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consul/agent/proxycfg/manager.go

382 lines
11 KiB

// Copyright (c) HashiCorp, Inc.
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MPL-2.0
package proxycfg
import (
"errors"
"runtime/debug"
"sync"
"github.com/hashicorp/go-hclog"
"golang.org/x/time/rate"
"github.com/hashicorp/consul/agent/structs"
wan federation via mesh gateways (#6884) This is like a Möbius strip of code due to the fact that low-level components (serf/memberlist) are connected to high-level components (the catalog and mesh-gateways) in a twisty maze of references which make it hard to dive into. With that in mind here's a high level summary of what you'll find in the patch: There are several distinct chunks of code that are affected: * new flags and config options for the server * retry join WAN is slightly different * retry join code is shared to discover primary mesh gateways from secondary datacenters * because retry join logic runs in the *agent* and the results of that operation for primary mesh gateways are needed in the *server* there are some methods like `RefreshPrimaryGatewayFallbackAddresses` that must occur at multiple layers of abstraction just to pass the data down to the right layer. * new cache type `FederationStateListMeshGatewaysName` for use in `proxycfg/xds` layers * the function signature for RPC dialing picked up a new required field (the node name of the destination) * several new RPCs for manipulating a FederationState object: `FederationState:{Apply,Get,List,ListMeshGateways}` * 3 read-only internal APIs for debugging use to invoke those RPCs from curl * raft and fsm changes to persist these FederationStates * replication for FederationStates as they are canonically stored in the Primary and replicated to the Secondaries. * a special derivative of anti-entropy that runs in secondaries to snapshot their local mesh gateway `CheckServiceNodes` and sync them into their upstream FederationState in the primary (this works in conjunction with the replication to distribute addresses for all mesh gateways in all DCs to all other DCs) * a "gateway locator" convenience object to make use of this data to choose the addresses of gateways to use for any given RPC or gossip operation to a remote DC. This gets data from the "retry join" logic in the agent and also directly calls into the FSM. * RPC (`:8300`) on the server sniffs the first byte of a new connection to determine if it's actually doing native TLS. If so it checks the ALPN header for protocol determination (just like how the existing system uses the type-byte marker). * 2 new kinds of protocols are exclusively decoded via this native TLS mechanism: one for ferrying "packet" operations (udp-like) from the gossip layer and one for "stream" operations (tcp-like). The packet operations re-use sockets (using length-prefixing) to cut down on TLS re-negotiation overhead. * the server instances specially wrap the `memberlist.NetTransport` when running with gateway federation enabled (in a `wanfed.Transport`). The general gist is that if it tries to dial a node in the SAME datacenter (deduced by looking at the suffix of the node name) there is no change. If dialing a DIFFERENT datacenter it is wrapped up in a TLS+ALPN blob and sent through some mesh gateways to eventually end up in a server's :8300 port. * a new flag when launching a mesh gateway via `consul connect envoy` to indicate that the servers are to be exposed. This sets a special service meta when registering the gateway into the catalog. * `proxycfg/xds` notice this metadata blob to activate additional watches for the FederationState objects as well as the location of all of the consul servers in that datacenter. * `xds:` if the extra metadata is in place additional clusters are defined in a DC to bulk sink all traffic to another DC's gateways. For the current datacenter we listen on a wildcard name (`server.<dc>.consul`) that load balances all servers as well as one mini-cluster per node (`<node>.server.<dc>.consul`) * the `consul tls cert create` command got a new flag (`-node`) to help create an additional SAN in certs that can be used with this flavor of federation.
5 years ago
"github.com/hashicorp/consul/tlsutil"
)
// ProxyID is a handle on a proxy service instance being tracked by Manager.
type ProxyID struct {
structs.ServiceID
// NodeName identifies the node to which the proxy is registered.
NodeName string
// Token is used to track watches on the same proxy with different ACL tokens
// separately, to prevent accidental security bugs.
//
// Note: this can be different to the ACL token used for authorization that is
// passed to Register (e.g. agent-local services are registered ahead-of-time
// with a token that may be different to the one presented in the xDS stream).
Token string
}
// ProxySource identifies where a proxy service tracked by Manager came from,
// such as the agent's local state or the catalog. It's used to prevent sources
// from overwriting each other's registrations.
type ProxySource string
// CancelFunc is a type for a returned function that can be called to cancel a
// watch.
type CancelFunc func()
// Manager provides an API with which proxy services can be registered, and
// coordinates the fetching (and refreshing) of intentions, upstreams, discovery
// chain, certificates etc.
//
// Consumers such as the xDS server can then subscribe to receive snapshots of
// this data whenever it changes.
//
// See package docs for more detail.
type Manager struct {
ManagerConfig
rateLimiter *rate.Limiter
mu sync.Mutex
proxies map[ProxyID]*state
watchers map[ProxyID]map[uint64]chan *ConfigSnapshot
maxWatchID uint64
}
// ManagerConfig holds the required external dependencies for a Manager
// instance. All fields must be set to something valid or the manager will
// panic. The ManagerConfig is passed by value to NewManager so the passed value
// can be mutated safely.
type ManagerConfig struct {
// DataSources contains the dependencies used to consume data used to configure
// proxies.
DataSources DataSources
// source describes the current agent's identity, it's used directly for
// prepared query discovery but also indirectly as a way to pass current
// Datacenter name into other request types that need it. This is sufficient
// for now and cleaner than passing the entire RuntimeConfig.
Source *structs.QuerySource
// DNSConfig is the agent's relevant DNS config for any proxies.
DNSConfig DNSConfig
// logger is the agent's logger to be used for logging logs.
wan federation via mesh gateways (#6884) This is like a Möbius strip of code due to the fact that low-level components (serf/memberlist) are connected to high-level components (the catalog and mesh-gateways) in a twisty maze of references which make it hard to dive into. With that in mind here's a high level summary of what you'll find in the patch: There are several distinct chunks of code that are affected: * new flags and config options for the server * retry join WAN is slightly different * retry join code is shared to discover primary mesh gateways from secondary datacenters * because retry join logic runs in the *agent* and the results of that operation for primary mesh gateways are needed in the *server* there are some methods like `RefreshPrimaryGatewayFallbackAddresses` that must occur at multiple layers of abstraction just to pass the data down to the right layer. * new cache type `FederationStateListMeshGatewaysName` for use in `proxycfg/xds` layers * the function signature for RPC dialing picked up a new required field (the node name of the destination) * several new RPCs for manipulating a FederationState object: `FederationState:{Apply,Get,List,ListMeshGateways}` * 3 read-only internal APIs for debugging use to invoke those RPCs from curl * raft and fsm changes to persist these FederationStates * replication for FederationStates as they are canonically stored in the Primary and replicated to the Secondaries. * a special derivative of anti-entropy that runs in secondaries to snapshot their local mesh gateway `CheckServiceNodes` and sync them into their upstream FederationState in the primary (this works in conjunction with the replication to distribute addresses for all mesh gateways in all DCs to all other DCs) * a "gateway locator" convenience object to make use of this data to choose the addresses of gateways to use for any given RPC or gossip operation to a remote DC. This gets data from the "retry join" logic in the agent and also directly calls into the FSM. * RPC (`:8300`) on the server sniffs the first byte of a new connection to determine if it's actually doing native TLS. If so it checks the ALPN header for protocol determination (just like how the existing system uses the type-byte marker). * 2 new kinds of protocols are exclusively decoded via this native TLS mechanism: one for ferrying "packet" operations (udp-like) from the gossip layer and one for "stream" operations (tcp-like). The packet operations re-use sockets (using length-prefixing) to cut down on TLS re-negotiation overhead. * the server instances specially wrap the `memberlist.NetTransport` when running with gateway federation enabled (in a `wanfed.Transport`). The general gist is that if it tries to dial a node in the SAME datacenter (deduced by looking at the suffix of the node name) there is no change. If dialing a DIFFERENT datacenter it is wrapped up in a TLS+ALPN blob and sent through some mesh gateways to eventually end up in a server's :8300 port. * a new flag when launching a mesh gateway via `consul connect envoy` to indicate that the servers are to be exposed. This sets a special service meta when registering the gateway into the catalog. * `proxycfg/xds` notice this metadata blob to activate additional watches for the FederationState objects as well as the location of all of the consul servers in that datacenter. * `xds:` if the extra metadata is in place additional clusters are defined in a DC to bulk sink all traffic to another DC's gateways. For the current datacenter we listen on a wildcard name (`server.<dc>.consul`) that load balances all servers as well as one mini-cluster per node (`<node>.server.<dc>.consul`) * the `consul tls cert create` command got a new flag (`-node`) to help create an additional SAN in certs that can be used with this flavor of federation.
5 years ago
Logger hclog.Logger
TLSConfigurator *tlsutil.Configurator
// IntentionDefaultAllow is set by the agent so that we can pass this
// information to proxies that need to make intention decisions on their
// own.
IntentionDefaultAllow bool
// UpdateRateLimit controls the rate at which config snapshots are delivered
// when updates are received from data sources. This enables us to reduce the
// impact of updates to "global" resources (e.g. proxy-defaults and wildcard
// intentions) that could otherwise saturate system resources, and cause Raft
// or gossip instability.
//
// Defaults to rate.Inf (no rate limit).
UpdateRateLimit rate.Limit
}
// NewManager constructs a Manager.
func NewManager(cfg ManagerConfig) (*Manager, error) {
if cfg.Source == nil || cfg.Logger == nil {
return nil, errors.New("all ManagerConfig fields must be provided")
}
if cfg.UpdateRateLimit == 0 {
cfg.UpdateRateLimit = rate.Inf
}
m := &Manager{
ManagerConfig: cfg,
proxies: make(map[ProxyID]*state),
watchers: make(map[ProxyID]map[uint64]chan *ConfigSnapshot),
rateLimiter: rate.NewLimiter(cfg.UpdateRateLimit, 1),
}
return m, nil
}
// UpdateRateLimit returns the configured update rate limit (see ManagerConfig).
func (m *Manager) UpdateRateLimit() rate.Limit {
return m.rateLimiter.Limit()
}
// SetUpdateRateLimit configures the update rate limit (see ManagerConfig).
func (m *Manager) SetUpdateRateLimit(l rate.Limit) {
m.rateLimiter.SetLimit(l)
}
// RegisteredProxies returns a list of the proxies tracked by Manager, filtered
// by source.
func (m *Manager) RegisteredProxies(source ProxySource) []ProxyID {
m.mu.Lock()
defer m.mu.Unlock()
proxies := make([]ProxyID, 0, len(m.proxies))
for id, state := range m.proxies {
if state.source != source {
continue
}
proxies = append(proxies, id)
}
return proxies
}
// Register and start fetching resources for the given proxy service. If the
// given service was already registered by a different source (e.g. we began
// tracking it from the catalog, but then it was registered to the server
// agent locally) the service will be left as-is unless overwrite is true.
func (m *Manager) Register(id ProxyID, ns *structs.NodeService, source ProxySource, token string, overwrite bool) error {
m.mu.Lock()
defer m.mu.Unlock()
defer func() {
if r := recover(); r != nil {
m.Logger.Error("unexpected panic during service manager registration",
"node", id.NodeName,
"service", id.ServiceID,
"message", r,
"stacktrace", string(debug.Stack()),
)
}
}()
return m.register(id, ns, source, token, overwrite)
}
func (m *Manager) register(id ProxyID, ns *structs.NodeService, source ProxySource, token string, overwrite bool) error {
state, ok := m.proxies[id]
proxycfg: ensure that an irrecoverable error in proxycfg closes the xds session and triggers a replacement proxycfg watcher (#16497) Receiving an "acl not found" error from an RPC in the agent cache and the streaming/event components will cause any request loops to cease under the assumption that they will never work again if the token was destroyed. This prevents log spam (#14144, #9738). Unfortunately due to things like: - authz requests going to stale servers that may not have witnessed the token creation yet - authz requests in a secondary datacenter happening before the tokens get replicated to that datacenter - authz requests from a primary TO a secondary datacenter happening before the tokens get replicated to that datacenter The caller will get an "acl not found" *before* the token exists, rather than just after. The machinery added above in the linked PRs will kick in and prevent the request loop from looping around again once the tokens actually exist. For `consul-dataplane` usages, where xDS is served by the Consul servers rather than the clients ultimately this is not a problem because in that scenario the `agent/proxycfg` machinery is on-demand and launched by a new xDS stream needing data for a specific service in the catalog. If the watching goroutines are terminated it ripples down and terminates the xDS stream, which CDP will eventually re-establish and restart everything. For Consul client usages, the `agent/proxycfg` machinery is ahead-of-time launched at service registration time (called "local" in some of the proxycfg machinery) so when the xDS stream comes in the data is already ready to go. If the watching goroutines terminate it should terminate the xDS stream, but there's no mechanism to re-spawn the watching goroutines. If the xDS stream reconnects it will see no `ConfigSnapshot` and will not get one again until the client agent is restarted, or the service is re-registered with something changed in it. This PR fixes a few things in the machinery: - there was an inadvertent deadlock in fetching snapshot from the proxycfg machinery by xDS, such that when the watching goroutine terminated the snapshots would never be fetched. This caused some of the xDS machinery to get indefinitely paused and not finish the teardown properly. - Every 30s we now attempt to re-insert all locally registered services into the proxycfg machinery. - When services are re-inserted into the proxycfg machinery we special case "dead" ones such that we unilaterally replace them rather that doing that conditionally.
2 years ago
if ok && !state.stoppedRunning() {
if state.source != source && !overwrite {
// Registered by a different source, leave as-is.
return nil
}
if !state.Changed(ns, token) {
// No change
return nil
}
// We are updating the proxy, close its old state
state.Close(false)
}
// TODO: move to a function that translates ManagerConfig->stateConfig
stateConfig := stateConfig{
logger: m.Logger.With("service_id", id.String()),
dataSources: m.DataSources,
source: m.Source,
dnsConfig: m.DNSConfig,
intentionDefaultAllow: m.IntentionDefaultAllow,
}
wan federation via mesh gateways (#6884) This is like a Möbius strip of code due to the fact that low-level components (serf/memberlist) are connected to high-level components (the catalog and mesh-gateways) in a twisty maze of references which make it hard to dive into. With that in mind here's a high level summary of what you'll find in the patch: There are several distinct chunks of code that are affected: * new flags and config options for the server * retry join WAN is slightly different * retry join code is shared to discover primary mesh gateways from secondary datacenters * because retry join logic runs in the *agent* and the results of that operation for primary mesh gateways are needed in the *server* there are some methods like `RefreshPrimaryGatewayFallbackAddresses` that must occur at multiple layers of abstraction just to pass the data down to the right layer. * new cache type `FederationStateListMeshGatewaysName` for use in `proxycfg/xds` layers * the function signature for RPC dialing picked up a new required field (the node name of the destination) * several new RPCs for manipulating a FederationState object: `FederationState:{Apply,Get,List,ListMeshGateways}` * 3 read-only internal APIs for debugging use to invoke those RPCs from curl * raft and fsm changes to persist these FederationStates * replication for FederationStates as they are canonically stored in the Primary and replicated to the Secondaries. * a special derivative of anti-entropy that runs in secondaries to snapshot their local mesh gateway `CheckServiceNodes` and sync them into their upstream FederationState in the primary (this works in conjunction with the replication to distribute addresses for all mesh gateways in all DCs to all other DCs) * a "gateway locator" convenience object to make use of this data to choose the addresses of gateways to use for any given RPC or gossip operation to a remote DC. This gets data from the "retry join" logic in the agent and also directly calls into the FSM. * RPC (`:8300`) on the server sniffs the first byte of a new connection to determine if it's actually doing native TLS. If so it checks the ALPN header for protocol determination (just like how the existing system uses the type-byte marker). * 2 new kinds of protocols are exclusively decoded via this native TLS mechanism: one for ferrying "packet" operations (udp-like) from the gossip layer and one for "stream" operations (tcp-like). The packet operations re-use sockets (using length-prefixing) to cut down on TLS re-negotiation overhead. * the server instances specially wrap the `memberlist.NetTransport` when running with gateway federation enabled (in a `wanfed.Transport`). The general gist is that if it tries to dial a node in the SAME datacenter (deduced by looking at the suffix of the node name) there is no change. If dialing a DIFFERENT datacenter it is wrapped up in a TLS+ALPN blob and sent through some mesh gateways to eventually end up in a server's :8300 port. * a new flag when launching a mesh gateway via `consul connect envoy` to indicate that the servers are to be exposed. This sets a special service meta when registering the gateway into the catalog. * `proxycfg/xds` notice this metadata blob to activate additional watches for the FederationState objects as well as the location of all of the consul servers in that datacenter. * `xds:` if the extra metadata is in place additional clusters are defined in a DC to bulk sink all traffic to another DC's gateways. For the current datacenter we listen on a wildcard name (`server.<dc>.consul`) that load balances all servers as well as one mini-cluster per node (`<node>.server.<dc>.consul`) * the `consul tls cert create` command got a new flag (`-node`) to help create an additional SAN in certs that can be used with this flavor of federation.
5 years ago
if m.TLSConfigurator != nil {
stateConfig.serverSNIFn = m.TLSConfigurator.ServerSNI
}
var err error
state, err = newState(id, ns, source, token, stateConfig, m.rateLimiter)
if err != nil {
return err
wan federation via mesh gateways (#6884) This is like a Möbius strip of code due to the fact that low-level components (serf/memberlist) are connected to high-level components (the catalog and mesh-gateways) in a twisty maze of references which make it hard to dive into. With that in mind here's a high level summary of what you'll find in the patch: There are several distinct chunks of code that are affected: * new flags and config options for the server * retry join WAN is slightly different * retry join code is shared to discover primary mesh gateways from secondary datacenters * because retry join logic runs in the *agent* and the results of that operation for primary mesh gateways are needed in the *server* there are some methods like `RefreshPrimaryGatewayFallbackAddresses` that must occur at multiple layers of abstraction just to pass the data down to the right layer. * new cache type `FederationStateListMeshGatewaysName` for use in `proxycfg/xds` layers * the function signature for RPC dialing picked up a new required field (the node name of the destination) * several new RPCs for manipulating a FederationState object: `FederationState:{Apply,Get,List,ListMeshGateways}` * 3 read-only internal APIs for debugging use to invoke those RPCs from curl * raft and fsm changes to persist these FederationStates * replication for FederationStates as they are canonically stored in the Primary and replicated to the Secondaries. * a special derivative of anti-entropy that runs in secondaries to snapshot their local mesh gateway `CheckServiceNodes` and sync them into their upstream FederationState in the primary (this works in conjunction with the replication to distribute addresses for all mesh gateways in all DCs to all other DCs) * a "gateway locator" convenience object to make use of this data to choose the addresses of gateways to use for any given RPC or gossip operation to a remote DC. This gets data from the "retry join" logic in the agent and also directly calls into the FSM. * RPC (`:8300`) on the server sniffs the first byte of a new connection to determine if it's actually doing native TLS. If so it checks the ALPN header for protocol determination (just like how the existing system uses the type-byte marker). * 2 new kinds of protocols are exclusively decoded via this native TLS mechanism: one for ferrying "packet" operations (udp-like) from the gossip layer and one for "stream" operations (tcp-like). The packet operations re-use sockets (using length-prefixing) to cut down on TLS re-negotiation overhead. * the server instances specially wrap the `memberlist.NetTransport` when running with gateway federation enabled (in a `wanfed.Transport`). The general gist is that if it tries to dial a node in the SAME datacenter (deduced by looking at the suffix of the node name) there is no change. If dialing a DIFFERENT datacenter it is wrapped up in a TLS+ALPN blob and sent through some mesh gateways to eventually end up in a server's :8300 port. * a new flag when launching a mesh gateway via `consul connect envoy` to indicate that the servers are to be exposed. This sets a special service meta when registering the gateway into the catalog. * `proxycfg/xds` notice this metadata blob to activate additional watches for the FederationState objects as well as the location of all of the consul servers in that datacenter. * `xds:` if the extra metadata is in place additional clusters are defined in a DC to bulk sink all traffic to another DC's gateways. For the current datacenter we listen on a wildcard name (`server.<dc>.consul`) that load balances all servers as well as one mini-cluster per node (`<node>.server.<dc>.consul`) * the `consul tls cert create` command got a new flag (`-node`) to help create an additional SAN in certs that can be used with this flavor of federation.
5 years ago
}
if _, err = state.Watch(); err != nil {
return err
}
m.proxies[id] = state
// Start a goroutine that will wait for changes and broadcast them to watchers.
go m.notifyBroadcast(id, state)
return nil
}
// Deregister the given proxy service, but only if it was registered by the same
// source.
func (m *Manager) Deregister(id ProxyID, source ProxySource) {
m.mu.Lock()
defer m.mu.Unlock()
state, ok := m.proxies[id]
if !ok {
return
}
if state.source != source {
return
}
// Closing state will let the goroutine we started in Register finish since
// watch chan is closed
state.Close(false)
delete(m.proxies, id)
// We intentionally leave potential watchers hanging here - there is no new
// config for them and closing their channels might be indistinguishable from
// an error that they should retry. We rely for them to eventually give up
// (because they are in fact not running any more) and so the watches be
// cleaned up naturally.
}
func (m *Manager) notifyBroadcast(proxyID ProxyID, state *state) {
// Run until ch is closed (by a defer in state.run).
for snap := range state.snapCh {
m.notify(&snap)
}
// If state.run exited because of an irrecoverable error, close all of the
// watchers so that the consumers reconnect/retry at a higher level.
if state.failed() {
m.closeAllWatchers(proxyID)
}
}
func (m *Manager) notify(snap *ConfigSnapshot) {
m.mu.Lock()
defer m.mu.Unlock()
watchers, ok := m.watchers[snap.ProxyID]
if !ok {
return
}
for _, ch := range watchers {
m.deliverLatest(snap, ch)
}
}
// deliverLatest delivers the snapshot to a watch chan. If the delivery blocks,
// it will drain the chan and then re-attempt delivery so that a slow consumer
// gets the latest config earlier. This MUST be called from a method where m.mu
// is held to be safe since it assumes we are the only goroutine sending on ch.
func (m *Manager) deliverLatest(snap *ConfigSnapshot, ch chan *ConfigSnapshot) {
// Send if chan is empty
select {
case ch <- snap:
return
default:
}
// Not empty, drain the chan of older snapshots and redeliver. For now we only
// use 1-buffered chans but this will still work if we change that later.
OUTER:
for {
select {
case <-ch:
continue
default:
break OUTER
}
}
// Now send again
select {
case ch <- snap:
return
default:
// This should not be possible since we should be the only sender, enforced
// by m.mu but error and drop the update rather than panic.
m.Logger.Error("failed to deliver ConfigSnapshot to proxy",
"proxy", snap.ProxyID.String(),
)
}
}
// Watch registers a watch on a proxy. It might not exist yet in which case this
// will not fail, but no updates will be delivered until the proxy is
// registered. If there is already a valid snapshot in memory, it will be
// delivered immediately.
func (m *Manager) Watch(id ProxyID) (<-chan *ConfigSnapshot, CancelFunc) {
m.mu.Lock()
defer m.mu.Unlock()
// This buffering is crucial otherwise we'd block immediately trying to
// deliver the current snapshot below if we already have one.
ch := make(chan *ConfigSnapshot, 1)
watchers, ok := m.watchers[id]
if !ok {
watchers = make(map[uint64]chan *ConfigSnapshot)
}
watchID := m.maxWatchID
m.maxWatchID++
watchers[watchID] = ch
m.watchers[id] = watchers
// Deliver the current snapshot immediately if there is one ready
if state, ok := m.proxies[id]; ok {
if snap := state.CurrentSnapshot(); snap != nil {
// We rely on ch being buffered above and that it's not been passed
// anywhere so we must be the only writer so this will never block and
// deadlock.
ch <- snap
}
}
return ch, func() {
m.mu.Lock()
defer m.mu.Unlock()
m.closeWatchLocked(id, watchID)
}
}
func (m *Manager) closeAllWatchers(proxyID ProxyID) {
m.mu.Lock()
defer m.mu.Unlock()
watchers, ok := m.watchers[proxyID]
if !ok {
return
}
for watchID := range watchers {
m.closeWatchLocked(proxyID, watchID)
}
}
// closeWatchLocked cleans up state related to a single watcher. It assumes the
// lock is held.
func (m *Manager) closeWatchLocked(proxyID ProxyID, watchID uint64) {
if watchers, ok := m.watchers[proxyID]; ok {
if ch, ok := watchers[watchID]; ok {
delete(watchers, watchID)
close(ch)
if len(watchers) == 0 {
delete(m.watchers, proxyID)
}
}
}
}
// Close removes all state and stops all running goroutines.
func (m *Manager) Close() error {
m.mu.Lock()
defer m.mu.Unlock()
// Close all current watchers first
for proxyID, watchers := range m.watchers {
for watchID := range watchers {
m.closeWatchLocked(proxyID, watchID)
}
}
// Then close all states
for proxyID, state := range m.proxies {
state.Close(false)
delete(m.proxies, proxyID)
}
return nil
}