* Add InboundPeerTrustBundle maps to Terminating Gateway
* Add notify and cancelation of watch for inbound peer trust bundles
* Pass peer trust bundles to the RBAC creation function
* Regenerate Golden Files
* add changelog, also adds another spot that needed peeredTrustBundles
* Add basic test for terminating gateway with peer trust bundle
* Add intention to cluster peered golden test
* rerun codegen
* update changelog
* really update the changelog
---------
Co-authored-by: Melisa Griffin <melisa.griffin@hashicorp.com>
Fix issues with empty sources
* Validate that each permission on traffic permissions resources has at least one source.
* Don't construct RBAC policies when there aren't any principals. This resulted in Envoy rejecting xDS updates with a validation error.
```
error=
| rpc error: code = Internal desc = Error adding/updating listener(s) public_listener: Proto constraint validation failed (RBACValidationError.Rules: embedded message failed validation | caused by RBACValidationError.Policies[consul-intentions-layer4-1]: embedded message failed validation | caused by PolicyValidationError.Principals: value must contain at least 1 item(s)): rules {
```
* Fixes issues in setting status
* Update golden files for changes to xds generation to not use deprecated
methods
* Fixed default for validation of JWT for route
### Description
<!-- Please describe why you're making this change, in plain English.
-->
- Currently the jwt-auth filter doesn't take into account the service
identity when validating jwt-auth, it only takes into account the path
and jwt provider during validation. This causes issues when multiple
source intentions restrict access to an endpoint with different JWT
providers.
- To fix these issues, rather than use the JWT auth filter for
validation, we use it in metadata mode and allow it to forward the
successful validated JWT token payload to the RBAC filter which will
make the decisions.
This PR ensures requests with and without JWT tokens successfully go
through the jwt-authn filter. The filter however only forwards the data
for successful/valid tokens. On the RBAC filter level, we check the
payload for claims and token issuer + existing rbac rules.
### Testing & Reproduction steps
<!--
* In the case of bugs, describe how to replicate
* If any manual tests were done, document the steps and the conditions
to replicate
* Call out any important/ relevant unit tests, e2e tests or integration
tests you have added or are adding
-->
- This test covers a multi level jwt requirements (requirements at top
level and permissions level). It also assumes you have envoy running,
you have a redis and a sidecar proxy service registered, and have a way
to generate jwks with jwt. I mostly use:
https://www.scottbrady91.com/tools/jwt for this.
- first write your proxy defaults
```
Kind = "proxy-defaults"
name = "global"
config {
protocol = "http"
}
```
- Create two providers
```
Kind = "jwt-provider"
Name = "auth0"
Issuer = "https://ronald.local"
JSONWebKeySet = {
Local = {
JWKS = "eyJrZXlzIjog....."
}
}
```
```
Kind = "jwt-provider"
Name = "okta"
Issuer = "https://ronald.local"
JSONWebKeySet = {
Local = {
JWKS = "eyJrZXlzIjogW3...."
}
}
```
- add a service intention
```
Kind = "service-intentions"
Name = "redis"
JWT = {
Providers = [
{
Name = "okta"
},
]
}
Sources = [
{
Name = "*"
Permissions = [{
Action = "allow"
HTTP = {
PathPrefix = "/workspace"
}
JWT = {
Providers = [
{
Name = "okta"
VerifyClaims = [
{
Path = ["aud"]
Value = "my_client_app"
},
{
Path = ["sub"]
Value = "5be86359073c434bad2da3932222dabe"
}
]
},
]
}
},
{
Action = "allow"
HTTP = {
PathPrefix = "/"
}
JWT = {
Providers = [
{
Name = "auth0"
},
]
}
}]
}
]
```
- generate 3 jwt tokens: 1 from auth0 jwks, 1 from okta jwks with
different claims than `/workspace` expects and 1 with correct claims
- connect to your envoy (change service and address as needed) to view
logs and potential errors. You can add: `-- --log-level debug` to see
what data is being forwarded
```
consul connect envoy -sidecar-for redis1 -grpc-addr 127.0.0.1:8502
```
- Make the following requests:
```
curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $Auth0_TOKEN" --insecure --cert leaf.cert --key leaf.key --cacert connect-ca.pem https://localhost:20000/workspace -v
RBAC filter denied
curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $Okta_TOKEN_with_wrong_claims" --insecure --cert leaf.cert --key leaf.key --cacert connect-ca.pem https://localhost:20000/workspace -v
RBAC filter denied
curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $Okta_TOKEN_with_correct_claims" --insecure --cert leaf.cert --key leaf.key --cacert connect-ca.pem https://localhost:20000/workspace -v
Successful request
```
### TODO
* [x] Update test coverage
* [ ] update integration tests (follow-up PR)
* [x] appropriate backport labels added
When the protocol is http-like, and an intention has a peered source
then the normal RBAC mTLS SAN field check is replaces with a joint combo
of:
mTLS SAN field must be the service's local mesh gateway leaf cert
AND
the first XFCC header (from the MGW) must have a URI field that matches the original intention source
Also:
- Update the regex program limit to be much higher than the teeny
defaults, since the RBAC regex constructions are more complicated now.
- Fix a few stray panics in xds generation.
When converting from Consul intentions to xds RBAC rules, services imported from other peers must encode additional data like partition (from the remote cluster) and trust domain.
This PR updates the PeeringTrustBundle to hold the sending side's local partition as ExportedPartition. It also updates RBAC code to encode SpiffeIDs of imported services with the ExportedPartition and TrustDomain.
Note that this does NOT upgrade to xDS v3. That will come in a future PR.
Additionally:
- Ignored staticcheck warnings about how github.com/golang/protobuf is deprecated.
- Shuffled some agent/xds imports in advance of a later xDS v3 upgrade.
- Remove support for envoy 1.13.x but don't add in 1.17.x yet. We have to wait until the xDS v3 support is added in a follow-up PR.
Fixes#8425
Extend Consul’s intentions model to allow for request-based access control enforcement for HTTP-like protocols in addition to the existing connection-based enforcement for unspecified protocols (e.g. tcp).
Thomas Eckert