Commit Graph

6 Commits (aa02545fbaa4a2d2a8e341d0776636059a3000ef)

Author SHA1 Message Date
Nils Maier 51beb4bfa7 WinTLS: Move some defines out of the header 2014-04-13 18:51:04 +02:00
Nils Maier 219fd5b4b7 WinTLS: Make ca-file rejection a warning 2014-04-13 18:51:04 +02:00
Nils Maier 8d55e30561 WinTLS: Use SCH_USE_STRONG_CRYPTO
See: #217
2014-04-13 18:50:54 +02:00
Nils Maier 0a51b8d172 WinTLS: Accept chains with no revocation information.
This is kind what browser do anyway (IE, Firefox, Chrome tested), what
AppleTLS does, what GnuTLS does and what OpenSSL does. Actually, most
browsers will also be OK with the CRL/OCSP provider being offline.
WinTLS will still fail in that case.

Should revocation information be available in the trust chain (CRL or
OCSP) the certificate still will be checked!

"Real" CAs, aka. those provided by the OS or system CA bundle, usually
provide revocation information and are thus still checked.
It should be mostly (only?) custom (organization) CAs that lack
revocation information, but those users might want to use aria2 in their
intranets and VPNs anyway ;)

See #217
2014-04-13 18:50:38 +02:00
Nils Maier 4c84af31be WinTLS: Fix PKCS12 loading
It appears that, contrary to most documentation, CERT_CONTEXT* is eaten
alive by AcquireCredentialsHandle(). Hence you cannot really reuse that.
2013-09-30 16:36:15 +02:00
Nils Maier 00dd83b461 Implement WinTLS 2013-09-30 13:53:21 +02:00