2014-08-11 21:01:45 +00:00
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package consul
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import (
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2018-10-19 16:04:07 +00:00
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"fmt"
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"log"
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2014-08-11 21:01:45 +00:00
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"os"
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Creates new "prepared-query" ACL type and new token capture behavior.
Prior to this change, prepared queries had the following behavior for
ACLs, which will need to change to support templates:
1. A management token, or a token with read access to the service being
queried needed to be provided in order to create a prepared query.
2. The token used to create the prepared query was stored with the query
in the state store and used to execute the query.
3. A management token, or the token used to create the query needed to be
supplied to perform and CRUD operations on an existing prepared query.
This was pretty subtle and complicated behavior, and won't work for
templates since the service name is computed at execution time. To solve
this, we introduce a new "prepared-query" ACL type, where the prefix
applies to the query name for static prepared query types and to the
prefix for template prepared query types.
With this change, the new behavior is:
1. A management token, or a token with "prepared-query" write access to
the query name or (soon) the given template prefix is required to do
any CRUD operations on a prepared query, or to list prepared queries
(the list is filtered by this ACL).
2. You will no longer need a management token to list prepared queries,
but you will only be able to see prepared queries that you have access
to (you get an empty list instead of permission denied).
3. When listing or getting a query, because it was easy to capture
management tokens given the past behavior, this will always blank out
the "Token" field (replacing the contents as <hidden>) for all tokens
unless a management token is supplied. Going forward, we should
discourage people from binding tokens for execution unless strictly
necessary.
4. No token will be captured by default when a prepared query is created.
If the user wishes to supply an execution token then can pass it in via
the "Token" field in the prepared query definition. Otherwise, this
field will default to empty.
5. At execution time, we will use the captured token if it exists with the
prepared query definition, otherwise we will use the token that's passed
in with the request, just like we do for other RPCs (or you can use the
agent's configured token for DNS).
6. Prepared queries with no name (accessible only by ID) will not require
ACLs to create or modify (execution time will depend on the service ACL
configuration). Our argument here is that these are designed to be
ephemeral and the IDs are as good as an ACL. Management tokens will be
able to list all of these.
These changes enable templates, but also enable delegation of authority to
manage the prepared query namespace.
2016-02-23 08:12:58 +00:00
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"reflect"
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2016-12-09 00:01:01 +00:00
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"strings"
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2019-01-22 18:14:43 +00:00
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"sync/atomic"
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2014-08-11 21:01:45 +00:00
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"testing"
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2019-01-22 18:14:43 +00:00
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"time"
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2014-08-11 21:01:45 +00:00
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2014-08-11 21:18:51 +00:00
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"github.com/hashicorp/consul/acl"
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2017-07-06 10:34:00 +00:00
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"github.com/hashicorp/consul/agent/structs"
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2019-03-27 12:54:56 +00:00
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"github.com/hashicorp/consul/sdk/testutil/retry"
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2018-03-06 18:51:26 +00:00
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"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
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2018-10-19 16:04:07 +00:00
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"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
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2014-08-11 21:01:45 +00:00
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)
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2016-12-09 00:01:01 +00:00
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var testACLPolicy = `
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key "" {
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policy = "deny"
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}
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key "foo/" {
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policy = "write"
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}
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`
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2018-10-19 16:04:07 +00:00
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var testACLPolicyNew = `
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key_prefix "" {
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policy = "deny"
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}
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key_prefix "foo/" {
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policy = "write"
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}
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`
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2014-08-11 21:01:45 +00:00
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2019-01-22 18:14:43 +00:00
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type asyncResolutionResult struct {
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authz acl.Authorizer
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err error
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}
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func resolveTokenAsync(r *ACLResolver, token string, ch chan *asyncResolutionResult) {
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authz, err := r.ResolveToken(token)
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ch <- &asyncResolutionResult{authz: authz, err: err}
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}
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2018-10-19 16:04:07 +00:00
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func testIdentityForToken(token string) (bool, structs.ACLIdentity, error) {
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switch token {
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case "missing-policy":
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return true, &structs.ACLToken{
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AccessorID: "435a75af-1763-4980-89f4-f0951dda53b4",
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SecretID: "b1b6be70-ed2e-4c80-8495-bdb3db110b1e",
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Policies: []structs.ACLTokenPolicyLink{
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structs.ACLTokenPolicyLink{
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ID: "not-found",
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},
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structs.ACLTokenPolicyLink{
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ID: "acl-ro",
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},
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},
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}, nil
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case "legacy-management":
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return true, &structs.ACLToken{
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AccessorID: "d109a033-99d1-47e2-a711-d6593373a973",
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SecretID: "415cd1e1-1493-4fb4-827d-d762ed9cfe7c",
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Type: structs.ACLTokenTypeManagement,
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}, nil
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case "legacy-client":
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return true, &structs.ACLToken{
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AccessorID: "b7375838-b104-4a25-b457-329d939bf257",
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SecretID: "03f49328-c23c-4b26-92a2-3b898332400d",
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Type: structs.ACLTokenTypeClient,
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Rules: `service "" { policy = "read" }`,
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}, nil
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case "found":
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return true, &structs.ACLToken{
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AccessorID: "5f57c1f6-6a89-4186-9445-531b316e01df",
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SecretID: "a1a54629-5050-4d17-8a4e-560d2423f835",
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Policies: []structs.ACLTokenPolicyLink{
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structs.ACLTokenPolicyLink{
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ID: "node-wr",
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},
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structs.ACLTokenPolicyLink{
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ID: "dc2-key-wr",
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},
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},
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}, nil
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case "acl-ro":
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return true, &structs.ACLToken{
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AccessorID: "435a75af-1763-4980-89f4-f0951dda53b4",
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SecretID: "b1b6be70-ed2e-4c80-8495-bdb3db110b1e",
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Policies: []structs.ACLTokenPolicyLink{
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structs.ACLTokenPolicyLink{
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ID: "acl-ro",
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},
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},
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}, nil
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case "acl-wr":
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return true, &structs.ACLToken{
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AccessorID: "435a75af-1763-4980-89f4-f0951dda53b4",
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SecretID: "b1b6be70-ed2e-4c80-8495-bdb3db110b1e",
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Policies: []structs.ACLTokenPolicyLink{
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structs.ACLTokenPolicyLink{
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ID: "acl-wr",
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},
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},
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}, nil
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2019-01-22 18:14:43 +00:00
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case "racey-unmodified":
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return true, &structs.ACLToken{
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AccessorID: "5f57c1f6-6a89-4186-9445-531b316e01df",
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SecretID: "a1a54629-5050-4d17-8a4e-560d2423f835",
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Policies: []structs.ACLTokenPolicyLink{
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structs.ACLTokenPolicyLink{
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ID: "node-wr",
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},
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structs.ACLTokenPolicyLink{
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ID: "acl-wr",
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},
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},
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}, nil
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case "racey-modified":
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return true, &structs.ACLToken{
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AccessorID: "5f57c1f6-6a89-4186-9445-531b316e01df",
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SecretID: "a1a54629-5050-4d17-8a4e-560d2423f835",
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Policies: []structs.ACLTokenPolicyLink{
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structs.ACLTokenPolicyLink{
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ID: "node-wr",
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},
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},
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}, nil
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2019-03-14 14:35:34 +00:00
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case "concurrent-resolve":
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2019-01-22 18:14:43 +00:00
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return true, &structs.ACLToken{
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AccessorID: "5f57c1f6-6a89-4186-9445-531b316e01df",
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SecretID: "a1a54629-5050-4d17-8a4e-560d2423f835",
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Policies: []structs.ACLTokenPolicyLink{
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structs.ACLTokenPolicyLink{
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ID: "node-wr",
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},
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structs.ACLTokenPolicyLink{
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ID: "acl-wr",
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},
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},
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}, nil
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2018-10-19 16:04:07 +00:00
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case anonymousToken:
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return true, &structs.ACLToken{
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AccessorID: "00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000002",
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SecretID: anonymousToken,
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Policies: []structs.ACLTokenPolicyLink{
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structs.ACLTokenPolicyLink{
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ID: "node-wr",
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},
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},
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}, nil
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default:
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return true, nil, acl.ErrNotFound
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2014-08-11 21:01:45 +00:00
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}
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}
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2018-10-19 16:04:07 +00:00
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func testPolicyForID(policyID string) (bool, *structs.ACLPolicy, error) {
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switch policyID {
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case "acl-ro":
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return true, &structs.ACLPolicy{
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ID: "acl-ro",
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Name: "acl-ro",
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Description: "acl-ro",
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Rules: `acl = "read"`,
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Syntax: acl.SyntaxCurrent,
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RaftIndex: structs.RaftIndex{CreateIndex: 1, ModifyIndex: 2},
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}, nil
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case "acl-wr":
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return true, &structs.ACLPolicy{
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ID: "acl-wr",
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Name: "acl-wr",
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Description: "acl-wr",
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Rules: `acl = "write"`,
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Syntax: acl.SyntaxCurrent,
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RaftIndex: structs.RaftIndex{CreateIndex: 1, ModifyIndex: 2},
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}, nil
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case "node-wr":
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return true, &structs.ACLPolicy{
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ID: "node-wr",
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Name: "node-wr",
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Description: "node-wr",
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Rules: `node_prefix "" { policy = "write"}`,
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Syntax: acl.SyntaxCurrent,
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Datacenters: []string{"dc1"},
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RaftIndex: structs.RaftIndex{CreateIndex: 1, ModifyIndex: 2},
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}, nil
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case "dc2-key-wr":
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return true, &structs.ACLPolicy{
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ID: "dc2-key-wr",
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Name: "dc2-key-wr",
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Description: "dc2-key-wr",
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Rules: `key_prefix "" { policy = "write"}`,
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Syntax: acl.SyntaxCurrent,
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Datacenters: []string{"dc2"},
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RaftIndex: structs.RaftIndex{CreateIndex: 1, ModifyIndex: 2},
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}, nil
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default:
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return true, nil, acl.ErrNotFound
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2014-08-12 17:58:02 +00:00
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}
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2018-10-19 16:04:07 +00:00
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}
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2014-08-12 17:58:02 +00:00
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2018-10-19 16:04:07 +00:00
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// ACLResolverTestDelegate is used to test
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// the ACLResolver without running Agents
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type ACLResolverTestDelegate struct {
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enabled bool
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datacenter string
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legacy bool
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localTokens bool
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localPolicies bool
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getPolicyFn func(*structs.ACLPolicyResolveLegacyRequest, *structs.ACLPolicyResolveLegacyResponse) error
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2018-10-31 20:00:46 +00:00
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tokenReadFn func(*structs.ACLTokenGetRequest, *structs.ACLTokenResponse) error
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policyResolveFn func(*structs.ACLPolicyBatchGetRequest, *structs.ACLPolicyBatchResponse) error
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2014-08-12 17:58:02 +00:00
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}
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2018-10-19 16:04:07 +00:00
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func (d *ACLResolverTestDelegate) ACLsEnabled() bool {
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return d.enabled
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}
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2014-08-11 21:01:45 +00:00
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2018-10-19 16:04:07 +00:00
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func (d *ACLResolverTestDelegate) ACLDatacenter(legacy bool) string {
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return d.datacenter
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}
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2014-08-11 21:01:45 +00:00
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2018-10-19 16:04:07 +00:00
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func (d *ACLResolverTestDelegate) UseLegacyACLs() bool {
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return d.legacy
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2014-08-11 21:01:45 +00:00
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}
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2018-10-19 16:04:07 +00:00
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func (d *ACLResolverTestDelegate) ResolveIdentityFromToken(token string) (bool, structs.ACLIdentity, error) {
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if !d.localTokens {
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return false, nil, nil
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}
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2014-08-11 21:01:45 +00:00
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2018-10-19 16:04:07 +00:00
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return testIdentityForToken(token)
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}
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2014-08-11 21:01:45 +00:00
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2018-10-19 16:04:07 +00:00
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func (d *ACLResolverTestDelegate) ResolvePolicyFromID(policyID string) (bool, *structs.ACLPolicy, error) {
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if !d.localPolicies {
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return false, nil, nil
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2014-08-11 21:01:45 +00:00
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}
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2018-10-19 16:04:07 +00:00
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return testPolicyForID(policyID)
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}
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2014-08-11 21:01:45 +00:00
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2018-10-19 16:04:07 +00:00
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func (d *ACLResolverTestDelegate) RPC(method string, args interface{}, reply interface{}) error {
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switch method {
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case "ACL.GetPolicy":
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if d.getPolicyFn != nil {
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return d.getPolicyFn(args.(*structs.ACLPolicyResolveLegacyRequest), reply.(*structs.ACLPolicyResolveLegacyResponse))
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}
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panic("Bad Test Implmentation: should provide a getPolicyFn to the ACLResolverTestDelegate")
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case "ACL.TokenRead":
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if d.tokenReadFn != nil {
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2018-10-31 20:00:46 +00:00
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return d.tokenReadFn(args.(*structs.ACLTokenGetRequest), reply.(*structs.ACLTokenResponse))
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2018-10-19 16:04:07 +00:00
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}
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panic("Bad Test Implmentation: should provide a tokenReadFn to the ACLResolverTestDelegate")
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case "ACL.PolicyResolve":
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if d.policyResolveFn != nil {
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2018-10-31 20:00:46 +00:00
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return d.policyResolveFn(args.(*structs.ACLPolicyBatchGetRequest), reply.(*structs.ACLPolicyBatchResponse))
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2018-10-19 16:04:07 +00:00
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}
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panic("Bad Test Implmentation: should provide a policyResolveFn to the ACLResolverTestDelegate")
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2014-08-11 21:01:45 +00:00
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}
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2018-10-19 16:04:07 +00:00
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panic("Bad Test Implementation: Was the ACLResolver updated to use new RPC methods")
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2014-08-11 21:01:45 +00:00
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}
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2018-10-19 16:04:07 +00:00
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func newTestACLResolver(t *testing.T, delegate ACLResolverDelegate, cb func(*ACLResolverConfig)) *ACLResolver {
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config := DefaultConfig()
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config.ACLDefaultPolicy = "deny"
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config.ACLDownPolicy = "extend-cache"
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rconf := &ACLResolverConfig{
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Config: config,
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Logger: log.New(os.Stdout, t.Name()+" - ", log.LstdFlags|log.Lmicroseconds),
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CacheConfig: &structs.ACLCachesConfig{
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Identities: 4,
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Policies: 4,
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ParsedPolicies: 4,
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Authorizers: 4,
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},
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AutoDisable: true,
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Delegate: delegate,
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2014-08-11 21:54:18 +00:00
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}
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2018-10-19 16:04:07 +00:00
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if cb != nil {
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cb(rconf)
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2014-08-11 21:54:18 +00:00
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}
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2018-10-19 16:04:07 +00:00
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resolver, err := NewACLResolver(rconf)
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require.NoError(t, err)
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return resolver
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2014-08-11 21:54:18 +00:00
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|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2018-10-19 16:04:07 +00:00
|
|
|
func TestACLResolver_Disabled(t *testing.T) {
|
2017-06-27 13:22:18 +00:00
|
|
|
t.Parallel()
|
2014-08-11 21:54:18 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2018-10-19 16:04:07 +00:00
|
|
|
delegate := &ACLResolverTestDelegate{
|
|
|
|
enabled: false,
|
|
|
|
datacenter: "dc1",
|
|
|
|
legacy: false,
|
2014-08-11 21:54:18 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2018-10-19 16:04:07 +00:00
|
|
|
r := newTestACLResolver(t, delegate, nil)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
authz, err := r.ResolveToken("does not exist")
|
|
|
|
require.Nil(t, authz)
|
|
|
|
require.Nil(t, err)
|
2014-08-11 21:54:18 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2018-10-19 16:04:07 +00:00
|
|
|
func TestACLResolver_ResolveRootACL(t *testing.T) {
|
2017-06-27 13:22:18 +00:00
|
|
|
t.Parallel()
|
2018-10-19 16:04:07 +00:00
|
|
|
delegate := &ACLResolverTestDelegate{
|
|
|
|
enabled: true,
|
|
|
|
datacenter: "dc1",
|
|
|
|
legacy: false,
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
r := newTestACLResolver(t, delegate, nil)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
t.Run("Allow", func(t *testing.T) {
|
|
|
|
authz, err := r.ResolveToken("allow")
|
|
|
|
require.Nil(t, authz)
|
|
|
|
require.Error(t, err)
|
|
|
|
require.True(t, acl.IsErrRootDenied(err))
|
2014-08-12 17:38:57 +00:00
|
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
|
2018-10-19 16:04:07 +00:00
|
|
|
t.Run("Deny", func(t *testing.T) {
|
|
|
|
authz, err := r.ResolveToken("deny")
|
|
|
|
require.Nil(t, authz)
|
|
|
|
require.Error(t, err)
|
|
|
|
require.True(t, acl.IsErrRootDenied(err))
|
|
|
|
})
|
2014-08-12 17:38:57 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2018-10-19 16:04:07 +00:00
|
|
|
t.Run("Manage", func(t *testing.T) {
|
|
|
|
authz, err := r.ResolveToken("manage")
|
|
|
|
require.Nil(t, authz)
|
|
|
|
require.Error(t, err)
|
|
|
|
require.True(t, acl.IsErrRootDenied(err))
|
|
|
|
})
|
2014-08-12 17:38:57 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2018-10-19 16:04:07 +00:00
|
|
|
func TestACLResolver_DownPolicy(t *testing.T) {
|
2017-06-27 13:22:18 +00:00
|
|
|
t.Parallel()
|
2014-08-11 21:01:45 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2019-03-12 15:23:43 +00:00
|
|
|
requireIdentityCached := func(t *testing.T, r *ACLResolver, token string, present bool, msg string) {
|
|
|
|
t.Helper()
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
cacheVal := r.cache.GetIdentity(token)
|
|
|
|
require.NotNil(t, cacheVal)
|
|
|
|
if present {
|
|
|
|
require.NotNil(t, cacheVal.Identity, msg)
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
require.Nil(t, cacheVal.Identity, msg)
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
requirePolicyCached := func(t *testing.T, r *ACLResolver, policyID string, present bool, msg string) {
|
|
|
|
t.Helper()
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
cacheVal := r.cache.GetPolicy(policyID)
|
|
|
|
require.NotNil(t, cacheVal)
|
|
|
|
if present {
|
|
|
|
require.NotNil(t, cacheVal.Policy, msg)
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
require.Nil(t, cacheVal.Policy, msg)
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2018-10-19 16:04:07 +00:00
|
|
|
t.Run("Deny", func(t *testing.T) {
|
|
|
|
t.Parallel()
|
|
|
|
delegate := &ACLResolverTestDelegate{
|
|
|
|
enabled: true,
|
|
|
|
datacenter: "dc1",
|
|
|
|
legacy: false,
|
|
|
|
localTokens: false,
|
|
|
|
localPolicies: true,
|
2018-10-31 20:00:46 +00:00
|
|
|
tokenReadFn: func(*structs.ACLTokenGetRequest, *structs.ACLTokenResponse) error {
|
2018-10-19 16:04:07 +00:00
|
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("Induced RPC Error")
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
r := newTestACLResolver(t, delegate, func(config *ACLResolverConfig) {
|
|
|
|
config.Config.ACLDownPolicy = "deny"
|
|
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
authz, err := r.ResolveToken("foo")
|
|
|
|
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
|
|
require.NotNil(t, authz)
|
|
|
|
require.Equal(t, authz, acl.DenyAll())
|
2019-03-12 15:23:43 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
requireIdentityCached(t, r, "foo", false, "not present")
|
2014-08-11 21:01:45 +00:00
|
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
|
2018-10-19 16:04:07 +00:00
|
|
|
t.Run("Allow", func(t *testing.T) {
|
|
|
|
t.Parallel()
|
|
|
|
delegate := &ACLResolverTestDelegate{
|
|
|
|
enabled: true,
|
|
|
|
datacenter: "dc1",
|
|
|
|
legacy: false,
|
|
|
|
localTokens: false,
|
|
|
|
localPolicies: true,
|
2018-10-31 20:00:46 +00:00
|
|
|
tokenReadFn: func(*structs.ACLTokenGetRequest, *structs.ACLTokenResponse) error {
|
2018-10-19 16:04:07 +00:00
|
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("Induced RPC Error")
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
r := newTestACLResolver(t, delegate, func(config *ACLResolverConfig) {
|
|
|
|
config.Config.ACLDownPolicy = "allow"
|
|
|
|
})
|
2014-08-11 21:01:45 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2018-10-19 16:04:07 +00:00
|
|
|
authz, err := r.ResolveToken("foo")
|
|
|
|
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
|
|
require.NotNil(t, authz)
|
|
|
|
require.Equal(t, authz, acl.AllowAll())
|
2019-03-12 15:23:43 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
requireIdentityCached(t, r, "foo", false, "not present")
|
2018-10-19 16:04:07 +00:00
|
|
|
})
|
2014-08-11 21:01:45 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2018-10-19 16:04:07 +00:00
|
|
|
t.Run("Expired-Policy", func(t *testing.T) {
|
|
|
|
t.Parallel()
|
|
|
|
policyCached := false
|
|
|
|
delegate := &ACLResolverTestDelegate{
|
|
|
|
enabled: true,
|
|
|
|
datacenter: "dc1",
|
|
|
|
legacy: false,
|
|
|
|
localTokens: true,
|
|
|
|
localPolicies: false,
|
2018-10-31 20:00:46 +00:00
|
|
|
policyResolveFn: func(args *structs.ACLPolicyBatchGetRequest, reply *structs.ACLPolicyBatchResponse) error {
|
2018-10-19 16:04:07 +00:00
|
|
|
if !policyCached {
|
|
|
|
for _, policyID := range args.PolicyIDs {
|
|
|
|
_, policy, _ := testPolicyForID(policyID)
|
|
|
|
if policy != nil {
|
|
|
|
reply.Policies = append(reply.Policies, policy)
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
policyCached = true
|
|
|
|
return nil
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("Induced RPC Error")
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
r := newTestACLResolver(t, delegate, func(config *ACLResolverConfig) {
|
|
|
|
config.Config.ACLDownPolicy = "deny"
|
|
|
|
config.Config.ACLPolicyTTL = 0
|
|
|
|
})
|
2014-08-11 21:01:45 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2018-10-19 16:04:07 +00:00
|
|
|
authz, err := r.ResolveToken("found")
|
|
|
|
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
|
|
require.NotNil(t, authz)
|
|
|
|
require.True(t, authz.NodeWrite("foo", nil))
|
|
|
|
|
2019-03-12 15:23:43 +00:00
|
|
|
requirePolicyCached(t, r, "node-wr", true, "cached") // from "found" token
|
|
|
|
requirePolicyCached(t, r, "dc2-key-wr", true, "cached") // from "found" token
|
|
|
|
|
2018-10-19 16:04:07 +00:00
|
|
|
// policy cache expired - so we will fail to resolve that policy and use the default policy only
|
|
|
|
authz2, err := r.ResolveToken("found")
|
|
|
|
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
|
|
require.NotNil(t, authz2)
|
|
|
|
require.False(t, authz == authz2)
|
|
|
|
require.False(t, authz2.NodeWrite("foo", nil))
|
2019-03-12 15:23:43 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
requirePolicyCached(t, r, "node-wr", false, "expired") // from "found" token
|
|
|
|
requirePolicyCached(t, r, "dc2-key-wr", false, "expired") // from "found" token
|
2018-10-19 16:04:07 +00:00
|
|
|
})
|
2014-08-11 21:01:45 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2018-10-19 16:04:07 +00:00
|
|
|
t.Run("Extend-Cache", func(t *testing.T) {
|
|
|
|
t.Parallel()
|
|
|
|
cached := false
|
|
|
|
delegate := &ACLResolverTestDelegate{
|
|
|
|
enabled: true,
|
|
|
|
datacenter: "dc1",
|
|
|
|
legacy: false,
|
|
|
|
localTokens: false,
|
|
|
|
localPolicies: true,
|
2018-10-31 20:00:46 +00:00
|
|
|
tokenReadFn: func(args *structs.ACLTokenGetRequest, reply *structs.ACLTokenResponse) error {
|
2018-10-19 16:04:07 +00:00
|
|
|
if !cached {
|
|
|
|
_, token, _ := testIdentityForToken("found")
|
|
|
|
reply.Token = token.(*structs.ACLToken)
|
|
|
|
cached = true
|
|
|
|
return nil
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("Induced RPC Error")
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
r := newTestACLResolver(t, delegate, func(config *ACLResolverConfig) {
|
|
|
|
config.Config.ACLDownPolicy = "extend-cache"
|
|
|
|
config.Config.ACLTokenTTL = 0
|
|
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
authz, err := r.ResolveToken("foo")
|
|
|
|
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
|
|
require.NotNil(t, authz)
|
|
|
|
require.True(t, authz.NodeWrite("foo", nil))
|
|
|
|
|
2019-03-12 15:23:43 +00:00
|
|
|
requireIdentityCached(t, r, "foo", true, "cached")
|
|
|
|
|
2018-10-19 16:04:07 +00:00
|
|
|
authz2, err := r.ResolveToken("foo")
|
|
|
|
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
|
|
require.NotNil(t, authz2)
|
|
|
|
// testing pointer equality - these will be the same object because it is cached.
|
|
|
|
require.True(t, authz == authz2)
|
|
|
|
require.True(t, authz.NodeWrite("foo", nil))
|
2019-03-12 15:23:43 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
requireIdentityCached(t, r, "foo", true, "still cached")
|
2014-08-11 21:01:45 +00:00
|
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
|
2018-10-19 16:04:07 +00:00
|
|
|
t.Run("Extend-Cache-Expired-Policy", func(t *testing.T) {
|
|
|
|
t.Parallel()
|
|
|
|
policyCached := false
|
|
|
|
delegate := &ACLResolverTestDelegate{
|
|
|
|
enabled: true,
|
|
|
|
datacenter: "dc1",
|
|
|
|
legacy: false,
|
|
|
|
localTokens: true,
|
|
|
|
localPolicies: false,
|
2018-10-31 20:00:46 +00:00
|
|
|
policyResolveFn: func(args *structs.ACLPolicyBatchGetRequest, reply *structs.ACLPolicyBatchResponse) error {
|
2018-10-19 16:04:07 +00:00
|
|
|
if !policyCached {
|
|
|
|
for _, policyID := range args.PolicyIDs {
|
|
|
|
_, policy, _ := testPolicyForID(policyID)
|
|
|
|
if policy != nil {
|
|
|
|
reply.Policies = append(reply.Policies, policy)
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
policyCached = true
|
|
|
|
return nil
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("Induced RPC Error")
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
r := newTestACLResolver(t, delegate, func(config *ACLResolverConfig) {
|
|
|
|
config.Config.ACLDownPolicy = "extend-cache"
|
|
|
|
config.Config.ACLPolicyTTL = 0
|
|
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
authz, err := r.ResolveToken("found")
|
|
|
|
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
|
|
require.NotNil(t, authz)
|
|
|
|
require.True(t, authz.NodeWrite("foo", nil))
|
|
|
|
|
2019-03-12 15:23:43 +00:00
|
|
|
requirePolicyCached(t, r, "node-wr", true, "cached") // from "found" token
|
|
|
|
requirePolicyCached(t, r, "dc2-key-wr", true, "cached") // from "found" token
|
|
|
|
|
2018-10-19 16:04:07 +00:00
|
|
|
// Will just use the policy cache
|
|
|
|
authz2, err := r.ResolveToken("found")
|
|
|
|
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
|
|
require.NotNil(t, authz2)
|
|
|
|
require.True(t, authz == authz2)
|
|
|
|
require.True(t, authz.NodeWrite("foo", nil))
|
2019-03-12 15:23:43 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
requirePolicyCached(t, r, "node-wr", true, "still cached") // from "found" token
|
|
|
|
requirePolicyCached(t, r, "dc2-key-wr", true, "still cached") // from "found" token
|
2014-08-11 21:01:45 +00:00
|
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
|
2018-10-19 16:04:07 +00:00
|
|
|
t.Run("Async-Cache-Expired-Policy", func(t *testing.T) {
|
|
|
|
t.Parallel()
|
|
|
|
policyCached := false
|
|
|
|
delegate := &ACLResolverTestDelegate{
|
|
|
|
enabled: true,
|
|
|
|
datacenter: "dc1",
|
|
|
|
legacy: false,
|
|
|
|
localTokens: true,
|
|
|
|
localPolicies: false,
|
2018-10-31 20:00:46 +00:00
|
|
|
policyResolveFn: func(args *structs.ACLPolicyBatchGetRequest, reply *structs.ACLPolicyBatchResponse) error {
|
2018-10-19 16:04:07 +00:00
|
|
|
if !policyCached {
|
|
|
|
for _, policyID := range args.PolicyIDs {
|
|
|
|
_, policy, _ := testPolicyForID(policyID)
|
|
|
|
if policy != nil {
|
|
|
|
reply.Policies = append(reply.Policies, policy)
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
policyCached = true
|
|
|
|
return nil
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// We don't need to return acl.ErrNotFound here but we could. The ACLResolver will search for any
|
|
|
|
// policies not in the response and emit an ACL not found for any not-found within the result set.
|
|
|
|
return nil
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
r := newTestACLResolver(t, delegate, func(config *ACLResolverConfig) {
|
|
|
|
config.Config.ACLDownPolicy = "async-cache"
|
|
|
|
config.Config.ACLPolicyTTL = 0
|
|
|
|
})
|
2014-08-11 21:01:45 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2018-10-19 16:04:07 +00:00
|
|
|
authz, err := r.ResolveToken("found")
|
|
|
|
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
|
|
require.NotNil(t, authz)
|
|
|
|
require.True(t, authz.NodeWrite("foo", nil))
|
|
|
|
|
2019-03-12 15:23:43 +00:00
|
|
|
requirePolicyCached(t, r, "node-wr", true, "cached") // from "found" token
|
|
|
|
requirePolicyCached(t, r, "dc2-key-wr", true, "cached") // from "found" token
|
|
|
|
|
2018-10-19 16:04:07 +00:00
|
|
|
// The identity should have been cached so this should still be valid
|
|
|
|
authz2, err := r.ResolveToken("found")
|
|
|
|
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
|
|
require.NotNil(t, authz2)
|
|
|
|
// testing pointer equality - these will be the same object because it is cached.
|
|
|
|
require.True(t, authz == authz2)
|
|
|
|
require.True(t, authz.NodeWrite("foo", nil))
|
|
|
|
|
2019-03-12 15:23:43 +00:00
|
|
|
requirePolicyCached(t, r, "node-wr", true, "cached") // from "found" token
|
|
|
|
requirePolicyCached(t, r, "dc2-key-wr", true, "cached") // from "found" token
|
|
|
|
|
2018-10-19 16:04:07 +00:00
|
|
|
// the go routine spawned will eventually return with a authz that doesn't have the policy
|
|
|
|
retry.Run(t, func(t *retry.R) {
|
|
|
|
authz3, err := r.ResolveToken("found")
|
|
|
|
assert.NoError(t, err)
|
|
|
|
assert.NotNil(t, authz3)
|
|
|
|
assert.False(t, authz3.NodeWrite("foo", nil))
|
|
|
|
})
|
2019-03-12 15:23:43 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
requirePolicyCached(t, r, "node-wr", false, "no longer cached") // from "found" token
|
|
|
|
requirePolicyCached(t, r, "dc2-key-wr", false, "no longer cached") // from "found" token
|
2018-10-19 16:04:07 +00:00
|
|
|
})
|
2014-08-11 21:01:45 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2018-10-19 16:04:07 +00:00
|
|
|
t.Run("Extend-Cache-Client", func(t *testing.T) {
|
|
|
|
t.Parallel()
|
|
|
|
tokenCached := false
|
|
|
|
policyCached := false
|
|
|
|
delegate := &ACLResolverTestDelegate{
|
|
|
|
enabled: true,
|
|
|
|
datacenter: "dc1",
|
|
|
|
legacy: false,
|
|
|
|
localTokens: false,
|
|
|
|
localPolicies: false,
|
2018-10-31 20:00:46 +00:00
|
|
|
tokenReadFn: func(args *structs.ACLTokenGetRequest, reply *structs.ACLTokenResponse) error {
|
2018-10-19 16:04:07 +00:00
|
|
|
if !tokenCached {
|
|
|
|
_, token, _ := testIdentityForToken("found")
|
|
|
|
reply.Token = token.(*structs.ACLToken)
|
|
|
|
tokenCached = true
|
|
|
|
return nil
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("Induced RPC Error")
|
|
|
|
},
|
2018-10-31 20:00:46 +00:00
|
|
|
policyResolveFn: func(args *structs.ACLPolicyBatchGetRequest, reply *structs.ACLPolicyBatchResponse) error {
|
2018-10-19 16:04:07 +00:00
|
|
|
if !policyCached {
|
|
|
|
for _, policyID := range args.PolicyIDs {
|
|
|
|
_, policy, _ := testPolicyForID(policyID)
|
|
|
|
if policy != nil {
|
|
|
|
reply.Policies = append(reply.Policies, policy)
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
policyCached = true
|
|
|
|
return nil
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("Induced RPC Error")
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
r := newTestACLResolver(t, delegate, func(config *ACLResolverConfig) {
|
|
|
|
config.Config.ACLDownPolicy = "extend-cache"
|
|
|
|
config.Config.ACLTokenTTL = 0
|
|
|
|
config.Config.ACLPolicyTTL = 0
|
|
|
|
})
|
2014-08-11 21:01:45 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2018-10-19 16:04:07 +00:00
|
|
|
authz, err := r.ResolveToken("found")
|
|
|
|
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
|
|
require.NotNil(t, authz)
|
|
|
|
require.True(t, authz.NodeWrite("foo", nil))
|
|
|
|
|
2019-03-12 15:23:43 +00:00
|
|
|
requirePolicyCached(t, r, "node-wr", true, "cached") // from "found" token
|
|
|
|
requirePolicyCached(t, r, "dc2-key-wr", true, "cached") // from "found" token
|
|
|
|
|
2018-10-19 16:04:07 +00:00
|
|
|
authz2, err := r.ResolveToken("found")
|
|
|
|
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
|
|
require.NotNil(t, authz2)
|
|
|
|
// testing pointer equality - these will be the same object because it is cached.
|
|
|
|
require.True(t, authz == authz2)
|
|
|
|
require.True(t, authz.NodeWrite("foo", nil))
|
2019-03-12 15:23:43 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
requirePolicyCached(t, r, "node-wr", true, "still cached") // from "found" token
|
|
|
|
requirePolicyCached(t, r, "dc2-key-wr", true, "still cached") // from "found" token
|
2018-10-19 16:04:07 +00:00
|
|
|
})
|
2014-08-11 21:01:45 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2018-10-19 16:04:07 +00:00
|
|
|
t.Run("Async-Cache", func(t *testing.T) {
|
|
|
|
t.Parallel()
|
|
|
|
cached := false
|
|
|
|
delegate := &ACLResolverTestDelegate{
|
|
|
|
enabled: true,
|
|
|
|
datacenter: "dc1",
|
|
|
|
legacy: false,
|
|
|
|
localTokens: false,
|
|
|
|
localPolicies: true,
|
2018-10-31 20:00:46 +00:00
|
|
|
tokenReadFn: func(args *structs.ACLTokenGetRequest, reply *structs.ACLTokenResponse) error {
|
2018-10-19 16:04:07 +00:00
|
|
|
if !cached {
|
|
|
|
_, token, _ := testIdentityForToken("found")
|
|
|
|
reply.Token = token.(*structs.ACLToken)
|
|
|
|
cached = true
|
|
|
|
return nil
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return acl.ErrNotFound
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
r := newTestACLResolver(t, delegate, func(config *ACLResolverConfig) {
|
|
|
|
config.Config.ACLDownPolicy = "async-cache"
|
|
|
|
config.Config.ACLTokenTTL = 0
|
|
|
|
})
|
2014-08-11 21:01:45 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2018-10-19 16:04:07 +00:00
|
|
|
authz, err := r.ResolveToken("foo")
|
|
|
|
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
|
|
require.NotNil(t, authz)
|
|
|
|
require.True(t, authz.NodeWrite("foo", nil))
|
|
|
|
|
2019-03-12 15:23:43 +00:00
|
|
|
requireIdentityCached(t, r, "foo", true, "cached")
|
|
|
|
|
2018-10-19 16:04:07 +00:00
|
|
|
// The identity should have been cached so this should still be valid
|
|
|
|
authz2, err := r.ResolveToken("foo")
|
|
|
|
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
|
|
require.NotNil(t, authz2)
|
|
|
|
// testing pointer equality - these will be the same object because it is cached.
|
|
|
|
require.True(t, authz == authz2)
|
|
|
|
require.True(t, authz.NodeWrite("foo", nil))
|
|
|
|
|
2019-03-12 15:23:43 +00:00
|
|
|
requireIdentityCached(t, r, "foo", true, "cached")
|
|
|
|
|
2018-10-19 16:04:07 +00:00
|
|
|
// the go routine spawned will eventually return and this will be a not found error
|
|
|
|
retry.Run(t, func(t *retry.R) {
|
|
|
|
authz3, err := r.ResolveToken("foo")
|
|
|
|
assert.Error(t, err)
|
|
|
|
assert.True(t, acl.IsErrNotFound(err))
|
|
|
|
assert.Nil(t, authz3)
|
|
|
|
})
|
2019-03-12 15:23:43 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
requireIdentityCached(t, r, "foo", false, "no longer cached")
|
2018-10-19 16:04:07 +00:00
|
|
|
})
|
2019-03-14 14:35:34 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
t.Run("PolicyResolve-TokenNotFound", func(t *testing.T) {
|
|
|
|
t.Parallel()
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
_, rawToken, _ := testIdentityForToken("found")
|
|
|
|
foundToken := rawToken.(*structs.ACLToken)
|
|
|
|
secretID := foundToken.SecretID
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
tokenResolved := false
|
|
|
|
policyResolved := false
|
|
|
|
delegate := &ACLResolverTestDelegate{
|
|
|
|
enabled: true,
|
|
|
|
datacenter: "dc1",
|
|
|
|
legacy: false,
|
|
|
|
localTokens: false,
|
|
|
|
localPolicies: false,
|
|
|
|
tokenReadFn: func(args *structs.ACLTokenGetRequest, reply *structs.ACLTokenResponse) error {
|
|
|
|
if !tokenResolved {
|
|
|
|
reply.Token = foundToken
|
|
|
|
tokenResolved = true
|
|
|
|
return nil
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("Not Supposed to be Invoked again")
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
policyResolveFn: func(args *structs.ACLPolicyBatchGetRequest, reply *structs.ACLPolicyBatchResponse) error {
|
|
|
|
if !policyResolved {
|
|
|
|
for _, policyID := range args.PolicyIDs {
|
|
|
|
_, policy, _ := testPolicyForID(policyID)
|
|
|
|
if policy != nil {
|
|
|
|
reply.Policies = append(reply.Policies, policy)
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
policyResolved = true
|
|
|
|
return nil
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return acl.ErrNotFound // test condition
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
r := newTestACLResolver(t, delegate, func(config *ACLResolverConfig) {
|
|
|
|
config.Config.ACLDownPolicy = "extend-cache"
|
|
|
|
config.Config.ACLTokenTTL = 0
|
|
|
|
config.Config.ACLPolicyTTL = 0
|
|
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// Prime the standard caches.
|
|
|
|
authz, err := r.ResolveToken(secretID)
|
|
|
|
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
|
|
require.NotNil(t, authz)
|
|
|
|
require.True(t, authz.NodeWrite("foo", nil))
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// Verify that the caches are setup properly.
|
|
|
|
requireIdentityCached(t, r, secretID, true, "cached")
|
|
|
|
requirePolicyCached(t, r, "node-wr", true, "cached") // from "found" token
|
|
|
|
requirePolicyCached(t, r, "dc2-key-wr", true, "cached") // from "found" token
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// Nuke 1 policy from the cache so that we force a policy resolve
|
|
|
|
// during token resolve.
|
|
|
|
r.cache.RemovePolicy("dc2-key-wr")
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
_, err = r.ResolveToken(secretID)
|
|
|
|
require.True(t, acl.IsErrNotFound(err))
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
requireIdentityCached(t, r, secretID, false, "identity not found cached")
|
|
|
|
requirePolicyCached(t, r, "node-wr", true, "still cached")
|
|
|
|
require.Nil(t, r.cache.GetPolicy("dc2-key-wr"), "not stored at all")
|
|
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
t.Run("PolicyResolve-PermissionDenied", func(t *testing.T) {
|
|
|
|
t.Parallel()
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
_, rawToken, _ := testIdentityForToken("found")
|
|
|
|
foundToken := rawToken.(*structs.ACLToken)
|
|
|
|
secretID := foundToken.SecretID
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
policyResolved := false
|
|
|
|
delegate := &ACLResolverTestDelegate{
|
|
|
|
enabled: true,
|
|
|
|
datacenter: "dc1",
|
|
|
|
legacy: false,
|
|
|
|
localTokens: false,
|
|
|
|
localPolicies: false,
|
|
|
|
tokenReadFn: func(args *structs.ACLTokenGetRequest, reply *structs.ACLTokenResponse) error {
|
|
|
|
// no limit
|
|
|
|
reply.Token = foundToken
|
|
|
|
return nil
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
policyResolveFn: func(args *structs.ACLPolicyBatchGetRequest, reply *structs.ACLPolicyBatchResponse) error {
|
|
|
|
if !policyResolved {
|
|
|
|
for _, policyID := range args.PolicyIDs {
|
|
|
|
_, policy, _ := testPolicyForID(policyID)
|
|
|
|
if policy != nil {
|
|
|
|
reply.Policies = append(reply.Policies, policy)
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
policyResolved = true
|
|
|
|
return nil
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return acl.ErrPermissionDenied // test condition
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
r := newTestACLResolver(t, delegate, func(config *ACLResolverConfig) {
|
|
|
|
config.Config.ACLDownPolicy = "extend-cache"
|
|
|
|
config.Config.ACLTokenTTL = 0
|
|
|
|
config.Config.ACLPolicyTTL = 0
|
|
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// Prime the standard caches.
|
|
|
|
authz, err := r.ResolveToken(secretID)
|
|
|
|
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
|
|
require.NotNil(t, authz)
|
|
|
|
require.True(t, authz.NodeWrite("foo", nil))
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// Verify that the caches are setup properly.
|
|
|
|
requireIdentityCached(t, r, secretID, true, "cached")
|
|
|
|
requirePolicyCached(t, r, "node-wr", true, "cached") // from "found" token
|
|
|
|
requirePolicyCached(t, r, "dc2-key-wr", true, "cached") // from "found" token
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// Nuke 1 policy from the cache so that we force a policy resolve
|
|
|
|
// during token resolve.
|
|
|
|
r.cache.RemovePolicy("dc2-key-wr")
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
_, err = r.ResolveToken(secretID)
|
|
|
|
require.True(t, acl.IsErrPermissionDenied(err))
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
require.Nil(t, r.cache.GetIdentity(secretID), "identity not stored at all")
|
|
|
|
requirePolicyCached(t, r, "node-wr", true, "still cached")
|
|
|
|
require.Nil(t, r.cache.GetPolicy("dc2-key-wr"), "not stored at all")
|
|
|
|
})
|
2014-08-11 21:01:45 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2018-10-19 16:04:07 +00:00
|
|
|
func TestACLResolver_DatacenterScoping(t *testing.T) {
|
2017-06-27 13:22:18 +00:00
|
|
|
t.Parallel()
|
2018-10-19 16:04:07 +00:00
|
|
|
t.Run("dc1", func(t *testing.T) {
|
|
|
|
delegate := &ACLResolverTestDelegate{
|
|
|
|
enabled: true,
|
|
|
|
datacenter: "dc1",
|
|
|
|
legacy: false,
|
|
|
|
localTokens: true,
|
|
|
|
localPolicies: true,
|
|
|
|
// No need to provide any of the RPC callbacks
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
r := newTestACLResolver(t, delegate, nil)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
authz, err := r.ResolveToken("found")
|
|
|
|
require.NotNil(t, authz)
|
|
|
|
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
|
|
require.False(t, authz.ACLRead())
|
|
|
|
require.True(t, authz.NodeWrite("foo", nil))
|
|
|
|
require.False(t, authz.KeyWrite("foo", nil))
|
2014-08-12 17:54:56 +00:00
|
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
|
2018-10-19 16:04:07 +00:00
|
|
|
t.Run("dc2", func(t *testing.T) {
|
|
|
|
delegate := &ACLResolverTestDelegate{
|
|
|
|
enabled: true,
|
|
|
|
datacenter: "dc2",
|
|
|
|
legacy: false,
|
|
|
|
localTokens: true,
|
|
|
|
localPolicies: true,
|
|
|
|
// No need to provide any of the RPC callbacks
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
r := newTestACLResolver(t, delegate, func(config *ACLResolverConfig) {
|
|
|
|
config.Config.Datacenter = "dc2"
|
|
|
|
})
|
2014-08-12 17:54:56 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2018-10-19 16:04:07 +00:00
|
|
|
authz, err := r.ResolveToken("found")
|
|
|
|
require.NotNil(t, authz)
|
|
|
|
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
|
|
require.False(t, authz.ACLRead())
|
|
|
|
require.False(t, authz.NodeWrite("foo", nil))
|
|
|
|
require.True(t, authz.KeyWrite("foo", nil))
|
|
|
|
})
|
2014-08-12 17:54:56 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2019-01-22 18:14:43 +00:00
|
|
|
func TestACLResolver_Client(t *testing.T) {
|
|
|
|
t.Parallel()
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
t.Run("Racey-Token-Mod-Policy-Resolve", func(t *testing.T) {
|
|
|
|
t.Parallel()
|
|
|
|
var tokenReads int32
|
|
|
|
var policyResolves int32
|
|
|
|
modified := false
|
|
|
|
deleted := false
|
|
|
|
delegate := &ACLResolverTestDelegate{
|
|
|
|
enabled: true,
|
|
|
|
datacenter: "dc1",
|
|
|
|
legacy: false,
|
|
|
|
localTokens: false,
|
|
|
|
localPolicies: false,
|
|
|
|
tokenReadFn: func(args *structs.ACLTokenGetRequest, reply *structs.ACLTokenResponse) error {
|
|
|
|
atomic.AddInt32(&tokenReads, 1)
|
|
|
|
if deleted {
|
|
|
|
return acl.ErrNotFound
|
|
|
|
} else if modified {
|
|
|
|
_, token, _ := testIdentityForToken("racey-modified")
|
|
|
|
reply.Token = token.(*structs.ACLToken)
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
_, token, _ := testIdentityForToken("racey-unmodified")
|
|
|
|
reply.Token = token.(*structs.ACLToken)
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return nil
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
policyResolveFn: func(args *structs.ACLPolicyBatchGetRequest, reply *structs.ACLPolicyBatchResponse) error {
|
|
|
|
atomic.AddInt32(&policyResolves, 1)
|
|
|
|
if deleted {
|
|
|
|
return acl.ErrNotFound
|
|
|
|
} else if !modified {
|
|
|
|
modified = true
|
|
|
|
return acl.ErrPermissionDenied
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
deleted = true
|
|
|
|
for _, policyID := range args.PolicyIDs {
|
|
|
|
_, policy, _ := testPolicyForID(policyID)
|
|
|
|
if policy != nil {
|
|
|
|
reply.Policies = append(reply.Policies, policy)
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
modified = true
|
|
|
|
return nil
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
r := newTestACLResolver(t, delegate, func(config *ACLResolverConfig) {
|
|
|
|
config.Config.ACLTokenTTL = 600 * time.Second
|
|
|
|
config.Config.ACLPolicyTTL = 30 * time.Millisecond
|
|
|
|
config.Config.ACLDownPolicy = "extend-cache"
|
|
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// resolves the token
|
|
|
|
// gets a permission denied resolving the policies - token updated
|
|
|
|
// invalidates the token
|
|
|
|
// refetches the token
|
|
|
|
// fetches the policies from the modified token
|
|
|
|
// creates the authorizers
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
// Must use the token secret here in order for the cached identity
|
|
|
|
// to be removed properly. Many other tests just resolve some other
|
|
|
|
// random name and it wont matter but this one cannot.
|
|
|
|
authz, err := r.ResolveToken("a1a54629-5050-4d17-8a4e-560d2423f835")
|
|
|
|
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
|
|
require.NotNil(t, authz)
|
|
|
|
require.True(t, authz.NodeWrite("foo", nil))
|
|
|
|
require.False(t, authz.ACLRead())
|
|
|
|
require.True(t, modified)
|
|
|
|
require.True(t, deleted)
|
|
|
|
require.Equal(t, int32(2), tokenReads)
|
|
|
|
require.Equal(t, int32(2), policyResolves)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// sleep long enough for the policy cache to expire
|
|
|
|
time.Sleep(50 * time.Millisecond)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// this round the identity will be resolved from the cache
|
|
|
|
// then the policy will be resolved but resolution will return ACL not found
|
|
|
|
// resolution will stop with the not found error (even though we still have the
|
|
|
|
// policies within the cache)
|
|
|
|
authz, err = r.ResolveToken("a1a54629-5050-4d17-8a4e-560d2423f835")
|
|
|
|
require.EqualError(t, err, acl.ErrNotFound.Error())
|
|
|
|
require.Nil(t, authz)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
require.True(t, modified)
|
|
|
|
require.True(t, deleted)
|
|
|
|
require.Equal(t, tokenReads, int32(2))
|
|
|
|
require.Equal(t, policyResolves, int32(3))
|
|
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
t.Run("Concurrent-Token-Resolve", func(t *testing.T) {
|
|
|
|
t.Parallel()
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
var tokenReads int32
|
|
|
|
var policyResolves int32
|
|
|
|
readyCh := make(chan struct{})
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
delegate := &ACLResolverTestDelegate{
|
|
|
|
enabled: true,
|
|
|
|
datacenter: "dc1",
|
|
|
|
legacy: false,
|
|
|
|
localTokens: false,
|
|
|
|
localPolicies: false,
|
|
|
|
tokenReadFn: func(args *structs.ACLTokenGetRequest, reply *structs.ACLTokenResponse) error {
|
|
|
|
atomic.AddInt32(&tokenReads, 1)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
switch args.TokenID {
|
|
|
|
case "a1a54629-5050-4d17-8a4e-560d2423f835":
|
2019-03-14 14:35:34 +00:00
|
|
|
_, token, _ := testIdentityForToken("concurrent-resolve")
|
2019-01-22 18:14:43 +00:00
|
|
|
reply.Token = token.(*structs.ACLToken)
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
return acl.ErrNotFound
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
select {
|
|
|
|
case <-readyCh:
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
time.Sleep(100 * time.Millisecond)
|
|
|
|
return nil
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
policyResolveFn: func(args *structs.ACLPolicyBatchGetRequest, reply *structs.ACLPolicyBatchResponse) error {
|
|
|
|
atomic.AddInt32(&policyResolves, 1)
|
2019-03-14 14:35:34 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2019-01-22 18:14:43 +00:00
|
|
|
for _, policyID := range args.PolicyIDs {
|
|
|
|
_, policy, _ := testPolicyForID(policyID)
|
|
|
|
if policy != nil {
|
|
|
|
reply.Policies = append(reply.Policies, policy)
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return nil
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
r := newTestACLResolver(t, delegate, func(config *ACLResolverConfig) {
|
|
|
|
// effectively disable caching - so the only way we end up with 1 token read is if they were
|
|
|
|
// being resolved concurrently
|
|
|
|
config.Config.ACLTokenTTL = 0 * time.Second
|
|
|
|
config.Config.ACLPolicyTTL = 30 * time.Millisecond
|
|
|
|
config.Config.ACLDownPolicy = "extend-cache"
|
|
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ch1 := make(chan *asyncResolutionResult)
|
|
|
|
ch2 := make(chan *asyncResolutionResult)
|
|
|
|
go resolveTokenAsync(r, "a1a54629-5050-4d17-8a4e-560d2423f835", ch1)
|
|
|
|
go resolveTokenAsync(r, "a1a54629-5050-4d17-8a4e-560d2423f835", ch2)
|
|
|
|
close(readyCh)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
res1 := <-ch1
|
|
|
|
res2 := <-ch2
|
|
|
|
require.NoError(t, res1.err)
|
|
|
|
require.NoError(t, res2.err)
|
|
|
|
require.Equal(t, res1.authz, res2.authz)
|
|
|
|
require.Equal(t, int32(1), tokenReads)
|
|
|
|
require.Equal(t, int32(1), policyResolves)
|
|
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2018-10-19 16:04:07 +00:00
|
|
|
func TestACLResolver_LocalTokensAndPolicies(t *testing.T) {
|
2017-06-27 13:22:18 +00:00
|
|
|
t.Parallel()
|
2018-10-19 16:04:07 +00:00
|
|
|
delegate := &ACLResolverTestDelegate{
|
|
|
|
enabled: true,
|
|
|
|
datacenter: "dc1",
|
|
|
|
legacy: false,
|
|
|
|
localTokens: true,
|
|
|
|
localPolicies: true,
|
|
|
|
// No need to provide any of the RPC callbacks
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
r := newTestACLResolver(t, delegate, nil)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
t.Run("Missing Identity", func(t *testing.T) {
|
|
|
|
authz, err := r.ResolveToken("doesn't exist")
|
|
|
|
require.Nil(t, authz)
|
|
|
|
require.Error(t, err)
|
|
|
|
require.True(t, acl.IsErrNotFound(err))
|
2014-08-11 21:18:51 +00:00
|
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
|
2018-10-19 16:04:07 +00:00
|
|
|
t.Run("Missing Policy", func(t *testing.T) {
|
|
|
|
authz, err := r.ResolveToken("missing-policy")
|
|
|
|
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
|
|
require.NotNil(t, authz)
|
|
|
|
require.True(t, authz.ACLRead())
|
|
|
|
require.False(t, authz.NodeWrite("foo", nil))
|
2014-08-11 21:18:51 +00:00
|
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
|
2018-10-19 16:04:07 +00:00
|
|
|
t.Run("Normal", func(t *testing.T) {
|
|
|
|
authz, err := r.ResolveToken("found")
|
|
|
|
require.NotNil(t, authz)
|
|
|
|
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
|
|
require.False(t, authz.ACLRead())
|
|
|
|
require.True(t, authz.NodeWrite("foo", nil))
|
|
|
|
})
|
2014-08-11 21:18:51 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2018-10-19 16:04:07 +00:00
|
|
|
t.Run("Anonymous", func(t *testing.T) {
|
|
|
|
authz, err := r.ResolveToken("")
|
|
|
|
require.NotNil(t, authz)
|
|
|
|
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
|
|
require.False(t, authz.ACLRead())
|
|
|
|
require.True(t, authz.NodeWrite("foo", nil))
|
|
|
|
})
|
2014-08-11 21:18:51 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2018-10-19 16:04:07 +00:00
|
|
|
t.Run("legacy-management", func(t *testing.T) {
|
|
|
|
authz, err := r.ResolveToken("legacy-management")
|
|
|
|
require.NotNil(t, authz)
|
|
|
|
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
|
|
require.True(t, authz.ACLWrite())
|
|
|
|
require.True(t, authz.KeyRead("foo"))
|
|
|
|
})
|
2014-08-11 21:18:51 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2018-10-19 16:04:07 +00:00
|
|
|
t.Run("legacy-client", func(t *testing.T) {
|
|
|
|
authz, err := r.ResolveToken("legacy-client")
|
|
|
|
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
|
|
require.NotNil(t, authz)
|
|
|
|
require.False(t, authz.OperatorRead())
|
|
|
|
require.True(t, authz.ServiceRead("foo"))
|
|
|
|
})
|
2014-08-11 21:18:51 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2018-10-19 16:04:07 +00:00
|
|
|
func TestACLResolver_LocalPolicies(t *testing.T) {
|
2017-06-27 13:22:18 +00:00
|
|
|
t.Parallel()
|
2018-10-19 16:04:07 +00:00
|
|
|
delegate := &ACLResolverTestDelegate{
|
|
|
|
enabled: true,
|
|
|
|
datacenter: "dc1",
|
|
|
|
legacy: false,
|
|
|
|
localTokens: false,
|
|
|
|
localPolicies: true,
|
2018-10-31 20:00:46 +00:00
|
|
|
tokenReadFn: func(args *structs.ACLTokenGetRequest, reply *structs.ACLTokenResponse) error {
|
2018-10-19 16:04:07 +00:00
|
|
|
_, token, err := testIdentityForToken(args.TokenID)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if token != nil {
|
|
|
|
reply.Token = token.(*structs.ACLToken)
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return err
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
r := newTestACLResolver(t, delegate, nil)
|
2014-08-11 21:18:51 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2018-10-19 16:04:07 +00:00
|
|
|
t.Run("Missing Identity", func(t *testing.T) {
|
|
|
|
authz, err := r.ResolveToken("doesn't exist")
|
|
|
|
require.Nil(t, authz)
|
|
|
|
require.Error(t, err)
|
|
|
|
require.True(t, acl.IsErrNotFound(err))
|
2014-08-11 21:18:51 +00:00
|
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
|
2018-10-19 16:04:07 +00:00
|
|
|
t.Run("Missing Policy", func(t *testing.T) {
|
|
|
|
authz, err := r.ResolveToken("missing-policy")
|
|
|
|
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
|
|
require.NotNil(t, authz)
|
|
|
|
require.True(t, authz.ACLRead())
|
|
|
|
require.False(t, authz.NodeWrite("foo", nil))
|
|
|
|
})
|
2014-08-11 21:18:51 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2018-10-19 16:04:07 +00:00
|
|
|
t.Run("Normal", func(t *testing.T) {
|
|
|
|
authz, err := r.ResolveToken("found")
|
|
|
|
require.NotNil(t, authz)
|
|
|
|
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
|
|
require.False(t, authz.ACLRead())
|
|
|
|
require.True(t, authz.NodeWrite("foo", nil))
|
|
|
|
})
|
2014-08-11 21:18:51 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2018-10-19 16:04:07 +00:00
|
|
|
t.Run("Anonymous", func(t *testing.T) {
|
|
|
|
authz, err := r.ResolveToken("")
|
|
|
|
require.NotNil(t, authz)
|
|
|
|
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
|
|
require.False(t, authz.ACLRead())
|
|
|
|
require.True(t, authz.NodeWrite("foo", nil))
|
|
|
|
})
|
2014-08-11 21:18:51 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2018-10-19 16:04:07 +00:00
|
|
|
t.Run("legacy-management", func(t *testing.T) {
|
|
|
|
authz, err := r.ResolveToken("legacy-management")
|
|
|
|
require.NotNil(t, authz)
|
|
|
|
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
|
|
require.True(t, authz.ACLWrite())
|
|
|
|
require.True(t, authz.KeyRead("foo"))
|
|
|
|
})
|
2014-08-11 21:18:51 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2018-10-19 16:04:07 +00:00
|
|
|
t.Run("legacy-client", func(t *testing.T) {
|
|
|
|
authz, err := r.ResolveToken("legacy-client")
|
|
|
|
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
|
|
require.NotNil(t, authz)
|
|
|
|
require.False(t, authz.OperatorRead())
|
|
|
|
require.True(t, authz.ServiceRead("foo"))
|
|
|
|
})
|
2014-08-11 21:18:51 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2018-10-19 16:04:07 +00:00
|
|
|
func TestACLResolver_Legacy(t *testing.T) {
|
2017-06-27 13:22:18 +00:00
|
|
|
t.Parallel()
|
2018-07-01 10:50:53 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2018-10-19 16:04:07 +00:00
|
|
|
t.Run("Cached", func(t *testing.T) {
|
|
|
|
t.Parallel()
|
|
|
|
cached := false
|
|
|
|
delegate := &ACLResolverTestDelegate{
|
|
|
|
enabled: true,
|
|
|
|
datacenter: "dc1",
|
|
|
|
legacy: true,
|
|
|
|
localTokens: false,
|
|
|
|
localPolicies: false,
|
|
|
|
getPolicyFn: func(args *structs.ACLPolicyResolveLegacyRequest, reply *structs.ACLPolicyResolveLegacyResponse) error {
|
|
|
|
if !cached {
|
|
|
|
reply.Parent = "deny"
|
|
|
|
reply.TTL = 30
|
|
|
|
reply.ETag = "nothing"
|
|
|
|
reply.Policy = &acl.Policy{
|
|
|
|
ID: "not-needed",
|
|
|
|
Nodes: []*acl.NodePolicy{
|
|
|
|
&acl.NodePolicy{
|
|
|
|
Name: "foo",
|
|
|
|
Policy: acl.PolicyWrite,
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
cached = true
|
|
|
|
return nil
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("Induced RPC Error")
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
r := newTestACLResolver(t, delegate, nil)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
authz, err := r.ResolveToken("foo")
|
|
|
|
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
|
|
require.NotNil(t, authz)
|
|
|
|
// there is a bit of translation that happens
|
|
|
|
require.True(t, authz.NodeWrite("foo", nil))
|
|
|
|
require.True(t, authz.NodeWrite("foo/bar", nil))
|
|
|
|
require.False(t, authz.NodeWrite("fo", nil))
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// this should be from the cache
|
|
|
|
authz, err = r.ResolveToken("foo")
|
|
|
|
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
|
|
require.NotNil(t, authz)
|
|
|
|
// there is a bit of translation that happens
|
|
|
|
require.True(t, authz.NodeWrite("foo", nil))
|
|
|
|
require.True(t, authz.NodeWrite("foo/bar", nil))
|
|
|
|
require.False(t, authz.NodeWrite("fo", nil))
|
|
|
|
})
|
2018-07-01 10:50:53 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2018-10-19 16:04:07 +00:00
|
|
|
t.Run("Cache-Expiry-Extend", func(t *testing.T) {
|
|
|
|
t.Parallel()
|
|
|
|
cached := false
|
|
|
|
delegate := &ACLResolverTestDelegate{
|
|
|
|
enabled: true,
|
|
|
|
datacenter: "dc1",
|
|
|
|
legacy: true,
|
|
|
|
localTokens: false,
|
|
|
|
localPolicies: false,
|
|
|
|
getPolicyFn: func(args *structs.ACLPolicyResolveLegacyRequest, reply *structs.ACLPolicyResolveLegacyResponse) error {
|
|
|
|
if !cached {
|
|
|
|
reply.Parent = "deny"
|
|
|
|
reply.TTL = 0
|
|
|
|
reply.ETag = "nothing"
|
|
|
|
reply.Policy = &acl.Policy{
|
|
|
|
ID: "not-needed",
|
|
|
|
Nodes: []*acl.NodePolicy{
|
|
|
|
&acl.NodePolicy{
|
|
|
|
Name: "foo",
|
|
|
|
Policy: acl.PolicyWrite,
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
cached = true
|
|
|
|
return nil
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("Induced RPC Error")
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
r := newTestACLResolver(t, delegate, func(config *ACLResolverConfig) {
|
|
|
|
config.Config.ACLTokenTTL = 0
|
2018-07-01 10:50:53 +00:00
|
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
|
2018-10-19 16:04:07 +00:00
|
|
|
authz, err := r.ResolveToken("foo")
|
|
|
|
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
|
|
require.NotNil(t, authz)
|
|
|
|
// there is a bit of translation that happens
|
|
|
|
require.True(t, authz.NodeWrite("foo", nil))
|
|
|
|
require.True(t, authz.NodeWrite("foo/bar", nil))
|
|
|
|
require.False(t, authz.NodeWrite("fo", nil))
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// this should be from the cache
|
|
|
|
authz, err = r.ResolveToken("foo")
|
|
|
|
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
|
|
require.NotNil(t, authz)
|
|
|
|
// there is a bit of translation that happens
|
|
|
|
require.True(t, authz.NodeWrite("foo", nil))
|
|
|
|
require.True(t, authz.NodeWrite("foo/bar", nil))
|
|
|
|
require.False(t, authz.NodeWrite("fo", nil))
|
|
|
|
})
|
2018-07-01 10:50:53 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2018-10-19 16:04:07 +00:00
|
|
|
t.Run("Cache-Expiry-Allow", func(t *testing.T) {
|
|
|
|
t.Parallel()
|
|
|
|
cached := false
|
|
|
|
delegate := &ACLResolverTestDelegate{
|
|
|
|
enabled: true,
|
|
|
|
datacenter: "dc1",
|
|
|
|
legacy: true,
|
|
|
|
localTokens: false,
|
|
|
|
localPolicies: false,
|
|
|
|
getPolicyFn: func(args *structs.ACLPolicyResolveLegacyRequest, reply *structs.ACLPolicyResolveLegacyResponse) error {
|
|
|
|
if !cached {
|
|
|
|
reply.Parent = "deny"
|
|
|
|
reply.TTL = 0
|
|
|
|
reply.ETag = "nothing"
|
|
|
|
reply.Policy = &acl.Policy{
|
|
|
|
ID: "not-needed",
|
|
|
|
Nodes: []*acl.NodePolicy{
|
|
|
|
&acl.NodePolicy{
|
|
|
|
Name: "foo",
|
|
|
|
Policy: acl.PolicyWrite,
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
cached = true
|
|
|
|
return nil
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("Induced RPC Error")
|
2018-07-01 10:50:53 +00:00
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
}
|
2018-10-19 16:04:07 +00:00
|
|
|
r := newTestACLResolver(t, delegate, func(config *ACLResolverConfig) {
|
|
|
|
config.Config.ACLDownPolicy = "allow"
|
|
|
|
config.Config.ACLTokenTTL = 0
|
|
|
|
})
|
2018-07-01 10:50:53 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2018-10-19 16:04:07 +00:00
|
|
|
authz, err := r.ResolveToken("foo")
|
|
|
|
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
|
|
require.NotNil(t, authz)
|
|
|
|
// there is a bit of translation that happens
|
|
|
|
require.True(t, authz.NodeWrite("foo", nil))
|
|
|
|
require.True(t, authz.NodeWrite("foo/bar", nil))
|
|
|
|
require.False(t, authz.NodeWrite("fo", nil))
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// this should be from the cache
|
|
|
|
authz, err = r.ResolveToken("foo")
|
|
|
|
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
|
|
require.NotNil(t, authz)
|
|
|
|
// there is a bit of translation that happens
|
|
|
|
require.True(t, authz.NodeWrite("foo", nil))
|
|
|
|
require.True(t, authz.NodeWrite("foo/bar", nil))
|
|
|
|
require.True(t, authz.NodeWrite("fo", nil))
|
|
|
|
})
|
2018-07-01 10:50:53 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2018-10-19 16:04:07 +00:00
|
|
|
t.Run("Cache-Expiry-Deny", func(t *testing.T) {
|
|
|
|
t.Parallel()
|
|
|
|
cached := false
|
|
|
|
delegate := &ACLResolverTestDelegate{
|
|
|
|
enabled: true,
|
|
|
|
datacenter: "dc1",
|
|
|
|
legacy: true,
|
|
|
|
localTokens: false,
|
|
|
|
localPolicies: false,
|
|
|
|
getPolicyFn: func(args *structs.ACLPolicyResolveLegacyRequest, reply *structs.ACLPolicyResolveLegacyResponse) error {
|
|
|
|
if !cached {
|
|
|
|
reply.Parent = "deny"
|
|
|
|
reply.TTL = 0
|
|
|
|
reply.ETag = "nothing"
|
|
|
|
reply.Policy = &acl.Policy{
|
|
|
|
ID: "not-needed",
|
|
|
|
Nodes: []*acl.NodePolicy{
|
|
|
|
&acl.NodePolicy{
|
|
|
|
Name: "foo",
|
|
|
|
Policy: acl.PolicyWrite,
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
cached = true
|
|
|
|
return nil
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("Induced RPC Error")
|
|
|
|
},
|
2018-07-01 10:50:53 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2018-10-19 16:04:07 +00:00
|
|
|
r := newTestACLResolver(t, delegate, func(config *ACLResolverConfig) {
|
|
|
|
config.Config.ACLDownPolicy = "deny"
|
|
|
|
config.Config.ACLTokenTTL = 0
|
|
|
|
})
|
2018-07-01 10:50:53 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2018-10-19 16:04:07 +00:00
|
|
|
authz, err := r.ResolveToken("foo")
|
|
|
|
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
|
|
require.NotNil(t, authz)
|
|
|
|
// there is a bit of translation that happens
|
|
|
|
require.True(t, authz.NodeWrite("foo", nil))
|
|
|
|
require.True(t, authz.NodeWrite("foo/bar", nil))
|
|
|
|
require.False(t, authz.NodeWrite("fo", nil))
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// this should be from the cache
|
|
|
|
authz, err = r.ResolveToken("foo")
|
|
|
|
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
|
|
require.NotNil(t, authz)
|
|
|
|
// there is a bit of translation that happens
|
|
|
|
require.False(t, authz.NodeWrite("foo", nil))
|
|
|
|
require.False(t, authz.NodeWrite("foo/bar", nil))
|
|
|
|
require.False(t, authz.NodeWrite("fo", nil))
|
|
|
|
})
|
2018-07-01 10:50:53 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2018-10-19 16:04:07 +00:00
|
|
|
t.Run("Cache-Expiry-Async-Cache", func(t *testing.T) {
|
|
|
|
t.Parallel()
|
|
|
|
cached := false
|
|
|
|
delegate := &ACLResolverTestDelegate{
|
|
|
|
enabled: true,
|
|
|
|
datacenter: "dc1",
|
|
|
|
legacy: true,
|
|
|
|
localTokens: false,
|
|
|
|
localPolicies: false,
|
|
|
|
getPolicyFn: func(args *structs.ACLPolicyResolveLegacyRequest, reply *structs.ACLPolicyResolveLegacyResponse) error {
|
|
|
|
if !cached {
|
|
|
|
reply.Parent = "deny"
|
|
|
|
reply.TTL = 0
|
|
|
|
reply.ETag = "nothing"
|
|
|
|
reply.Policy = &acl.Policy{
|
|
|
|
ID: "not-needed",
|
|
|
|
Nodes: []*acl.NodePolicy{
|
|
|
|
&acl.NodePolicy{
|
|
|
|
Name: "foo",
|
|
|
|
Policy: acl.PolicyWrite,
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
cached = true
|
|
|
|
return nil
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return acl.ErrNotFound
|
|
|
|
},
|
2018-07-01 10:50:53 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2018-10-19 16:04:07 +00:00
|
|
|
r := newTestACLResolver(t, delegate, func(config *ACLResolverConfig) {
|
|
|
|
config.Config.ACLDownPolicy = "async-cache"
|
|
|
|
config.Config.ACLTokenTTL = 0
|
|
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
authz, err := r.ResolveToken("foo")
|
|
|
|
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
|
|
require.NotNil(t, authz)
|
|
|
|
// there is a bit of translation that happens
|
|
|
|
require.True(t, authz.NodeWrite("foo", nil))
|
|
|
|
require.True(t, authz.NodeWrite("foo/bar", nil))
|
|
|
|
require.False(t, authz.NodeWrite("fo", nil))
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// delivered from the cache
|
|
|
|
authz2, err := r.ResolveToken("foo")
|
|
|
|
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
|
|
require.NotNil(t, authz)
|
|
|
|
require.True(t, authz == authz2)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// the go routine spawned will eventually return and this will be a not found error
|
|
|
|
retry.Run(t, func(t *retry.R) {
|
|
|
|
authz3, err := r.ResolveToken("foo")
|
|
|
|
assert.Error(t, err)
|
|
|
|
assert.True(t, acl.IsErrNotFound(err))
|
|
|
|
assert.Nil(t, authz3)
|
|
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
})
|
2014-08-11 21:18:51 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2018-10-19 16:04:07 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
|
2016-08-05 00:59:08 +00:00
|
|
|
func TestACL_Replication(t *testing.T) {
|
2017-06-27 13:22:18 +00:00
|
|
|
t.Parallel()
|
2018-07-01 18:00:20 +00:00
|
|
|
aclExtendPolicies := []string{"extend-cache", "async-cache"} //"async-cache"
|
2016-08-05 00:59:08 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2018-07-01 18:00:20 +00:00
|
|
|
for _, aclDownPolicy := range aclExtendPolicies {
|
|
|
|
dir1, s1 := testServerWithConfig(t, func(c *Config) {
|
|
|
|
c.ACLDatacenter = "dc1"
|
|
|
|
c.ACLMasterToken = "root"
|
|
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
defer os.RemoveAll(dir1)
|
|
|
|
defer s1.Shutdown()
|
|
|
|
client := rpcClient(t, s1)
|
|
|
|
defer client.Close()
|
2016-08-05 00:59:08 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2018-07-01 18:00:20 +00:00
|
|
|
dir2, s2 := testServerWithConfig(t, func(c *Config) {
|
|
|
|
c.Datacenter = "dc2"
|
|
|
|
c.ACLDatacenter = "dc1"
|
|
|
|
c.ACLDefaultPolicy = "deny"
|
|
|
|
c.ACLDownPolicy = aclDownPolicy
|
2018-10-19 16:04:07 +00:00
|
|
|
c.ACLTokenReplication = true
|
|
|
|
c.ACLReplicationRate = 100
|
|
|
|
c.ACLReplicationBurst = 100
|
2018-07-01 18:00:20 +00:00
|
|
|
c.ACLReplicationApplyLimit = 1000000
|
|
|
|
})
|
2019-02-27 19:28:31 +00:00
|
|
|
s2.tokens.UpdateReplicationToken("root")
|
2018-07-01 18:00:20 +00:00
|
|
|
defer os.RemoveAll(dir2)
|
|
|
|
defer s2.Shutdown()
|
2016-08-05 00:59:08 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2018-07-01 18:00:20 +00:00
|
|
|
dir3, s3 := testServerWithConfig(t, func(c *Config) {
|
|
|
|
c.Datacenter = "dc3"
|
|
|
|
c.ACLDatacenter = "dc1"
|
|
|
|
c.ACLDownPolicy = "deny"
|
2018-10-19 16:04:07 +00:00
|
|
|
c.ACLTokenReplication = true
|
|
|
|
c.ACLReplicationRate = 100
|
|
|
|
c.ACLReplicationBurst = 100
|
2018-07-01 18:00:20 +00:00
|
|
|
c.ACLReplicationApplyLimit = 1000000
|
|
|
|
})
|
2019-02-27 19:28:31 +00:00
|
|
|
s3.tokens.UpdateReplicationToken("root")
|
2018-07-01 18:00:20 +00:00
|
|
|
defer os.RemoveAll(dir3)
|
|
|
|
defer s3.Shutdown()
|
2016-08-05 00:59:08 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2018-07-01 18:00:20 +00:00
|
|
|
// Try to join.
|
|
|
|
joinWAN(t, s2, s1)
|
|
|
|
joinWAN(t, s3, s1)
|
|
|
|
testrpc.WaitForLeader(t, s1.RPC, "dc1")
|
|
|
|
testrpc.WaitForLeader(t, s1.RPC, "dc2")
|
|
|
|
testrpc.WaitForLeader(t, s1.RPC, "dc3")
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// Create a new token.
|
|
|
|
arg := structs.ACLRequest{
|
|
|
|
Datacenter: "dc1",
|
|
|
|
Op: structs.ACLSet,
|
|
|
|
ACL: structs.ACL{
|
|
|
|
Name: "User token",
|
2018-10-19 16:04:07 +00:00
|
|
|
Type: structs.ACLTokenTypeClient,
|
2018-07-01 18:00:20 +00:00
|
|
|
Rules: testACLPolicy,
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
WriteRequest: structs.WriteRequest{Token: "root"},
|
2016-08-05 00:59:08 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2018-07-01 18:00:20 +00:00
|
|
|
var id string
|
|
|
|
if err := s1.RPC("ACL.Apply", &arg, &id); err != nil {
|
|
|
|
t.Fatalf("err: %v", err)
|
2016-08-05 00:59:08 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2018-07-01 18:00:20 +00:00
|
|
|
// Wait for replication to occur.
|
|
|
|
retry.Run(t, func(r *retry.R) {
|
2018-10-19 16:04:07 +00:00
|
|
|
_, acl, err := s2.fsm.State().ACLTokenGetBySecret(nil, id)
|
2018-07-01 18:00:20 +00:00
|
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
|
|
r.Fatal(err)
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if acl == nil {
|
|
|
|
r.Fatal(nil)
|
|
|
|
}
|
2018-10-19 16:04:07 +00:00
|
|
|
_, acl, err = s3.fsm.State().ACLTokenGetBySecret(nil, id)
|
2018-07-01 18:00:20 +00:00
|
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
|
|
r.Fatal(err)
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if acl == nil {
|
|
|
|
r.Fatal(nil)
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// Kill the ACL datacenter.
|
|
|
|
s1.Shutdown()
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// Token should resolve on s2, which has replication + extend-cache.
|
2018-10-19 16:04:07 +00:00
|
|
|
acl, err := s2.ResolveToken(id)
|
2016-08-05 00:59:08 +00:00
|
|
|
if err != nil {
|
2018-07-01 18:00:20 +00:00
|
|
|
t.Fatalf("err: %v", err)
|
2016-08-05 00:59:08 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if acl == nil {
|
2018-07-01 18:00:20 +00:00
|
|
|
t.Fatalf("missing acl")
|
2016-08-05 00:59:08 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2018-07-01 18:00:20 +00:00
|
|
|
// Check the policy
|
|
|
|
if acl.KeyRead("bar") {
|
|
|
|
t.Fatalf("unexpected read")
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if !acl.KeyRead("foo/test") {
|
|
|
|
t.Fatalf("unexpected failed read")
|
|
|
|
}
|
2016-08-05 00:59:08 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2018-07-01 18:00:20 +00:00
|
|
|
// Although s3 has replication, and we verified that the ACL is there,
|
|
|
|
// it can not be used because of the down policy.
|
2018-10-19 16:04:07 +00:00
|
|
|
acl, err = s3.ResolveToken(id)
|
2018-07-01 18:00:20 +00:00
|
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
|
|
t.Fatalf("err: %v", err)
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if acl == nil {
|
|
|
|
t.Fatalf("missing acl")
|
|
|
|
}
|
2016-08-05 00:59:08 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2018-07-01 18:00:20 +00:00
|
|
|
// Check the policy.
|
|
|
|
if acl.KeyRead("bar") {
|
|
|
|
t.Fatalf("unexpected read")
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if acl.KeyRead("foo/test") {
|
|
|
|
t.Fatalf("unexpected read")
|
|
|
|
}
|
2016-08-05 00:59:08 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2014-08-11 21:18:51 +00:00
|
|
|
func TestACL_MultiDC_Found(t *testing.T) {
|
2017-06-27 13:22:18 +00:00
|
|
|
t.Parallel()
|
2014-08-11 21:18:51 +00:00
|
|
|
dir1, s1 := testServerWithConfig(t, func(c *Config) {
|
|
|
|
c.ACLDatacenter = "dc1"
|
2014-08-12 22:32:44 +00:00
|
|
|
c.ACLMasterToken = "root"
|
2014-08-11 21:18:51 +00:00
|
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
defer os.RemoveAll(dir1)
|
|
|
|
defer s1.Shutdown()
|
|
|
|
client := rpcClient(t, s1)
|
|
|
|
defer client.Close()
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
dir2, s2 := testServerWithConfig(t, func(c *Config) {
|
|
|
|
c.Datacenter = "dc2"
|
|
|
|
c.ACLDatacenter = "dc1" // Enable ACLs!
|
|
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
defer os.RemoveAll(dir2)
|
|
|
|
defer s2.Shutdown()
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// Try to join
|
2017-05-05 10:29:49 +00:00
|
|
|
joinWAN(t, s2, s1)
|
2014-08-11 21:18:51 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2017-04-19 23:00:11 +00:00
|
|
|
testrpc.WaitForLeader(t, s1.RPC, "dc1")
|
|
|
|
testrpc.WaitForLeader(t, s1.RPC, "dc2")
|
2014-08-11 21:18:51 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// Create a new token
|
|
|
|
arg := structs.ACLRequest{
|
|
|
|
Datacenter: "dc1",
|
|
|
|
Op: structs.ACLSet,
|
|
|
|
ACL: structs.ACL{
|
|
|
|
Name: "User token",
|
2018-10-19 16:04:07 +00:00
|
|
|
Type: structs.ACLTokenTypeClient,
|
2014-08-11 21:18:51 +00:00
|
|
|
Rules: testACLPolicy,
|
|
|
|
},
|
2014-08-12 22:32:44 +00:00
|
|
|
WriteRequest: structs.WriteRequest{Token: "root"},
|
2014-08-11 21:18:51 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
var id string
|
2015-10-13 23:43:52 +00:00
|
|
|
if err := s1.RPC("ACL.Apply", &arg, &id); err != nil {
|
2014-08-11 21:18:51 +00:00
|
|
|
t.Fatalf("err: %v", err)
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// Token should resolve
|
2018-10-19 16:04:07 +00:00
|
|
|
acl, err := s2.ResolveToken(id)
|
2014-08-11 21:18:51 +00:00
|
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
|
|
t.Fatalf("err: %v", err)
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if acl == nil {
|
|
|
|
t.Fatalf("missing acl")
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// Check the policy
|
|
|
|
if acl.KeyRead("bar") {
|
|
|
|
t.Fatalf("unexpected read")
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if !acl.KeyRead("foo/test") {
|
|
|
|
t.Fatalf("unexpected failed read")
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
2018-10-19 16:04:07 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2014-08-11 21:18:51 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2015-06-11 21:14:43 +00:00
|
|
|
func TestACL_filterHealthChecks(t *testing.T) {
|
2017-05-22 22:14:27 +00:00
|
|
|
t.Parallel()
|
2016-12-13 00:28:52 +00:00
|
|
|
// Create some health checks.
|
|
|
|
fill := func() structs.HealthChecks {
|
|
|
|
return structs.HealthChecks{
|
|
|
|
&structs.HealthCheck{
|
|
|
|
Node: "node1",
|
|
|
|
CheckID: "check1",
|
|
|
|
ServiceName: "foo",
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
}
|
2015-06-11 21:14:43 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2016-12-13 00:28:52 +00:00
|
|
|
// Try permissive filtering.
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
hc := fill()
|
2017-04-21 00:02:42 +00:00
|
|
|
filt := newACLFilter(acl.AllowAll(), nil, false)
|
2016-12-13 00:28:52 +00:00
|
|
|
filt.filterHealthChecks(&hc)
|
|
|
|
if len(hc) != 1 {
|
|
|
|
t.Fatalf("bad: %#v", hc)
|
|
|
|
}
|
2015-06-11 21:14:43 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2016-12-13 00:28:52 +00:00
|
|
|
// Try restrictive filtering.
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
hc := fill()
|
2017-04-21 00:02:42 +00:00
|
|
|
filt := newACLFilter(acl.DenyAll(), nil, false)
|
2016-12-13 00:28:52 +00:00
|
|
|
filt.filterHealthChecks(&hc)
|
|
|
|
if len(hc) != 0 {
|
|
|
|
t.Fatalf("bad: %#v", hc)
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// Allowed to see the service but not the node.
|
2018-10-19 16:04:07 +00:00
|
|
|
policy, err := acl.NewPolicyFromSource("", 0, `
|
2016-12-13 00:28:52 +00:00
|
|
|
service "foo" {
|
|
|
|
policy = "read"
|
|
|
|
}
|
2018-10-19 16:04:07 +00:00
|
|
|
`, acl.SyntaxLegacy, nil)
|
2016-12-13 00:28:52 +00:00
|
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
|
|
t.Fatalf("err %v", err)
|
|
|
|
}
|
2018-10-19 16:04:07 +00:00
|
|
|
perms, err := acl.NewPolicyAuthorizer(acl.DenyAll(), []*acl.Policy{policy}, nil)
|
2016-12-13 00:28:52 +00:00
|
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
|
|
t.Fatalf("err: %v", err)
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// This will work because version 8 ACLs aren't being enforced.
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
hc := fill()
|
2017-04-21 00:02:42 +00:00
|
|
|
filt := newACLFilter(perms, nil, false)
|
2016-12-13 00:28:52 +00:00
|
|
|
filt.filterHealthChecks(&hc)
|
|
|
|
if len(hc) != 1 {
|
|
|
|
t.Fatalf("bad: %#v", hc)
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// But with version 8 the node will block it.
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
hc := fill()
|
2017-04-21 00:02:42 +00:00
|
|
|
filt := newACLFilter(perms, nil, true)
|
2016-12-13 00:28:52 +00:00
|
|
|
filt.filterHealthChecks(&hc)
|
|
|
|
if len(hc) != 0 {
|
|
|
|
t.Fatalf("bad: %#v", hc)
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// Chain on access to the node.
|
2018-10-19 16:04:07 +00:00
|
|
|
policy, err = acl.NewPolicyFromSource("", 0, `
|
2016-12-13 00:28:52 +00:00
|
|
|
node "node1" {
|
|
|
|
policy = "read"
|
|
|
|
}
|
2018-10-19 16:04:07 +00:00
|
|
|
`, acl.SyntaxLegacy, nil)
|
2016-12-13 00:28:52 +00:00
|
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
|
|
t.Fatalf("err %v", err)
|
|
|
|
}
|
2018-10-19 16:04:07 +00:00
|
|
|
perms, err = acl.NewPolicyAuthorizer(perms, []*acl.Policy{policy}, nil)
|
2016-12-13 00:28:52 +00:00
|
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
|
|
t.Fatalf("err: %v", err)
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// Now it should go through.
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
hc := fill()
|
2017-04-21 00:02:42 +00:00
|
|
|
filt := newACLFilter(perms, nil, true)
|
2016-12-13 00:28:52 +00:00
|
|
|
filt.filterHealthChecks(&hc)
|
|
|
|
if len(hc) != 1 {
|
|
|
|
t.Fatalf("bad: %#v", hc)
|
|
|
|
}
|
2015-06-11 21:14:43 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2018-03-05 02:46:33 +00:00
|
|
|
func TestACL_filterIntentions(t *testing.T) {
|
|
|
|
t.Parallel()
|
2018-03-06 18:51:26 +00:00
|
|
|
assert := assert.New(t)
|
|
|
|
|
2018-03-05 02:46:33 +00:00
|
|
|
fill := func() structs.Intentions {
|
|
|
|
return structs.Intentions{
|
|
|
|
&structs.Intention{
|
|
|
|
ID: "f004177f-2c28-83b7-4229-eacc25fe55d1",
|
|
|
|
DestinationName: "bar",
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
&structs.Intention{
|
|
|
|
ID: "f004177f-2c28-83b7-4229-eacc25fe55d2",
|
|
|
|
DestinationName: "foo",
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// Try permissive filtering.
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
ixns := fill()
|
|
|
|
filt := newACLFilter(acl.AllowAll(), nil, false)
|
|
|
|
filt.filterIntentions(&ixns)
|
2018-03-06 18:51:26 +00:00
|
|
|
assert.Len(ixns, 2)
|
2018-03-05 02:46:33 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// Try restrictive filtering.
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
ixns := fill()
|
|
|
|
filt := newACLFilter(acl.DenyAll(), nil, false)
|
|
|
|
filt.filterIntentions(&ixns)
|
2018-03-06 18:51:26 +00:00
|
|
|
assert.Len(ixns, 0)
|
2018-03-05 02:46:33 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// Policy to see one
|
2018-10-19 16:04:07 +00:00
|
|
|
policy, err := acl.NewPolicyFromSource("", 0, `
|
2018-03-05 02:46:33 +00:00
|
|
|
service "foo" {
|
|
|
|
policy = "read"
|
|
|
|
}
|
2018-10-19 16:04:07 +00:00
|
|
|
`, acl.SyntaxLegacy, nil)
|
2018-03-06 18:51:26 +00:00
|
|
|
assert.Nil(err)
|
2018-10-19 16:04:07 +00:00
|
|
|
perms, err := acl.NewPolicyAuthorizer(acl.DenyAll(), []*acl.Policy{policy}, nil)
|
2018-03-06 18:51:26 +00:00
|
|
|
assert.Nil(err)
|
2018-03-05 02:46:33 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// Filter
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
ixns := fill()
|
|
|
|
filt := newACLFilter(perms, nil, false)
|
|
|
|
filt.filterIntentions(&ixns)
|
2018-03-06 18:51:26 +00:00
|
|
|
assert.Len(ixns, 1)
|
2018-03-05 02:46:33 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2015-06-11 21:14:43 +00:00
|
|
|
func TestACL_filterServices(t *testing.T) {
|
2017-05-22 22:14:27 +00:00
|
|
|
t.Parallel()
|
2015-06-11 21:14:43 +00:00
|
|
|
// Create some services
|
|
|
|
services := structs.Services{
|
|
|
|
"service1": []string{},
|
|
|
|
"service2": []string{},
|
2017-03-23 23:10:50 +00:00
|
|
|
"consul": []string{},
|
2015-06-11 21:14:43 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-03-23 23:10:50 +00:00
|
|
|
// Try permissive filtering.
|
2017-04-21 00:02:42 +00:00
|
|
|
filt := newACLFilter(acl.AllowAll(), nil, false)
|
2015-06-11 21:14:43 +00:00
|
|
|
filt.filterServices(services)
|
2017-03-23 23:10:50 +00:00
|
|
|
if len(services) != 3 {
|
2015-06-11 21:14:43 +00:00
|
|
|
t.Fatalf("bad: %#v", services)
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-03-23 23:10:50 +00:00
|
|
|
// Try restrictive filtering.
|
2017-04-21 00:02:42 +00:00
|
|
|
filt = newACLFilter(acl.DenyAll(), nil, false)
|
2015-06-11 21:14:43 +00:00
|
|
|
filt.filterServices(services)
|
2017-03-23 23:10:50 +00:00
|
|
|
if len(services) != 1 {
|
|
|
|
t.Fatalf("bad: %#v", services)
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if _, ok := services["consul"]; !ok {
|
|
|
|
t.Fatalf("bad: %#v", services)
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// Try restrictive filtering with version 8 enforcement.
|
2017-04-21 00:02:42 +00:00
|
|
|
filt = newACLFilter(acl.DenyAll(), nil, true)
|
2017-03-23 23:10:50 +00:00
|
|
|
filt.filterServices(services)
|
2015-06-11 21:14:43 +00:00
|
|
|
if len(services) != 0 {
|
|
|
|
t.Fatalf("bad: %#v", services)
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
func TestACL_filterServiceNodes(t *testing.T) {
|
2017-05-22 22:14:27 +00:00
|
|
|
t.Parallel()
|
2016-12-11 21:22:14 +00:00
|
|
|
// Create some service nodes.
|
|
|
|
fill := func() structs.ServiceNodes {
|
|
|
|
return structs.ServiceNodes{
|
|
|
|
&structs.ServiceNode{
|
|
|
|
Node: "node1",
|
|
|
|
ServiceName: "foo",
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
}
|
2015-06-11 21:14:43 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2016-12-11 21:22:14 +00:00
|
|
|
// Try permissive filtering.
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
nodes := fill()
|
2017-04-21 00:02:42 +00:00
|
|
|
filt := newACLFilter(acl.AllowAll(), nil, false)
|
2016-12-11 21:22:14 +00:00
|
|
|
filt.filterServiceNodes(&nodes)
|
|
|
|
if len(nodes) != 1 {
|
|
|
|
t.Fatalf("bad: %#v", nodes)
|
|
|
|
}
|
2015-06-11 21:14:43 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2016-12-11 21:22:14 +00:00
|
|
|
// Try restrictive filtering.
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
nodes := fill()
|
2017-04-21 00:02:42 +00:00
|
|
|
filt := newACLFilter(acl.DenyAll(), nil, false)
|
2016-12-11 21:22:14 +00:00
|
|
|
filt.filterServiceNodes(&nodes)
|
|
|
|
if len(nodes) != 0 {
|
|
|
|
t.Fatalf("bad: %#v", nodes)
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// Allowed to see the service but not the node.
|
2018-10-19 16:04:07 +00:00
|
|
|
policy, err := acl.NewPolicyFromSource("", 0, `
|
2016-12-11 21:22:14 +00:00
|
|
|
service "foo" {
|
|
|
|
policy = "read"
|
|
|
|
}
|
2018-10-19 16:04:07 +00:00
|
|
|
`, acl.SyntaxLegacy, nil)
|
2016-12-11 21:22:14 +00:00
|
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
|
|
t.Fatalf("err %v", err)
|
|
|
|
}
|
2018-10-19 16:04:07 +00:00
|
|
|
perms, err := acl.NewPolicyAuthorizer(acl.DenyAll(), []*acl.Policy{policy}, nil)
|
2016-12-11 21:22:14 +00:00
|
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
|
|
t.Fatalf("err: %v", err)
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2016-12-13 00:28:52 +00:00
|
|
|
// This will work because version 8 ACLs aren't being enforced.
|
2016-12-11 21:22:14 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
nodes := fill()
|
2017-04-21 00:02:42 +00:00
|
|
|
filt := newACLFilter(perms, nil, false)
|
2016-12-11 21:22:14 +00:00
|
|
|
filt.filterServiceNodes(&nodes)
|
|
|
|
if len(nodes) != 1 {
|
|
|
|
t.Fatalf("bad: %#v", nodes)
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// But with version 8 the node will block it.
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
nodes := fill()
|
2017-04-21 00:02:42 +00:00
|
|
|
filt := newACLFilter(perms, nil, true)
|
2016-12-11 21:22:14 +00:00
|
|
|
filt.filterServiceNodes(&nodes)
|
|
|
|
if len(nodes) != 0 {
|
|
|
|
t.Fatalf("bad: %#v", nodes)
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// Chain on access to the node.
|
2018-10-19 16:04:07 +00:00
|
|
|
policy, err = acl.NewPolicyFromSource("", 0, `
|
2016-12-11 21:22:14 +00:00
|
|
|
node "node1" {
|
|
|
|
policy = "read"
|
|
|
|
}
|
2018-10-19 16:04:07 +00:00
|
|
|
`, acl.SyntaxLegacy, nil)
|
2016-12-11 21:22:14 +00:00
|
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
|
|
t.Fatalf("err %v", err)
|
|
|
|
}
|
2018-10-19 16:04:07 +00:00
|
|
|
perms, err = acl.NewPolicyAuthorizer(perms, []*acl.Policy{policy}, nil)
|
2016-12-11 21:22:14 +00:00
|
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
|
|
t.Fatalf("err: %v", err)
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// Now it should go through.
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
nodes := fill()
|
2017-04-21 00:02:42 +00:00
|
|
|
filt := newACLFilter(perms, nil, true)
|
2016-12-11 21:22:14 +00:00
|
|
|
filt.filterServiceNodes(&nodes)
|
|
|
|
if len(nodes) != 1 {
|
|
|
|
t.Fatalf("bad: %#v", nodes)
|
|
|
|
}
|
2015-06-11 21:14:43 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
func TestACL_filterNodeServices(t *testing.T) {
|
2017-05-22 22:14:27 +00:00
|
|
|
t.Parallel()
|
2016-12-13 00:53:31 +00:00
|
|
|
// Create some node services.
|
|
|
|
fill := func() *structs.NodeServices {
|
|
|
|
return &structs.NodeServices{
|
|
|
|
Node: &structs.Node{
|
|
|
|
Node: "node1",
|
2015-06-11 21:14:43 +00:00
|
|
|
},
|
2016-12-13 00:53:31 +00:00
|
|
|
Services: map[string]*structs.NodeService{
|
|
|
|
"foo": &structs.NodeService{
|
|
|
|
ID: "foo",
|
|
|
|
Service: "foo",
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
}
|
2015-06-11 21:14:43 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2016-12-13 00:53:31 +00:00
|
|
|
// Try nil, which is a possible input.
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
var services *structs.NodeServices
|
2017-04-21 00:02:42 +00:00
|
|
|
filt := newACLFilter(acl.AllowAll(), nil, false)
|
2016-12-13 00:53:31 +00:00
|
|
|
filt.filterNodeServices(&services)
|
|
|
|
if services != nil {
|
|
|
|
t.Fatalf("bad: %#v", services)
|
|
|
|
}
|
2015-06-11 21:14:43 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2016-12-13 00:53:31 +00:00
|
|
|
// Try permissive filtering.
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
services := fill()
|
2017-04-21 00:02:42 +00:00
|
|
|
filt := newACLFilter(acl.AllowAll(), nil, false)
|
2016-12-13 00:53:31 +00:00
|
|
|
filt.filterNodeServices(&services)
|
|
|
|
if len(services.Services) != 1 {
|
|
|
|
t.Fatalf("bad: %#v", services.Services)
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// Try restrictive filtering.
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
services := fill()
|
2017-04-21 00:02:42 +00:00
|
|
|
filt := newACLFilter(acl.DenyAll(), nil, false)
|
2016-12-13 00:53:31 +00:00
|
|
|
filt.filterNodeServices(&services)
|
|
|
|
if len((*services).Services) != 0 {
|
|
|
|
t.Fatalf("bad: %#v", (*services).Services)
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// Allowed to see the service but not the node.
|
2018-10-19 16:04:07 +00:00
|
|
|
policy, err := acl.NewPolicyFromSource("", 0, `
|
2016-12-13 00:53:31 +00:00
|
|
|
service "foo" {
|
|
|
|
policy = "read"
|
|
|
|
}
|
2018-10-19 16:04:07 +00:00
|
|
|
`, acl.SyntaxLegacy, nil)
|
2016-12-13 00:53:31 +00:00
|
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
|
|
t.Fatalf("err %v", err)
|
|
|
|
}
|
2018-10-19 16:04:07 +00:00
|
|
|
perms, err := acl.NewPolicyAuthorizer(acl.DenyAll(), []*acl.Policy{policy}, nil)
|
2016-12-13 00:53:31 +00:00
|
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
|
|
t.Fatalf("err: %v", err)
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// This will work because version 8 ACLs aren't being enforced.
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
services := fill()
|
2017-04-21 00:02:42 +00:00
|
|
|
filt := newACLFilter(perms, nil, false)
|
2016-12-13 00:53:31 +00:00
|
|
|
filt.filterNodeServices(&services)
|
|
|
|
if len((*services).Services) != 1 {
|
|
|
|
t.Fatalf("bad: %#v", (*services).Services)
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// But with version 8 the node will block it.
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
services := fill()
|
2017-04-21 00:02:42 +00:00
|
|
|
filt := newACLFilter(perms, nil, true)
|
2016-12-13 00:53:31 +00:00
|
|
|
filt.filterNodeServices(&services)
|
|
|
|
if services != nil {
|
|
|
|
t.Fatalf("bad: %#v", services)
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// Chain on access to the node.
|
2018-10-19 16:04:07 +00:00
|
|
|
policy, err = acl.NewPolicyFromSource("", 0, `
|
2016-12-13 00:53:31 +00:00
|
|
|
node "node1" {
|
|
|
|
policy = "read"
|
|
|
|
}
|
2018-10-19 16:04:07 +00:00
|
|
|
`, acl.SyntaxLegacy, nil)
|
2016-12-13 00:53:31 +00:00
|
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
|
|
t.Fatalf("err %v", err)
|
|
|
|
}
|
2018-10-19 16:04:07 +00:00
|
|
|
perms, err = acl.NewPolicyAuthorizer(perms, []*acl.Policy{policy}, nil)
|
2016-12-13 00:53:31 +00:00
|
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
|
|
t.Fatalf("err: %v", err)
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// Now it should go through.
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
services := fill()
|
2017-04-21 00:02:42 +00:00
|
|
|
filt := newACLFilter(perms, nil, true)
|
2016-12-13 00:53:31 +00:00
|
|
|
filt.filterNodeServices(&services)
|
|
|
|
if len((*services).Services) != 1 {
|
|
|
|
t.Fatalf("bad: %#v", (*services).Services)
|
|
|
|
}
|
2015-06-11 21:14:43 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
func TestACL_filterCheckServiceNodes(t *testing.T) {
|
2017-05-22 22:14:27 +00:00
|
|
|
t.Parallel()
|
2016-12-13 00:28:52 +00:00
|
|
|
// Create some nodes.
|
|
|
|
fill := func() structs.CheckServiceNodes {
|
|
|
|
return structs.CheckServiceNodes{
|
|
|
|
structs.CheckServiceNode{
|
|
|
|
Node: &structs.Node{
|
|
|
|
Node: "node1",
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
Service: &structs.NodeService{
|
|
|
|
ID: "foo",
|
|
|
|
Service: "foo",
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
Checks: structs.HealthChecks{
|
|
|
|
&structs.HealthCheck{
|
|
|
|
Node: "node1",
|
|
|
|
CheckID: "check1",
|
|
|
|
ServiceName: "foo",
|
|
|
|
},
|
2015-06-11 21:14:43 +00:00
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
},
|
2016-12-13 00:28:52 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2015-06-11 21:14:43 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2016-12-13 00:28:52 +00:00
|
|
|
// Try permissive filtering.
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
nodes := fill()
|
2017-04-21 00:02:42 +00:00
|
|
|
filt := newACLFilter(acl.AllowAll(), nil, false)
|
2016-12-13 00:28:52 +00:00
|
|
|
filt.filterCheckServiceNodes(&nodes)
|
|
|
|
if len(nodes) != 1 {
|
|
|
|
t.Fatalf("bad: %#v", nodes)
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if len(nodes[0].Checks) != 1 {
|
|
|
|
t.Fatalf("bad: %#v", nodes[0].Checks)
|
|
|
|
}
|
2015-06-11 21:14:43 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2016-12-13 00:28:52 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// Try restrictive filtering.
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
nodes := fill()
|
2017-04-21 00:02:42 +00:00
|
|
|
filt := newACLFilter(acl.DenyAll(), nil, false)
|
2016-12-13 00:28:52 +00:00
|
|
|
filt.filterCheckServiceNodes(&nodes)
|
|
|
|
if len(nodes) != 0 {
|
|
|
|
t.Fatalf("bad: %#v", nodes)
|
|
|
|
}
|
2015-06-11 21:14:43 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2016-12-13 00:28:52 +00:00
|
|
|
// Allowed to see the service but not the node.
|
2018-10-19 16:04:07 +00:00
|
|
|
policy, err := acl.NewPolicyFromSource("", 0, `
|
2016-12-13 00:28:52 +00:00
|
|
|
service "foo" {
|
|
|
|
policy = "read"
|
|
|
|
}
|
2018-10-19 16:04:07 +00:00
|
|
|
`, acl.SyntaxLegacy, nil)
|
2016-12-13 00:28:52 +00:00
|
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
|
|
t.Fatalf("err %v", err)
|
|
|
|
}
|
2018-10-19 16:04:07 +00:00
|
|
|
perms, err := acl.NewPolicyAuthorizer(acl.DenyAll(), []*acl.Policy{policy}, nil)
|
2016-12-13 00:28:52 +00:00
|
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
|
|
t.Fatalf("err: %v", err)
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// This will work because version 8 ACLs aren't being enforced.
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
nodes := fill()
|
2017-04-21 00:02:42 +00:00
|
|
|
filt := newACLFilter(perms, nil, false)
|
2016-12-13 00:28:52 +00:00
|
|
|
filt.filterCheckServiceNodes(&nodes)
|
|
|
|
if len(nodes) != 1 {
|
|
|
|
t.Fatalf("bad: %#v", nodes)
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if len(nodes[0].Checks) != 1 {
|
|
|
|
t.Fatalf("bad: %#v", nodes[0].Checks)
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// But with version 8 the node will block it.
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
nodes := fill()
|
2017-04-21 00:02:42 +00:00
|
|
|
filt := newACLFilter(perms, nil, true)
|
2016-12-13 00:28:52 +00:00
|
|
|
filt.filterCheckServiceNodes(&nodes)
|
|
|
|
if len(nodes) != 0 {
|
|
|
|
t.Fatalf("bad: %#v", nodes)
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// Chain on access to the node.
|
2018-10-19 16:04:07 +00:00
|
|
|
policy, err = acl.NewPolicyFromSource("", 0, `
|
2016-12-13 00:28:52 +00:00
|
|
|
node "node1" {
|
|
|
|
policy = "read"
|
|
|
|
}
|
2018-10-19 16:04:07 +00:00
|
|
|
`, acl.SyntaxLegacy, nil)
|
2016-12-13 00:28:52 +00:00
|
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
|
|
t.Fatalf("err %v", err)
|
|
|
|
}
|
2018-10-19 16:04:07 +00:00
|
|
|
perms, err = acl.NewPolicyAuthorizer(perms, []*acl.Policy{policy}, nil)
|
2016-12-13 00:28:52 +00:00
|
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
|
|
t.Fatalf("err: %v", err)
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// Now it should go through.
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
nodes := fill()
|
2017-04-21 00:02:42 +00:00
|
|
|
filt := newACLFilter(perms, nil, true)
|
2016-12-13 00:28:52 +00:00
|
|
|
filt.filterCheckServiceNodes(&nodes)
|
|
|
|
if len(nodes) != 1 {
|
|
|
|
t.Fatalf("bad: %#v", nodes)
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if len(nodes[0].Checks) != 1 {
|
|
|
|
t.Fatalf("bad: %#v", nodes[0].Checks)
|
|
|
|
}
|
2015-06-11 21:14:43 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2016-12-12 19:58:31 +00:00
|
|
|
func TestACL_filterCoordinates(t *testing.T) {
|
2017-05-22 22:14:27 +00:00
|
|
|
t.Parallel()
|
2016-12-12 19:58:31 +00:00
|
|
|
// Create some coordinates.
|
|
|
|
coords := structs.Coordinates{
|
|
|
|
&structs.Coordinate{
|
|
|
|
Node: "node1",
|
|
|
|
Coord: generateRandomCoordinate(),
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
&structs.Coordinate{
|
|
|
|
Node: "node2",
|
|
|
|
Coord: generateRandomCoordinate(),
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// Try permissive filtering.
|
2017-04-21 00:02:42 +00:00
|
|
|
filt := newACLFilter(acl.AllowAll(), nil, false)
|
2016-12-12 19:58:31 +00:00
|
|
|
filt.filterCoordinates(&coords)
|
|
|
|
if len(coords) != 2 {
|
|
|
|
t.Fatalf("bad: %#v", coords)
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// Try restrictive filtering without version 8 ACL enforcement.
|
2017-04-21 00:02:42 +00:00
|
|
|
filt = newACLFilter(acl.DenyAll(), nil, false)
|
2016-12-12 19:58:31 +00:00
|
|
|
filt.filterCoordinates(&coords)
|
|
|
|
if len(coords) != 2 {
|
|
|
|
t.Fatalf("bad: %#v", coords)
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// Try restrictive filtering with version 8 ACL enforcement.
|
2017-04-21 00:02:42 +00:00
|
|
|
filt = newACLFilter(acl.DenyAll(), nil, true)
|
2016-12-12 19:58:31 +00:00
|
|
|
filt.filterCoordinates(&coords)
|
|
|
|
if len(coords) != 0 {
|
|
|
|
t.Fatalf("bad: %#v", coords)
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2016-12-13 05:59:22 +00:00
|
|
|
func TestACL_filterSessions(t *testing.T) {
|
2017-05-22 22:14:27 +00:00
|
|
|
t.Parallel()
|
2016-12-13 05:59:22 +00:00
|
|
|
// Create a session list.
|
|
|
|
sessions := structs.Sessions{
|
|
|
|
&structs.Session{
|
|
|
|
Node: "foo",
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
&structs.Session{
|
|
|
|
Node: "bar",
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// Try permissive filtering.
|
2017-04-21 00:02:42 +00:00
|
|
|
filt := newACLFilter(acl.AllowAll(), nil, true)
|
2016-12-13 05:59:22 +00:00
|
|
|
filt.filterSessions(&sessions)
|
|
|
|
if len(sessions) != 2 {
|
|
|
|
t.Fatalf("bad: %#v", sessions)
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// Try restrictive filtering but with version 8 enforcement turned off.
|
2017-04-21 00:02:42 +00:00
|
|
|
filt = newACLFilter(acl.DenyAll(), nil, false)
|
2016-12-13 05:59:22 +00:00
|
|
|
filt.filterSessions(&sessions)
|
|
|
|
if len(sessions) != 2 {
|
|
|
|
t.Fatalf("bad: %#v", sessions)
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// Try restrictive filtering with version 8 enforcement turned on.
|
2017-04-21 00:02:42 +00:00
|
|
|
filt = newACLFilter(acl.DenyAll(), nil, true)
|
2016-12-13 05:59:22 +00:00
|
|
|
filt.filterSessions(&sessions)
|
|
|
|
if len(sessions) != 0 {
|
|
|
|
t.Fatalf("bad: %#v", sessions)
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2015-06-11 21:14:43 +00:00
|
|
|
func TestACL_filterNodeDump(t *testing.T) {
|
2017-05-22 22:14:27 +00:00
|
|
|
t.Parallel()
|
2016-12-13 02:21:00 +00:00
|
|
|
// Create a node dump.
|
|
|
|
fill := func() structs.NodeDump {
|
|
|
|
return structs.NodeDump{
|
|
|
|
&structs.NodeInfo{
|
|
|
|
Node: "node1",
|
|
|
|
Services: []*structs.NodeService{
|
|
|
|
&structs.NodeService{
|
|
|
|
ID: "foo",
|
|
|
|
Service: "foo",
|
|
|
|
},
|
2015-06-11 21:14:43 +00:00
|
|
|
},
|
2016-12-13 02:21:00 +00:00
|
|
|
Checks: []*structs.HealthCheck{
|
|
|
|
&structs.HealthCheck{
|
|
|
|
Node: "node1",
|
|
|
|
CheckID: "check1",
|
|
|
|
ServiceName: "foo",
|
|
|
|
},
|
2015-06-11 21:14:43 +00:00
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
},
|
2016-12-13 02:21:00 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2015-06-11 21:14:43 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2016-12-13 02:21:00 +00:00
|
|
|
// Try permissive filtering.
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
dump := fill()
|
2017-04-21 00:02:42 +00:00
|
|
|
filt := newACLFilter(acl.AllowAll(), nil, false)
|
2016-12-13 02:21:00 +00:00
|
|
|
filt.filterNodeDump(&dump)
|
|
|
|
if len(dump) != 1 {
|
|
|
|
t.Fatalf("bad: %#v", dump)
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if len(dump[0].Services) != 1 {
|
|
|
|
t.Fatalf("bad: %#v", dump[0].Services)
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if len(dump[0].Checks) != 1 {
|
|
|
|
t.Fatalf("bad: %#v", dump[0].Checks)
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// Try restrictive filtering.
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
dump := fill()
|
2017-04-21 00:02:42 +00:00
|
|
|
filt := newACLFilter(acl.DenyAll(), nil, false)
|
2016-12-13 02:21:00 +00:00
|
|
|
filt.filterNodeDump(&dump)
|
|
|
|
if len(dump) != 1 {
|
|
|
|
t.Fatalf("bad: %#v", dump)
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if len(dump[0].Services) != 0 {
|
|
|
|
t.Fatalf("bad: %#v", dump[0].Services)
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if len(dump[0].Checks) != 0 {
|
|
|
|
t.Fatalf("bad: %#v", dump[0].Checks)
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// Allowed to see the service but not the node.
|
2018-10-19 16:04:07 +00:00
|
|
|
policy, err := acl.NewPolicyFromSource("", 0, `
|
2016-12-13 02:21:00 +00:00
|
|
|
service "foo" {
|
|
|
|
policy = "read"
|
|
|
|
}
|
2018-10-19 16:04:07 +00:00
|
|
|
`, acl.SyntaxLegacy, nil)
|
2016-12-13 02:21:00 +00:00
|
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
|
|
t.Fatalf("err %v", err)
|
2015-06-11 21:14:43 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2018-10-19 16:04:07 +00:00
|
|
|
perms, err := acl.NewPolicyAuthorizer(acl.DenyAll(), []*acl.Policy{policy}, nil)
|
2016-12-13 02:21:00 +00:00
|
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
|
|
t.Fatalf("err: %v", err)
|
2015-06-11 21:14:43 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2016-12-13 02:21:00 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// This will work because version 8 ACLs aren't being enforced.
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
dump := fill()
|
2017-04-21 00:02:42 +00:00
|
|
|
filt := newACLFilter(perms, nil, false)
|
2016-12-13 02:21:00 +00:00
|
|
|
filt.filterNodeDump(&dump)
|
|
|
|
if len(dump) != 1 {
|
|
|
|
t.Fatalf("bad: %#v", dump)
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if len(dump[0].Services) != 1 {
|
|
|
|
t.Fatalf("bad: %#v", dump[0].Services)
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if len(dump[0].Checks) != 1 {
|
|
|
|
t.Fatalf("bad: %#v", dump[0].Checks)
|
|
|
|
}
|
2015-06-11 21:14:43 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2016-12-13 02:21:00 +00:00
|
|
|
// But with version 8 the node will block it.
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
dump := fill()
|
2017-04-21 00:02:42 +00:00
|
|
|
filt := newACLFilter(perms, nil, true)
|
2016-12-13 02:21:00 +00:00
|
|
|
filt.filterNodeDump(&dump)
|
|
|
|
if len(dump) != 0 {
|
|
|
|
t.Fatalf("bad: %#v", dump)
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// Chain on access to the node.
|
2018-10-19 16:04:07 +00:00
|
|
|
policy, err = acl.NewPolicyFromSource("", 0, `
|
2016-12-13 02:21:00 +00:00
|
|
|
node "node1" {
|
|
|
|
policy = "read"
|
|
|
|
}
|
2018-10-19 16:04:07 +00:00
|
|
|
`, acl.SyntaxLegacy, nil)
|
2016-12-13 02:21:00 +00:00
|
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
|
|
t.Fatalf("err %v", err)
|
2015-06-11 21:14:43 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2018-10-19 16:04:07 +00:00
|
|
|
perms, err = acl.NewPolicyAuthorizer(perms, []*acl.Policy{policy}, nil)
|
2016-12-13 02:21:00 +00:00
|
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
|
|
t.Fatalf("err: %v", err)
|
2015-06-11 21:14:43 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2016-12-13 02:21:00 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// Now it should go through.
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
dump := fill()
|
2017-04-21 00:02:42 +00:00
|
|
|
filt := newACLFilter(perms, nil, true)
|
2016-12-13 02:21:00 +00:00
|
|
|
filt.filterNodeDump(&dump)
|
|
|
|
if len(dump) != 1 {
|
|
|
|
t.Fatalf("bad: %#v", dump)
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if len(dump[0].Services) != 1 {
|
|
|
|
t.Fatalf("bad: %#v", dump[0].Services)
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if len(dump[0].Checks) != 1 {
|
|
|
|
t.Fatalf("bad: %#v", dump[0].Checks)
|
|
|
|
}
|
2015-06-11 21:14:43 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2016-12-11 00:00:11 +00:00
|
|
|
func TestACL_filterNodes(t *testing.T) {
|
2017-05-22 22:14:27 +00:00
|
|
|
t.Parallel()
|
2016-12-11 00:00:11 +00:00
|
|
|
// Create a nodes list.
|
|
|
|
nodes := structs.Nodes{
|
|
|
|
&structs.Node{
|
|
|
|
Node: "foo",
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
&structs.Node{
|
|
|
|
Node: "bar",
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// Try permissive filtering.
|
2017-04-21 00:02:42 +00:00
|
|
|
filt := newACLFilter(acl.AllowAll(), nil, true)
|
2016-12-11 00:00:11 +00:00
|
|
|
filt.filterNodes(&nodes)
|
|
|
|
if len(nodes) != 2 {
|
|
|
|
t.Fatalf("bad: %#v", nodes)
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// Try restrictive filtering but with version 8 enforcement turned off.
|
2017-04-21 00:02:42 +00:00
|
|
|
filt = newACLFilter(acl.DenyAll(), nil, false)
|
2016-12-11 00:00:11 +00:00
|
|
|
filt.filterNodes(&nodes)
|
|
|
|
if len(nodes) != 2 {
|
|
|
|
t.Fatalf("bad: %#v", nodes)
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// Try restrictive filtering with version 8 enforcement turned on.
|
2017-04-21 00:02:42 +00:00
|
|
|
filt = newACLFilter(acl.DenyAll(), nil, true)
|
2016-12-11 00:00:11 +00:00
|
|
|
filt.filterNodes(&nodes)
|
|
|
|
if len(nodes) != 0 {
|
|
|
|
t.Fatalf("bad: %#v", nodes)
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2016-02-26 23:59:00 +00:00
|
|
|
func TestACL_redactPreparedQueryTokens(t *testing.T) {
|
2017-05-22 22:14:27 +00:00
|
|
|
t.Parallel()
|
2016-02-26 23:59:00 +00:00
|
|
|
query := &structs.PreparedQuery{
|
|
|
|
ID: "f004177f-2c28-83b7-4229-eacc25fe55d1",
|
|
|
|
Token: "root",
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
expected := &structs.PreparedQuery{
|
|
|
|
ID: "f004177f-2c28-83b7-4229-eacc25fe55d1",
|
|
|
|
Token: "root",
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// Try permissive filtering with a management token. This will allow the
|
|
|
|
// embedded token to be seen.
|
2017-04-21 00:02:42 +00:00
|
|
|
filt := newACLFilter(acl.ManageAll(), nil, false)
|
2016-02-26 23:59:00 +00:00
|
|
|
filt.redactPreparedQueryTokens(&query)
|
|
|
|
if !reflect.DeepEqual(query, expected) {
|
|
|
|
t.Fatalf("bad: %#v", &query)
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// Hang on to the entry with a token, which needs to survive the next
|
|
|
|
// operation.
|
|
|
|
original := query
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// Now try permissive filtering with a client token, which should cause
|
|
|
|
// the embedded token to get redacted.
|
2017-04-21 00:02:42 +00:00
|
|
|
filt = newACLFilter(acl.AllowAll(), nil, false)
|
2016-02-26 23:59:00 +00:00
|
|
|
filt.redactPreparedQueryTokens(&query)
|
|
|
|
expected.Token = redactedToken
|
|
|
|
if !reflect.DeepEqual(query, expected) {
|
|
|
|
t.Fatalf("bad: %#v", *query)
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// Make sure that the original object didn't lose its token.
|
|
|
|
if original.Token != "root" {
|
|
|
|
t.Fatalf("bad token: %s", original.Token)
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2018-10-19 16:04:07 +00:00
|
|
|
func TestACL_redactTokenSecret(t *testing.T) {
|
|
|
|
t.Parallel()
|
|
|
|
delegate := &ACLResolverTestDelegate{
|
|
|
|
enabled: true,
|
|
|
|
datacenter: "dc1",
|
|
|
|
legacy: false,
|
|
|
|
localTokens: true,
|
|
|
|
localPolicies: true,
|
|
|
|
// No need to provide any of the RPC callbacks
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
r := newTestACLResolver(t, delegate, nil)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
token := &structs.ACLToken{
|
|
|
|
AccessorID: "6a5e25b3-28f2-4085-9012-c3fb754314d1",
|
|
|
|
SecretID: "6a5e25b3-28f2-4085-9012-c3fb754314d1",
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
err := r.filterACL("acl-wr", &token)
|
|
|
|
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
|
|
require.Equal(t, "6a5e25b3-28f2-4085-9012-c3fb754314d1", token.SecretID)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
err = r.filterACL("acl-ro", &token)
|
|
|
|
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
|
|
require.Equal(t, redactedToken, token.SecretID)
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
func TestACL_redactTokenSecrets(t *testing.T) {
|
|
|
|
t.Parallel()
|
|
|
|
delegate := &ACLResolverTestDelegate{
|
|
|
|
enabled: true,
|
|
|
|
datacenter: "dc1",
|
|
|
|
legacy: false,
|
|
|
|
localTokens: true,
|
|
|
|
localPolicies: true,
|
|
|
|
// No need to provide any of the RPC callbacks
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
r := newTestACLResolver(t, delegate, nil)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
tokens := structs.ACLTokens{
|
|
|
|
&structs.ACLToken{
|
|
|
|
AccessorID: "6a5e25b3-28f2-4085-9012-c3fb754314d1",
|
|
|
|
SecretID: "6a5e25b3-28f2-4085-9012-c3fb754314d1",
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
err := r.filterACL("acl-wr", &tokens)
|
|
|
|
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
|
|
require.Equal(t, "6a5e25b3-28f2-4085-9012-c3fb754314d1", tokens[0].SecretID)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
err = r.filterACL("acl-ro", &tokens)
|
|
|
|
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
|
|
require.Equal(t, redactedToken, tokens[0].SecretID)
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
Creates new "prepared-query" ACL type and new token capture behavior.
Prior to this change, prepared queries had the following behavior for
ACLs, which will need to change to support templates:
1. A management token, or a token with read access to the service being
queried needed to be provided in order to create a prepared query.
2. The token used to create the prepared query was stored with the query
in the state store and used to execute the query.
3. A management token, or the token used to create the query needed to be
supplied to perform and CRUD operations on an existing prepared query.
This was pretty subtle and complicated behavior, and won't work for
templates since the service name is computed at execution time. To solve
this, we introduce a new "prepared-query" ACL type, where the prefix
applies to the query name for static prepared query types and to the
prefix for template prepared query types.
With this change, the new behavior is:
1. A management token, or a token with "prepared-query" write access to
the query name or (soon) the given template prefix is required to do
any CRUD operations on a prepared query, or to list prepared queries
(the list is filtered by this ACL).
2. You will no longer need a management token to list prepared queries,
but you will only be able to see prepared queries that you have access
to (you get an empty list instead of permission denied).
3. When listing or getting a query, because it was easy to capture
management tokens given the past behavior, this will always blank out
the "Token" field (replacing the contents as <hidden>) for all tokens
unless a management token is supplied. Going forward, we should
discourage people from binding tokens for execution unless strictly
necessary.
4. No token will be captured by default when a prepared query is created.
If the user wishes to supply an execution token then can pass it in via
the "Token" field in the prepared query definition. Otherwise, this
field will default to empty.
5. At execution time, we will use the captured token if it exists with the
prepared query definition, otherwise we will use the token that's passed
in with the request, just like we do for other RPCs (or you can use the
agent's configured token for DNS).
6. Prepared queries with no name (accessible only by ID) will not require
ACLs to create or modify (execution time will depend on the service ACL
configuration). Our argument here is that these are designed to be
ephemeral and the IDs are as good as an ACL. Management tokens will be
able to list all of these.
These changes enable templates, but also enable delegation of authority to
manage the prepared query namespace.
2016-02-23 08:12:58 +00:00
|
|
|
func TestACL_filterPreparedQueries(t *testing.T) {
|
2017-05-22 22:14:27 +00:00
|
|
|
t.Parallel()
|
Creates new "prepared-query" ACL type and new token capture behavior.
Prior to this change, prepared queries had the following behavior for
ACLs, which will need to change to support templates:
1. A management token, or a token with read access to the service being
queried needed to be provided in order to create a prepared query.
2. The token used to create the prepared query was stored with the query
in the state store and used to execute the query.
3. A management token, or the token used to create the query needed to be
supplied to perform and CRUD operations on an existing prepared query.
This was pretty subtle and complicated behavior, and won't work for
templates since the service name is computed at execution time. To solve
this, we introduce a new "prepared-query" ACL type, where the prefix
applies to the query name for static prepared query types and to the
prefix for template prepared query types.
With this change, the new behavior is:
1. A management token, or a token with "prepared-query" write access to
the query name or (soon) the given template prefix is required to do
any CRUD operations on a prepared query, or to list prepared queries
(the list is filtered by this ACL).
2. You will no longer need a management token to list prepared queries,
but you will only be able to see prepared queries that you have access
to (you get an empty list instead of permission denied).
3. When listing or getting a query, because it was easy to capture
management tokens given the past behavior, this will always blank out
the "Token" field (replacing the contents as <hidden>) for all tokens
unless a management token is supplied. Going forward, we should
discourage people from binding tokens for execution unless strictly
necessary.
4. No token will be captured by default when a prepared query is created.
If the user wishes to supply an execution token then can pass it in via
the "Token" field in the prepared query definition. Otherwise, this
field will default to empty.
5. At execution time, we will use the captured token if it exists with the
prepared query definition, otherwise we will use the token that's passed
in with the request, just like we do for other RPCs (or you can use the
agent's configured token for DNS).
6. Prepared queries with no name (accessible only by ID) will not require
ACLs to create or modify (execution time will depend on the service ACL
configuration). Our argument here is that these are designed to be
ephemeral and the IDs are as good as an ACL. Management tokens will be
able to list all of these.
These changes enable templates, but also enable delegation of authority to
manage the prepared query namespace.
2016-02-23 08:12:58 +00:00
|
|
|
queries := structs.PreparedQueries{
|
|
|
|
&structs.PreparedQuery{
|
|
|
|
ID: "f004177f-2c28-83b7-4229-eacc25fe55d1",
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
&structs.PreparedQuery{
|
2016-02-24 09:26:16 +00:00
|
|
|
ID: "f004177f-2c28-83b7-4229-eacc25fe55d2",
|
|
|
|
Name: "query-with-no-token",
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
&structs.PreparedQuery{
|
|
|
|
ID: "f004177f-2c28-83b7-4229-eacc25fe55d3",
|
|
|
|
Name: "query-with-a-token",
|
Creates new "prepared-query" ACL type and new token capture behavior.
Prior to this change, prepared queries had the following behavior for
ACLs, which will need to change to support templates:
1. A management token, or a token with read access to the service being
queried needed to be provided in order to create a prepared query.
2. The token used to create the prepared query was stored with the query
in the state store and used to execute the query.
3. A management token, or the token used to create the query needed to be
supplied to perform and CRUD operations on an existing prepared query.
This was pretty subtle and complicated behavior, and won't work for
templates since the service name is computed at execution time. To solve
this, we introduce a new "prepared-query" ACL type, where the prefix
applies to the query name for static prepared query types and to the
prefix for template prepared query types.
With this change, the new behavior is:
1. A management token, or a token with "prepared-query" write access to
the query name or (soon) the given template prefix is required to do
any CRUD operations on a prepared query, or to list prepared queries
(the list is filtered by this ACL).
2. You will no longer need a management token to list prepared queries,
but you will only be able to see prepared queries that you have access
to (you get an empty list instead of permission denied).
3. When listing or getting a query, because it was easy to capture
management tokens given the past behavior, this will always blank out
the "Token" field (replacing the contents as <hidden>) for all tokens
unless a management token is supplied. Going forward, we should
discourage people from binding tokens for execution unless strictly
necessary.
4. No token will be captured by default when a prepared query is created.
If the user wishes to supply an execution token then can pass it in via
the "Token" field in the prepared query definition. Otherwise, this
field will default to empty.
5. At execution time, we will use the captured token if it exists with the
prepared query definition, otherwise we will use the token that's passed
in with the request, just like we do for other RPCs (or you can use the
agent's configured token for DNS).
6. Prepared queries with no name (accessible only by ID) will not require
ACLs to create or modify (execution time will depend on the service ACL
configuration). Our argument here is that these are designed to be
ephemeral and the IDs are as good as an ACL. Management tokens will be
able to list all of these.
These changes enable templates, but also enable delegation of authority to
manage the prepared query namespace.
2016-02-23 08:12:58 +00:00
|
|
|
Token: "root",
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
expected := structs.PreparedQueries{
|
|
|
|
&structs.PreparedQuery{
|
|
|
|
ID: "f004177f-2c28-83b7-4229-eacc25fe55d1",
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
&structs.PreparedQuery{
|
2016-02-24 09:26:16 +00:00
|
|
|
ID: "f004177f-2c28-83b7-4229-eacc25fe55d2",
|
|
|
|
Name: "query-with-no-token",
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
&structs.PreparedQuery{
|
|
|
|
ID: "f004177f-2c28-83b7-4229-eacc25fe55d3",
|
|
|
|
Name: "query-with-a-token",
|
Creates new "prepared-query" ACL type and new token capture behavior.
Prior to this change, prepared queries had the following behavior for
ACLs, which will need to change to support templates:
1. A management token, or a token with read access to the service being
queried needed to be provided in order to create a prepared query.
2. The token used to create the prepared query was stored with the query
in the state store and used to execute the query.
3. A management token, or the token used to create the query needed to be
supplied to perform and CRUD operations on an existing prepared query.
This was pretty subtle and complicated behavior, and won't work for
templates since the service name is computed at execution time. To solve
this, we introduce a new "prepared-query" ACL type, where the prefix
applies to the query name for static prepared query types and to the
prefix for template prepared query types.
With this change, the new behavior is:
1. A management token, or a token with "prepared-query" write access to
the query name or (soon) the given template prefix is required to do
any CRUD operations on a prepared query, or to list prepared queries
(the list is filtered by this ACL).
2. You will no longer need a management token to list prepared queries,
but you will only be able to see prepared queries that you have access
to (you get an empty list instead of permission denied).
3. When listing or getting a query, because it was easy to capture
management tokens given the past behavior, this will always blank out
the "Token" field (replacing the contents as <hidden>) for all tokens
unless a management token is supplied. Going forward, we should
discourage people from binding tokens for execution unless strictly
necessary.
4. No token will be captured by default when a prepared query is created.
If the user wishes to supply an execution token then can pass it in via
the "Token" field in the prepared query definition. Otherwise, this
field will default to empty.
5. At execution time, we will use the captured token if it exists with the
prepared query definition, otherwise we will use the token that's passed
in with the request, just like we do for other RPCs (or you can use the
agent's configured token for DNS).
6. Prepared queries with no name (accessible only by ID) will not require
ACLs to create or modify (execution time will depend on the service ACL
configuration). Our argument here is that these are designed to be
ephemeral and the IDs are as good as an ACL. Management tokens will be
able to list all of these.
These changes enable templates, but also enable delegation of authority to
manage the prepared query namespace.
2016-02-23 08:12:58 +00:00
|
|
|
Token: "root",
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// Try permissive filtering with a management token. This will allow the
|
2016-02-24 09:26:16 +00:00
|
|
|
// embedded token to be seen.
|
2017-04-21 00:02:42 +00:00
|
|
|
filt := newACLFilter(acl.ManageAll(), nil, false)
|
Creates new "prepared-query" ACL type and new token capture behavior.
Prior to this change, prepared queries had the following behavior for
ACLs, which will need to change to support templates:
1. A management token, or a token with read access to the service being
queried needed to be provided in order to create a prepared query.
2. The token used to create the prepared query was stored with the query
in the state store and used to execute the query.
3. A management token, or the token used to create the query needed to be
supplied to perform and CRUD operations on an existing prepared query.
This was pretty subtle and complicated behavior, and won't work for
templates since the service name is computed at execution time. To solve
this, we introduce a new "prepared-query" ACL type, where the prefix
applies to the query name for static prepared query types and to the
prefix for template prepared query types.
With this change, the new behavior is:
1. A management token, or a token with "prepared-query" write access to
the query name or (soon) the given template prefix is required to do
any CRUD operations on a prepared query, or to list prepared queries
(the list is filtered by this ACL).
2. You will no longer need a management token to list prepared queries,
but you will only be able to see prepared queries that you have access
to (you get an empty list instead of permission denied).
3. When listing or getting a query, because it was easy to capture
management tokens given the past behavior, this will always blank out
the "Token" field (replacing the contents as <hidden>) for all tokens
unless a management token is supplied. Going forward, we should
discourage people from binding tokens for execution unless strictly
necessary.
4. No token will be captured by default when a prepared query is created.
If the user wishes to supply an execution token then can pass it in via
the "Token" field in the prepared query definition. Otherwise, this
field will default to empty.
5. At execution time, we will use the captured token if it exists with the
prepared query definition, otherwise we will use the token that's passed
in with the request, just like we do for other RPCs (or you can use the
agent's configured token for DNS).
6. Prepared queries with no name (accessible only by ID) will not require
ACLs to create or modify (execution time will depend on the service ACL
configuration). Our argument here is that these are designed to be
ephemeral and the IDs are as good as an ACL. Management tokens will be
able to list all of these.
These changes enable templates, but also enable delegation of authority to
manage the prepared query namespace.
2016-02-23 08:12:58 +00:00
|
|
|
filt.filterPreparedQueries(&queries)
|
|
|
|
if !reflect.DeepEqual(queries, expected) {
|
|
|
|
t.Fatalf("bad: %#v", queries)
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// Hang on to the entry with a token, which needs to survive the next
|
|
|
|
// operation.
|
2016-02-24 09:26:16 +00:00
|
|
|
original := queries[2]
|
Creates new "prepared-query" ACL type and new token capture behavior.
Prior to this change, prepared queries had the following behavior for
ACLs, which will need to change to support templates:
1. A management token, or a token with read access to the service being
queried needed to be provided in order to create a prepared query.
2. The token used to create the prepared query was stored with the query
in the state store and used to execute the query.
3. A management token, or the token used to create the query needed to be
supplied to perform and CRUD operations on an existing prepared query.
This was pretty subtle and complicated behavior, and won't work for
templates since the service name is computed at execution time. To solve
this, we introduce a new "prepared-query" ACL type, where the prefix
applies to the query name for static prepared query types and to the
prefix for template prepared query types.
With this change, the new behavior is:
1. A management token, or a token with "prepared-query" write access to
the query name or (soon) the given template prefix is required to do
any CRUD operations on a prepared query, or to list prepared queries
(the list is filtered by this ACL).
2. You will no longer need a management token to list prepared queries,
but you will only be able to see prepared queries that you have access
to (you get an empty list instead of permission denied).
3. When listing or getting a query, because it was easy to capture
management tokens given the past behavior, this will always blank out
the "Token" field (replacing the contents as <hidden>) for all tokens
unless a management token is supplied. Going forward, we should
discourage people from binding tokens for execution unless strictly
necessary.
4. No token will be captured by default when a prepared query is created.
If the user wishes to supply an execution token then can pass it in via
the "Token" field in the prepared query definition. Otherwise, this
field will default to empty.
5. At execution time, we will use the captured token if it exists with the
prepared query definition, otherwise we will use the token that's passed
in with the request, just like we do for other RPCs (or you can use the
agent's configured token for DNS).
6. Prepared queries with no name (accessible only by ID) will not require
ACLs to create or modify (execution time will depend on the service ACL
configuration). Our argument here is that these are designed to be
ephemeral and the IDs are as good as an ACL. Management tokens will be
able to list all of these.
These changes enable templates, but also enable delegation of authority to
manage the prepared query namespace.
2016-02-23 08:12:58 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// Now try permissive filtering with a client token, which should cause
|
2016-02-24 09:26:16 +00:00
|
|
|
// the embedded token to get redacted, and the query with no name to get
|
|
|
|
// filtered out.
|
2017-04-21 00:02:42 +00:00
|
|
|
filt = newACLFilter(acl.AllowAll(), nil, false)
|
Creates new "prepared-query" ACL type and new token capture behavior.
Prior to this change, prepared queries had the following behavior for
ACLs, which will need to change to support templates:
1. A management token, or a token with read access to the service being
queried needed to be provided in order to create a prepared query.
2. The token used to create the prepared query was stored with the query
in the state store and used to execute the query.
3. A management token, or the token used to create the query needed to be
supplied to perform and CRUD operations on an existing prepared query.
This was pretty subtle and complicated behavior, and won't work for
templates since the service name is computed at execution time. To solve
this, we introduce a new "prepared-query" ACL type, where the prefix
applies to the query name for static prepared query types and to the
prefix for template prepared query types.
With this change, the new behavior is:
1. A management token, or a token with "prepared-query" write access to
the query name or (soon) the given template prefix is required to do
any CRUD operations on a prepared query, or to list prepared queries
(the list is filtered by this ACL).
2. You will no longer need a management token to list prepared queries,
but you will only be able to see prepared queries that you have access
to (you get an empty list instead of permission denied).
3. When listing or getting a query, because it was easy to capture
management tokens given the past behavior, this will always blank out
the "Token" field (replacing the contents as <hidden>) for all tokens
unless a management token is supplied. Going forward, we should
discourage people from binding tokens for execution unless strictly
necessary.
4. No token will be captured by default when a prepared query is created.
If the user wishes to supply an execution token then can pass it in via
the "Token" field in the prepared query definition. Otherwise, this
field will default to empty.
5. At execution time, we will use the captured token if it exists with the
prepared query definition, otherwise we will use the token that's passed
in with the request, just like we do for other RPCs (or you can use the
agent's configured token for DNS).
6. Prepared queries with no name (accessible only by ID) will not require
ACLs to create or modify (execution time will depend on the service ACL
configuration). Our argument here is that these are designed to be
ephemeral and the IDs are as good as an ACL. Management tokens will be
able to list all of these.
These changes enable templates, but also enable delegation of authority to
manage the prepared query namespace.
2016-02-23 08:12:58 +00:00
|
|
|
filt.filterPreparedQueries(&queries)
|
2016-02-24 09:26:16 +00:00
|
|
|
expected[2].Token = redactedToken
|
|
|
|
expected = append(structs.PreparedQueries{}, expected[1], expected[2])
|
Creates new "prepared-query" ACL type and new token capture behavior.
Prior to this change, prepared queries had the following behavior for
ACLs, which will need to change to support templates:
1. A management token, or a token with read access to the service being
queried needed to be provided in order to create a prepared query.
2. The token used to create the prepared query was stored with the query
in the state store and used to execute the query.
3. A management token, or the token used to create the query needed to be
supplied to perform and CRUD operations on an existing prepared query.
This was pretty subtle and complicated behavior, and won't work for
templates since the service name is computed at execution time. To solve
this, we introduce a new "prepared-query" ACL type, where the prefix
applies to the query name for static prepared query types and to the
prefix for template prepared query types.
With this change, the new behavior is:
1. A management token, or a token with "prepared-query" write access to
the query name or (soon) the given template prefix is required to do
any CRUD operations on a prepared query, or to list prepared queries
(the list is filtered by this ACL).
2. You will no longer need a management token to list prepared queries,
but you will only be able to see prepared queries that you have access
to (you get an empty list instead of permission denied).
3. When listing or getting a query, because it was easy to capture
management tokens given the past behavior, this will always blank out
the "Token" field (replacing the contents as <hidden>) for all tokens
unless a management token is supplied. Going forward, we should
discourage people from binding tokens for execution unless strictly
necessary.
4. No token will be captured by default when a prepared query is created.
If the user wishes to supply an execution token then can pass it in via
the "Token" field in the prepared query definition. Otherwise, this
field will default to empty.
5. At execution time, we will use the captured token if it exists with the
prepared query definition, otherwise we will use the token that's passed
in with the request, just like we do for other RPCs (or you can use the
agent's configured token for DNS).
6. Prepared queries with no name (accessible only by ID) will not require
ACLs to create or modify (execution time will depend on the service ACL
configuration). Our argument here is that these are designed to be
ephemeral and the IDs are as good as an ACL. Management tokens will be
able to list all of these.
These changes enable templates, but also enable delegation of authority to
manage the prepared query namespace.
2016-02-23 08:12:58 +00:00
|
|
|
if !reflect.DeepEqual(queries, expected) {
|
|
|
|
t.Fatalf("bad: %#v", queries)
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// Make sure that the original object didn't lose its token.
|
|
|
|
if original.Token != "root" {
|
|
|
|
t.Fatalf("bad token: %s", original.Token)
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// Now try restrictive filtering.
|
2017-04-21 00:02:42 +00:00
|
|
|
filt = newACLFilter(acl.DenyAll(), nil, false)
|
Creates new "prepared-query" ACL type and new token capture behavior.
Prior to this change, prepared queries had the following behavior for
ACLs, which will need to change to support templates:
1. A management token, or a token with read access to the service being
queried needed to be provided in order to create a prepared query.
2. The token used to create the prepared query was stored with the query
in the state store and used to execute the query.
3. A management token, or the token used to create the query needed to be
supplied to perform and CRUD operations on an existing prepared query.
This was pretty subtle and complicated behavior, and won't work for
templates since the service name is computed at execution time. To solve
this, we introduce a new "prepared-query" ACL type, where the prefix
applies to the query name for static prepared query types and to the
prefix for template prepared query types.
With this change, the new behavior is:
1. A management token, or a token with "prepared-query" write access to
the query name or (soon) the given template prefix is required to do
any CRUD operations on a prepared query, or to list prepared queries
(the list is filtered by this ACL).
2. You will no longer need a management token to list prepared queries,
but you will only be able to see prepared queries that you have access
to (you get an empty list instead of permission denied).
3. When listing or getting a query, because it was easy to capture
management tokens given the past behavior, this will always blank out
the "Token" field (replacing the contents as <hidden>) for all tokens
unless a management token is supplied. Going forward, we should
discourage people from binding tokens for execution unless strictly
necessary.
4. No token will be captured by default when a prepared query is created.
If the user wishes to supply an execution token then can pass it in via
the "Token" field in the prepared query definition. Otherwise, this
field will default to empty.
5. At execution time, we will use the captured token if it exists with the
prepared query definition, otherwise we will use the token that's passed
in with the request, just like we do for other RPCs (or you can use the
agent's configured token for DNS).
6. Prepared queries with no name (accessible only by ID) will not require
ACLs to create or modify (execution time will depend on the service ACL
configuration). Our argument here is that these are designed to be
ephemeral and the IDs are as good as an ACL. Management tokens will be
able to list all of these.
These changes enable templates, but also enable delegation of authority to
manage the prepared query namespace.
2016-02-23 08:12:58 +00:00
|
|
|
filt.filterPreparedQueries(&queries)
|
|
|
|
if len(queries) != 0 {
|
|
|
|
t.Fatalf("bad: %#v", queries)
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2015-06-11 23:46:15 +00:00
|
|
|
func TestACL_unhandledFilterType(t *testing.T) {
|
2017-05-22 22:14:27 +00:00
|
|
|
t.Parallel()
|
2015-06-11 23:46:15 +00:00
|
|
|
defer func(t *testing.T) {
|
|
|
|
if recover() == nil {
|
|
|
|
t.Fatalf("should panic")
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}(t)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// Create the server
|
|
|
|
dir, token, srv, client := testACLFilterServer(t)
|
|
|
|
defer os.RemoveAll(dir)
|
|
|
|
defer srv.Shutdown()
|
|
|
|
defer client.Close()
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// Pass an unhandled type into the ACL filter.
|
|
|
|
srv.filterACL(token, &structs.HealthCheck{})
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2016-12-09 00:01:01 +00:00
|
|
|
func TestACL_vetRegisterWithACL(t *testing.T) {
|
2017-05-22 22:14:27 +00:00
|
|
|
t.Parallel()
|
2016-12-09 00:01:01 +00:00
|
|
|
args := &structs.RegisterRequest{
|
|
|
|
Node: "nope",
|
|
|
|
Address: "127.0.0.1",
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// With a nil ACL, the update should be allowed.
|
|
|
|
if err := vetRegisterWithACL(nil, args, nil); err != nil {
|
|
|
|
t.Fatalf("err: %v", err)
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// Create a basic node policy.
|
2018-10-19 16:04:07 +00:00
|
|
|
policy, err := acl.NewPolicyFromSource("", 0, `
|
2016-12-09 00:01:01 +00:00
|
|
|
node "node" {
|
|
|
|
policy = "write"
|
2014-08-11 21:01:45 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2018-10-19 16:04:07 +00:00
|
|
|
`, acl.SyntaxLegacy, nil)
|
2016-12-09 00:01:01 +00:00
|
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
|
|
t.Fatalf("err %v", err)
|
|
|
|
}
|
2018-10-19 16:04:07 +00:00
|
|
|
perms, err := acl.NewPolicyAuthorizer(acl.DenyAll(), []*acl.Policy{policy}, nil)
|
2016-12-09 00:01:01 +00:00
|
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
|
|
t.Fatalf("err: %v", err)
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// With that policy, the update should now be blocked for node reasons.
|
|
|
|
err = vetRegisterWithACL(perms, args, nil)
|
2017-08-23 14:52:48 +00:00
|
|
|
if !acl.IsErrPermissionDenied(err) {
|
2016-12-09 00:01:01 +00:00
|
|
|
t.Fatalf("bad: %v", err)
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// Now use a permitted node name.
|
|
|
|
args.Node = "node"
|
|
|
|
if err := vetRegisterWithACL(perms, args, nil); err != nil {
|
|
|
|
t.Fatalf("err: %v", err)
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// Build some node info that matches what we have now.
|
|
|
|
ns := &structs.NodeServices{
|
|
|
|
Node: &structs.Node{
|
|
|
|
Node: "node",
|
|
|
|
Address: "127.0.0.1",
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
Services: make(map[string]*structs.NodeService),
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// Try to register a service, which should be blocked.
|
|
|
|
args.Service = &structs.NodeService{
|
|
|
|
Service: "service",
|
|
|
|
ID: "my-id",
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
err = vetRegisterWithACL(perms, args, ns)
|
2017-08-23 14:52:48 +00:00
|
|
|
if !acl.IsErrPermissionDenied(err) {
|
2016-12-09 00:01:01 +00:00
|
|
|
t.Fatalf("bad: %v", err)
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// Chain on a basic service policy.
|
2018-10-19 16:04:07 +00:00
|
|
|
policy, err = acl.NewPolicyFromSource("", 0, `
|
2016-12-09 00:01:01 +00:00
|
|
|
service "service" {
|
|
|
|
policy = "write"
|
|
|
|
}
|
2018-10-19 16:04:07 +00:00
|
|
|
`, acl.SyntaxLegacy, nil)
|
2016-12-09 00:01:01 +00:00
|
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
|
|
t.Fatalf("err %v", err)
|
|
|
|
}
|
2018-10-19 16:04:07 +00:00
|
|
|
perms, err = acl.NewPolicyAuthorizer(perms, []*acl.Policy{policy}, nil)
|
2016-12-09 00:01:01 +00:00
|
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
|
|
t.Fatalf("err: %v", err)
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// With the service ACL, the update should go through.
|
|
|
|
if err := vetRegisterWithACL(perms, args, ns); err != nil {
|
|
|
|
t.Fatalf("err: %v", err)
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// Add an existing service that they are clobbering and aren't allowed
|
|
|
|
// to write to.
|
|
|
|
ns.Services["my-id"] = &structs.NodeService{
|
|
|
|
Service: "other",
|
|
|
|
ID: "my-id",
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
err = vetRegisterWithACL(perms, args, ns)
|
2017-08-23 14:52:48 +00:00
|
|
|
if !acl.IsErrPermissionDenied(err) {
|
2016-12-09 00:01:01 +00:00
|
|
|
t.Fatalf("bad: %v", err)
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// Chain on a policy that allows them to write to the other service.
|
2018-10-19 16:04:07 +00:00
|
|
|
policy, err = acl.NewPolicyFromSource("", 0, `
|
2016-12-09 00:01:01 +00:00
|
|
|
service "other" {
|
|
|
|
policy = "write"
|
|
|
|
}
|
2018-10-19 16:04:07 +00:00
|
|
|
`, acl.SyntaxLegacy, nil)
|
2016-12-09 00:01:01 +00:00
|
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
|
|
t.Fatalf("err %v", err)
|
|
|
|
}
|
2018-10-19 16:04:07 +00:00
|
|
|
perms, err = acl.NewPolicyAuthorizer(perms, []*acl.Policy{policy}, nil)
|
2016-12-09 00:01:01 +00:00
|
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
|
|
t.Fatalf("err: %v", err)
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// Now it should go through.
|
|
|
|
if err := vetRegisterWithACL(perms, args, ns); err != nil {
|
|
|
|
t.Fatalf("err: %v", err)
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// Try creating the node and the service at once by having no existing
|
|
|
|
// node record. This should be ok since we have node and service
|
|
|
|
// permissions.
|
|
|
|
if err := vetRegisterWithACL(perms, args, nil); err != nil {
|
|
|
|
t.Fatalf("err: %v", err)
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// Add a node-level check to the member, which should be rejected.
|
|
|
|
args.Check = &structs.HealthCheck{
|
|
|
|
Node: "node",
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
err = vetRegisterWithACL(perms, args, ns)
|
|
|
|
if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "check member must be nil") {
|
|
|
|
t.Fatalf("bad: %v", err)
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// Move the check into the slice, but give a bad node name.
|
|
|
|
args.Check.Node = "nope"
|
|
|
|
args.Checks = append(args.Checks, args.Check)
|
|
|
|
args.Check = nil
|
|
|
|
err = vetRegisterWithACL(perms, args, ns)
|
|
|
|
if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "doesn't match register request node") {
|
|
|
|
t.Fatalf("bad: %v", err)
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// Fix the node name, which should now go through.
|
|
|
|
args.Checks[0].Node = "node"
|
|
|
|
if err := vetRegisterWithACL(perms, args, ns); err != nil {
|
|
|
|
t.Fatalf("err: %v", err)
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// Add a service-level check.
|
|
|
|
args.Checks = append(args.Checks, &structs.HealthCheck{
|
|
|
|
Node: "node",
|
|
|
|
ServiceID: "my-id",
|
|
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
if err := vetRegisterWithACL(perms, args, ns); err != nil {
|
|
|
|
t.Fatalf("err: %v", err)
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// Try creating everything at once. This should be ok since we have all
|
|
|
|
// the permissions we need. It also makes sure that we can register a
|
|
|
|
// new node, service, and associated checks.
|
|
|
|
if err := vetRegisterWithACL(perms, args, nil); err != nil {
|
|
|
|
t.Fatalf("err: %v", err)
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// Nil out the service registration, which'll skip the special case
|
|
|
|
// and force us to look at the ns data (it will look like we are
|
|
|
|
// writing to the "other" service which also has "my-id").
|
|
|
|
args.Service = nil
|
|
|
|
if err := vetRegisterWithACL(perms, args, ns); err != nil {
|
|
|
|
t.Fatalf("err: %v", err)
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// Chain on a policy that forbids them to write to the other service.
|
2018-10-19 16:04:07 +00:00
|
|
|
policy, err = acl.NewPolicyFromSource("", 0, `
|
2016-12-09 00:01:01 +00:00
|
|
|
service "other" {
|
|
|
|
policy = "deny"
|
|
|
|
}
|
2018-10-19 16:04:07 +00:00
|
|
|
`, acl.SyntaxLegacy, nil)
|
2016-12-09 00:01:01 +00:00
|
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
|
|
t.Fatalf("err %v", err)
|
|
|
|
}
|
2018-10-19 16:04:07 +00:00
|
|
|
perms, err = acl.NewPolicyAuthorizer(perms, []*acl.Policy{policy}, nil)
|
2016-12-09 00:01:01 +00:00
|
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
|
|
t.Fatalf("err: %v", err)
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// This should get rejected.
|
|
|
|
err = vetRegisterWithACL(perms, args, ns)
|
2017-08-23 14:52:48 +00:00
|
|
|
if !acl.IsErrPermissionDenied(err) {
|
2016-12-09 00:01:01 +00:00
|
|
|
t.Fatalf("bad: %v", err)
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// Change the existing service data to point to a service name they
|
|
|
|
// car write to. This should go through.
|
|
|
|
ns.Services["my-id"] = &structs.NodeService{
|
|
|
|
Service: "service",
|
|
|
|
ID: "my-id",
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if err := vetRegisterWithACL(perms, args, ns); err != nil {
|
|
|
|
t.Fatalf("err: %v", err)
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// Chain on a policy that forbids them to write to the node.
|
2018-10-19 16:04:07 +00:00
|
|
|
policy, err = acl.NewPolicyFromSource("", 0, `
|
2016-12-09 00:01:01 +00:00
|
|
|
node "node" {
|
|
|
|
policy = "deny"
|
|
|
|
}
|
2018-10-19 16:04:07 +00:00
|
|
|
`, acl.SyntaxLegacy, nil)
|
2016-12-09 00:01:01 +00:00
|
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
|
|
t.Fatalf("err %v", err)
|
|
|
|
}
|
2018-10-19 16:04:07 +00:00
|
|
|
perms, err = acl.NewPolicyAuthorizer(perms, []*acl.Policy{policy}, nil)
|
2016-12-09 00:01:01 +00:00
|
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
|
|
t.Fatalf("err: %v", err)
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// This should get rejected because there's a node-level check in here.
|
|
|
|
err = vetRegisterWithACL(perms, args, ns)
|
2017-08-23 14:52:48 +00:00
|
|
|
if !acl.IsErrPermissionDenied(err) {
|
2016-12-09 00:01:01 +00:00
|
|
|
t.Fatalf("bad: %v", err)
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// Change the node-level check into a service check, and then it should
|
|
|
|
// go through.
|
|
|
|
args.Checks[0].ServiceID = "my-id"
|
|
|
|
if err := vetRegisterWithACL(perms, args, ns); err != nil {
|
|
|
|
t.Fatalf("err: %v", err)
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// Finally, attempt to update the node part of the data and make sure
|
|
|
|
// that gets rejected since they no longer have permissions.
|
|
|
|
args.Address = "127.0.0.2"
|
|
|
|
err = vetRegisterWithACL(perms, args, ns)
|
2017-08-23 14:52:48 +00:00
|
|
|
if !acl.IsErrPermissionDenied(err) {
|
2016-12-09 00:01:01 +00:00
|
|
|
t.Fatalf("bad: %v", err)
|
|
|
|
}
|
2014-08-11 21:01:45 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2016-12-10 03:15:44 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
func TestACL_vetDeregisterWithACL(t *testing.T) {
|
2017-05-22 22:14:27 +00:00
|
|
|
t.Parallel()
|
2016-12-10 03:15:44 +00:00
|
|
|
args := &structs.DeregisterRequest{
|
|
|
|
Node: "nope",
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// With a nil ACL, the update should be allowed.
|
|
|
|
if err := vetDeregisterWithACL(nil, args, nil, nil); err != nil {
|
|
|
|
t.Fatalf("err: %v", err)
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// Create a basic node policy.
|
2018-10-19 16:04:07 +00:00
|
|
|
policy, err := acl.NewPolicyFromSource("", 0, `
|
2016-12-10 03:15:44 +00:00
|
|
|
node "node" {
|
|
|
|
policy = "write"
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
service "service" {
|
|
|
|
policy = "write"
|
|
|
|
}
|
2018-10-19 16:04:07 +00:00
|
|
|
`, acl.SyntaxLegacy, nil)
|
2016-12-10 03:15:44 +00:00
|
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
|
|
t.Fatalf("err %v", err)
|
|
|
|
}
|
2018-10-19 16:04:07 +00:00
|
|
|
perms, err := acl.NewPolicyAuthorizer(acl.DenyAll(), []*acl.Policy{policy}, nil)
|
2016-12-10 03:15:44 +00:00
|
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
|
|
t.Fatalf("err: %v", err)
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// With that policy, the update should now be blocked for node reasons.
|
|
|
|
err = vetDeregisterWithACL(perms, args, nil, nil)
|
2017-08-23 14:52:48 +00:00
|
|
|
if !acl.IsErrPermissionDenied(err) {
|
2016-12-10 03:15:44 +00:00
|
|
|
t.Fatalf("bad: %v", err)
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// Now use a permitted node name.
|
|
|
|
args.Node = "node"
|
|
|
|
if err := vetDeregisterWithACL(perms, args, nil, nil); err != nil {
|
|
|
|
t.Fatalf("err: %v", err)
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// Try an unknown check.
|
|
|
|
args.CheckID = "check-id"
|
|
|
|
err = vetDeregisterWithACL(perms, args, nil, nil)
|
|
|
|
if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "Unknown check") {
|
|
|
|
t.Fatalf("bad: %v", err)
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// Now pass in a check that should be blocked.
|
|
|
|
nc := &structs.HealthCheck{
|
|
|
|
Node: "node",
|
|
|
|
CheckID: "check-id",
|
|
|
|
ServiceID: "service-id",
|
|
|
|
ServiceName: "nope",
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
err = vetDeregisterWithACL(perms, args, nil, nc)
|
2017-08-23 14:52:48 +00:00
|
|
|
if !acl.IsErrPermissionDenied(err) {
|
2016-12-10 03:15:44 +00:00
|
|
|
t.Fatalf("bad: %v", err)
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// Change it to an allowed service, which should go through.
|
|
|
|
nc.ServiceName = "service"
|
|
|
|
if err := vetDeregisterWithACL(perms, args, nil, nc); err != nil {
|
|
|
|
t.Fatalf("err: %v", err)
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// Switch to a node check that should be blocked.
|
|
|
|
args.Node = "nope"
|
|
|
|
nc.Node = "nope"
|
|
|
|
nc.ServiceID = ""
|
|
|
|
nc.ServiceName = ""
|
|
|
|
err = vetDeregisterWithACL(perms, args, nil, nc)
|
2017-08-23 14:52:48 +00:00
|
|
|
if !acl.IsErrPermissionDenied(err) {
|
2016-12-10 03:15:44 +00:00
|
|
|
t.Fatalf("bad: %v", err)
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// Switch to an allowed node check, which should go through.
|
|
|
|
args.Node = "node"
|
|
|
|
nc.Node = "node"
|
|
|
|
if err := vetDeregisterWithACL(perms, args, nil, nc); err != nil {
|
|
|
|
t.Fatalf("err: %v", err)
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// Try an unknown service.
|
|
|
|
args.ServiceID = "service-id"
|
|
|
|
err = vetDeregisterWithACL(perms, args, nil, nil)
|
|
|
|
if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "Unknown service") {
|
|
|
|
t.Fatalf("bad: %v", err)
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// Now pass in a service that should be blocked.
|
|
|
|
ns := &structs.NodeService{
|
|
|
|
ID: "service-id",
|
|
|
|
Service: "nope",
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
err = vetDeregisterWithACL(perms, args, ns, nil)
|
2017-08-23 14:52:48 +00:00
|
|
|
if !acl.IsErrPermissionDenied(err) {
|
2016-12-10 03:15:44 +00:00
|
|
|
t.Fatalf("bad: %v", err)
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// Change it to an allowed service, which should go through.
|
|
|
|
ns.Service = "service"
|
|
|
|
if err := vetDeregisterWithACL(perms, args, ns, nil); err != nil {
|
|
|
|
t.Fatalf("err: %v", err)
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
2019-04-08 18:19:09 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
func TestDedupeServiceIdentities(t *testing.T) {
|
|
|
|
srvid := func(name string, datacenters ...string) *structs.ACLServiceIdentity {
|
|
|
|
return &structs.ACLServiceIdentity{
|
|
|
|
ServiceName: name,
|
|
|
|
Datacenters: datacenters,
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
tests := []struct {
|
|
|
|
name string
|
|
|
|
in []*structs.ACLServiceIdentity
|
|
|
|
expect []*structs.ACLServiceIdentity
|
|
|
|
}{
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
name: "empty",
|
|
|
|
in: nil,
|
|
|
|
expect: nil,
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
name: "one",
|
|
|
|
in: []*structs.ACLServiceIdentity{
|
|
|
|
srvid("foo"),
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
expect: []*structs.ACLServiceIdentity{
|
|
|
|
srvid("foo"),
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
name: "just names",
|
|
|
|
in: []*structs.ACLServiceIdentity{
|
|
|
|
srvid("fooZ"),
|
|
|
|
srvid("fooA"),
|
|
|
|
srvid("fooY"),
|
|
|
|
srvid("fooB"),
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
expect: []*structs.ACLServiceIdentity{
|
|
|
|
srvid("fooA"),
|
|
|
|
srvid("fooB"),
|
|
|
|
srvid("fooY"),
|
|
|
|
srvid("fooZ"),
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
name: "just names with dupes",
|
|
|
|
in: []*structs.ACLServiceIdentity{
|
|
|
|
srvid("fooZ"),
|
|
|
|
srvid("fooA"),
|
|
|
|
srvid("fooY"),
|
|
|
|
srvid("fooB"),
|
|
|
|
srvid("fooA"),
|
|
|
|
srvid("fooB"),
|
|
|
|
srvid("fooY"),
|
|
|
|
srvid("fooZ"),
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
expect: []*structs.ACLServiceIdentity{
|
|
|
|
srvid("fooA"),
|
|
|
|
srvid("fooB"),
|
|
|
|
srvid("fooY"),
|
|
|
|
srvid("fooZ"),
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
name: "names with dupes and datacenters",
|
|
|
|
in: []*structs.ACLServiceIdentity{
|
|
|
|
srvid("fooZ", "dc2", "dc4"),
|
|
|
|
srvid("fooA"),
|
|
|
|
srvid("fooY", "dc1"),
|
|
|
|
srvid("fooB"),
|
|
|
|
srvid("fooA", "dc9", "dc8"),
|
|
|
|
srvid("fooB"),
|
|
|
|
srvid("fooY", "dc1"),
|
|
|
|
srvid("fooZ", "dc3", "dc4"),
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
expect: []*structs.ACLServiceIdentity{
|
|
|
|
srvid("fooA"),
|
|
|
|
srvid("fooB"),
|
|
|
|
srvid("fooY", "dc1"),
|
|
|
|
srvid("fooZ", "dc2", "dc3", "dc4"),
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for _, test := range tests {
|
|
|
|
t.Run(test.name, func(t *testing.T) {
|
|
|
|
got := dedupeServiceIdentities(test.in)
|
|
|
|
require.ElementsMatch(t, test.expect, got)
|
|
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|