|
|
// the canonical form SidecarService since that is translated by the time
|
|
// the lookup here happens. Note that sidecar service doesn't support
|
|
// managed proxies (connect.proxy).
|
|
"Connect.SidecarService.Meta": "",
|
|
"Connect.SidecarService.Proxy.Config": "",
|
|
"Connect.SidecarService.Proxy.Upstreams.config": "",
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
for k, v := range rawMap {
|
|
switch strings.ToLower(k) {
|
|
case "check":
|
|
if err := FixupCheckType(v); err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
case "checks":
|
|
chkTypes, ok := v.([]interface{})
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
for _, chkType := range chkTypes {
|
|
if err := FixupCheckType(chkType); err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
if err := decodeBody(req, &args, decodeCB); err != nil {
|
|
resp.WriteHeader(http.StatusBadRequest)
|
|
fmt.Fprintf(resp, "Request decode failed: %v", err)
|
|
return nil, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Verify the service has a name.
|
|
if args.Name == "" {
|
|
resp.WriteHeader(http.StatusBadRequest)
|
|
fmt.Fprint(resp, "Missing service name")
|
|
return nil, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Check the service address here and in the catalog RPC endpoint
|
|
// since service registration isn't synchronous.
|
|
if ipaddr.IsAny(args.Address) {
|
|
resp.WriteHeader(http.StatusBadRequest)
|
|
fmt.Fprintf(resp, "Invalid service address")
|
|
return nil, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Get the node service.
|
|
ns := args.NodeService()
|
|
if ns.Weights != nil {
|
|
if err := structs.ValidateWeights(ns.Weights); err != nil {
|
|
resp.WriteHeader(http.StatusBadRequest)
|
|
fmt.Fprint(resp, fmt.Errorf("Invalid Weights: %v", err))
|
|
return nil, nil
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if err := structs.ValidateMetadata(ns.Meta, false); err != nil {
|
|
resp.WriteHeader(http.StatusBadRequest)
|
|
fmt.Fprint(resp, fmt.Errorf("Invalid Service Meta: %v", err))
|
|
return nil, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Run validation. This is the same validation that would happen on
|
|
// the catalog endpoint so it helps ensure the sync will work properly.
|
|
if err := ns.Validate(); err != nil {
|
|
resp.WriteHeader(http.StatusBadRequest)
|
|
fmt.Fprintf(resp, err.Error())
|
|
return nil, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Verify the check type.
|
|
chkTypes, err := args.CheckTypes()
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
resp.WriteHeader(http.StatusBadRequest)
|
|
fmt.Fprint(resp, fmt.Errorf("Invalid check: %v", err))
|
|
return nil, nil
|
|
}
|
|
for _, check := range chkTypes {
|
|
if check.Status != "" && !structs.ValidStatus(check.Status) {
|
|
resp.WriteHeader(http.StatusBadRequest)
|
|
fmt.Fprint(resp, "Status for checks must 'passing', 'warning', 'critical'")
|
|
return nil, nil
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Verify the sidecar check types
|
|
if args.Connect != nil && args.Connect.SidecarService != nil {
|
|
chkTypes, err := args.Connect.SidecarService.CheckTypes()
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, &BadRequestError{
|
|
Reason: fmt.Sprintf("Invalid check in sidecar_service: %v", err),
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
for _, check := range chkTypes {
|
|
if check.Status != "" && !structs.ValidStatus(check.Status) {
|
|
return nil, &BadRequestError{
|
|
Reason: "Status for checks must 'passing', 'warning', 'critical'",
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Get the provided token, if any, and vet against any ACL policies.
|
|
var token string
|
|
s.parseToken(req, &token)
|
|
if err := s.agent.vetServiceRegister(token, ns); err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// See if we have a sidecar to register too
|
|
sidecar, sidecarChecks, sidecarToken, err := s.agent.sidecarServiceFromNodeService(ns, token)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, &BadRequestError{
|
|
Reason: fmt.Sprintf("Invalid SidecarService: %s", err)}
|
|
}
|
|
if sidecar != nil {
|
|
// Make sure we are allowed to register the sidecar using the token
|
|
// specified (might be specific to sidecar or the same one as the overall
|
|
// request).
|
|
if err := s.agent.vetServiceRegister(sidecarToken, sidecar); err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
// We parsed the sidecar registration, now remove it from the NodeService
|
|
// for the actual service since it's done it's job and we don't want to
|
|
// persist it in the actual state/catalog. SidecarService is meant to be a
|
|
// registration syntax sugar so don't propagate it any further.
|
|
ns.Connect.SidecarService = nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Get any proxy registrations
|
|
proxy, err := args.ConnectManagedProxy()
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
resp.WriteHeader(http.StatusBadRequest)
|
|
fmt.Fprintf(resp, err.Error())
|
|
return nil, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// If we have a proxy, verify that we're allowed to add a proxy via the API
|
|
if proxy != nil && !s.agent.config.ConnectProxyAllowManagedAPIRegistration {
|
|
return nil, &BadRequestError{
|
|
Reason: "Managed proxy registration via the API is disallowed."}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Add the service.
|
|
if err := s.agent.AddService(ns, chkTypes, true, token, ConfigSourceRemote); err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
// Add proxy (which will add proxy service so do it before we trigger sync)
|
|
if proxy != nil {
|
|
if err := s.agent.AddProxy(proxy, true, false, "", ConfigSourceRemote); err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
// Add sidecar.
|
|
if sidecar != nil {
|
|
if err := s.agent.AddService(sidecar, sidecarChecks, true, sidecarToken, ConfigSourceRemote); err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
s.syncChanges()
|
|
return nil, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (s *HTTPServer) AgentDeregisterService(resp http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) (interface{}, error) {
|
|
serviceID := strings.TrimPrefix(req.URL.Path, "/v1/agent/service/deregister/")
|
|
|
|
// Get the provided token, if any, and vet against any ACL policies.
|
|
var token string
|
|
s.parseToken(req, &token)
|
|
if err := s.agent.vetServiceUpdate(token, serviceID); err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Verify this isn't a proxy
|
|
if s.agent.State.Proxy(serviceID) != nil {
|
|
return nil, &BadRequestError{
|
|
Reason: "Managed proxy service cannot be deregistered directly. " +
|
|
"Deregister the service that has a managed proxy to automatically " +
|
|
"deregister the managed proxy itself."}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if err := s.agent.RemoveService(serviceID, true); err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
s.syncChanges()
|
|
return nil, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (s *HTTPServer) AgentServiceMaintenance(resp http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) (interface{}, error) {
|
|
// Ensure we have a service ID
|
|
serviceID := strings.TrimPrefix(req.URL.Path, "/v1/agent/service/maintenance/")
|
|
if serviceID == "" {
|
|
resp.WriteHeader(http.StatusBadRequest)
|
|
fmt.Fprint(resp, "Missing service ID")
|
|
return nil, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Ensure we have some action
|
|
params := req.URL.Query()
|
|
if _, ok := params["enable"]; !ok {
|
|
resp.WriteHeader(http.StatusBadRequest)
|
|
fmt.Fprint(resp, "Missing value for enable")
|
|
return nil, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
raw := params.Get("enable")
|
|
enable, err := strconv.ParseBool(raw)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
resp.WriteHeader(http.StatusBadRequest)
|
|
fmt.Fprintf(resp, "Invalid value for enable: %q", raw)
|
|
return nil, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Get the provided token, if any, and vet against any ACL policies.
|
|
var token string
|
|
s.parseToken(req, &token)
|
|
if err := s.agent.vetServiceUpdate(token, serviceID); err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if enable {
|
|
reason := params.Get("reason")
|
|
if err = s.agent.EnableServiceMaintenance(serviceID, reason, token); err != nil {
|
|
resp.WriteHeader(http.StatusNotFound)
|
|
fmt.Fprint(resp, err.Error())
|
|
return nil, nil
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
if err = s.agent.DisableServiceMaintenance(serviceID); err != nil {
|
|
resp.WriteHeader(http.StatusNotFound)
|
|
fmt.Fprint(resp, err.Error())
|
|
return nil, nil
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
s.syncChanges()
|
|
return nil, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (s *HTTPServer) AgentNodeMaintenance(resp http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) (interface{}, error) {
|
|
// Ensure we have some action
|
|
params := req.URL.Query()
|
|
if _, ok := params["enable"]; !ok {
|
|
resp.WriteHeader(http.StatusBadRequest)
|
|
fmt.Fprint(resp, "Missing value for enable")
|
|
return nil, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
raw := params.Get("enable")
|
|
enable, err := strconv.ParseBool(raw)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
resp.WriteHeader(http.StatusBadRequest)
|
|
fmt.Fprintf(resp, "Invalid value for enable: %q", raw)
|
|
return nil, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Get the provided token, if any, and vet against any ACL policies.
|
|
var token string
|
|
s.parseToken(req, &token)
|
|
rule, err := s.agent.resolveToken(token)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
if rule != nil && !rule.NodeWrite(s.agent.config.NodeName, nil) {
|
|
return nil, acl.ErrPermissionDenied
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if enable {
|
|
s.agent.EnableNodeMaintenance(params.Get("reason"), token)
|
|
} else {
|
|
s.agent.DisableNodeMaintenance()
|
|
}
|
|
s.syncChanges()
|
|
return nil, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (s *HTTPServer) AgentMonitor(resp http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) (interface{}, error) {
|
|
// Fetch the ACL token, if any, and enforce agent policy.
|
|
var token string
|
|
s.parseToken(req, &token)
|
|
rule, err := s.agent.resolveToken(token)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
if rule != nil && !rule.AgentRead(s.agent.config.NodeName) {
|
|
return nil, acl.ErrPermissionDenied
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Get the provided loglevel.
|
|
logLevel := req.URL.Query().Get("loglevel")
|
|
if logLevel == "" {
|
|
logLevel = "INFO"
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Upper case the level since that's required by the filter.
|
|
logLevel = strings.ToUpper(logLevel)
|
|
|
|
// Create a level filter and flusher.
|
|
filter := logger.LevelFilter()
|
|
filter.MinLevel = logutils.LogLevel(logLevel)
|
|
if !logger.ValidateLevelFilter(filter.MinLevel, filter) {
|
|
resp.WriteHeader(http.StatusBadRequest)
|
|
fmt.Fprintf(resp, "Unknown log level: %s", filter.MinLevel)
|
|
return nil, nil
|
|
}
|
|
flusher, ok := resp.(http.Flusher)
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("Streaming not supported")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Set up a log handler.
|
|
handler := &httpLogHandler{
|
|
filter: filter,
|
|
logCh: make(chan string, 512),
|
|
logger: s.agent.logger,
|
|
}
|
|
s.agent.LogWriter.RegisterHandler(handler)
|
|
defer s.agent.LogWriter.DeregisterHandler(handler)
|
|
notify := resp.(http.CloseNotifier).CloseNotify()
|
|
|
|
// Send header so client can start streaming body
|
|
resp.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
|
|
|
|
// 0 byte write is needed before the Flush call so that if we are using
|
|
// a gzip stream it will go ahead and write out the HTTP response header
|
|
resp.Write([]byte(""))
|
|
flusher.Flush()
|
|
|
|
// Stream logs until the connection is closed.
|
|
for {
|
|
select {
|
|
case <-notify:
|
|
s.agent.LogWriter.DeregisterHandler(handler)
|
|
if handler.droppedCount > 0 {
|
|
s.agent.logger.Printf("[WARN] agent: Dropped %d logs during monitor request", handler.droppedCount)
|
|
}
|
|
return nil, nil
|
|
case log := <-handler.logCh:
|
|
fmt.Fprintln(resp, log)
|
|
flusher.Flush()
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
type httpLogHandler struct {
|
|
filter *logutils.LevelFilter
|
|
logCh chan string
|
|
logger *log.Logger
|
|
droppedCount int
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (h *httpLogHandler) HandleLog(log string) {
|
|
// Check the log level
|
|
if !h.filter.Check([]byte(log)) {
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Do a non-blocking send
|
|
select {
|
|
case h.logCh <- log:
|
|
default:
|
|
// Just increment a counter for dropped logs to this handler; we can't log now
|
|
// because the lock is already held by the LogWriter invoking this
|
|
h.droppedCount++
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (s *HTTPServer) AgentToken(resp http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) (interface{}, error) {
|
|
if s.checkACLDisabled(resp, req) {
|
|
return nil, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Fetch the ACL token, if any, and enforce agent policy.
|
|
var token string
|
|
s.parseToken(req, &token)
|
|
rule, err := s.agent.resolveToken(token)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
if rule != nil && !rule.AgentWrite(s.agent.config.NodeName) {
|
|
return nil, acl.ErrPermissionDenied
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// The body is just the token, but it's in a JSON object so we can add
|
|
// fields to this later if needed.
|
|
var args api.AgentToken
|
|
if err := decodeBody(req, &args, nil); err != nil {
|
|
resp.WriteHeader(http.StatusBadRequest)
|
|
fmt.Fprintf(resp, "Request decode failed: %v", err)
|
|
return nil, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if s.agent.config.ACLEnableTokenPersistence {
|
|
// we hold the lock around updating the internal token store
|
|
// as well as persisting the tokens because we don't want to write
|
|
// into the store to have something else wipe it out before we can
|
|
// persist everything (like an agent config reload). The token store
|
|
// lock is only held for those operations so other go routines that
|
|
// just need to read some token out of the store will not be impacted
|
|
// any more than they would be without token persistence.
|
|
s.agent.persistedTokensLock.Lock()
|
|
defer s.agent.persistedTokensLock.Unlock()
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Figure out the target token.
|
|
target := strings.TrimPrefix(req.URL.Path, "/v1/agent/token/")
|
|
switch target {
|
|
case "acl_token", "default":
|
|
s.agent.tokens.UpdateUserToken(args.Token, token_store.TokenSourceAPI)
|
|
|
|
case "acl_agent_token", "agent":
|
|
s.agent.tokens.UpdateAgentToken(args.Token, token_store.TokenSourceAPI)
|
|
|
|
case "acl_agent_master_token", "agent_master":
|
|
s.agent.tokens.UpdateAgentMasterToken(args.Token, token_store.TokenSourceAPI)
|
|
|
|
case "acl_replication_token", "replication":
|
|
s.agent.tokens.UpdateReplicationToken(args.Token, token_store.TokenSourceAPI)
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
resp.WriteHeader(http.StatusNotFound)
|
|
fmt.Fprintf(resp, "Token %q is unknown", target)
|
|
return nil, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if s.agent.config.ACLEnableTokenPersistence {
|
|
tokens := persistedTokens{}
|
|
|
|
if tok, source := s.agent.tokens.UserTokenAndSource(); tok != "" && source == token_store.TokenSourceAPI {
|
|
tokens.Default = tok
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if tok, source := s.agent.tokens.AgentTokenAndSource(); tok != "" && source == token_store.TokenSourceAPI {
|
|
tokens.Agent = tok
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if tok, source := s.agent.tokens.AgentMasterTokenAndSource(); tok != "" && source == token_store.TokenSourceAPI {
|
|
tokens.AgentMaster = tok
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if tok, source := s.agent.tokens.ReplicationTokenAndSource(); tok != "" && source == token_store.TokenSourceAPI {
|
|
tokens.Replication = tok
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
data, err := json.Marshal(tokens)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
s.agent.logger.Printf("[WARN] agent: failed to persist tokens - %v", err)
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("Failed to marshal tokens for persistence: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if err := file.WriteAtomicWithPerms(filepath.Join(s.agent.config.DataDir, tokensPath), data, 0600); err != nil {
|
|
s.agent.logger.Printf("[WARN] agent: failed to persist tokens - %v", err)
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("Failed to persist tokens - %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
s.agent.logger.Printf("[INFO] agent: Updated agent's ACL token %q", target)
|
|
return nil, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// AgentConnectCARoots returns the trusted CA roots.
|
|
func (s *HTTPServer) AgentConnectCARoots(resp http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) (interface{}, error) {
|
|
var args structs.DCSpecificRequest
|
|
if done := s.parse(resp, req, &args.Datacenter, &args.QueryOptions); done {
|
|
return nil, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
raw, m, err := s.agent.cache.Get(cachetype.ConnectCARootName, &args)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
defer setCacheMeta(resp, &m)
|
|
|
|
// Add cache hit
|
|
|
|
reply, ok := raw.(*structs.IndexedCARoots)
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
// This should never happen, but we want to protect against panics
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("internal error: response type not correct")
|
|
}
|
|
defer setMeta(resp, &reply.QueryMeta)
|
|
|
|
return *reply, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// AgentConnectCALeafCert returns the certificate bundle for a service
|
|
// instance. This supports blocking queries to update the returned bundle.
|
|
func (s *HTTPServer) AgentConnectCALeafCert(resp http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) (interface{}, error) {
|
|
// Get the service name. Note that this is the name of the service,
|
|
// not the ID of the service instance.
|
|
serviceName := strings.TrimPrefix(req.URL.Path, "/v1/agent/connect/ca/leaf/")
|
|
|
|
args := cachetype.ConnectCALeafRequest{
|
|
Service: serviceName, // Need name not ID
|
|
}
|
|
var qOpts structs.QueryOptions
|
|
|
|
// Store DC in the ConnectCALeafRequest but query opts separately
|
|
// Don't resolve a proxy token to a real token that will be
|
|
// done with a call to verifyProxyToken later along with
|
|
// other security relevant checks.
|
|
if done := s.parseWithoutResolvingProxyToken(resp, req, &args.Datacenter, &qOpts); done {
|
|
return nil, nil
|
|
}
|
|
args.MinQueryIndex = qOpts.MinQueryIndex
|
|
args.MaxQueryTime = qOpts.MaxQueryTime
|
|
|
|
// Verify the proxy token. This will check both the local proxy token
|
|
// as well as the ACL if the token isn't local. The checks done in
|
|
// verifyProxyToken are still relevant because a leaf cert can be cached
|
|
// verifying the proxy token matches the service id or that a real
|
|
// acl token still is valid and has ServiceWrite is necessary or
|
|
// that cached cert is potentially unprotected.
|
|
effectiveToken, _, err := s.agent.verifyProxyToken(qOpts.Token, serviceName, "")
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
args.Token = effectiveToken
|
|
|
|
raw, m, err := s.agent.cache.Get(cachetype.ConnectCALeafName, &args)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
defer setCacheMeta(resp, &m)
|
|
|
|
reply, ok := raw.(*structs.IssuedCert)
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
// This should never happen, but we want to protect against panics
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("internal error: response type not correct")
|
|
}
|
|
setIndex(resp, reply.ModifyIndex)
|
|
|
|
return reply, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// GET /v1/agent/connect/proxy/:proxy_service_id
|
|
//
|
|
// Returns the local proxy config for the identified proxy. Requires token=
|
|
// param with the correct local ProxyToken (not ACL token).
|
|
func (s *HTTPServer) AgentConnectProxyConfig(resp http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) (interface{}, error) {
|
|
// Get the proxy ID. Note that this is the ID of a proxy's service instance.
|
|
id := strings.TrimPrefix(req.URL.Path, "/v1/agent/connect/proxy/")
|
|
|
|
// Maybe block
|
|
var queryOpts structs.QueryOptions
|
|
if parseWait(resp, req, &queryOpts) {
|
|
// parseWait returns an error itself
|
|
return nil, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Parse the token - don't resolve a proxy token to a real token
|
|
// that will be done with a call to verifyProxyToken later along with
|
|
// other security relevant checks.
|
|
var token string
|
|
s.parseTokenWithoutResolvingProxyToken(req, &token)
|
|
|
|
// Parse hash specially since it's only this endpoint that uses it currently.
|
|
// Eventually this should happen in parseWait and end up in QueryOptions but I
|
|
// didn't want to make very general changes right away.
|
|
hash := req.URL.Query().Get("hash")
|
|
|
|
return s.agentLocalBlockingQuery(resp, hash, &queryOpts,
|
|
func(ws memdb.WatchSet) (string, interface{}, error) {
|
|
// Retrieve the proxy specified
|
|
proxy := s.agent.State.Proxy(id)
|
|
if proxy == nil {
|
|
resp.WriteHeader(http.StatusNotFound)
|
|
fmt.Fprintf(resp, "unknown proxy service ID: %s", id)
|
|
return "", nil, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Lookup the target service as a convenience
|
|
target := s.agent.State.Service(proxy.Proxy.TargetServiceID)
|
|
if target == nil {
|
|
// Not found since this endpoint is only useful for agent-managed proxies so
|
|
// service missing means the service was deregistered racily with this call.
|
|
resp.WriteHeader(http.StatusNotFound)
|
|
fmt.Fprintf(resp, "unknown target service ID: %s", proxy.Proxy.TargetServiceID)
|
|
return "", nil, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Validate the ACL token - because this endpoint uses data local to a single
|
|
// agent, this function is responsible for all enforcement regarding
|
|
// protection of the configuration. verifyProxyToken will match the proxies
|
|
// token to the correct service or in the case of being provide a real ACL
|
|
// token it will ensure that the requester has ServiceWrite privileges
|
|
// for this service.
|
|
_, isProxyToken, err := s.agent.verifyProxyToken(token, target.Service, id)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return "", nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Watch the proxy for changes
|
|
ws.Add(proxy.WatchCh)
|
|
|
|
hash, err := hashstructure.Hash(proxy.Proxy, nil)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return "", nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
contentHash := fmt.Sprintf("%x", hash)
|
|
|
|
// Set defaults
|
|
config, err := s.agent.applyProxyConfigDefaults(proxy.Proxy)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return "", nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Only merge in telemetry config from agent if the requested is
|
|
// authorized with a proxy token. This prevents us leaking potentially
|
|
// sensitive config like Circonus API token via a public endpoint. Proxy
|
|
// tokens are only ever generated in-memory and passed via ENV to a child
|
|
// proxy process so potential for abuse here seems small. This endpoint in
|
|
// general is only useful for managed proxies now so it should _always_ be
|
|
// true that auth is via a proxy token but inconvenient for testing if we
|
|
// lock it down so strictly.
|
|
if isProxyToken {
|
|
// Add telemetry config. Copy the global config so we can customize the
|
|
// prefix.
|
|
telemetryCfg := s.agent.config.Telemetry
|
|
telemetryCfg.MetricsPrefix = telemetryCfg.MetricsPrefix + ".proxy." + target.ID
|
|
|
|
// First see if the user has specified telemetry
|
|
if userRaw, ok := config["telemetry"]; ok {
|
|
// User specified domething, see if it is compatible with agent
|
|
// telemetry config:
|
|
var uCfg lib.TelemetryConfig
|
|
dec, err := mapstructure.NewDecoder(&mapstructure.DecoderConfig{
|
|
Result: &uCfg,
|
|
// Make sure that if the user passes something that isn't just a
|
|
// simple override of a valid TelemetryConfig that we fail so that we
|
|
// don't clobber their custom config.
|
|
ErrorUnused: true,
|
|
})
|
|
if err == nil {
|
|
if err = dec.Decode(userRaw); err == nil {
|
|
// It did decode! Merge any unspecified fields from agent config.
|
|
uCfg.MergeDefaults(&telemetryCfg)
|
|
config["telemetry"] = uCfg
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
// Failed to decode, just keep user's config["telemetry"] verbatim
|
|
// with no agent merge.
|
|
} else {
|
|
// Add agent telemetry config.
|
|
config["telemetry"] = telemetryCfg
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
reply := &api.ConnectProxyConfig{
|
|
ProxyServiceID: proxy.Proxy.ProxyService.ID,
|
|
TargetServiceID: target.ID,
|
|
TargetServiceName: target.Service,
|
|
ContentHash: contentHash,
|
|
ExecMode: api.ProxyExecMode(proxy.Proxy.ExecMode.String()),
|
|
Command: proxy.Proxy.Command,
|
|
Config: config,
|
|
Upstreams: proxy.Proxy.Upstreams.ToAPI(),
|
|
}
|
|
return contentHash, reply, nil
|
|
})
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
type agentLocalBlockingFunc func(ws memdb.WatchSet) (string, interface{}, error)
|
|
|
|
// agentLocalBlockingQuery performs a blocking query in a generic way against
|
|
// local agent state that has no RPC or raft to back it. It uses `hash` parameter
|
|
// instead of an `index`. The resp is needed to write the `X-Consul-ContentHash`
|
|
// header back on return no Status nor body content is ever written to it.
|
|
func (s *HTTPServer) agentLocalBlockingQuery(resp http.ResponseWriter, hash string,
|
|
queryOpts *structs.QueryOptions, fn agentLocalBlockingFunc) (interface{}, error) {
|
|
|
|
// If we are not blocking we can skip tracking and allocating - nil WatchSet
|
|
// is still valid to call Add on and will just be a no op.
|
|
var ws memdb.WatchSet
|
|
var timeout *time.Timer
|
|
|
|
if hash != "" {
|
|
// TODO(banks) at least define these defaults somewhere in a const. Would be
|
|
// nice not to duplicate the ones in consul/rpc.go too...
|
|
wait := queryOpts.MaxQueryTime
|
|
if wait == 0 {
|
|
wait = 5 * time.Minute
|
|
}
|
|
if wait > 10*time.Minute {
|
|
wait = 10 * time.Minute
|
|
}
|
|
// Apply a small amount of jitter to the request.
|
|
wait += lib.RandomStagger(wait / 16)
|
|
timeout = time.NewTimer(wait)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for {
|
|
// Must reset this every loop in case the Watch set is already closed but
|
|
// hash remains same. In that case we'll need to re-block on ws.Watch()
|
|
// again.
|
|
ws = memdb.NewWatchSet()
|
|
curHash, curResp, err := fn(ws)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return curResp, err
|
|
}
|
|
// Return immediately if there is no timeout, the hash is different or the
|
|
// Watch returns true (indicating timeout fired). Note that Watch on a nil
|
|
// WatchSet immediately returns false which would incorrectly cause this to
|
|
// loop and repeat again, however we rely on the invariant that ws == nil
|
|
// IFF timeout == nil in which case the Watch call is never invoked.
|
|
if timeout == nil || hash != curHash || ws.Watch(timeout.C) {
|
|
resp.Header().Set("X-Consul-ContentHash", curHash)
|
|
return curResp, err
|
|
}
|
|
// Watch returned false indicating a change was detected, loop and repeat
|
|
// the callback to load the new value. If agent sync is paused it means
|
|
// local state is currently being bulk-edited e.g. config reload. In this
|
|
// case it's likely that local state just got unloaded and may or may not be
|
|
// reloaded yet. Wait a short amount of time for Sync to resume to ride out
|
|
// typical config reloads.
|
|
if syncPauseCh := s.agent.syncPausedCh(); syncPauseCh != nil {
|
|
select {
|
|
case <-syncPauseCh:
|
|
case <-timeout.C:
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// AgentConnectAuthorize
|
|
//
|
|
// POST /v1/agent/connect/authorize
|
|
//
|
|
// Note: when this logic changes, consider if the Intention.Check RPC method
|
|
// also needs to be updated.
|
|
func (s *HTTPServer) AgentConnectAuthorize(resp http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) (interface{}, error) {
|
|
// Fetch the token
|
|
var token string
|
|
s.parseToken(req, &token)
|
|
|
|
// Decode the request from the request body
|
|
var authReq structs.ConnectAuthorizeRequest
|
|
if err := decodeBody(req, &authReq, nil); err != nil {
|
|
return nil, BadRequestError{fmt.Sprintf("Request decode failed: %v", err)}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
authz, reason, cacheMeta, err := s.agent.ConnectAuthorize(token, &authReq)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
setCacheMeta(resp, cacheMeta)
|
|
|
|
return &connectAuthorizeResp{
|
|
Authorized: authz,
|
|
Reason: reason,
|
|
}, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// connectAuthorizeResp is the response format/structure for the
|
|
// /v1/agent/connect/authorize endpoint.
|
|
type connectAuthorizeResp struct {
|
|
Authorized bool // True if authorized, false if not
|
|
Reason string // Reason for the Authorized value (whether true or false)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// AgentHost
|
|
//
|
|
// GET /v1/agent/host
|
|
//
|
|
// Retrieves information about resources available and in-use for the
|
|
// host the agent is running on such as CPU, memory, and disk usage. Requires
|
|
// a operator:read ACL token.
|
|
func (s *HTTPServer) AgentHost(resp http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) (interface{}, error) {
|
|
// Fetch the ACL token, if any, and enforce agent policy.
|
|
var token string
|
|
s.parseToken(req, &token)
|
|
rule, err := s.agent.resolveToken(token)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if rule != nil && !rule.OperatorRead() {
|
|
return nil, acl.ErrPermissionDenied
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return debug.CollectHostInfo(), nil
|
|
}
|