Fixes an issue described in #10132, where if two DCs are WAN federated
over mesh gateways, and the gateway in the non-primary DC is terminated
and receives a new IP address (as is commonly the case when running them
on ephemeral compute instances) the primary DC is unable to re-establish
its connection until the agent running on its own gateway is restarted.
This was happening because we always preferred gateways discovered by
the `Internal.ServiceDump` RPC (which would fail because there's no way
to dial the remote DC) over those discovered in the federation state,
which is replicated as long as the primary DC's gateway is reachable.
This will behave the way we handle SNI and SPIFFE IDs, where the default
partition is excluded.
Excluding the default ensures that don't attempt to compare default.dc2
to dc2 in OSS.
This commit updates mesh gateway watches for cross-partitions
communication.
* Mesh gateways are keyed by partition and datacenter.
* Mesh gateways will now watch gateways in partitions that export
services to their partition.
* Mesh gateways in non-default partitions will not have cross-datacenter
watches. They are not involved in traditional WAN federation.
Previously the datacenter of the gateway was the key identifier, now it
is the datacenter and partition.
When dialing services in other partitions or datacenters we now watch
the appropriate partition.
Previously SAN validation for prepared queries was broken because we
validated against the name, namespace, and datacenter for prepared
queries.
However, prepared queries can target:
- Services with a name that isn't their own
- Services in multiple datacenters
This means that the SpiffeID to validate needs to be based on the
prepared query endpoints, and not the prepared query's upstream
definition.
This commit updates prepared query clusters to account for that.
- The TestNodeService helper created services with the fixed name "web",
and now that name is overridable.
- The discovery chain snapshot didn't have prepared query endpoints so
the endpoints tests were missing data for prepared queries
This adds support for the Incremental xDS protocol when using xDS v3. This is best reviewed commit-by-commit and will not be squashed when merged.
Union of all commit messages follows to give an overarching summary:
xds: exclusively support incremental xDS when using xDS v3
Attempts to use SoTW via v3 will fail, much like attempts to use incremental via v2 will fail.
Work around a strange older envoy behavior involving empty CDS responses over incremental xDS.
xds: various cleanups and refactors that don't strictly concern the addition of incremental xDS support
Dissolve the connectionInfo struct in favor of per-connection ResourceGenerators instead.
Do a better job of ensuring the xds code uses a well configured logger that accurately describes the connected client.
xds: pull out checkStreamACLs method in advance of a later commit
xds: rewrite SoTW xDS protocol tests to use protobufs rather than hand-rolled json strings
In the test we very lightly reuse some of the more boring protobuf construction helper code that is also technically under test. The important thing of the protocol tests is testing the protocol. The actual inputs and outputs are largely already handled by the xds golden output tests now so these protocol tests don't have to do double-duty.
This also updates the SoTW protocol test to exclusively use xDS v2 which is the only variant of SoTW that will be supported in Consul 1.10.
xds: default xds.Server.AuthCheckFrequency at use-time instead of construction-time
The rationale behind removing them is that all of our own code (xDS, builtin connect proxy) use the cache notification mechanism. This ensures that the blocking fetch behind the scenes is always executing. Therefore the only way you might go to get a certificate and have to wait is when 1) the request has never been made for that cert before or 2) you are using the v1/agent/connect/ca/leaf API for retrieving the cert yourself.
In the first case, the refresh change doesn’t alter the behavior. In the second case, it can be mitigated by using blocking queries with that API which just like normal cache notification mechanism will cause the blocking fetch to be initiated and to get leaf certs as soon as needed.
If you are not using blocking queries, or Envoy/xDS, or the builtin connect proxy but are retrieving the certs yourself then the HTTP endpoint might take a little longer to respond.
This also renames the RefreshTimeout field on the register options to QueryTimeout to more accurately reflect that it is used for any type that supports blocking queries.
The DNS resolution will be handled by Envoy and defaults to LOGICAL_DNS. This discovery type can be overridden on a per-gateway basis with the envoy_dns_discovery_type Gateway Option.
If a service contains an instance with a hostname as an address we set the Envoy cluster to use DNS as the discovery type rather than EDS. Since both mesh gateways and terminating gateways route to clusters using SNI, whenever there is a mix of hostnames and IP addresses associated with a service we use the hostname + CDS rather than the IPs + EDS.
Note that we detect hostnames by attempting to parse the service instance's address as an IP. If it is not a valid IP we assume it is a hostname.
This commit adds the necessary changes to allow an ingress gateway to
route traffic from a single defined port to multiple different upstream
services in the Consul mesh.
To do this, we now require all HTTP requests coming into the ingress
gateway to specify a Host header that matches "<service-name>.*" in
order to correctly route traffic to the correct service.
- Differentiate multiple listener's route names by port
- Adds a case in xds for allowing default discovery chains to create a
route configuration when on an ingress gateway. This allows default
services to easily use host header routing
- ingress-gateways have a single route config for each listener
that utilizes domain matching to route to different services.
This commit copies many of the connect-proxy xds testcases and reuses
for ingress gateways. This allows us to more easily see changes to the
envoy configuration when make updates to ingress gateways.
Previously the SupportsBlocking option was specified by a method on the
type, and all the other options were specified from RegisterOptions.
This change moves RegisterOptions to a method on the type, and moves
SupportsBlocking into the options struct.
Currently there are only 2 cache-types. So all cache-types can implement
this method by embedding a struct with those predefined values. In the
future if a cache type needs to be registered more than once with different
options it can remove the embedded type and implement the method in a way
that allows for paramaterization.
* Implements a simple, tcp ingress gateway workflow
This adds a new type of gateway for allowing Ingress traffic into Connect from external services.
Co-authored-by: Chris Piraino <cpiraino@hashicorp.com>
If a proxied service is a gRPC or HTTP2 service, but a path is exposed
using the HTTP1 or TCP protocol, Envoy should not be configured with
`http2ProtocolOptions` for the cluster backing the path.
A situation where this comes up is a gRPC service whose healthcheck or
metrics route (e.g. for Prometheus) is an HTTP1 service running on
a different port. Previously, if these were exposed either using
`Expose: { Checks: true }` or `Expose: { Paths: ... }`, Envoy would
still be configured to communicate with the path over HTTP2, which would
not work properly.
This is like a Möbius strip of code due to the fact that low-level components (serf/memberlist) are connected to high-level components (the catalog and mesh-gateways) in a twisty maze of references which make it hard to dive into. With that in mind here's a high level summary of what you'll find in the patch:
There are several distinct chunks of code that are affected:
* new flags and config options for the server
* retry join WAN is slightly different
* retry join code is shared to discover primary mesh gateways from secondary datacenters
* because retry join logic runs in the *agent* and the results of that
operation for primary mesh gateways are needed in the *server* there are
some methods like `RefreshPrimaryGatewayFallbackAddresses` that must occur
at multiple layers of abstraction just to pass the data down to the right
layer.
* new cache type `FederationStateListMeshGatewaysName` for use in `proxycfg/xds` layers
* the function signature for RPC dialing picked up a new required field (the
node name of the destination)
* several new RPCs for manipulating a FederationState object:
`FederationState:{Apply,Get,List,ListMeshGateways}`
* 3 read-only internal APIs for debugging use to invoke those RPCs from curl
* raft and fsm changes to persist these FederationStates
* replication for FederationStates as they are canonically stored in the
Primary and replicated to the Secondaries.
* a special derivative of anti-entropy that runs in secondaries to snapshot
their local mesh gateway `CheckServiceNodes` and sync them into their upstream
FederationState in the primary (this works in conjunction with the
replication to distribute addresses for all mesh gateways in all DCs to all
other DCs)
* a "gateway locator" convenience object to make use of this data to choose
the addresses of gateways to use for any given RPC or gossip operation to a
remote DC. This gets data from the "retry join" logic in the agent and also
directly calls into the FSM.
* RPC (`:8300`) on the server sniffs the first byte of a new connection to
determine if it's actually doing native TLS. If so it checks the ALPN header
for protocol determination (just like how the existing system uses the
type-byte marker).
* 2 new kinds of protocols are exclusively decoded via this native TLS
mechanism: one for ferrying "packet" operations (udp-like) from the gossip
layer and one for "stream" operations (tcp-like). The packet operations
re-use sockets (using length-prefixing) to cut down on TLS re-negotiation
overhead.
* the server instances specially wrap the `memberlist.NetTransport` when running
with gateway federation enabled (in a `wanfed.Transport`). The general gist is
that if it tries to dial a node in the SAME datacenter (deduced by looking
at the suffix of the node name) there is no change. If dialing a DIFFERENT
datacenter it is wrapped up in a TLS+ALPN blob and sent through some mesh
gateways to eventually end up in a server's :8300 port.
* a new flag when launching a mesh gateway via `consul connect envoy` to
indicate that the servers are to be exposed. This sets a special service
meta when registering the gateway into the catalog.
* `proxycfg/xds` notice this metadata blob to activate additional watches for
the FederationState objects as well as the location of all of the consul
servers in that datacenter.
* `xds:` if the extra metadata is in place additional clusters are defined in a
DC to bulk sink all traffic to another DC's gateways. For the current
datacenter we listen on a wildcard name (`server.<dc>.consul`) that load
balances all servers as well as one mini-cluster per node
(`<node>.server.<dc>.consul`)
* the `consul tls cert create` command got a new flag (`-node`) to help create
an additional SAN in certs that can be used with this flavor of federation.
* Use consts for well known tagged adress keys
* Add ipv4 and ipv6 tagged addresses for node lan and wan
* Add ipv4 and ipv6 tagged addresses for service lan and wan
* Use IPv4 and IPv6 address in DNS
Fixes: #5396
This PR adds a proxy configuration stanza called expose. These flags register
listeners in Connect sidecar proxies to allow requests to specific HTTP paths from outside of the node. This allows services to protect themselves by only
listening on the loopback interface, while still accepting traffic from non
Connect-enabled services.
Under expose there is a boolean checks flag that would automatically expose all
registered HTTP and gRPC check paths.
This stanza also accepts a paths list to expose individual paths. The primary
use case for this functionality would be to expose paths for third parties like
Prometheus or the kubelet.
Listeners for requests to exposed paths are be configured dynamically at run
time. Any time a proxy, or check can be registered, a listener can also be
created.
In this initial implementation requests to these paths are not
authenticated/encrypted.
The fields in the certs are meant to hold the original binary
representation of this data, not some ascii-encoded version.
The only time we should be colon-hex-encoding fields is for display
purposes or marshaling through non-TLS mediums (like RPC).
Daniel Upton