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<td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td>
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<td class="header">Final</td>
<td class="header">N. Sakimura</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="header">&nbsp;</td>
<td class="header">NRI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="header">&nbsp;</td>
<td class="header">J. Bradley</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="header">&nbsp;</td>
<td class="header">Ping Identity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="header">&nbsp;</td>
<td class="header">M. Jones</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="header">&nbsp;</td>
<td class="header">Microsoft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="header">&nbsp;</td>
<td class="header">B. de Medeiros</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="header">&nbsp;</td>
<td class="header">Google</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="header">&nbsp;</td>
<td class="header">C. Mortimore</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="header">&nbsp;</td>
<td class="header">Salesforce</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="header">&nbsp;</td>
<td class="header">November 8, 2014</td>
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<h1><br>OpenID Connect Core 1.0 incorporating errata set 1</h1>
<h3>Abstract</h3>
<p>OpenID Connect 1.0 is a simple identity layer on top of the OAuth 2.0
protocol. It enables Clients to verify the identity of the End-User based
on the authentication performed by an Authorization Server, as well as to
obtain basic profile information about the End-User in an interoperable and
REST-like manner.
</p>
<p>
This specification defines
the core OpenID Connect functionality:
authentication built on top of OAuth 2.0 and
the use of Claims to communicate information about the End-User.
It also describes the security and privacy considerations for using OpenID Connect.
</p><a name="toc"></a><br>
<hr>
<h3>Table of Contents</h3>
<p class="toc">
<a href="#Introduction">1.</a>&nbsp;
Introduction<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a href="#rnc">1.1.</a>&nbsp;
Requirements Notation and Conventions<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a href="#Terminology">1.2.</a>&nbsp;
Terminology<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a href="#Overview">1.3.</a>&nbsp;
Overview<br>
<a href="#IDToken">2.</a>&nbsp;
ID Token<br>
<a href="#Authentication">3.</a>&nbsp;
Authentication<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a href="#CodeFlowAuth">3.1.</a>&nbsp;
Authentication using the Authorization Code Flow<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a
href="#CodeFlowSteps">3.1.1.</a>&nbsp;
Authorization Code Flow Steps<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a
href="#AuthorizationEndpoint">3.1.2.</a>&nbsp;
Authorization Endpoint<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a
href="#AuthRequest">3.1.2.1.</a>&nbsp;
Authentication Request<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a
href="#AuthRequestValidation">3.1.2.2.</a>&nbsp;
Authentication Request Validation<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a
href="#Authenticates">3.1.2.3.</a>&nbsp;
Authorization Server Authenticates End-User<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a
href="#Consent">3.1.2.4.</a>&nbsp;
Authorization Server Obtains End-User Consent/Authorization<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a
href="#AuthResponse">3.1.2.5.</a>&nbsp;
Successful Authentication Response<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a
href="#AuthError">3.1.2.6.</a>&nbsp;
Authentication Error Response<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a
href="#AuthResponseValidation">3.1.2.7.</a>&nbsp;
Authentication Response Validation<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a
href="#TokenEndpoint">3.1.3.</a>&nbsp;
Token Endpoint<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a
href="#TokenRequest">3.1.3.1.</a>&nbsp;
Token Request<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a
href="#TokenRequestValidation">3.1.3.2.</a>&nbsp;
Token Request Validation<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a
href="#TokenResponse">3.1.3.3.</a>&nbsp;
Successful Token Response<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a
href="#TokenErrorResponse">3.1.3.4.</a>&nbsp;
Token Error Response<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a
href="#TokenResponseValidation">3.1.3.5.</a>&nbsp;
Token Response Validation<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a
href="#CodeIDToken">3.1.3.6.</a>&nbsp;
ID Token<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a
href="#IDTokenValidation">3.1.3.7.</a>&nbsp;
ID Token Validation<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a
href="#CodeFlowTokenValidation">3.1.3.8.</a>&nbsp;
Access Token Validation<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a href="#ImplicitFlowAuth">3.2.</a>&nbsp;
Authentication using the Implicit Flow<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a
href="#ImplicitFlowSteps">3.2.1.</a>&nbsp;
Implicit Flow Steps<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a
href="#ImplicitAuthorizationEndpoint">3.2.2.</a>&nbsp;
Authorization Endpoint<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a
href="#ImplicitAuthRequest">3.2.2.1.</a>&nbsp;
Authentication Request<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a
href="#ImplicitValidation">3.2.2.2.</a>&nbsp;
Authentication Request Validation<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a
href="#ImplicitAuthenticates">3.2.2.3.</a>&nbsp;
Authorization Server Authenticates End-User<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a
href="#ImplicitConsent">3.2.2.4.</a>&nbsp;
Authorization Server Obtains End-User Consent/Authorization<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a
href="#ImplicitAuthResponse">3.2.2.5.</a>&nbsp;
Successful Authentication Response<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a
href="#ImplicitAuthError">3.2.2.6.</a>&nbsp;
Authentication Error Response<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a
href="#ImplicitCallback">3.2.2.7.</a>&nbsp;
Redirect URI Fragment Handling<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a
href="#ImplicitAuthResponseValidation">3.2.2.8.</a>&nbsp;
Authentication Response Validation<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a
href="#ImplicitTokenValidation">3.2.2.9.</a>&nbsp;
Access Token Validation<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a
href="#ImplicitIDToken">3.2.2.10.</a>&nbsp;
ID Token<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a
href="#ImplicitIDTValidation">3.2.2.11.</a>&nbsp;
ID Token Validation<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a href="#HybridFlowAuth">3.3.</a>&nbsp;
Authentication using the Hybrid Flow<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a
href="#HybridFlowSteps">3.3.1.</a>&nbsp;
Hybrid Flow Steps<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a
href="#HybridAuthorizationEndpoint">3.3.2.</a>&nbsp;
Authorization Endpoint<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a
href="#HybridAuthRequest">3.3.2.1.</a>&nbsp;
Authentication Request<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a
href="#HybridValidation">3.3.2.2.</a>&nbsp;
Authentication Request Validation<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a
href="#HybridAuthenticates">3.3.2.3.</a>&nbsp;
Authorization Server Authenticates End-User<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a
href="#HybridConsent">3.3.2.4.</a>&nbsp;
Authorization Server Obtains End-User Consent/Authorization<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a
href="#HybridAuthResponse">3.3.2.5.</a>&nbsp;
Successful Authentication Response<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a
href="#HybridAuthError">3.3.2.6.</a>&nbsp;
Authentication Error Response<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a
href="#HybridCallback">3.3.2.7.</a>&nbsp;
Redirect URI Fragment Handling<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a
href="#HybridAuthResponseValidation">3.3.2.8.</a>&nbsp;
Authentication Response Validation<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a
href="#HybridTokenValidation">3.3.2.9.</a>&nbsp;
Access Token Validation<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a
href="#CodeValidation">3.3.2.10.</a>&nbsp;
Authorization Code Validation<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a
href="#HybridIDToken">3.3.2.11.</a>&nbsp;
ID Token<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a
href="#HybridIDTValidation">3.3.2.12.</a>&nbsp;
ID Token Validation<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a
href="#HybridTokenEndpoint">3.3.3.</a>&nbsp;
Token Endpoint<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a
href="#HybridTokenRequest">3.3.3.1.</a>&nbsp;
Token Request<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a
href="#HybridTokenRequestValidation">3.3.3.2.</a>&nbsp;
Token Request Validation<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a
href="#HybridTokenResponse">3.3.3.3.</a>&nbsp;
Successful Token Response<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a
href="#HybridTokenErrorResponse">3.3.3.4.</a>&nbsp;
Token Error Response<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a
href="#HybridTokenResponseValidation">3.3.3.5.</a>&nbsp;
Token Response Validation<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a
href="#HybridIDToken2">3.3.3.6.</a>&nbsp;
ID Token<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a
href="#HybridIDTValidation2">3.3.3.7.</a>&nbsp;
ID Token Validation<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a
href="#HybridAccessToken2">3.3.3.8.</a>&nbsp;
Access Token<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a
href="#HybridTokenValidation2">3.3.3.9.</a>&nbsp;
Access Token Validation<br>
<a href="#ThirdPartyInitiatedLogin">4.</a>&nbsp;
Initiating Login from a Third Party<br>
<a href="#Claims">5.</a>&nbsp;
Claims<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a href="#StandardClaims">5.1.</a>&nbsp;
Standard Claims<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a
href="#AddressClaim">5.1.1.</a>&nbsp;
Address Claim<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a
href="#AdditionalClaims">5.1.2.</a>&nbsp;
Additional Claims<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a href="#ClaimsLanguagesAndScripts">5.2.</a>&nbsp;
Claims Languages and Scripts<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a href="#UserInfo">5.3.</a>&nbsp;
UserInfo Endpoint<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a
href="#UserInfoRequest">5.3.1.</a>&nbsp;
UserInfo Request<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a
href="#UserInfoResponse">5.3.2.</a>&nbsp;
Successful UserInfo Response<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a
href="#UserInfoError">5.3.3.</a>&nbsp;
UserInfo Error Response<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a
href="#UserInfoResponseValidation">5.3.4.</a>&nbsp;
UserInfo Response Validation<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a href="#ScopeClaims">5.4.</a>&nbsp;
Requesting Claims using Scope Values<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a href="#ClaimsParameter">5.5.</a>&nbsp;
Requesting Claims using the "claims" Request Parameter<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a
href="#IndividualClaimsRequests">5.5.1.</a>&nbsp;
Individual Claims Requests<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a
href="#acrSemantics">5.5.1.1.</a>&nbsp;
Requesting the "acr" Claim<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a
href="#IndividualClaimsLanguages">5.5.2.</a>&nbsp;
Languages and Scripts for Individual Claims<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a href="#ClaimTypes">5.6.</a>&nbsp;
Claim Types<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a
href="#NormalClaims">5.6.1.</a>&nbsp;
Normal Claims<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a
href="#AggregatedDistributedClaims">5.6.2.</a>&nbsp;
Aggregated and Distributed Claims<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a
href="#AggregatedExample">5.6.2.1.</a>&nbsp;
Example of Aggregated Claims<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a
href="#DistributedExample">5.6.2.2.</a>&nbsp;
Example of Distributed Claims<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a href="#ClaimStability">5.7.</a>&nbsp;
Claim Stability and Uniqueness<br>
<a href="#JWTRequests">6.</a>&nbsp;
Passing Request Parameters as JWTs<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a href="#RequestObject">6.1.</a>&nbsp;
Passing a Request Object by Value<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a
href="#RequestParameter">6.1.1.</a>&nbsp;
Request using the "request" Request Parameter<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a href="#RequestUriParameter">6.2.</a>&nbsp;
Passing a Request Object by Reference<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a
href="#CreateRequestUri">6.2.1.</a>&nbsp;
URL Referencing the Request Object<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a
href="#UseRequestUri">6.2.2.</a>&nbsp;
Request using the "request_uri" Request Parameter<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a
href="#GetRequestUri">6.2.3.</a>&nbsp;
Authorization Server Fetches Request Object<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a
href="#RequestUriRationale">6.2.4.</a>&nbsp;
"request_uri" Rationale<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a href="#JWTRequestValidation">6.3.</a>&nbsp;
Validating JWT-Based Requests<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a
href="#EncryptedRequestObject">6.3.1.</a>&nbsp;
Encrypted Request Object<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a
href="#SignedRequestObject">6.3.2.</a>&nbsp;
Signed Request Object<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a
href="#RequestParameterValidation">6.3.3.</a>&nbsp;
Request Parameter Assembly and Validation<br>
<a href="#SelfIssued">7.</a>&nbsp;
Self-Issued OpenID Provider<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a href="#SelfIssuedDiscovery">7.1.</a>&nbsp;
Self-Issued OpenID Provider Discovery<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a
href="#SelfIssuedRegistration">7.2.</a>&nbsp;
Self-Issued OpenID Provider Registration<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a
href="#RegistrationParameter">7.2.1.</a>&nbsp;
Providing Information with the "registration" Request Parameter<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a href="#SelfIssuedRequest">7.3.</a>&nbsp;
Self-Issued OpenID Provider Request<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a href="#SelfIssuedResponse">7.4.</a>&nbsp;
Self-Issued OpenID Provider Response<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a href="#SelfIssuedValidation">7.5.</a>&nbsp;
Self-Issued ID Token Validation<br>
<a href="#SubjectIDTypes">8.</a>&nbsp;
Subject Identifier Types<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a href="#PairwiseAlg">8.1.</a>&nbsp;
Pairwise Identifier Algorithm<br>
<a href="#ClientAuthentication">9.</a>&nbsp;
Client Authentication<br>
<a href="#SigEnc">10.</a>&nbsp;
Signatures and Encryption<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a href="#Signing">10.1.</a>&nbsp;
Signing<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a
href="#RotateSigKeys">10.1.1.</a>&nbsp;
Rotation of Asymmetric Signing Keys<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a href="#Encryption">10.2.</a>&nbsp;
Encryption<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a
href="#RotateEncKeys">10.2.1.</a>&nbsp;
Rotation of Asymmetric Encryption Keys<br>
<a href="#OfflineAccess">11.</a>&nbsp;
Offline Access<br>
<a href="#RefreshTokens">12.</a>&nbsp;
Using Refresh Tokens<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a
href="#RefreshingAccessToken">12.1.</a>&nbsp;
Refresh Request<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a
href="#RefreshTokenResponse">12.2.</a>&nbsp;
Successful Refresh Response<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a
href="#RefreshErrorResponse">12.3.</a>&nbsp;
Refresh Error Response<br>
<a href="#Serializations">13.</a>&nbsp;
Serializations<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a href="#QuerySerialization">13.1.</a>&nbsp;
Query String Serialization<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a href="#FormSerialization">13.2.</a>&nbsp;
Form Serialization<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a href="#JSONSerialization">13.3.</a>&nbsp;
JSON Serialization<br>
<a href="#StringOps">14.</a>&nbsp;
String Operations<br>
<a href="#ImplementationConsiderations">15.</a>&nbsp;
Implementation Considerations<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a href="#ServerMTI">15.1.</a>&nbsp;
Mandatory to Implement Features for All OpenID Providers<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a href="#DynamicMTI">15.2.</a>&nbsp;
Mandatory to Implement Features for Dynamic OpenID Providers<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a href="#DiscoReg">15.3.</a>&nbsp;
Discovery and Registration<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a href="#RPMTI">15.4.</a>&nbsp;
Mandatory to Implement Features for Relying Parties<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a href="#ImplementationNotes">15.5.</a>&nbsp;
Implementation Notes<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a
href="#CodeNotes">15.5.1.</a>&nbsp;
Authorization Code Implementation Notes<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a
href="#NonceNotes">15.5.2.</a>&nbsp;
Nonce Implementation Notes<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a
href="#FragmentNotes">15.5.3.</a>&nbsp;
Redirect URI Fragment Handling Implementation Notes<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a href="#CompatibilityNotes">15.6.</a>&nbsp;
Compatibility Notes<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a
href="#PreFinalIETFSpecs">15.6.1.</a>&nbsp;
Pre-Final IETF Specifications<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a
href="#GoogleIss">15.6.2.</a>&nbsp;
Google "iss" Value<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a href="#RelatedSpecs">15.7.</a>&nbsp;
Related Specifications and Implementer's Guides<br>
<a href="#Security">16.</a>&nbsp;
Security Considerations<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a href="#RequestDisclosure">16.1.</a>&nbsp;
Request Disclosure<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a href="#ServerMasquerading">16.2.</a>&nbsp;
Server Masquerading<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a href="#TokenManufacture">16.3.</a>&nbsp;
Token Manufacture/Modification<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a
href="#AccessTokenDisclosure">16.4.</a>&nbsp;
Access Token Disclosure<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a href="#ResponseDisclosure">16.5.</a>&nbsp;
Server Response Disclosure<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a href="#ServerResponseRepudiation">16.6.</a>&nbsp;
Server Response Repudiation<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a href="#RequestRepudation">16.7.</a>&nbsp;
Request Repudiation<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a href="#AccessTokenRedirect">16.8.</a>&nbsp;
Access Token Redirect<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a href="#TokenReuse">16.9.</a>&nbsp;
Token Reuse<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a href="#AuthCodeCapture">16.10.</a>&nbsp;
Eavesdropping or Leaking Authorization Codes (Secondary Authenticator Capture)<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a href="#TokenSubstitution">16.11.</a>&nbsp;
Token Substitution<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a href="#TimingAttack">16.12.</a>&nbsp;
Timing Attack<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a href="#OtherCryptoAttacks">16.13.</a>&nbsp;
Other Crypto Related Attacks<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a href="#SigningOrder">16.14.</a>&nbsp;
Signing and Encryption Order<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a href="#IssuerIdentifier">16.15.</a>&nbsp;
Issuer Identifier<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a
href="#ImplicitFlowThreats">16.16.</a>&nbsp;
Implicit Flow Threats<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a href="#TLSRequirements">16.17.</a>&nbsp;
TLS Requirements<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a href="#TokenLifetime">16.18.</a>&nbsp;
Lifetimes of Access Tokens and Refresh Tokens<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a
href="#SymmetricKeyEntropy">16.19.</a>&nbsp;
Symmetric Key Entropy<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a
href="#NeedForSignedRequests">16.20.</a>&nbsp;
Need for Signed Requests<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a href="#NeedForEncryptedRequests">16.21.</a>&nbsp;
Need for Encrypted Requests<br>
<a href="#Privacy">17.</a>&nbsp;
Privacy Considerations<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a href="#PII">17.1.</a>&nbsp;
Personally Identifiable Information<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a href="#AccessMonitoring">17.2.</a>&nbsp;
Data Access Monitoring<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a href="#Correlation">17.3.</a>&nbsp;
Correlation<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a
href="#OfflineAccessPrivacy">17.4.</a>&nbsp;
Offline Access<br>
<a href="#IANA">18.</a>&nbsp;
IANA Considerations<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a href="#ClaimsRegistry">18.1.</a>&nbsp;
JSON Web Token Claims Registration<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a
href="#ClaimsContents">18.1.1.</a>&nbsp;
Registry Contents<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a
href="#OAuthParametersRegistry">18.2.</a>&nbsp;
OAuth Parameters Registration<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a
href="#ParametersContents">18.2.1.</a>&nbsp;
Registry Contents<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a href="#OAuthErrorRegistry">18.3.</a>&nbsp;
OAuth Extensions Error Registration<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a
href="#ErrorContents">18.3.1.</a>&nbsp;
Registry Contents<br>
<a href="#rfc.references1">19.</a>&nbsp;
References<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a href="#rfc.references1">19.1.</a>&nbsp;
Normative References<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a href="#rfc.references2">19.2.</a>&nbsp;
Informative References<br>
<a href="#AuthorizationExamples">Appendix&nbsp;A.</a>&nbsp;
Authorization Examples<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a href="#codeExample">A.1.</a>&nbsp;
Example using response_type=code<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a href="#id_tokenExample">A.2.</a>&nbsp;
Example using response_type=id_token<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a
href="#id_token-tokenExample">A.3.</a>&nbsp;
Example using response_type=id_token&nbsp;token<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a href="#code-id_tokenExample">A.4.</a>&nbsp;
Example using response_type=code&nbsp;id_token<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a href="#code-tokenExample">A.5.</a>&nbsp;
Example using response_type=code&nbsp;token<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a href="#code-id_token-tokenExample">A.6.</a>&nbsp;
Example using response_type=code&nbsp;id_token&nbsp;token<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a href="#ExampleRSAKey">A.7.</a>&nbsp;
RSA Key Used in Examples<br>
<a href="#Acknowledgements">Appendix&nbsp;B.</a>&nbsp;
Acknowledgements<br>
<a href="#Notices">Appendix&nbsp;C.</a>&nbsp;
Notices<br>
<a href="#rfc.authors">§</a>&nbsp;
Authors' Addresses<br>
</p>
<br clear="all">
<a name="Introduction"></a><br>
<hr>
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<a name="rfc.section.1"></a>
<h3>1.&nbsp;
Introduction</h3>
<p>
OpenID Connect 1.0 is a simple identity layer on top of the OAuth 2.0
<a class="info" href="#RFC6749">[RFC6749]<span> (</span><span
class="info">Hardt, D., “The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework,” October&nbsp;2012.</span><span>)</span></a>
protocol. It enables Clients to verify the identity of the End-User based
on the authentication performed by an Authorization Server, as well as to
obtain basic profile information about the End-User in an interoperable and
REST-like manner.
</p>
<p>
The OpenID Connect Core 1.0 specification defines
the core OpenID Connect functionality:
authentication built on top of OAuth 2.0 and
the use of Claims to communicate information about the End-User.
It also describes the security and privacy considerations for using OpenID Connect.
</p>
<p>
As background,
the <a class="info" href="#RFC6749">OAuth 2.0 Authorization
Framework<span> (</span><span
class="info">Hardt, D., “The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework,” October&nbsp;2012.</span><span>)</span></a>
[RFC6749]
and <a class="info" href="#RFC6750">OAuth 2.0 Bearer Token Usage<span> (</span><span
class="info">Jones, M. and D. Hardt, “The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework: Bearer Token Usage,” October&nbsp;2012.</span><span>)</span></a>
[RFC6750]
specifications provide a general framework for third-party applications
to obtain and use limited access to HTTP resources. They define
mechanisms to obtain and use Access Tokens to access resources but
do not define standard methods to provide identity information.
Notably, without profiling OAuth 2.0, it is incapable of
providing information about the authentication of an End-User.
Readers are expected to be familiar with these specifications.
</p>
<p>
OpenID Connect implements authentication as an extension to the
OAuth 2.0 authorization process.
Use of this extension is requested by Clients by including
the <tt>openid</tt> scope value
in the Authorization Request.
Information about the authentication performed is returned
in a <a class="info" href="#JWT">JSON Web Token
(JWT)<span> (</span><span class="info">Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, “JSON Web Token (JWT),” July&nbsp;2014.</span><span>)</span></a>
[JWT]
called an ID Token (see <a class="info" href="#IDToken">Section&nbsp;2<span> (</span><span
class="info">ID Token</span><span>)</span></a>).
OAuth 2.0 Authentication Servers implementing OpenID Connect
are also referred to as OpenID Providers (OPs).
OAuth 2.0 Clients using OpenID Connect
are also referred to as Relying Parties (RPs).
</p>
<p>
This specification assumes that the Relying Party has already obtained
configuration information about the OpenID Provider, including its
Authorization Endpoint and Token Endpoint locations.
This information is normally obtained via Discovery,
as described in <a class="info" href="#OpenID.Discovery">OpenID
Connect Discovery 1.0<span> (</span><span class="info">Sakimura, N., Bradley, J., Jones, M., and E. Jay, “OpenID Connect Discovery 1.0,” November&nbsp;2014.</span><span>)</span></a>
[OpenID.Discovery],
or may be obtained via other mechanisms.
</p>
<p>
Likewise, this specification assumes that the Relying Party has already obtained
sufficient credentials and provided information needed to use the OpenID Provider.
This is normally done via Dynamic Registration,
as described in
<a class="info" href="#OpenID.Registration">OpenID Connect
Dynamic Client Registration 1.0<span> (</span><span class="info">Sakimura, N., Bradley, J., and M. Jones, “OpenID Connect Dynamic Client Registration 1.0,” November&nbsp;2014.</span><span>)</span></a>
[OpenID.Registration],
or may be obtained via other mechanisms.
</p>
<a name="rnc"></a><br>
<hr>
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<a name="rfc.section.1.1"></a>
<h3>1.1.&nbsp;
Requirements Notation and Conventions</h3>
<p>The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in <a class="info"
href="#RFC2119">RFC
2119<span> (</span><span class="info">Bradner, S., “Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels,” March&nbsp;1997.</span><span>)</span></a>
[RFC2119].
</p>
<p>
In the .txt version of this document,
values are quoted to indicate that they are to be taken literally.
When using these values in protocol messages,
the quotes MUST NOT be used as part of the value.
In the HTML version of this document,
values to be taken literally are indicated by
the use of <tt>this fixed-width font</tt>.
</p>
<p>
All uses of <a class="info" href="#JWS">JSON Web Signature (JWS)<span> (</span><span
class="info">Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, “JSON Web Signature (JWS),” July&nbsp;2014.</span><span>)</span></a>
[JWS]
and <a class="info" href="#JWE">JSON Web Encryption (JWE)<span> (</span><span
class="info">Jones, M., Rescorla, E., and J. Hildebrand, “JSON Web Encryption (JWE),” July&nbsp;2014.</span><span>)</span></a>
[JWE]
data structures in this specification utilize
the JWS Compact Serialization or the JWE Compact Serialization;
the JWS JSON Serialization and the JWE JSON Serialization are not used.
</p>
<a name="Terminology"></a><br>
<hr>
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<a name="rfc.section.1.2"></a>
<h3>1.2.&nbsp;
Terminology</h3>
<p>
This specification uses the terms "Access Token", "Authorization Code",
"Authorization Endpoint", "Authorization Grant", "Authorization Server",
"Client", "Client Authentication", "Client Identifier", "Client Secret",
"Grant Type", "Protected Resource", "Redirection URI", "Refresh Token",
"Resource Owner", "Resource Server", "Response Type", and "Token Endpoint"
defined by <a class="info" href="#RFC6749">OAuth
2.0<span> (</span><span
class="info">Hardt, D., “The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework,” October&nbsp;2012.</span><span>)</span></a>
[RFC6749],
the terms "Claim Name", "Claim Value", "JSON Web Token (JWT)",
"JWT Claims Set", and "Nested JWT"
defined by <a class="info" href="#JWT">JSON Web Token
(JWT)<span> (</span><span class="info">Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, “JSON Web Token (JWT),” July&nbsp;2014.</span><span>)</span></a>
[JWT],
the terms "Header Parameter" and "JOSE Header"
defined by <a class="info" href="#JWS">JSON Web Signature
(JWS)<span> (</span><span class="info">Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, “JSON Web Signature (JWS),” July&nbsp;2014.</span><span>)</span></a>
[JWS],
the term "User Agent" defined by <a class="info"
href="#RFC2616">RFC
2616<span> (</span><span class="info">Fielding, R., Gettys, J., Mogul, J., Frystyk, H., Masinter, L., Leach, P., and T. Berners-Lee, “Hypertext Transfer Protocol -- HTTP/1.1,” June&nbsp;1999.</span><span>)</span></a>
[RFC2616],
and the term "Response Mode" defined by
<a class="info" href="#OAuth.Responses">OAuth 2.0 Multiple
Response Type Encoding Practices<span> (</span><span class="info">de Medeiros, B., Ed., Scurtescu, M., Tarjan, P., and M. Jones, “OAuth 2.0 Multiple Response Type Encoding Practices,” February&nbsp;2014.</span><span>)</span></a>
[OAuth.Responses].
</p>
<p>
This specification also defines the following terms:
</p>
<blockquote class="text">
<dl>
<dt>Authentication</dt>
<dd>
Process used to achieve sufficient confidence in the binding
between the Entity and the presented Identity.
</dd>
<dt>Authentication Request</dt>
<dd>
OAuth 2.0 Authorization Request using extension parameters and scopes
defined by OpenID Connect to request that the End-User be authenticated
by the Authorization Server, which is an OpenID Connect Provider,
to the Client, which is an OpenID Connect Relying Party.
</dd>
<dt>Authentication Context</dt>
<dd>
Information that the Relying Party can require before it makes an
entitlement decision with respect to an authentication response.
Such context can include, but is not limited to, the actual
authentication method used or level of assurance such as
<a class="info" href="#ISO29115">ISO/IEC
29115<span> (</span><span class="info">International Organization for Standardization, “ISO/IEC 29115:2013 -- Information technology - Security techniques - Entity authentication assurance framework,” March&nbsp;2013.</span><span>)</span></a>
[ISO29115]
entity authentication assurance level.
</dd>
<dt>Authentication Context Class</dt>
<dd>
Set of authentication methods or procedures that are considered
to be equivalent to each other in a particular context.
</dd>
<dt>Authentication Context Class Reference</dt>
<dd>
Identifier for an Authentication Context Class.
</dd>
<dt>Authorization Code Flow</dt>
<dd>
OAuth 2.0 flow in which
an Authorization Code is returned from the Authorization Endpoint and
all tokens are returned from the Token Endpoint.
</dd>
<dt>Authorization Request</dt>
<dd>
OAuth 2.0 Authorization Request as defined by <a class="info"
href="#RFC6749">[RFC6749]<span> (</span><span
class="info">Hardt, D., “The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework,” October&nbsp;2012.</span><span>)</span></a>.
</dd>
<dt>Claim</dt>
<dd>
Piece of information asserted about an Entity.
</dd>
<dt>Claim Type</dt>
<dd>
Syntax used for representing a Claim Value.
This specification defines Normal, Aggregated, and Distributed Claim Types.
</dd>
<dt>Claims Provider</dt>
<dd>
Server that can return Claims about an Entity.
</dd>
<dt>Credential</dt>
<dd>
Data presented as evidence of the right to use an identity
or other resources.
</dd>
<dt>End-User</dt>
<dd>
Human participant.
</dd>
<dt>Entity</dt>
<dd>
Something that has a separate and distinct existence and that can be
identified in a context. An End-User is one example of an Entity.
</dd>
<dt>Essential Claim</dt>
<dd>
Claim specified by the Client as being necessary to ensure a smooth
authorization experience for the specific task requested by the End-User.
</dd>
<dt>Hybrid Flow</dt>
<dd>
OAuth 2.0 flow in which
an Authorization Code is returned from the Authorization Endpoint,
some tokens are returned from the Authorization Endpoint,
and others are returned from the Token Endpoint.
</dd>
<dt>ID Token</dt>
<dd>
<a class="info" href="#JWT">JSON Web Token
(JWT)<span> (</span><span class="info">Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, “JSON Web Token (JWT),” July&nbsp;2014.</span><span>)</span></a>
[JWT] that contains Claims about the Authentication event.
It MAY contain other Claims.
</dd>
<dt>Identifier</dt>
<dd>
Value that uniquely characterizes an Entity in a specific context.
</dd>
<dt>Identity</dt>
<dd>
Set of attributes related to an Entity.
</dd>
<dt>Implicit Flow</dt>
<dd>
OAuth 2.0 flow in which all tokens are returned from the Authorization Endpoint
and neither the Token Endpoint nor an Authorization Code are used.
</dd>
<dt>Issuer</dt>
<dd>
Entity that issues a set of Claims.
</dd>
<dt>Issuer Identifier</dt>
<dd>
Verifiable Identifier for an Issuer.
An Issuer Identifier is a case sensitive URL
using the <tt>https</tt> scheme that
contains scheme, host, and optionally, port number and path
components and no query or fragment components.
</dd>
<dt>Message</dt>
<dd>
Request or a response between an OpenID
Relying Party and an OpenID Provider.
</dd>
<dt>OpenID Provider (OP)</dt>
<dd>
OAuth 2.0 Authorization Server that is capable of
Authenticating the End-User and
providing Claims to a Relying Party
about the Authentication event and the End-User.
</dd>
<dt>Request Object</dt>
<dd>
JWT that contains a set of request parameters as its Claims.
</dd>
<dt>Request URI</dt>
<dd>
URL that references a resource containing a Request Object.
The Request URI contents MUST be retrievable by the
Authorization Server.
</dd>
<dt>Pairwise Pseudonymous Identifier (PPID)</dt>
<dd>
Identifier that identifies the Entity to a Relying Party that cannot be correlated
with the Entity's PPID at another Relying Party.
</dd>
<dt>Personally Identifiable Information (PII)</dt>
<dd>
Information that (a) can be used to identify the natural person
to whom such information relates, or
(b) is or might be directly or indirectly linked to a
natural person to whom such information relates.
</dd>
<dt>Relying Party (RP)</dt>
<dd>
OAuth 2.0 Client application requiring End-User Authentication
and Claims from an OpenID Provider.
</dd>
<dt>Sector Identifier</dt>
<dd>
Host component of a URL used by the Relying Party's organization
that is an input to the computation of pairwise Subject Identifiers
for that Relying Party.
</dd>
<dt>Self-Issued OpenID Provider</dt>
<dd>
Personal, self-hosted OpenID Provider that issues self-signed ID Tokens.
</dd>
<dt>Subject Identifier</dt>
<dd>
Locally unique and never
reassigned identifier within the Issuer for the End-User,
which is intended to be consumed by the Client.
</dd>
<dt>UserInfo Endpoint</dt>
<dd>
Protected Resource that, when presented with an Access Token by the Client,
returns authorized information about the End-User represented by the corresponding
Authorization Grant.
The UserInfo Endpoint
URL MUST use the <tt>https</tt> scheme and MAY contain
port, path, and query parameter components.
</dd>
<dt>Validation</dt>
<dd>
Process intended to establish the soundness or correctness of a construct.
</dd>
<dt>Verification</dt>
<dd>
Process intended to test or prove the truth or accuracy of a fact or value.
</dd>
<dt>Voluntary Claim</dt>
<dd>
Claim specified by the Client as being useful but not Essential
for the specific task requested by the End-User.
</dd>
</dl>
</blockquote>
<p>
</p>
<p>
IMPORTANT NOTE TO READERS: The terminology definitions in
this section are a normative portion of this specification,
imposing requirements upon implementations. All the
capitalized words in the text of this specification, such as
"Issuer Identifier", reference these defined terms.
Whenever the reader encounters them, their definitions
found in this section must be followed.
</p>
<p>
For more background on some of the terminology used,
see <a class="info" href="#RFC4949">Internet Security Glossary,
Version 2<span> (</span><span
class="info">Shirey, R., “Internet Security Glossary, Version 2,” August&nbsp;2007.</span><span>)</span></a>
[RFC4949],
<a class="info" href="#ISO29115">ISO/IEC 29115 Entity
Authentication Assurance<span> (</span><span class="info">International Organization for Standardization, “ISO/IEC 29115:2013 -- Information technology - Security techniques - Entity authentication assurance framework,” March&nbsp;2013.</span><span>)</span></a>
[ISO29115],
and <a class="info" href="#X.1252">ITU-T
X.1252<span> (</span><span class="info">International Telecommunication Union, “ITU-T Recommendation X.1252 -- Cyberspace security -- Identity management -- Baseline identity management terms and definitions,” November&nbsp;2010.</span><span>)</span></a>
[X.1252].
</p>
<a name="Overview"></a><br>
<hr>
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<a name="rfc.section.1.3"></a>
<h3>1.3.&nbsp;
Overview</h3>
<p>The OpenID Connect protocol, in abstract, follows the following
steps.
</p>
<p>
</p>
<ol class="text">
<li>The RP (Client) sends a request to the OpenID Provider (OP).
</li>
<li>The OP authenticates the End-User and obtains authorization.
</li>
<li>The OP responds with an ID Token and usually an Access Token.
</li>
<li>The RP can send a request with the Access Token to the UserInfo Endpoint.
</li>
<li>The UserInfo Endpoint returns Claims about the End-User.
</li>
</ol>
<p>
</p>
<p>
These steps are illustrated in the following diagram:
</p>
<div style="display: table; width: 0; margin-left: 3em; margin-right: auto"><pre>+--------+ +--------+
| | | |
| |---------(1) AuthN Request--------&gt;| |
| | | |
| | +--------+ | |
| | | | | |
| | | End- |&lt;--(2) AuthN &amp; AuthZ--&gt;| |
| | | User | | |
| RP | | | | OP |
| | +--------+ | |
| | | |
| |&lt;--------(3) AuthN Response--------| |
| | | |
| |---------(4) UserInfo Request-----&gt;| |
| | | |
| |&lt;--------(5) UserInfo Response-----| |
| | | |
+--------+ +--------+
</pre>
</div>
<a name="IDToken"></a><br>
<hr>
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<a name="rfc.section.2"></a>
<h3>2.&nbsp;
ID Token</h3>
<p>
The primary extension that OpenID Connect makes to OAuth 2.0
to enable End-Users to be Authenticated
is the ID Token data structure.
The ID Token is a security token that contains Claims about the
Authentication of an End-User by an Authorization Server when using a Client,
and potentially other requested Claims.
The ID Token is represented as a
<a class="info" href="#JWT">JSON Web Token
(JWT)<span> (</span><span class="info">Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, “JSON Web Token (JWT),” July&nbsp;2014.</span><span>)</span></a>
[JWT].
</p>
<p>
The following Claims are used within the ID Token
for all OAuth 2.0 flows used by OpenID Connect:
</p>
<p>
</p>
<blockquote class="text">
<dl>
<dt>iss</dt>
<dd>
REQUIRED.
Issuer Identifier for the Issuer of the response.
The <tt>iss</tt> value is a case sensitive URL
using the <tt>https</tt> scheme that
contains scheme, host, and optionally, port number and path
components and no query or fragment components.
</dd>
<dt>sub</dt>
<dd>
REQUIRED.
Subject Identifier. A locally unique and never
reassigned identifier within the Issuer for the End-User,
which is intended to be consumed by the Client,
e.g., <tt>24400320</tt>
or <tt>AItOawmwtWwcT0k51BayewNvutrJUqsvl6qs7A4</tt>.
It MUST NOT exceed 255 ASCII characters in length.
The <tt>sub</tt> value is a case sensitive string.
</dd>
<dt>aud</dt>
<dd>
REQUIRED.
Audience(s) that this ID Token is intended for.
It MUST contain the OAuth 2.0 <tt>client_id</tt>
of the Relying Party as an audience value.
It MAY also contain identifiers for other audiences.
In the general case,
the <tt>aud</tt> value is an array of
case sensitive strings.
In the common special case when there is one audience,
the <tt>aud</tt> value MAY be a single
case sensitive string.
</dd>
<dt>exp</dt>
<dd>
REQUIRED.
Expiration time on or after which the ID Token MUST NOT be
accepted for processing. The processing of this parameter
requires that the current date/time MUST be before the
expiration date/time listed in the value. Implementers MAY
provide for some small leeway, usually no more than a few
minutes, to account for clock skew.
Its value is a JSON number representing the number of seconds from
1970-01-01T0:0:0Z as measured in UTC until the date/time.
See <a class="info" href="#RFC3339">RFC
3339<span> (</span><span class="info">Klyne, G., Ed. and C. Newman, “Date and Time on the Internet: Timestamps,” July&nbsp;2002.</span><span>)</span></a>
[RFC3339]
for details regarding date/times in general and UTC in
particular.
</dd>
<dt>iat</dt>
<dd>
REQUIRED.
Time at which the JWT was issued.
Its value is a JSON number representing the number of seconds from
1970-01-01T0:0:0Z as measured in UTC until the date/time.
</dd>
<dt>auth_time</dt>
<dd>
Time when the End-User authentication occurred.
Its value is a JSON number representing the number of seconds from
1970-01-01T0:0:0Z as measured in UTC until the date/time.
When a <tt>max_age</tt> request is made
or when <tt>auth_time</tt> is requested
as an Essential Claim,
then this Claim is REQUIRED; otherwise, its inclusion is OPTIONAL.
(The <tt>auth_time</tt> Claim semantically
corresponds to the OpenID 2.0 <a class="info"
href="#OpenID.PAPE">PAPE<span> (</span><span
class="info">Recordon, D., Jones, M., Bufu, J., Ed., Daugherty, J., Ed., and N. Sakimura, “OpenID Provider Authentication Policy Extension 1.0,” December&nbsp;2008.</span><span>)</span></a>
[OpenID.PAPE]
<tt>auth_time</tt> response parameter.)
</dd>
<dt>nonce</dt>
<dd>
String value used to associate a Client session
with an ID Token, and to mitigate replay attacks.
The value is passed through unmodified from the Authentication Request to the ID Token.
If present in the ID Token,
Clients MUST verify that
the <tt>nonce</tt> Claim Value is equal to
the value of the <tt>nonce</tt>
parameter sent in the Authentication Request.
If present in the Authentication Request, Authorization Servers
MUST include a <tt>nonce</tt> Claim in the
ID Token with the Claim Value
being the nonce value sent in the Authentication Request.
Authorization Servers SHOULD perform no other processing
on <tt>nonce</tt> values used.
The <tt>nonce</tt> value is a case sensitive string.
</dd>
<dt>acr</dt>
<dd>
OPTIONAL.
Authentication Context Class Reference.
String specifying an Authentication Context Class Reference value
that identifies the Authentication Context Class that the
authentication performed satisfied.
The value "0" indicates the End-User authentication
did not meet the requirements of
<a class="info" href="#ISO29115">ISO/IEC
29115<span> (</span><span class="info">International Organization for Standardization, “ISO/IEC 29115:2013 -- Information technology - Security techniques - Entity authentication assurance framework,” March&nbsp;2013.</span><span>)</span></a>
[ISO29115] level 1.
Authentication using a long-lived browser cookie, for instance, is one
example where the use of "level 0" is appropriate. Authentications with
level 0 SHOULD NOT be used to authorize access to any resource of any
monetary value.
(This corresponds to the OpenID 2.0
<a class="info"
href="#OpenID.PAPE">PAPE<span> (</span><span
class="info">Recordon, D., Jones, M., Bufu, J., Ed., Daugherty, J., Ed., and N. Sakimura, “OpenID Provider Authentication Policy Extension 1.0,” December&nbsp;2008.</span><span>)</span></a>
[OpenID.PAPE]
<tt>nist_auth_level</tt> 0.)
An absolute URI or an <a class="info" href="#RFC6711">RFC
6711<span> (</span><span class="info">Johansson, L., “An IANA Registry for Level of Assurance (LoA) Profiles,” August&nbsp;2012.</span><span>)</span></a>
[RFC6711]
registered name
SHOULD be used as the <tt>acr</tt> value;
registered names MUST NOT be used with a different meaning than
that which is registered.
Parties using this claim will need to agree upon the meanings of
the values used, which may be context-specific.
The <tt>acr</tt> value is a case sensitive string.
</dd>
<dt>amr</dt>
<dd>
OPTIONAL.
Authentication Methods References.
JSON array of strings that are identifiers for authentication methods
used in the authentication.
For instance, values might indicate that both password and OTP
authentication methods were used.
The definition of particular values to be used in the
<tt>amr</tt> Claim
is beyond the scope of this specification.
Parties using this claim will need to agree upon the meanings of
the values used, which may be context-specific.
The <tt>amr</tt> value is an array of
case sensitive strings.
</dd>
<dt>azp</dt>
<dd>
OPTIONAL.
Authorized party - the party to which the ID Token was issued.
If present, it MUST contain the OAuth 2.0
Client ID of this party.
This Claim is only needed when
the ID Token has a single audience value
and that audience is different than the authorized party.
It MAY be included even when the authorized party is the same
as the sole audience.
The <tt>azp</tt> value is a case sensitive string
containing a StringOrURI value.
</dd>
</dl>
</blockquote>
<p>
</p>
<p>
ID Tokens MAY contain other Claims.
Any Claims used that are not understood MUST be ignored.
See Sections
<a class="info" href="#CodeIDToken">3.1.3.6<span> (</span><span
class="info">ID Token</span><span>)</span></a>,
<a class="info"
href="#HybridIDToken">3.3.2.11<span> (</span><span
class="info">ID Token</span><span>)</span></a>,
<a class="info" href="#StandardClaims">5.1<span> (</span><span
class="info">Standard Claims</span><span>)</span></a>, and
<a class="info"
href="#SelfIssuedResponse">7.4<span> (</span><span
class="info">Self-Issued OpenID Provider Response</span><span>)</span></a>
for additional Claims defined by this specification.
</p>
<p>
ID Tokens MUST be signed using <a class="info"
href="#JWS">JWS<span> (</span><span
class="info">Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, “JSON Web Signature (JWS),” July&nbsp;2014.</span><span>)</span></a>
[JWS] and optionally both signed and then
encrypted using <a class="info"
href="#JWS">JWS<span> (</span><span
class="info">Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, “JSON Web Signature (JWS),” July&nbsp;2014.</span><span>)</span></a>
[JWS] and <a class="info" href="#JWE">JWE<span> (</span><span
class="info">Jones, M., Rescorla, E., and J. Hildebrand, “JSON Web Encryption (JWE),” July&nbsp;2014.</span><span>)</span></a>
[JWE] respectively, thereby providing
authentication, integrity,
non-repudiation, and optionally, confidentiality,
per <a class="info"
href="#SigningOrder">Section&nbsp;16.14<span> (</span><span
class="info">Signing and Encryption Order</span><span>)</span></a>.
If the ID Token is encrypted, it MUST be signed then encrypted,
with the result being a Nested JWT, as defined in <a class="info"
href="#JWT">[JWT]<span> (</span><span
class="info">Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, “JSON Web Token (JWT),” July&nbsp;2014.</span><span>)</span></a>.
ID Tokens MUST NOT use <tt>none</tt>
as the <tt>alg</tt> value
unless the Response Type used returns no ID Token from the
Authorization Endpoint
(such as when using the Authorization Code Flow)
and the Client explicitly requested the use of
<tt>none</tt> at Registration time.
</p>
<p>
ID Tokens SHOULD NOT use the JWS or JWE
<tt>x5u</tt>,
<tt>x5c</tt>,
<tt>jku</tt>, or
<tt>jwk</tt>
Header Parameter fields.
Instead, references to keys used are
communicated in advance using Discovery and Registration parameters,
per <a class="info"
href="#SigEnc">Section&nbsp;10<span> (</span><span
class="info">Signatures and Encryption</span><span>)</span></a>.
</p>
<p>
The following is a non-normative example of
the set of Claims (the JWT Claims Set) in an ID Token:
</p>
<div style="display: table; width: 0; margin-left: 3em; margin-right: auto"><pre> {
"iss": "https://server.example.com",
"sub": "24400320",
"aud": "s6BhdRkqt3",
"nonce": "n-0S6_WzA2Mj",
"exp": 1311281970,
"iat": 1311280970,
"auth_time": 1311280969,
"acr": "urn:mace:incommon:iap:silver"
}
</pre>
</div>
<a name="Authentication"></a><br>
<hr>
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<a name="rfc.section.3"></a>
<h3>3.&nbsp;
Authentication</h3>
<p>
OpenID Connect performs authentication to log in the End-User
or to determine that the End-User is already logged in.
OpenID Connect returns the result of the Authentication
performed by the Server to the Client in a secure manner
so that the Client can rely on it.
For this reason, the Client is called Relying Party (RP) in this case.
</p>
<p>
The Authentication result is returned in an
ID Token, as defined in <a class="info" href="#IDToken">Section&nbsp;2<span> (</span><span
class="info">ID Token</span><span>)</span></a>.
It has Claims expressing such information as the Issuer,
the Subject Identifier, when the authentication expires, etc.
</p>
<p>
Authentication can follow one of three paths:
the Authorization Code Flow (<tt>response_type=code</tt>),
the Implicit Flow (<tt>response_type=id_token&nbsp;token</tt>
or <tt>response_type=id_token</tt>), or
the Hybrid Flow (using other Response Type values defined in
<a class="info" href="#OAuth.Responses">OAuth 2.0 Multiple
Response Type Encoding Practices<span> (</span><span class="info">de Medeiros, B., Ed., Scurtescu, M., Tarjan, P., and M. Jones, “OAuth 2.0 Multiple Response Type Encoding Practices,” February&nbsp;2014.</span><span>)</span></a>
[OAuth.Responses]).
The flows determine how the ID Token and Access Token
are returned to the Client.
</p>
<p>
The characteristics of the three flows are summarized
in the following non-normative table.
The table is intended to provide some guidance on which flow to choose
in particular contexts.
</p><br>
<hr class="insert">
<table class="full" align="center" border="0" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="2">
<colgroup>
<col align="left">
<col align="left">
<col align="left">
<col align="left">
</colgroup>
<tbody>
<tr>
<th align="left">Property</th>
<th align="left">Authorization Code Flow</th>
<th align="left">Implicit Flow</th>
<th align="left">Hybrid Flow</th>
</tr>
<tr>
<td align="left">All tokens returned from Authorization Endpoint</td>
<td align="left">no</td>
<td align="left">yes</td>
<td align="left">no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td align="left">All tokens returned from Token Endpoint</td>
<td align="left">yes</td>
<td align="left">no</td>
<td align="left">no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td align="left">Tokens not revealed to User Agent</td>
<td align="left">yes</td>
<td align="left">no</td>
<td align="left">no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td align="left">Client can be authenticated</td>
<td align="left">yes</td>
<td align="left">no</td>
<td align="left">yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td align="left">Refresh Token possible</td>
<td align="left">yes</td>
<td align="left">no</td>
<td align="left">yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td align="left">Communication in one round trip</td>
<td align="left">no</td>
<td align="left">yes</td>
<td align="left">no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td align="left">Most communication server-to-server</td>
<td align="left">yes</td>
<td align="left">no</td>
<td align="left">varies</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<br clear="all">
<table border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" align="center">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td align="center"><font face="monaco, MS Sans Serif" size="1"><b>&nbsp;OpenID Connect Authentication Flows&nbsp;</b></font><br>
</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<hr class="insert">
<p>
The flow used is determined by the <tt>response_type</tt>
value contained in the Authorization Request.
These <tt>response_type</tt> values select
these flows:
</p><br>
<hr class="insert">
<table class="full" align="center" border="0" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="2">
<colgroup>
<col align="left">
<col align="left">
</colgroup>
<tbody>
<tr>
<th align="left">"response_type" value</th>
<th align="left">Flow</th>
</tr>
<tr>
<td align="left"><tt>code</tt>&nbsp;</td>
<td align="left">Authorization Code Flow</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td align="left"><tt>id_token</tt>&nbsp;</td>
<td align="left">Implicit Flow</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td align="left"><tt>id_token&nbsp;token</tt>&nbsp;</td>
<td align="left">Implicit Flow</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td align="left"><tt>code&nbsp;id_token</tt>&nbsp;</td>
<td align="left">Hybrid Flow</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td align="left"><tt>code&nbsp;token</tt>&nbsp;</td>
<td align="left">Hybrid Flow</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td align="left"><tt>code&nbsp;id_token&nbsp;token</tt>&nbsp;</td>
<td align="left">Hybrid Flow</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<br clear="all">
<table border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" align="center">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td align="center"><font face="monaco, MS Sans Serif" size="1"><b>&nbsp;OpenID Connect "response_type" Values&nbsp;</b></font><br>
</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<hr class="insert">
<p>
All but the <tt>code</tt> Response Type value,
which is defined by <a class="info" href="#RFC6749">OAuth
2.0<span> (</span><span
class="info">Hardt, D., “The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework,” October&nbsp;2012.</span><span>)</span></a>
[RFC6749],
are defined in the
<a class="info" href="#OAuth.Responses">OAuth 2.0 Multiple
Response Type Encoding Practices<span> (</span><span class="info">de Medeiros, B., Ed., Scurtescu, M., Tarjan, P., and M. Jones, “OAuth 2.0 Multiple Response Type Encoding Practices,” February&nbsp;2014.</span><span>)</span></a>
[OAuth.Responses]
specification.
NOTE: While OAuth 2.0 also defines the
<tt>token</tt> Response Type value
for the Implicit Flow, OpenID Connect does not use this Response Type,
since no ID Token would be returned.
</p>
<a name="CodeFlowAuth"></a><br>
<hr>
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<a name="rfc.section.3.1"></a>
<h3>3.1.&nbsp;
Authentication using the Authorization Code Flow</h3>
<p>
This section describes how to perform authentication using the Authorization Code Flow.
When using the Authorization Code Flow,
all tokens are returned from the Token Endpoint.
</p>
<p>The Authorization Code Flow returns an Authorization Code to the
Client, which can then exchange it for an ID Token and an Access Token directly.
This provides the benefit of not exposing any tokens to the
User Agent and possibly other malicious applications with access
to the User Agent.
The Authorization Server can also
authenticate the Client before exchanging the Authorization Code for an
Access Token. The Authorization Code flow is suitable for Clients that
can securely maintain a Client Secret between themselves and the
Authorization Server.
</p>
<a name="CodeFlowSteps"></a><br>
<hr>
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<a name="rfc.section.3.1.1"></a>
<h3>3.1.1.&nbsp;
Authorization Code Flow Steps</h3>
<p>The Authorization Code Flow goes through the following
steps.
</p>
<p>
</p>
<ol class="text">
<li>Client prepares an Authentication Request containing the desired
request parameters.
</li>
<li>Client sends the request to the Authorization Server.
</li>
<li>Authorization Server Authenticates the End-User.
</li>
<li>Authorization Server obtains End-User Consent/Authorization.
</li>
<li>Authorization Server sends the End-User back to the Client with
an Authorization Code.
</li>
<li>Client requests a response using the Authorization Code at the
Token Endpoint.
</li>
<li>Client receives a response that contains an ID Token
and Access Token in the response body.
</li>
<li>Client validates the ID token and retrieves the End-User's
Subject Identifier.
</li>
</ol>
<p>
</p>
<a name="AuthorizationEndpoint"></a><br>
<hr>
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<a name="rfc.section.3.1.2"></a>
<h3>3.1.2.&nbsp;
Authorization Endpoint</h3>
<p>
The Authorization Endpoint performs Authentication of the
End-User.
This is done by sending the User Agent to
the Authorization Server's Authorization Endpoint for Authentication and
Authorization, using request parameters defined by OAuth 2.0 and
additional parameters and parameter values defined by OpenID Connect.
</p>
<p>
Communication with the Authorization Endpoint MUST utilize TLS.
See <a class="info"
href="#TLSRequirements">Section&nbsp;16.17<span> (</span><span
class="info">TLS Requirements</span><span>)</span></a> for more information on using TLS.
</p>
<a name="AuthRequest"></a><br>
<hr>
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<a name="rfc.section.3.1.2.1"></a>
<h3>3.1.2.1.&nbsp;
Authentication Request</h3>
<p>
An Authentication Request is
an OAuth 2.0 Authorization Request that requests that the End-User
be authenticated by the Authorization Server.
</p>
<p>Authorization Servers MUST support the use of the HTTP <tt>GET</tt> and
<tt>POST</tt> methods defined in <a class="info"
href="#RFC2616">RFC
2616<span> (</span><span class="info">Fielding, R., Gettys, J., Mogul, J., Frystyk, H., Masinter, L., Leach, P., and T. Berners-Lee, “Hypertext Transfer Protocol -- HTTP/1.1,” June&nbsp;1999.</span><span>)</span></a>
[RFC2616] at the
Authorization Endpoint.
Clients MAY use the HTTP <tt>GET</tt> or
<tt>POST</tt> methods to send the
Authorization Request to the Authorization Server. If using the HTTP
<tt>GET</tt> method, the request parameters are serialized using
URI Query String Serialization, per <a class="info"
href="#QuerySerialization">Section&nbsp;13.1<span> (</span><span
class="info">Query String Serialization</span><span>)</span></a>.
If using the HTTP <tt>POST</tt>
method, the request parameters are serialized using
Form Serialization, per <a class="info"
href="#FormSerialization">Section&nbsp;13.2<span> (</span><span
class="info">Form Serialization</span><span>)</span></a>.
</p>
<p>
OpenID Connect uses the following OAuth 2.0 request parameters with
the Authorization Code Flow:
</p>
<p>
</p>
<blockquote class="text">
<dl>
<dt>scope</dt>
<dd>
REQUIRED.
OpenID Connect requests MUST contain the <tt>openid</tt> scope value.
If the <tt>openid</tt> scope value is not present,
the behavior is entirely unspecified.
Other scope values MAY be present.
Scope values used that are not understood by an implementation SHOULD be ignored.
See Sections <a class="info"
href="#ScopeClaims">5.4<span> (</span><span
class="info">Requesting Claims using Scope Values</span><span>)</span></a>
and <a class="info"
href="#OfflineAccess">11<span> (</span><span
class="info">Offline Access</span><span>)</span></a>
for additional scope values defined by this specification.
</dd>
<dt>response_type</dt>
<dd>
REQUIRED.
OAuth 2.0 Response Type value that determines
the authorization processing flow to be used,
including what parameters are returned from the endpoints used.
When using the Authorization Code Flow, this value is
<tt>code</tt>.
</dd>
<dt>client_id</dt>
<dd>
REQUIRED.
OAuth 2.0 Client Identifier
valid at the Authorization Server.
</dd>
<dt>redirect_uri</dt>
<dd>
REQUIRED.
Redirection URI to which the response will be sent.
This URI MUST exactly match one of the Redirection URI values
for the Client pre-registered at the OpenID Provider,
with the matching performed as described in
Section 6.2.1 of <a class="info" href="#RFC3986">[RFC3986]<span> (</span><span
class="info">Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, “Uniform Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax,” January&nbsp;2005.</span><span>)</span></a>
(Simple String Comparison).
When using this flow, the Redirection URI
SHOULD use the <tt>https</tt> scheme;
however, it MAY use the <tt>http</tt> scheme,
provided that the Client Type is
<tt>confidential</tt>,
as defined in Section 2.1 of OAuth 2.0, and
provided the OP allows the use of
<tt>http</tt> Redirection URIs in this case.
The Redirection URI MAY use an alternate scheme,
such as one that is intended to identify a callback into a native application.
</dd>
<dt>state</dt>
<dd>
RECOMMENDED.
Opaque value used
to maintain state between the request and the callback.
Typically, Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF, XSRF)
mitigation is done by cryptographically binding the value of
this parameter with a browser cookie.
</dd>
</dl>
</blockquote>
<p>
</p>
<p>
OpenID Connect also uses the following OAuth 2.0 request parameter,
which is defined in
<a class="info" href="#OAuth.Responses">OAuth 2.0 Multiple
Response Type Encoding Practices<span> (</span><span class="info">de Medeiros, B., Ed., Scurtescu, M., Tarjan, P., and M. Jones, “OAuth 2.0 Multiple Response Type Encoding Practices,” February&nbsp;2014.</span><span>)</span></a>
[OAuth.Responses]:
</p>
<p>
</p>
<blockquote class="text">
<dl>
<dt>response_mode</dt>
<dd>
OPTIONAL.
Informs the Authorization Server of the mechanism to be used
for returning parameters from the Authorization Endpoint.
This use of this parameter is NOT RECOMMENDED when the Response Mode
that would be requested is the default mode specified for the Response Type.
</dd>
</dl>
</blockquote>
<p>
</p>
<p>
This specification also defines the following request parameters:
</p>
<p>
</p>
<blockquote class="text">
<dl>
<dt>nonce</dt>
<dd>
OPTIONAL.
String value used to associate a Client session
with an ID Token, and to mitigate replay attacks.
The value is passed through unmodified from the Authentication Request to the ID Token.
Sufficient entropy MUST be present in the
<tt>nonce</tt> values used to prevent
attackers from guessing values.
For implementation notes, see <a class="info"
href="#NonceNotes">Section&nbsp;15.5.2<span> (</span><span
class="info">Nonce Implementation Notes</span><span>)</span></a>.
</dd>
<dt>display</dt>
<dd>
OPTIONAL.
ASCII string value that specifies
how the Authorization Server displays the authentication and
consent user interface pages to the End-User.
The defined values are:
<blockquote class="text">
<dl>
<dt>page</dt>
<dd>
The Authorization Server SHOULD display the
authentication and consent UI consistent with a full User Agent page
view. If the display parameter is not specified, this is the
default display mode.
</dd>
<dt>popup</dt>
<dd>
The Authorization Server SHOULD display the
authentication and consent UI consistent with a popup User Agent
window.
The popup User Agent window should be of an appropriate size
for a login-focused dialog and should not obscure
the entire window that it is popping up over.
</dd>
<dt>touch</dt>
<dd>
The Authorization Server SHOULD display the
authentication and consent UI consistent with a device that
leverages a touch interface.
</dd>
<dt>wap</dt>
<dd>
The Authorization Server SHOULD display the
authentication and consent UI consistent with a "feature phone"
type display.
</dd>
</dl>
</blockquote>
The Authorization Server MAY also attempt to detect the capabilities
of the User Agent and present an appropriate display.
</dd>
<dt>prompt</dt>
<dd>
OPTIONAL.
Space delimited, case sensitive list of ASCII string values
that specifies whether the Authorization Server prompts
the End-User for reauthentication and consent.
The defined values are:
<blockquote class="text">
<dl>
<dt>none</dt>
<dd>
The Authorization Server
MUST NOT display any authentication or consent
user interface pages.
An error is returned
if an End-User
is not already authenticated or the Client does not have
pre-configured consent for the requested
Claims or does not fulfill other conditions for processing the request.
The error code will typically be
<tt>login_required</tt>,
<tt>interaction_required</tt>,
or another code defined in <a class="info"
href="#AuthError">Section&nbsp;3.1.2.6<span> (</span><span
class="info">Authentication Error Response</span><span>)</span></a>.
This can be used as a
method to check for existing authentication and/or consent.
</dd>
<dt>login</dt>
<dd>
The Authorization Server SHOULD prompt the
End-User for reauthentication.
If it cannot reauthenticate the End-User, it MUST return an error,
typically <tt>login_required</tt>.
</dd>
<dt>consent</dt>
<dd>
The Authorization Server SHOULD prompt the End-User for consent
before returning information to the Client.
If it cannot obtain consent, it MUST return an error,
typically <tt>consent_required</tt>.
</dd>
<dt>select_account</dt>
<dd>
The Authorization Server SHOULD
prompt the End-User to select a user account. This enables
an End-User who has multiple accounts at the Authorization Server
to select amongst the multiple accounts that they might have
current sessions for.
If it cannot obtain an account selection choice made by the End-User,
it MUST return an error,
typically <tt>account_selection_required</tt>.
</dd>
</dl>
</blockquote>
The <tt>prompt</tt> parameter
can be used by the Client to make sure that the End-User is
still present for the current session or to bring attention to the
request. If this parameter contains <tt>none</tt>
with any other value, an
error is returned.
</dd>
<dt>max_age</dt>
<dd>
OPTIONAL.
Maximum Authentication Age.
Specifies the allowable elapsed time in seconds
since the last time the End-User was actively
authenticated by the OP. If the elapsed time is greater than
this value, the OP MUST attempt to actively
re-authenticate the End-User.
(The <tt>max_age</tt> request parameter corresponds to
the OpenID 2.0 <a class="info"
href="#OpenID.PAPE">PAPE<span> (</span><span
class="info">Recordon, D., Jones, M., Bufu, J., Ed., Daugherty, J., Ed., and N. Sakimura, “OpenID Provider Authentication Policy Extension 1.0,” December&nbsp;2008.</span><span>)</span></a>
[OpenID.PAPE]
<tt>max_auth_age</tt> request parameter.)
When <tt>max_age</tt> is used, the ID Token returned
MUST include an <tt>auth_time</tt> Claim Value.
</dd>
<dt>ui_locales</dt>
<dd>
OPTIONAL.
End-User's preferred languages and scripts for the user interface,
represented as a space-separated list of
<a class="info"
href="#RFC5646">BCP47<span> (</span><span
class="info">Phillips, A. and M. Davis, “Tags for Identifying Languages,” September&nbsp;2009.</span><span>)</span></a>
[RFC5646] language tag values,
ordered by preference.
For instance, the value "fr-CA fr en" represents a preference
for French as spoken in Canada,
then French (without a region designation),
followed by English (without a region designation).
An error SHOULD NOT result if some or all of the requested locales
are not supported by the OpenID Provider.
</dd>
<dt>id_token_hint</dt>
<dd>
OPTIONAL.
ID Token previously issued by the Authorization Server
being passed as a hint about the End-User's current or past
authenticated session with the Client.
If the End-User identified by the ID Token is logged in or is logged in by the request,
then the Authorization Server returns a positive response;
otherwise, it SHOULD return
an error, such as <tt>login_required</tt>.
When possible, an <tt>id_token_hint</tt>
SHOULD be present when <tt>prompt=none</tt> is used
and an <tt>invalid_request</tt> error
MAY be returned if it is not;
however, the server SHOULD respond successfully when possible,
even if it is not present.
The Authorization Server need not be listed as an
audience of the ID Token when it is used as an
<tt>id_token_hint</tt> value.
</dd>
<dt></dt>
<dd>
If the ID Token received by the RP from the OP is encrypted,
to use it as an <tt>id_token_hint</tt>, the Client MUST
decrypt the signed ID Token contained within the encrypted ID Token.
The Client MAY re-encrypt the signed ID token to the Authentication Server
using a key that enables the server to decrypt the ID Token,
and use the re-encrypted ID token as the
<tt>id_token_hint</tt> value.
</dd>
<dt>login_hint</dt>
<dd>
OPTIONAL.
Hint to the Authorization Server
about the login identifier the End-User might use to log in (if necessary).
This hint can be used by an RP if it first asks the End-User for their e-mail
address (or other identifier) and then wants to pass that value as a hint
to the discovered authorization service.
It is RECOMMENDED that the hint value match the value used for discovery.
This value MAY also be a phone number in the format specified for the
<tt>phone_number</tt> Claim.
The use of this parameter is left to the OP's discretion.
</dd>
<dt>acr_values</dt>
<dd>
OPTIONAL.
Requested Authentication Context Class Reference values.
Space-separated string that specifies the <tt>acr</tt>
values that the Authorization Server is being requested to use
for processing this Authentication Request,
with the values appearing in order of preference.
The Authentication Context Class satisfied by the authentication
performed is returned as the <tt>acr</tt> Claim Value,
as specified in <a class="info" href="#IDToken">Section&nbsp;2<span> (</span><span
class="info">ID Token</span><span>)</span></a>.
The <tt>acr</tt> Claim is requested as
a Voluntary Claim by this parameter.
</dd>
</dl>
</blockquote>
<p>
</p>
<p>
Other parameters MAY be sent.
See Sections <a class="info"
href="#ImplicitAuthorizationEndpoint">3.2.2<span> (</span><span
class="info">Authorization Endpoint</span><span>)</span></a>,
<a class="info" href="#HybridAuthorizationEndpoint">3.3.2<span> (</span><span
class="info">Authorization Endpoint</span><span>)</span></a>,
<a class="info"
href="#ClaimsLanguagesAndScripts">5.2<span> (</span><span
class="info">Claims Languages and Scripts</span><span>)</span></a>,
<a class="info" href="#ClaimsParameter">5.5<span> (</span><span
class="info">Requesting Claims using the "claims" Request Parameter</span><span>)</span></a>,
<a class="info" href="#JWTRequests">6<span> (</span><span
class="info">Passing Request Parameters as JWTs</span><span>)</span></a>, and
<a class="info"
href="#RegistrationParameter">7.2.1<span> (</span><span
class="info">Providing Information with the "registration" Request Parameter</span><span>)</span></a>
for additional Authorization Request parameters and parameter values
defined by this specification.
</p>
<p>
The following is a non-normative example
HTTP 302 redirect response by the Client, which triggers
the User Agent to make an Authentication Request
to the Authorization Endpoint
(with line wraps within values for display purposes only):
</p>
<div style="display: table; width: 0; margin-left: 3em; margin-right: auto"><pre> HTTP/1.1 302 Found
Location: https://server.example.com/authorize?
response_type=code
&amp;scope=openid%20profile%20email
&amp;client_id=s6BhdRkqt3
&amp;state=af0ifjsldkj
&amp;redirect_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fclient.example.org%2Fcb
</pre>
</div>
<p>
The following is the non-normative example request
that would be sent by the User Agent to the Authorization Server
in response to the HTTP 302 redirect response by the Client above
(with line wraps within values for display purposes only):
</p>
<div style="display: table; width: 0; margin-left: 3em; margin-right: auto"><pre> GET /authorize?
response_type=code
&amp;scope=openid%20profile%20email
&amp;client_id=s6BhdRkqt3
&amp;state=af0ifjsldkj
&amp;redirect_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fclient.example.org%2Fcb HTTP/1.1
Host: server.example.com
</pre>
</div>
<a name="AuthRequestValidation"></a><br>
<hr>
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<a name="rfc.section.3.1.2.2"></a>
<h3>3.1.2.2.&nbsp;
Authentication Request Validation</h3>
<p>
The Authorization Server MUST validate the request received as follows:
</p>
<p>
</p>
<ol class="text">
<li>
The Authorization Server MUST validate all the
OAuth 2.0 parameters according to the OAuth 2.0 specification.
</li>
<li>
Verify that a <tt>scope</tt> parameter is present
and contains the <tt>openid</tt> scope value.
(If no <tt>openid</tt> scope value is present,
the request may still be a valid OAuth 2.0 request,
but is not an OpenID Connect request.)
</li>
<li>
The Authorization Server MUST verify that all the REQUIRED parameters
are present
and their usage conforms to this specification.
</li>
<li>
If the <tt>sub</tt> (subject) Claim
is requested with a specific value for the ID Token,
the Authorization Server MUST only send a positive response
if the End-User identified by that <tt>sub</tt> value
has an active session with the Authorization Server
or has been Authenticated as a result of the request.
The Authorization Server MUST NOT reply with an ID Token or
Access Token for a different user,
even if they have an active session with the Authorization Server.
Such a request can be made either using an
<tt>id_token_hint</tt> parameter
or by requesting a specific Claim Value
as described in <a class="info"
href="#IndividualClaimsRequests">Section&nbsp;5.5.1<span> (</span><span
class="info">Individual Claims Requests</span><span>)</span></a>,
if the <tt>claims</tt> parameter
is supported by the implementation.
</li>
</ol>
<p>
</p>
<p>
As specified in <a class="info" href="#RFC6749">OAuth 2.0<span> (</span><span
class="info">Hardt, D., “The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework,” October&nbsp;2012.</span><span>)</span></a>
[RFC6749],
Authorization Servers SHOULD ignore unrecognized request parameters.
</p>
<p>
If the Authorization Server encounters any error,
it MUST return an error response, per <a class="info"
href="#AuthError">Section&nbsp;3.1.2.6<span> (</span><span
class="info">Authentication Error Response</span><span>)</span></a>.
</p>
<a name="Authenticates"></a><br>
<hr>
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<a name="rfc.section.3.1.2.3"></a>
<h3>3.1.2.3.&nbsp;
Authorization Server Authenticates End-User</h3>
<p>
If the request is valid, the Authorization Server attempts
to Authenticate the End-User or determines whether the End-User is Authenticated,
depending upon the request parameter values used.
The methods used by the Authorization Server to Authenticate the End-User
(e.g. username and password, session cookies, etc.)
are beyond the scope of this specification.
An Authentication user interface MAY be displayed by
the Authorization Server, depending upon the request parameter values used
and the authentication methods used.
</p>
<p>The Authorization Server MUST attempt to Authenticate the
End-User in the following cases:
</p>
<ul class="text">
<li>The End-User is not already Authenticated.
</li>
<li>The Authentication Request contains the <tt>prompt</tt> parameter with the value
<tt>login</tt>. In this case, the
Authorization Server MUST reauthenticate the End-User
even if the End-User is already authenticated.
</li>
</ul>
<p>
</p>
<p>The Authorization Server MUST NOT interact with the End-User
in the following case:
</p>
<ul class="text">
<li>The Authentication Request contains the <tt>prompt</tt> parameter with the value
<tt>none</tt>. In this case,
the Authorization Server MUST return
an error if an End-User
is not already Authenticated or could not be silently Authenticated.
</li>
</ul>
<p>
</p>
<p>
When interacting with the End-User,
the Authorization Server MUST employ appropriate measures against
Cross-Site Request Forgery and Clickjacking as, described in
Sections 10.12 and 10.13 of <a class="info" href="#RFC6749">OAuth
2.0<span> (</span><span
class="info">Hardt, D., “The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework,” October&nbsp;2012.</span><span>)</span></a>
[RFC6749].
</p>
<a name="Consent"></a><br>
<hr>
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<a name="rfc.section.3.1.2.4"></a>
<h3>3.1.2.4.&nbsp;
Authorization Server Obtains End-User Consent/Authorization</h3>
<p>
Once the End-User is authenticated, the Authorization Server MUST
obtain an authorization decision before releasing information
to the Relying Party.
When permitted by the request parameters used,
this MAY be done through an interactive dialogue with the End-User
that makes it clear what is being consented to
or by establishing consent via conditions for processing the request or
other means (for example, via previous administrative consent).
Sections <a class="info" href="#IDToken">2<span> (</span><span
class="info">ID Token</span><span>)</span></a> and
<a class="info" href="#UserInfo">5.3<span> (</span><span
class="info">UserInfo Endpoint</span><span>)</span></a> describe
information release mechanisms.
</p>
<a name="AuthResponse"></a><br>
<hr>
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<a name="rfc.section.3.1.2.5"></a>
<h3>3.1.2.5.&nbsp;
Successful Authentication Response</h3>
<p>
An Authentication Response is an OAuth 2.0 Authorization Response
message returned from the
OP's Authorization Endpoint in response to the Authorization Request
message sent by the RP.
</p>
<p>
When using the Authorization Code Flow, the Authorization Response
MUST return the parameters defined in Section 4.1.2 of
<a class="info" href="#RFC6749">OAuth 2.0<span> (</span><span
class="info">Hardt, D., “The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework,” October&nbsp;2012.</span><span>)</span></a>
[RFC6749]
by adding them as query parameters to the
<tt>redirect_uri</tt> specified in the Authorization Request
using the <tt>application/x-www-form-urlencoded</tt> format,
unless a different Response Mode was specified.
</p>
<p>
The following is a non-normative example
successful response using this flow
(with line wraps within values for display purposes only):
</p>
<div style="display: table; width: 0; margin-left: 3em; margin-right: auto"><pre> HTTP/1.1 302 Found
Location: https://client.example.org/cb?
code=SplxlOBeZQQYbYS6WxSbIA
&amp;state=af0ifjsldkj
</pre>
</div>
<p>
For implementation notes on the contents of
the Authorization Code, see <a class="info" href="#CodeNotes">Section&nbsp;15.5.1<span> (</span><span
class="info">Authorization Code Implementation Notes</span><span>)</span></a>.
</p>
<a name="AuthError"></a><br>
<hr>
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<a name="rfc.section.3.1.2.6"></a>
<h3>3.1.2.6.&nbsp;
Authentication Error Response</h3>
<p>
An Authentication Error Response is an OAuth 2.0 Authorization Error Response
message returned from the
OP's Authorization Endpoint in response to the Authorization Request
message sent by the RP.
</p>
<p>
If the End-User denies the request or the End-User authentication
fails, the OP (Authorization Server) informs the RP (Client)
by using the Error Response parameters defined in
Section 4.1.2.1 of <a class="info" href="#RFC6749">OAuth
2.0<span> (</span><span
class="info">Hardt, D., “The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework,” October&nbsp;2012.</span><span>)</span></a>
[RFC6749].
(HTTP errors unrelated to RFC 6749 are returned to the User Agent using the
appropriate HTTP status code.)
</p>
<p>
Unless the Redirection URI is invalid,
the Authorization Server returns the Client to
the Redirection URI specified in the Authorization Request
with the appropriate error and state parameters.
Other parameters SHOULD NOT be returned.
</p>
<p>
In addition to the error codes defined in Section 4.1.2.1 of
OAuth 2.0, this specification also defines the following error codes:
</p>
<p>
</p>
<blockquote class="text">
<dl>
<dt>interaction_required</dt>
<dd>
The Authorization Server
requires End-User interaction of some form to proceed.
This error MAY be returned when the
<tt>prompt</tt> parameter value in the
Authentication Request is <tt>none</tt>,
but the Authentication Request cannot be completed
without displaying a user interface for End-User interaction.
</dd>
<dt>login_required</dt>
<dd>
The Authorization Server requires
End-User authentication. This error MAY be returned when the
<tt>prompt</tt> parameter value in the
Authentication Request is <tt>none</tt>,
but the Authentication Request cannot be completed
without displaying a user interface for End-User authentication.
</dd>
<dt>account_selection_required</dt>
<dd>
The End-User is REQUIRED
to select a session at the Authorization Server. The End-User MAY
be authenticated at the Authorization Server with different
associated accounts, but the End-User did not select a session.
This error MAY be returned
when the <tt>prompt</tt> parameter value in the
Authentication Request is <tt>none</tt>,
but the Authentication Request cannot be completed
without displaying a user interface to prompt for a session to use.
</dd>
<dt>consent_required</dt>
<dd>
The Authorization Server
requires End-User consent. This error MAY be returned when the
<tt>prompt</tt> parameter value in the
Authentication Request is <tt>none</tt>,
but the Authentication Request cannot be completed
without displaying a user interface for End-User consent.
</dd>
<dt>invalid_request_uri</dt>
<dd>
The
<tt>request_uri</tt> in
the Authorization Request returns an error or contains invalid data.
</dd>
<dt>invalid_request_object</dt>
<dd>
The
<tt>request</tt> parameter contains an invalid
Request Object.
</dd>
<dt>request_not_supported</dt>
<dd>
The OP does not support use of the
<tt>request</tt> parameter
defined in <a class="info" href="#JWTRequests">Section&nbsp;6<span> (</span><span
class="info">Passing Request Parameters as JWTs</span><span>)</span></a>.
</dd>
<dt>request_uri_not_supported</dt>
<dd>
The OP does not support use of the
<tt>request_uri</tt> parameter
defined in <a class="info" href="#JWTRequests">Section&nbsp;6<span> (</span><span
class="info">Passing Request Parameters as JWTs</span><span>)</span></a>.
</dd>
<dt>registration_not_supported</dt>
<dd>
The OP does not support use of the
<tt>registration</tt> parameter
defined in <a class="info"
href="#RegistrationParameter">Section&nbsp;7.2.1<span> (</span><span
class="info">Providing Information with the "registration" Request Parameter</span><span>)</span></a>.
</dd>
</dl>
</blockquote>
<p>
</p>
<p>
The error response parameters are the following:
</p>
<blockquote class="text">
<dl>
<dt>error</dt>
<dd>
REQUIRED. Error code.
</dd>
<dt>error_description</dt>
<dd>
OPTIONAL. Human-readable ASCII
encoded text description of the error.
</dd>
<dt>error_uri</dt>
<dd>
OPTIONAL. URI of a web page that
includes additional information about the error.
</dd>
<dt>state</dt>
<dd>
OAuth 2.0 state value.
REQUIRED if the Authorization Request
included the <tt>state</tt> parameter. Set
to the value received from the Client.
</dd>
</dl>
</blockquote>
<p>
</p>
<p>
When using the Authorization Code Flow, the error response
parameters are added to the query component of the Redirection URI,
unless a different Response Mode was specified.
</p>
<p>
</p>
<p>
The following is a non-normative example
error response using this flow
(with line wraps within values for display purposes only):
</p>
<div style="display: table; width: 0; margin-left: 3em; margin-right: auto"><pre> HTTP/1.1 302 Found
Location: https://client.example.org/cb?
error=invalid_request
&amp;error_description=
Unsupported%20response_type%20value
&amp;state=af0ifjsldkj
</pre>
</div>
<a name="AuthResponseValidation"></a><br>
<hr>
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<a name="rfc.section.3.1.2.7"></a>
<h3>3.1.2.7.&nbsp;
Authentication Response Validation</h3>
<p>
When using the Authorization Code Flow,
the Client MUST validate the response according to RFC 6749,
especially Sections 4.1.2 and 10.12.
</p>
<a name="TokenEndpoint"></a><br>
<hr>
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<a name="rfc.section.3.1.3"></a>
<h3>3.1.3.&nbsp;
Token Endpoint</h3>
<p>
To obtain an Access Token, an ID Token, and optionally a Refresh Token,
the RP (Client) sends a Token Request to the Token Endpoint
to obtain a Token Response, as described in
Section 3.2 of <a class="info" href="#RFC6749">OAuth
2.0<span> (</span><span
class="info">Hardt, D., “The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework,” October&nbsp;2012.</span><span>)</span></a>
[RFC6749],
when using the Authorization Code Flow.
</p>
<p>
Communication with the Token Endpoint MUST utilize TLS.
See <a class="info"
href="#TLSRequirements">Section&nbsp;16.17<span> (</span><span
class="info">TLS Requirements</span><span>)</span></a> for more information on using TLS.
</p>
<a name="TokenRequest"></a><br>
<hr>
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<a name="rfc.section.3.1.3.1"></a>
<h3>3.1.3.1.&nbsp;
Token Request</h3>
<p>
A Client makes a Token Request by
presenting its Authorization Grant (in the form of
an Authorization Code) to the Token Endpoint
using the <tt>grant_type</tt> value
<tt>authorization_code</tt>, as described in
Section 4.1.3 of <a class="info" href="#RFC6749">OAuth 2.0<span> (</span><span
class="info">Hardt, D., “The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework,” October&nbsp;2012.</span><span>)</span></a>
[RFC6749].
If the Client is a Confidential Client, then it MUST
authenticate to the Token Endpoint using the authentication method
registered for its <tt>client_id</tt>,
as described in <a class="info" href="#ClientAuthentication">Section&nbsp;9<span> (</span><span
class="info">Client Authentication</span><span>)</span></a>.
</p>
<p>
The Client sends the parameters to the Token Endpoint
using the HTTP <tt>POST</tt> method and the
Form Serialization, per <a class="info"
href="#FormSerialization">Section&nbsp;13.2<span> (</span><span
class="info">Form Serialization</span><span>)</span></a>,
as described in Section 4.1.3 of
<a class="info" href="#RFC6749">OAuth 2.0<span> (</span><span
class="info">Hardt, D., “The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework,” October&nbsp;2012.</span><span>)</span></a>
[RFC6749].
</p>
<p>
The following is a non-normative example of a Token Request
(with line wraps within values for display purposes only):
</p>
<div style="display: table; width: 0; margin-left: 3em; margin-right: auto"><pre> POST /token HTTP/1.1
Host: server.example.com
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Authorization: Basic czZCaGRSa3F0MzpnWDFmQmF0M2JW
grant_type=authorization_code&amp;code=SplxlOBeZQQYbYS6WxSbIA
&amp;redirect_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fclient.example.org%2Fcb
</pre>
</div>
<a name="TokenRequestValidation"></a><br>
<hr>
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<a name="rfc.section.3.1.3.2"></a>
<h3>3.1.3.2.&nbsp;
Token Request Validation</h3>
<p>
The Authorization Server MUST validate the Token Request as follows:
</p>
<p>
</p>
<ul class="text">
<li>
Authenticate the Client if it was issued Client Credentials
or if it uses another Client Authentication method,
per <a class="info" href="#ClientAuthentication">Section&nbsp;9<span> (</span><span
class="info">Client Authentication</span><span>)</span></a>.
</li>
<li>
Ensure the
Authorization Code was issued to the authenticated Client.
</li>
<li>
Verify that the Authorization Code is valid.
</li>
<li>
If possible,
verify that the Authorization Code has not been previously used.
</li>
<li>
Ensure that the
<tt>redirect_uri</tt> parameter value
is identical to the <tt>redirect_uri</tt>
parameter value that was included in the initial Authorization Request.
If the <tt>redirect_uri</tt> parameter value
is not present when there is only one registered
<tt>redirect_uri</tt> value,
the Authorization Server MAY return an error
(since the Client should have included the parameter)
or MAY proceed without an error
(since OAuth 2.0 permits the parameter to be omitted in this case).
</li>
<li>
Verify that the Authorization Code used was issued
in response to an OpenID Connect Authentication Request
(so that an ID Token will be returned from the Token Endpoint).
</li>
</ul>
<p>
</p>
<a name="TokenResponse"></a><br>
<hr>
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<a name="rfc.section.3.1.3.3"></a>
<h3>3.1.3.3.&nbsp;
Successful Token Response</h3>
<p>
After receiving and validating a valid and authorized Token Request
from the Client, the Authorization Server returns a successful
response that includes an ID Token and an Access Token. The
parameters in the successful response are defined in Section 4.1.4
of <a class="info" href="#RFC6749">OAuth 2.0<span> (</span><span
class="info">Hardt, D., “The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework,” October&nbsp;2012.</span><span>)</span></a>
[RFC6749].
The response uses the <tt>application/json</tt>
media type.
</p>
<p>
The OAuth 2.0 <tt>token_type</tt> response parameter
value MUST be <tt>Bearer</tt>,
as specified in <a class="info" href="#RFC6750">OAuth 2.0 Bearer
Token Usage<span> (</span><span class="info">Jones, M. and D. Hardt, “The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework: Bearer Token Usage,” October&nbsp;2012.</span><span>)</span></a>
[RFC6750],
unless another Token Type has been negotiated with the Client.
Servers SHOULD support the <tt>Bearer</tt> Token Type;
use of other Token Types is outside the scope of this specification.
</p>
<p>
In addition to the response parameters specified by OAuth 2.0, the following
parameters MUST be included in the response:
</p>
<p>
</p>
<blockquote class="text">
<dl>
<dt>id_token</dt>
<dd>
ID Token value associated with the
authenticated session.
</dd>
</dl>
</blockquote>
<p>
</p>
<p>
All Token Responses that contain tokens, secrets, or other
sensitive information MUST include the following HTTP response header
fields and values:
</p><br>
<hr class="insert">
<table class="full" align="center" border="0" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="2">
<colgroup>
<col align="left">
<col align="left">
</colgroup>
<tbody>
<tr>
<th align="left">Header Name</th>
<th align="left">Header Value</th>
</tr>
<tr>
<td align="left">Cache-Control</td>
<td align="left">no-store</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td align="left">Pragma</td>
<td align="left">no-cache</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<br clear="all">
<table border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" align="center">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td align="center"><font face="monaco, MS Sans Serif" size="1"><b>&nbsp;HTTP Response Headers and
Values&nbsp;</b></font><br></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<hr class="insert">
<p>
The following is a non-normative example of a successful Token Response.
The ID Token signature in the example can be verified with the key at
<a class="info"
href="#ExampleRSAKey">Appendix&nbsp;A.7<span> (</span><span
class="info">RSA Key Used in Examples</span><span>)</span></a>.
</p>
<div style="display: table; width: 0; margin-left: 3em; margin-right: auto"><pre> HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/json
Cache-Control: no-store
Pragma: no-cache
{
"access_token": "SlAV32hkKG",
"token_type": "Bearer",
"refresh_token": "8xLOxBtZp8",
"expires_in": 3600,
"id_token": "eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiIsImtpZCI6IjFlOWdkazcifQ.ewogImlzc
yI6ICJodHRwOi8vc2VydmVyLmV4YW1wbGUuY29tIiwKICJzdWIiOiAiMjQ4Mjg5
NzYxMDAxIiwKICJhdWQiOiAiczZCaGRSa3F0MyIsCiAibm9uY2UiOiAibi0wUzZ
fV3pBMk1qIiwKICJleHAiOiAxMzExMjgxOTcwLAogImlhdCI6IDEzMTEyODA5Nz
AKfQ.ggW8hZ1EuVLuxNuuIJKX_V8a_OMXzR0EHR9R6jgdqrOOF4daGU96Sr_P6q
Jp6IcmD3HP99Obi1PRs-cwh3LO-p146waJ8IhehcwL7F09JdijmBqkvPeB2T9CJ
NqeGpe-gccMg4vfKjkM8FcGvnzZUN4_KSP0aAp1tOJ1zZwgjxqGByKHiOtX7Tpd
QyHE5lcMiKPXfEIQILVq0pc_E2DzL7emopWoaoZTF_m0_N0YzFC6g6EJbOEoRoS
K5hoDalrcvRYLSrQAZZKflyuVCyixEoV9GfNQC3_osjzw2PAithfubEEBLuVVk4
XUVrWOLrLl0nx7RkKU8NXNHq-rvKMzqg"
}
</pre>
</div>
<p>As specified in <a class="info" href="#RFC6749">OAuth
2.0<span> (</span><span
class="info">Hardt, D., “The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework,” October&nbsp;2012.</span><span>)</span></a>
[RFC6749], Clients
SHOULD ignore unrecognized response parameters.
</p>
<a name="TokenErrorResponse"></a><br>
<hr>
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<a name="rfc.section.3.1.3.4"></a>
<h3>3.1.3.4.&nbsp;
Token Error Response</h3>
<p>
If the Token Request is invalid or unauthorized, the
Authorization Server constructs the error response. The parameters
of the Token Error Response are defined as in Section 5.2 of <a class="info"
href="#RFC6749">OAuth
2.0<span> (</span><span
class="info">Hardt, D., “The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework,” October&nbsp;2012.</span><span>)</span></a>
[RFC6749].
The HTTP response body uses the <tt>application/json</tt>
media type with HTTP response code of 400.
</p>
<p>The following is a non-normative example Token Error Response:
</p>
<div style="display: table; width: 0; margin-left: 3em; margin-right: auto"><pre> HTTP/1.1 400 Bad Request
Content-Type: application/json
Cache-Control: no-store
Pragma: no-cache
{
"error": "invalid_request"
}
</pre>
</div>
<a name="TokenResponseValidation"></a><br>
<hr>
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<a name="rfc.section.3.1.3.5"></a>
<h3>3.1.3.5.&nbsp;
Token Response Validation</h3>
<p>
The Client MUST validate the Token Response as follows:
</p>
<ol class="text">
<li>
Follow the validation rules in RFC 6749,
especially those in Sections 5.1 and 10.12.
</li>
<li>
Follow the ID Token validation rules in <a class="info"
href="#IDTokenValidation">Section&nbsp;3.1.3.7<span> (</span><span
class="info">ID Token Validation</span><span>)</span></a>.
</li>
<li>
Follow the Access Token validation rules in <a class="info"
href="#CodeFlowTokenValidation">Section&nbsp;3.1.3.8<span> (</span><span
class="info">Access Token Validation</span><span>)</span></a>.
</li>
</ol>
<p>
</p>
<a name="CodeIDToken"></a><br>
<hr>
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<a name="rfc.section.3.1.3.6"></a>
<h3>3.1.3.6.&nbsp;
ID Token</h3>
<p>
The contents of the ID Token are as described in <a class="info"
href="#IDToken">Section&nbsp;2<span> (</span><span
class="info">ID Token</span><span>)</span></a>.
When using the Authorization Code Flow,
these additional requirements for the following ID Token Claims apply:
</p>
<p>
</p>
<blockquote class="text">
<dl>
<dt>at_hash</dt>
<dd>
OPTIONAL.
Access Token hash value.
Its value is the base64url encoding of the left-most half of the
hash of the octets of the ASCII representation of the
<tt>access_token</tt> value,
where the hash algorithm used is the hash algorithm
used in the <tt>alg</tt> Header Parameter
of the ID Token's JOSE Header.
For instance, if the <tt>alg</tt> is
<tt>RS256</tt>, hash the
<tt>access_token</tt> value
with SHA-256, then take the left-most 128 bits and base64url encode them.
The <tt>at_hash</tt> value is a case sensitive string.
</dd>
</dl>
</blockquote>
<p>
</p>
<a name="IDTokenValidation"></a><br>
<hr>
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<a name="rfc.section.3.1.3.7"></a>
<h3>3.1.3.7.&nbsp;
ID Token Validation</h3>
<p>
Clients MUST validate the ID Token in the Token Response
in the following manner:
</p>
<p>
</p>
<ol class="text">
<li>
If the ID Token is encrypted, decrypt it using the
keys and algorithms that the Client specified during Registration
that the OP was to use to encrypt the ID Token.
If encryption was negotiated with the OP at Registration time
and the ID Token is not encrypted, the RP SHOULD reject it.
</li>
<li>
The Issuer Identifier for the OpenID Provider
(which is typically obtained during Discovery)
MUST exactly match the value of the
<tt>iss</tt> (issuer) Claim.
</li>
<li>
The Client MUST validate that the
<tt>aud</tt> (audience) Claim
contains its <tt>client_id</tt> value
registered at the Issuer identified by the
<tt>iss</tt> (issuer) Claim
as an audience.
The <tt>aud</tt> (audience) Claim
MAY contain an array with more than one element.
The ID Token MUST be rejected if the ID Token does not list
the Client as a valid audience, or if it contains additional audiences not trusted by the Client.
</li>
<li>
If the ID Token contains multiple audiences, the Client SHOULD verify
that an <tt>azp</tt> Claim is present.
</li>
<li>
If an <tt>azp</tt> (authorized party) Claim is present,
the Client SHOULD verify that its <tt>client_id</tt>
is the Claim Value.
</li>
<li>
If the ID Token is received via direct
communication between the Client and the Token Endpoint
(which it is in this flow), the TLS server
validation MAY be used to validate the issuer in place of
checking the token signature.
The Client MUST validate the signature of all other ID Tokens according to
<a class="info" href="#JWS">JWS<span> (</span><span
class="info">Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, “JSON Web Signature (JWS),” July&nbsp;2014.</span><span>)</span></a>
[JWS] using the algorithm specified in the
JWT <tt>alg</tt> Header Parameter.
The Client MUST use the keys provided by the Issuer.
</li>
<li>The <tt>alg</tt> value SHOULD be the default of
<tt>RS256</tt>
or the algorithm sent by the Client
in the <tt>id_token_signed_response_alg</tt> parameter
during Registration.
</li>
<li>If the JWT <tt>alg</tt> Header Parameter
uses a MAC based algorithm such as
<tt>HS256</tt>, <tt>HS384</tt>,
or <tt>HS512</tt>,
the octets of the UTF-8 representation of
the <tt>client_secret</tt> corresponding to the
<tt>client_id</tt> contained in the
<tt>aud</tt> (audience) Claim are used as the key
to validate the signature.
For MAC based algorithms, the behavior is unspecified
if the <tt>aud</tt> is multi-valued or
if an <tt>azp</tt> value is present
that is different than the <tt>aud</tt> value.
</li>
<li>
The current time MUST be before the time represented by the
<tt>exp</tt> Claim.
</li>
<li>The <tt>iat</tt> Claim can be used to reject tokens that
were issued too far away from the current time, limiting the amount of
time that nonces need to be stored to prevent attacks.
The acceptable range is Client specific.
</li>
<li>
If a nonce value was sent in the Authentication Request,
a <tt>nonce</tt> Claim MUST be present
and its value checked to verify that
it is the same value as the one that was sent in the Authentication Request.
The Client SHOULD check the <tt>nonce</tt> value
for replay attacks.
The precise method for detecting replay attacks is Client specific.
</li>
<li>If the <tt>acr</tt> Claim was requested, the
Client SHOULD check that the asserted Claim Value is appropriate.
The meaning and processing of
<tt>acr</tt> Claim Values is out of scope for this specification.
</li>
<li>
If the <tt>auth_time</tt> Claim was requested,
either through a specific request for this Claim
or by using the <tt>max_age</tt> parameter,
the Client SHOULD check the <tt>auth_time</tt> Claim
value and request re-authentication if it determines too much time
has elapsed since the last End-User authentication.
</li>
</ol>
<p>
</p>
<a name="CodeFlowTokenValidation"></a><br>
<hr>
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<a name="rfc.section.3.1.3.8"></a>
<h3>3.1.3.8.&nbsp;
Access Token Validation</h3>
<p>
When using the Authorization Code Flow,
if the ID Token contains an <tt>at_hash</tt> Claim,
the Client MAY use it to validate the Access Token
in the same manner as for the Implicit Flow,
as defined in <a class="info" href="#ImplicitTokenValidation">Section&nbsp;3.2.2.9<span> (</span><span
class="info">Access Token Validation</span><span>)</span></a>,
but using the ID Token and Access Token returned from the Token Endpoint.
</p>
<a name="ImplicitFlowAuth"></a><br>
<hr>
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<a name="rfc.section.3.2"></a>
<h3>3.2.&nbsp;
Authentication using the Implicit Flow</h3>
<p>
This section describes how to perform authentication using the Implicit Flow.
When using the Implicit Flow,
all tokens are returned from the Authorization Endpoint;
the Token Endpoint is not used.
</p>
<p>The Implicit Flow is mainly used by Clients implemented in a browser
using a scripting language. The Access Token and ID Token are returned
directly to the Client, which may expose them to the End-User and
applications that have access to the End-User's User Agent.
The Authorization Server does not perform Client Authentication.
</p>
<a name="ImplicitFlowSteps"></a><br>
<hr>
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<a name="rfc.section.3.2.1"></a>
<h3>3.2.1.&nbsp;
Implicit Flow Steps</h3>
<p>The Implicit Flow follows the following steps:
</p>
<p>
</p>
<ol class="text">
<li>Client prepares an Authentication Request containing the desired
request parameters.
</li>
<li>Client sends the request to the Authorization Server.
</li>
<li>Authorization Server Authenticates the End-User.
</li>
<li>Authorization Server obtains End-User Consent/Authorization.
</li>
<li>Authorization Server sends the End-User back to the Client with
an ID Token and, if requested, an Access Token.
</li>
<li>Client validates the ID token and retrieves the End-User's
Subject Identifier.
</li>
</ol>
<p>
</p>
<a name="ImplicitAuthorizationEndpoint"></a><br>
<hr>
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<a name="rfc.section.3.2.2"></a>
<h3>3.2.2.&nbsp;
Authorization Endpoint</h3>
<p>
When using the Implicit Flow, the Authorization Endpoint is used
in the same manner as for the Authorization Code Flow,
as defined in <a class="info" href="#AuthorizationEndpoint">Section&nbsp;3.1.2<span> (</span><span
class="info">Authorization Endpoint</span><span>)</span></a>,
with the exception of the differences specified in this section.
</p>
<a name="ImplicitAuthRequest"></a><br>
<hr>
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<a name="rfc.section.3.2.2.1"></a>
<h3>3.2.2.1.&nbsp;
Authentication Request</h3>
<p>
Authentication Requests are made
as defined in <a class="info" href="#AuthRequest">Section&nbsp;3.1.2.1<span> (</span><span
class="info">Authentication Request</span><span>)</span></a>,
except that these Authentication Request parameters
are used as follows:
</p>
<p>
</p>
<blockquote class="text">
<dl>
<dt>response_type</dt>
<dd>
REQUIRED.
OAuth 2.0 Response Type value that determines
the authorization processing flow to be used,
including what parameters are returned from the endpoints used.
When using the Implicit Flow, this value is
<tt>id_token&nbsp;token</tt> or
<tt>id_token</tt>.
The meanings of both of these values are defined in
<a class="info" href="#OAuth.Responses">OAuth 2.0
Multiple Response Type Encoding Practices<span> (</span><span class="info">de Medeiros, B., Ed., Scurtescu, M., Tarjan, P., and M. Jones, “OAuth 2.0 Multiple Response Type Encoding Practices,” February&nbsp;2014.</span><span>)</span></a>
[OAuth.Responses].
No Access Token is returned when the value is
<tt>id_token</tt>.
</dd>
<dt></dt>
<dd>
NOTE: While OAuth 2.0 also defines the
<tt>token</tt> Response Type value
for the Implicit Flow, OpenID Connect does not use this Response Type,
since no ID Token would be returned.
</dd>
<dt>redirect_uri</dt>
<dd>
REQUIRED.
Redirection URI to which the response will be sent.
This URI MUST exactly match one of the Redirection URI values
for the Client pre-registered at the OpenID Provider,
with the matching performed as described in
Section 6.2.1 of <a class="info" href="#RFC3986">[RFC3986]<span> (</span><span
class="info">Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, “Uniform Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax,” January&nbsp;2005.</span><span>)</span></a>
(Simple String Comparison).
When using this flow, the Redirection URI
MUST NOT use the <tt>http</tt> scheme
unless the Client is a native application, in which case it MAY
use the <tt>http:</tt> scheme with
<tt>localhost</tt> as the hostname.
</dd>
<dt>nonce</dt>
<dd>
REQUIRED.
String value used to associate a Client session
with an ID Token, and to mitigate replay attacks.
The value is passed through unmodified from the Authentication Request to the ID Token.
Sufficient entropy MUST be present in the
<tt>nonce</tt> values used to prevent
attackers from guessing values.
For implementation notes, see <a class="info"
href="#NonceNotes">Section&nbsp;15.5.2<span> (</span><span
class="info">Nonce Implementation Notes</span><span>)</span></a>.
</dd>
</dl>
</blockquote>
<p>
</p>
<p>
The following is a non-normative example request using the Implicit Flow
that would be sent by the User Agent to the Authorization Server
in response to a corresponding HTTP 302 redirect response by the Client
(with line wraps within values for display purposes only):
</p>
<div style="display: table; width: 0; margin-left: 3em; margin-right: auto"><pre> GET /authorize?
response_type=id_token%20token
&amp;client_id=s6BhdRkqt3
&amp;redirect_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fclient.example.org%2Fcb
&amp;scope=openid%20profile
&amp;state=af0ifjsldkj
&amp;nonce=n-0S6_WzA2Mj HTTP/1.1
Host: server.example.com
</pre>
</div>
<a name="ImplicitValidation"></a><br>
<hr>
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<a name="rfc.section.3.2.2.2"></a>
<h3>3.2.2.2.&nbsp;
Authentication Request Validation</h3>
<p>
When using the Implicit Flow, the Authentication Request is validated
in the same manner as for the Authorization Code Flow,
as defined in <a class="info" href="#AuthRequestValidation">Section&nbsp;3.1.2.2<span> (</span><span
class="info">Authentication Request Validation</span><span>)</span></a>.
</p>
<a name="ImplicitAuthenticates"></a><br>
<hr>
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<a name="rfc.section.3.2.2.3"></a>
<h3>3.2.2.3.&nbsp;
Authorization Server Authenticates End-User</h3>
<p>
When using the Implicit Flow, End-User Authentication is performed
in the same manner as for the Authorization Code Flow,
as defined in <a class="info" href="#Authenticates">Section&nbsp;3.1.2.3<span> (</span><span
class="info">Authorization Server Authenticates End-User</span><span>)</span></a>.
</p>
<a name="ImplicitConsent"></a><br>
<hr>
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<a name="rfc.section.3.2.2.4"></a>
<h3>3.2.2.4.&nbsp;
Authorization Server Obtains End-User Consent/Authorization</h3>
<p>
When using the Implicit Flow, End-User Consent is obtained
in the same manner as for the Authorization Code Flow,
as defined in <a class="info" href="#Consent">Section&nbsp;3.1.2.4<span> (</span><span
class="info">Authorization Server Obtains End-User Consent/Authorization</span><span>)</span></a>.
</p>
<a name="ImplicitAuthResponse"></a><br>
<hr>
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<a name="rfc.section.3.2.2.5"></a>
<h3>3.2.2.5.&nbsp;
Successful Authentication Response</h3>
<p>
When using the Implicit Flow, Authentication Responses are made
in the same manner as for the Authorization Code Flow,
as defined in <a class="info" href="#AuthResponse">Section&nbsp;3.1.2.5<span> (</span><span
class="info">Successful Authentication Response</span><span>)</span></a>,
with the exception of the differences specified in this section.
</p>
<p>
When using the Implicit Flow,
all response parameters are added to the fragment component
of the Redirection URI, as specified in
<a class="info" href="#OAuth.Responses">OAuth 2.0 Multiple
Response Type Encoding Practices<span> (</span><span class="info">de Medeiros, B., Ed., Scurtescu, M., Tarjan, P., and M. Jones, “OAuth 2.0 Multiple Response Type Encoding Practices,” February&nbsp;2014.</span><span>)</span></a>
[OAuth.Responses],
unless a different Response Mode was specified.
</p>
<p>
These parameters are returned from the Authorization Endpoint:
</p>
<p>
</p>
<blockquote class="text">
<dl>
<dt>access_token</dt>
<dd>
OAuth 2.0 Access Token.
This is returned
unless the <tt>response_type</tt> value used is
<tt>id_token</tt>.
</dd>
<dt>token_type</dt>
<dd>
OAuth 2.0 Token Type value.
The value MUST be <tt>Bearer</tt> or
another <tt>token_type</tt> value that the Client
has negotiated with the Authorization Server.
Clients implementing this profile MUST support the <a class="info"
href="#RFC6750">OAuth
2.0 Bearer Token Usage<span> (</span><span class="info">Jones, M. and D. Hardt, “The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework: Bearer Token Usage,” October&nbsp;2012.</span><span>)</span></a>
[RFC6750] specification.
This profile only describes the use of bearer tokens.
This is returned in the same cases as
<tt>access_token</tt> is.
</dd>
<dt>id_token</dt>
<dd>
REQUIRED.
ID Token.
</dd>
<dt>state</dt>
<dd>
OAuth 2.0 state value.
REQUIRED if the
<tt>state</tt> parameter is present in the
Authorization Request. Clients MUST verify that the
<tt>state</tt> value is equal to the
value of <tt>state</tt> parameter in the
Authorization Request.
</dd>
<dt>expires_in</dt>
<dd>
OPTIONAL.
Expiration time of the Access Token in seconds
since the response was generated.
</dd>
</dl>
</blockquote>
<p>
</p>
<p>
Per Section 4.2.2 of <a class="info" href="#RFC6749">OAuth
2.0<span> (</span><span
class="info">Hardt, D., “The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework,” October&nbsp;2012.</span><span>)</span></a>
[RFC6749],
no <tt>code</tt> result is returned
when using the Implicit Flow.
</p>
<p>The following is a non-normative example
of a successful response using the Implicit Flow
(with line wraps for the display purposes only):
</p>
<div style="display: table; width: 0; margin-left: 3em; margin-right: auto"><pre> HTTP/1.1 302 Found
Location: https://client.example.org/cb#
access_token=SlAV32hkKG
&amp;token_type=bearer
&amp;id_token=eyJ0 ... NiJ9.eyJ1c ... I6IjIifX0.DeWt4Qu ... ZXso
&amp;expires_in=3600
&amp;state=af0ifjsldkj
</pre>
</div>
<a name="ImplicitAuthError"></a><br>
<hr>
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<a name="rfc.section.3.2.2.6"></a>
<h3>3.2.2.6.&nbsp;
Authentication Error Response</h3>
<p>
When using the Implicit Flow, Authorization Error Responses are made
in the same manner as for the Authorization Code Flow,
as defined in <a class="info" href="#AuthError">Section&nbsp;3.1.2.6<span> (</span><span
class="info">Authentication Error Response</span><span>)</span></a>,
with the exception of the differences specified in this section.
</p>
<p>
If the End-User denies the request or the End-User authentication
fails, the Authorization Server MUST return the error
Authorization Response in the
fragment component of the Redirection URI,
as defined in 4.2.2.1 of
<a class="info" href="#RFC6749">OAuth 2.0<span> (</span><span
class="info">Hardt, D., “The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework,” October&nbsp;2012.</span><span>)</span></a>
[RFC6749] and
<a class="info" href="#OAuth.Responses">OAuth 2.0 Multiple
Response Type Encoding Practices<span> (</span><span class="info">de Medeiros, B., Ed., Scurtescu, M., Tarjan, P., and M. Jones, “OAuth 2.0 Multiple Response Type Encoding Practices,” February&nbsp;2014.</span><span>)</span></a>
[OAuth.Responses],
unless a different Response Mode was specified.
</p>
<a name="ImplicitCallback"></a><br>
<hr>
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<a name="rfc.section.3.2.2.7"></a>
<h3>3.2.2.7.&nbsp;
Redirect URI Fragment Handling</h3>
<p>
Since response parameters are returned in the Redirection URI fragment value,
the Client needs to have the User Agent parse the fragment encoded values
and pass them to on to the Client's processing logic for consumption.
See <a class="info"
href="#FragmentNotes">Section&nbsp;15.5.3<span> (</span><span
class="info">Redirect URI Fragment Handling Implementation Notes</span><span>)</span></a> for implementation
notes
on URI fragment handling.
</p>
<a name="ImplicitAuthResponseValidation"></a><br>
<hr>
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<a name="rfc.section.3.2.2.8"></a>
<h3>3.2.2.8.&nbsp;
Authentication Response Validation</h3>
<p>
When using the Implicit Flow,
the Client MUST validate the response as follows:
</p>
<ol class="text">
<li>
Verify that the response conforms to Section 5 of
<a class="info"
href="#OAuth.Responses">[OAuth.Responses]<span> (</span><span
class="info">de Medeiros, B., Ed., Scurtescu, M., Tarjan, P., and M. Jones, “OAuth 2.0 Multiple Response Type Encoding Practices,” February&nbsp;2014.</span><span>)</span></a>.
</li>
<li>
Follow the validation rules in RFC 6749,
especially those in Sections 4.2.2 and 10.12.
</li>
<li>
Follow the ID Token validation rules in <a class="info"
href="#ImplicitIDTValidation">Section&nbsp;3.2.2.11<span> (</span><span
class="info">ID Token Validation</span><span>)</span></a>.
</li>
<li>
Follow the Access Token validation rules in <a class="info"
href="#ImplicitTokenValidation">Section&nbsp;3.2.2.9<span> (</span><span
class="info">Access Token Validation</span><span>)</span></a>,
unless the <tt>response_type</tt> value used is
<tt>id_token</tt>.
</li>
</ol>
<p>
</p>
<a name="ImplicitTokenValidation"></a><br>
<hr>
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<a name="rfc.section.3.2.2.9"></a>
<h3>3.2.2.9.&nbsp;
Access Token Validation</h3>
<p>To validate an Access Token issued from the Authorization Endpoint with an ID Token,
the Client SHOULD do the following:
</p>
<p>
</p>
<ol class="text">
<li>Hash the octets of the ASCII representation of
the <tt>access_token</tt>
with the hash algorithm specified in <a class="info"
href="#JWA">JWA<span> (</span><span
class="info">Jones, M., “JSON Web Algorithms (JWA),” July&nbsp;2014.</span><span>)</span></a> [JWA] for
the
<tt>alg</tt> Header Parameter
of the ID Token's JOSE Header.
For instance, if the <tt>alg</tt> is
<tt>RS256</tt>,
the hash algorithm used is SHA-256.
</li>
<li>Take the left-most half of the hash and base64url encode it.
</li>
<li>
The value of <tt>at_hash</tt> in the ID Token MUST
match the value produced in the previous step.
</li>
</ol>
<p>
</p>
<a name="ImplicitIDToken"></a><br>
<hr>
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<a name="rfc.section.3.2.2.10"></a>
<h3>3.2.2.10.&nbsp;
ID Token</h3>
<p>
The contents of the ID Token are as described in <a class="info"
href="#IDToken">Section&nbsp;2<span> (</span><span
class="info">ID Token</span><span>)</span></a>.
When using the Implicit Flow,
these additional requirements for the following ID Token Claims apply:
</p>
<p>
</p>
<blockquote class="text">
<dl>
<dt>nonce</dt>
<dd>
Use of the <tt>nonce</tt> Claim is REQUIRED
for this flow.
</dd>
<dt>at_hash</dt>
<dd>
Access Token hash value.
Its value is the base64url encoding of the left-most half of the
hash of the octets of the ASCII representation of the
<tt>access_token</tt> value,
where the hash algorithm used is the hash algorithm
used in the <tt>alg</tt> Header Parameter
of the ID Token's JOSE Header.
For instance, if the <tt>alg</tt> is
<tt>RS256</tt>, hash the
<tt>access_token</tt> value
with SHA-256, then take the left-most 128 bits and base64url encode them.
The <tt>at_hash</tt> value is a case sensitive string.
</dd>
<dt></dt>
<dd>
If the ID Token is issued from the Authorization Endpoint with an
<tt>access_token</tt> value,
which is the case for the <tt>response_type</tt> value
<tt>id_token&nbsp;token</tt>,
this is REQUIRED;
it MAY NOT be used when no Access Token is issued,
which is the case for the <tt>response_type</tt> value
<tt>id_token</tt>.
</dd>
</dl>
</blockquote>
<p>
</p>
<a name="ImplicitIDTValidation"></a><br>
<hr>
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<a name="rfc.section.3.2.2.11"></a>
<h3>3.2.2.11.&nbsp;
ID Token Validation</h3>
<p>
When using the Implicit Flow, the contents of the ID Token MUST be validated
in the same manner as for the Authorization Code Flow,
as defined in <a class="info" href="#IDTokenValidation">Section&nbsp;3.1.3.7<span> (</span><span
class="info">ID Token Validation</span><span>)</span></a>,
with the exception of the differences specified in this section.
</p>
<p>
</p>
<ol class="text">
<li>
The Client MUST validate the signature of the ID Token according to
<a class="info" href="#JWS">JWS<span> (</span><span
class="info">Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, “JSON Web Signature (JWS),” July&nbsp;2014.</span><span>)</span></a>
[JWS] using the algorithm specified in the
<tt>alg</tt> Header Parameter of the JOSE Header.
</li>
<li>
The value of the <tt>nonce</tt>
Claim MUST be checked to verify that
it is the same value as the one that was sent in the Authentication Request.
The Client SHOULD check the <tt>nonce</tt> value
for replay attacks.
The precise method for detecting replay attacks is Client specific.
</li>
</ol>
<p>
</p>
<a name="HybridFlowAuth"></a><br>
<hr>
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<a name="rfc.section.3.3"></a>
<h3>3.3.&nbsp;
Authentication using the Hybrid Flow</h3>
<p>
This section describes how to perform authentication using the Hybrid Flow.
When using the Hybrid Flow,
some tokens are returned from the Authorization Endpoint
and others are returned from the Token Endpoint.
The mechanisms for returning tokens in the Hybrid Flow are specified in
<a class="info" href="#OAuth.Responses">OAuth 2.0 Multiple
Response Type Encoding Practices<span> (</span><span class="info">de Medeiros, B., Ed., Scurtescu, M., Tarjan, P., and M. Jones, “OAuth 2.0 Multiple Response Type Encoding Practices,” February&nbsp;2014.</span><span>)</span></a>
[OAuth.Responses].
</p>
<a name="HybridFlowSteps"></a><br>
<hr>
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<a name="rfc.section.3.3.1"></a>
<h3>3.3.1.&nbsp;
Hybrid Flow Steps</h3>
<p>The Hybrid Flow follows the following steps:
</p>
<p>
</p>
<ol class="text">
<li>Client prepares an Authentication Request containing the desired
request parameters.
</li>
<li>Client sends the request to the Authorization Server.
</li>
<li>Authorization Server Authenticates the End-User.
</li>
<li>Authorization Server obtains End-User Consent/Authorization.
</li>
<li>
Authorization Server sends the End-User back to the Client with
an Authorization Code and, depending on the Response Type,
one or more additional parameters.
</li>
<li>Client requests a response using the Authorization Code at the
Token Endpoint.
</li>
<li>Client receives a response that contains an ID Token
and Access Token in the response body.
</li>
<li>Client validates the ID Token and retrieves the End-User's
Subject Identifier.
</li>
</ol>
<p>
</p>
<a name="HybridAuthorizationEndpoint"></a><br>
<hr>
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<a name="rfc.section.3.3.2"></a>
<h3>3.3.2.&nbsp;
Authorization Endpoint</h3>
<p>
When using the Hybrid Flow, the Authorization Endpoint is used
in the same manner as for the Authorization Code Flow,
as defined in <a class="info" href="#AuthorizationEndpoint">Section&nbsp;3.1.2<span> (</span><span
class="info">Authorization Endpoint</span><span>)</span></a>,
with the exception of the differences specified in this section.
</p>
<a name="HybridAuthRequest"></a><br>
<hr>
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<a name="rfc.section.3.3.2.1"></a>
<h3>3.3.2.1.&nbsp;
Authentication Request</h3>
<p>
Authentication Requests are made
as defined in <a class="info" href="#AuthRequest">Section&nbsp;3.1.2.1<span> (</span><span
class="info">Authentication Request</span><span>)</span></a>,
except that these Authentication Request parameters
are used as follows:
</p>
<p>
</p>
<blockquote class="text">
<dl>
<dt>response_type</dt>
<dd>
REQUIRED.
OAuth 2.0 Response Type value that determines
the authorization processing flow to be used,
including what parameters are returned from the endpoints used.
When using the Hybrid Flow, this value is
<tt>code&nbsp;id_token</tt>,
<tt>code&nbsp;token</tt>, or
<tt>code&nbsp;id_token&nbsp;token</tt>.
The meanings of these values are defined in
<a class="info" href="#OAuth.Responses">OAuth 2.0
Multiple Response Type Encoding Practices<span> (</span><span class="info">de Medeiros, B., Ed., Scurtescu, M., Tarjan, P., and M. Jones, “OAuth 2.0 Multiple Response Type Encoding Practices,” February&nbsp;2014.</span><span>)</span></a>
[OAuth.Responses].
</dd>
</dl>
</blockquote>
<p>
</p>
<p>
The following is a non-normative example request using the Hybrid Flow
that would be sent by the User Agent to the Authorization Server
in response to a corresponding HTTP 302 redirect response by the Client
(with line wraps within values for display purposes only):
</p>
<div style="display: table; width: 0; margin-left: 3em; margin-right: auto"><pre> GET /authorize?
response_type=code%20id_token
&amp;client_id=s6BhdRkqt3
&amp;redirect_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fclient.example.org%2Fcb
&amp;scope=openid%20profile%20email
&amp;nonce=n-0S6_WzA2Mj
&amp;state=af0ifjsldkj HTTP/1.1
Host: server.example.com
</pre>
</div>
<a name="HybridValidation"></a><br>
<hr>
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<a name="rfc.section.3.3.2.2"></a>
<h3>3.3.2.2.&nbsp;
Authentication Request Validation</h3>
<p>
When using the Hybrid Flow, the Authentication Request is validated
in the same manner as for the Authorization Code Flow,
as defined in <a class="info" href="#AuthRequestValidation">Section&nbsp;3.1.2.2<span> (</span><span
class="info">Authentication Request Validation</span><span>)</span></a>.
</p>
<a name="HybridAuthenticates"></a><br>
<hr>
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<a name="rfc.section.3.3.2.3"></a>
<h3>3.3.2.3.&nbsp;
Authorization Server Authenticates End-User</h3>
<p>
When using the Hybrid Flow, End-User Authentication is performed
in the same manner as for the Authorization Code Flow,
as defined in <a class="info" href="#Authenticates">Section&nbsp;3.1.2.3<span> (</span><span
class="info">Authorization Server Authenticates End-User</span><span>)</span></a>.
</p>
<a name="HybridConsent"></a><br>
<hr>
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<a name="rfc.section.3.3.2.4"></a>
<h3>3.3.2.4.&nbsp;
Authorization Server Obtains End-User Consent/Authorization</h3>
<p>
When using the Hybrid Flow, End-User Consent is obtained
in the same manner as for the Authorization Code Flow,
as defined in <a class="info" href="#Consent">Section&nbsp;3.1.2.4<span> (</span><span
class="info">Authorization Server Obtains End-User Consent/Authorization</span><span>)</span></a>.
</p>
<a name="HybridAuthResponse"></a><br>
<hr>
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<a name="rfc.section.3.3.2.5"></a>
<h3>3.3.2.5.&nbsp;
Successful Authentication Response</h3>
<p>
When using the Hybrid Flow, Authentication Responses are made
in the same manner as for the Implicit Flow,
as defined in <a class="info" href="#ImplicitAuthResponse">Section&nbsp;3.2.2.5<span> (</span><span
class="info">Successful Authentication Response</span><span>)</span></a>,
with the exception of the differences specified in this section.
</p>
<p>
These Authorization Endpoint results are used in the following manner:
</p>
<p>
</p>
<blockquote class="text">
<dl>
<dt>access_token</dt>
<dd>
OAuth 2.0 Access Token.
This is returned
when the <tt>response_type</tt> value used is
<tt>code&nbsp;token</tt>,
or <tt>code&nbsp;id_token&nbsp;token</tt>.
(A <tt>token_type</tt> value is also returned in the same cases.)
</dd>
<dt>id_token</dt>
<dd>
ID Token.
This is returned
when the <tt>response_type</tt> value used is
<tt>code&nbsp;id_token</tt> or
<tt>code&nbsp;id_token&nbsp;token</tt>.
</dd>
<dt>code</dt>
<dd>
Authorization Code.
This is always returned when using the Hybrid Flow.
</dd>
</dl>
</blockquote>
<p>
</p>
<p>The following is a non-normative example
of a successful response using the Hybrid Flow
(with line wraps for the display purposes only):
</p>
<div style="display: table; width: 0; margin-left: 3em; margin-right: auto"><pre> HTTP/1.1 302 Found
Location: https://client.example.org/cb#
code=SplxlOBeZQQYbYS6WxSbIA
&amp;id_token=eyJ0 ... NiJ9.eyJ1c ... I6IjIifX0.DeWt4Qu ... ZXso
&amp;state=af0ifjsldkj
</pre>
</div>
<a name="HybridAuthError"></a><br>
<hr>
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<a name="rfc.section.3.3.2.6"></a>
<h3>3.3.2.6.&nbsp;
Authentication Error Response</h3>
<p>
When using the Hybrid Flow, Authorization Error Responses are made
in the same manner as for the Authorization Code Flow,
as defined in <a class="info" href="#AuthError">Section&nbsp;3.1.2.6<span> (</span><span
class="info">Authentication Error Response</span><span>)</span></a>,
with the exception of the differences specified in this section.
</p>
<p>
If the End-User denies the request or the End-User authentication
fails, the Authorization Server MUST return the error
Authorization Response in the
fragment component of the Redirection URI,
as defined in 4.2.2.1 of
<a class="info" href="#RFC6749">OAuth 2.0<span> (</span><span
class="info">Hardt, D., “The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework,” October&nbsp;2012.</span><span>)</span></a>
[RFC6749] and
<a class="info" href="#OAuth.Responses">OAuth 2.0 Multiple
Response Type Encoding Practices<span> (</span><span class="info">de Medeiros, B., Ed., Scurtescu, M., Tarjan, P., and M. Jones, “OAuth 2.0 Multiple Response Type Encoding Practices,” February&nbsp;2014.</span><span>)</span></a>
[OAuth.Responses],
unless a different Response Mode was specified.
</p>
<a name="HybridCallback"></a><br>
<hr>
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<a name="rfc.section.3.3.2.7"></a>
<h3>3.3.2.7.&nbsp;
Redirect URI Fragment Handling</h3>
<p>
When using the Hybrid Flow, the same requirements for
Redirection URI fragment parameter handling apply as do for
the Implicit Flow, as defined in <a class="info"
href="#ImplicitCallback">Section&nbsp;3.2.2.7<span> (</span><span
class="info">Redirect URI Fragment Handling</span><span>)</span></a>.
Also see <a class="info" href="#FragmentNotes">Section&nbsp;15.5.3<span> (</span><span
class="info">Redirect URI Fragment Handling Implementation Notes</span><span>)</span></a> for implementation
notes
on URI fragment handling.
</p>
<a name="HybridAuthResponseValidation"></a><br>
<hr>
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<a name="rfc.section.3.3.2.8"></a>
<h3>3.3.2.8.&nbsp;
Authentication Response Validation</h3>
<p>
When using the Hybrid Flow,
the Client MUST validate the response as follows:
</p>
<ol class="text">
<li>
Verify that the response conforms to Section 5 of
<a class="info"
href="#OAuth.Responses">[OAuth.Responses]<span> (</span><span
class="info">de Medeiros, B., Ed., Scurtescu, M., Tarjan, P., and M. Jones, “OAuth 2.0 Multiple Response Type Encoding Practices,” February&nbsp;2014.</span><span>)</span></a>.
</li>
<li>
Follow the validation rules in RFC 6749,
especially those in Sections 4.2.2 and 10.12.
</li>
<li>
Follow the ID Token validation rules in <a class="info"
href="#HybridIDTValidation">Section&nbsp;3.3.2.12<span> (</span><span
class="info">ID Token Validation</span><span>)</span></a>
when the <tt>response_type</tt> value used is
<tt>code&nbsp;id_token</tt> or
<tt>code&nbsp;id_token&nbsp;token</tt>.
</li>
<li>
Follow the Access Token validation rules in <a class="info"
href="#HybridTokenValidation">Section&nbsp;3.3.2.9<span> (</span><span
class="info">Access Token Validation</span><span>)</span></a>
when the <tt>response_type</tt> value used is
<tt>code&nbsp;token</tt> or
<tt>code&nbsp;id_token&nbsp;token</tt>.
</li>
<li>
Follow the Authorization Code validation rules in <a class="info"
href="#CodeValidation">Section&nbsp;3.3.2.10<span> (</span><span
class="info">Authorization Code Validation</span><span>)</span></a>
when the <tt>response_type</tt> value used is
<tt>code&nbsp;id_token</tt> or
<tt>code&nbsp;id_token&nbsp;token</tt>.
</li>
</ol>
<p>
</p>
<a name="HybridTokenValidation"></a><br>
<hr>
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<a name="rfc.section.3.3.2.9"></a>
<h3>3.3.2.9.&nbsp;
Access Token Validation</h3>
<p>
When using the Hybrid Flow, Access Tokens
returned from the Authorization Endpoint are validated
in the same manner as for the Implicit Flow,
as defined in <a class="info" href="#ImplicitTokenValidation">Section&nbsp;3.2.2.9<span> (</span><span
class="info">Access Token Validation</span><span>)</span></a>.
</p>
<a name="CodeValidation"></a><br>
<hr>
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<a name="rfc.section.3.3.2.10"></a>
<h3>3.3.2.10.&nbsp;
Authorization Code Validation</h3>
<p>To validate an Authorization Code issued from the Authorization Endpoint with an ID Token,
the Client SHOULD do the following:
</p>
<p>
</p>
<ol class="text">
<li>Hash the octets of the ASCII representation of
the <tt>code</tt>
with the hash algorithm specified in <a class="info"
href="#JWA">JWA<span> (</span><span
class="info">Jones, M., “JSON Web Algorithms (JWA),” July&nbsp;2014.</span><span>)</span></a> [JWA] for
the
<tt>alg</tt> Header Parameter
of the ID Token's JOSE Header.
For instance, if the <tt>alg</tt> is
<tt>RS256</tt>,
the hash algorithm used is SHA-256.
</li>
<li>Take the left-most half of the hash and base64url encode it.
</li>
<li>The value of <tt>c_hash</tt> in the ID Token MUST
match the value produced in the previous step if <tt>c_hash</tt>
is present in the ID Token.
</li>
</ol>
<p>
</p>
<a name="HybridIDToken"></a><br>
<hr>
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<a name="rfc.section.3.3.2.11"></a>
<h3>3.3.2.11.&nbsp;
ID Token</h3>
<p>
The contents of the ID Token are as described in <a class="info"
href="#IDToken">Section&nbsp;2<span> (</span><span
class="info">ID Token</span><span>)</span></a>.
When using the Hybrid Flow,
these additional requirements for the following ID Token Claims apply
to an ID Token returned from the Authorization Endpoint:
</p>
<p>
</p>
<blockquote class="text">
<dl>
<dt>nonce</dt>
<dd>
Use of the <tt>nonce</tt> Claim is REQUIRED
for this flow.
</dd>
<dt>at_hash</dt>
<dd>
Access Token hash value.
Its value is the base64url encoding of the left-most half of the
hash of the octets of the ASCII representation of the
<tt>access_token</tt> value,
where the hash algorithm used is the hash algorithm
used in the <tt>alg</tt> Header Parameter
of the ID Token's JOSE Header.
For instance, if the <tt>alg</tt> is
<tt>RS256</tt>, hash the
<tt>access_token</tt> value
with SHA-256, then take the left-most 128 bits and base64url encode them.
The <tt>at_hash</tt> value is a case sensitive string.
</dd>
<dt></dt>
<dd>
If the ID Token is issued from the Authorization Endpoint with an
<tt>access_token</tt> value,
which is the case for the <tt>response_type</tt> value
<tt>code&nbsp;id_token&nbsp;token</tt>,
this is REQUIRED; otherwise, its inclusion is OPTIONAL.
</dd>
<dt>c_hash</dt>
<dd>
Code hash value.
Its value is the base64url encoding of the left-most half of the
hash of the octets of the ASCII representation of the
<tt>code</tt> value,
where the hash algorithm used is the hash algorithm
used in the <tt>alg</tt> Header Parameter
of the ID Token's JOSE Header.
For instance, if the <tt>alg</tt> is
<tt>HS512</tt>, hash the
<tt>code</tt> value
with SHA-512, then take the left-most 256 bits and base64url encode them.
The <tt>c_hash</tt> value is a case sensitive string.
</dd>
<dt></dt>
<dd>
If the ID Token is issued from the Authorization Endpoint with a
<tt>code</tt>,
which is the case for the <tt>response_type</tt> values
<tt>code&nbsp;id_token</tt> and
<tt>code&nbsp;id_token&nbsp;token</tt>,
this is REQUIRED; otherwise, its inclusion is OPTIONAL.
</dd>
</dl>
</blockquote>
<p>
</p>
<a name="HybridIDTValidation"></a><br>
<hr>
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<a name="rfc.section.3.3.2.12"></a>
<h3>3.3.2.12.&nbsp;
ID Token Validation</h3>
<p>
When using the Hybrid Flow, the contents of an ID Token
returned from the Authorization Endpoint MUST be validated
in the same manner as for the Implicit Flow,
as defined in <a class="info" href="#ImplicitIDTValidation">Section&nbsp;3.2.2.11<span> (</span><span
class="info">ID Token Validation</span><span>)</span></a>.
</p>
<a name="HybridTokenEndpoint"></a><br>
<hr>
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<a name="rfc.section.3.3.3"></a>
<h3>3.3.3.&nbsp;
Token Endpoint</h3>
<p>
When using the Hybrid Flow, the Token Endpoint is used
in the same manner as for the Authorization Code Flow,
as defined in <a class="info" href="#TokenEndpoint">Section&nbsp;3.1.3<span> (</span><span
class="info">Token Endpoint</span><span>)</span></a>,
with the exception of the differences specified in this section.
</p>
<a name="HybridTokenRequest"></a><br>
<hr>
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<a name="rfc.section.3.3.3.1"></a>
<h3>3.3.3.1.&nbsp;
Token Request</h3>
<p>
When using the Hybrid Flow, Token Requests are made
in the same manner as for the Authorization Code Flow,
as defined in <a class="info" href="#TokenRequest">Section&nbsp;3.1.3.1<span> (</span><span
class="info">Token Request</span><span>)</span></a>.
</p>
<a name="HybridTokenRequestValidation"></a><br>
<hr>
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<a name="rfc.section.3.3.3.2"></a>
<h3>3.3.3.2.&nbsp;
Token Request Validation</h3>
<p>
When using the Hybrid Flow, Token Requests are validated
in the same manner as for the Authorization Code Flow,
as defined in <a class="info" href="#TokenRequestValidation">Section&nbsp;3.1.3.2<span> (</span><span
class="info">Token Request Validation</span><span>)</span></a>.
</p>
<a name="HybridTokenResponse"></a><br>
<hr>
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<a name="rfc.section.3.3.3.3"></a>
<h3>3.3.3.3.&nbsp;
Successful Token Response</h3>
<p>
When using the Hybrid Flow, Token Responses are made
in the same manner as for the Authorization Code Flow,
as defined in <a class="info" href="#TokenResponse">Section&nbsp;3.1.3.3<span> (</span><span
class="info">Successful Token Response</span><span>)</span></a>.
</p>
<a name="HybridTokenErrorResponse"></a><br>
<hr>
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<a name="rfc.section.3.3.3.4"></a>
<h3>3.3.3.4.&nbsp;
Token Error Response</h3>
<p>
When using the Hybrid Flow, Token Error Responses are made
in the same manner as for the Authorization Code Flow,
as defined in <a class="info" href="#TokenErrorResponse">Section&nbsp;3.1.3.4<span> (</span><span
class="info">Token Error Response</span><span>)</span></a>.
</p>
<a name="HybridTokenResponseValidation"></a><br>
<hr>
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<a name="rfc.section.3.3.3.5"></a>
<h3>3.3.3.5.&nbsp;
Token Response Validation</h3>
<p>
When using the Hybrid Flow, Token Responses are validated
in the same manner as for the Authorization Code Flow,
as defined in <a class="info" href="#TokenResponseValidation">Section&nbsp;3.1.3.5<span> (</span><span
class="info">Token Response Validation</span><span>)</span></a>.
</p>
<a name="HybridIDToken2"></a><br>
<hr>
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<a name="rfc.section.3.3.3.6"></a>
<h3>3.3.3.6.&nbsp;
ID Token</h3>
<p>
When using the Hybrid Flow, the contents of an ID Token
returned from the Token Endpoint are
the same as for an ID Token returned from the Authorization Endpoint,
as defined in <a class="info" href="#HybridIDToken">Section&nbsp;3.3.2.11<span> (</span><span
class="info">ID Token</span><span>)</span></a>,
with the exception of the differences specified in this section.
</p>
<p>
If an ID Token is returned from both the Authorization Endpoint
and from the Token Endpoint,
which is the case for the <tt>response_type</tt> values
<tt>code&nbsp;id_token</tt> and
<tt>code&nbsp;id_token&nbsp;token</tt>,
the <tt>iss</tt> and <tt>sub</tt>
Claim Values MUST be identical in both ID Tokens.
All Claims about the Authentication event present in either
SHOULD be present in both.
If either ID Token contains Claims about the End-User,
any that are present in both SHOULD have the same values in both.
Note that the OP MAY choose to return fewer Claims about the End-User
from the Authorization Endpoint, for instance, for privacy reasons.
The <tt>at_hash</tt>
and <tt>c_hash</tt> Claims
MAY be omitted from the ID Token returned from the Token Endpoint
even when these Claims are
present in the ID Token returned from the Authorization Endpoint,
because the ID Token and Access Token values returned from
the Token Endpoint are already cryptographically bound together
by the TLS encryption performed by the Token Endpoint.
</p>
<a name="HybridIDTValidation2"></a><br>
<hr>
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<a name="rfc.section.3.3.3.7"></a>
<h3>3.3.3.7.&nbsp;
ID Token Validation</h3>
<p>
When using the Hybrid Flow, the contents of an ID Token
returned from the Token Endpoint MUST be validated
in the same manner as for the Authorization Code Flow,
as defined in <a class="info" href="#IDTokenValidation">Section&nbsp;3.1.3.7<span> (</span><span
class="info">ID Token Validation</span><span>)</span></a>.
</p>
<a name="HybridAccessToken2"></a><br>
<hr>
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<a name="rfc.section.3.3.3.8"></a>
<h3>3.3.3.8.&nbsp;
Access Token</h3>
<p>
If an Access Token is returned from both the Authorization Endpoint
and from the Token Endpoint,
which is the case for the <tt>response_type</tt> values
<tt>code&nbsp;token</tt> and
<tt>code&nbsp;id_token&nbsp;token</tt>,
their values MAY be the same
or they MAY be different.
Note that different Access Tokens might be returned
be due to the different security characteristics
of the two endpoints and the lifetimes and
the access to resources granted by them might also be different.
</p>
<a name="HybridTokenValidation2"></a><br>
<hr>
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<a name="rfc.section.3.3.3.9"></a>
<h3>3.3.3.9.&nbsp;
Access Token Validation</h3>
<p>
When using the Hybrid Flow, the Access Token
returned from the Token Endpoint
is validated
in the same manner as for the Authorization Code Flow,
as defined in <a class="info" href="#CodeFlowTokenValidation">Section&nbsp;3.1.3.8<span> (</span><span
class="info">Access Token Validation</span><span>)</span></a>.
</p>
<a name="ThirdPartyInitiatedLogin"></a><br>
<hr>
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<a name="rfc.section.4"></a>
<h3>4.&nbsp;
Initiating Login from a Third Party</h3>
<p>
In some cases, the login flow is initiated by an OpenID Provider
or another party, rather than the Relying Party.
In this case, the initiator redirects to the RP at its login initiation endpoint,
which requests that the RP send an Authentication Request to a specified OP.
This login initiation endpoint can be a deep link at the RP,
rather than a default landing page.
RPs supporting
<a class="info" href="#OpenID.Registration">OpenID Connect
Dynamic Client Registration 1.0<span> (</span><span class="info">Sakimura, N., Bradley, J., and M. Jones, “OpenID Connect Dynamic Client Registration 1.0,” November&nbsp;2014.</span><span>)</span></a>
[OpenID.Registration]
register this endpoint value using the
<tt>initiate_login_uri</tt> Registration parameter.
</p>
<p>
The party initiating the login request does so by redirecting
to the login initiation endpoint at the RP, passing the following parameters:
</p>
<p>
</p>
<blockquote class="text">
<dl>
<dt>iss</dt>
<dd>
REQUIRED.
Issuer Identifier for the OP that the RP is to send
the Authentication Request to.
Its value MUST be a URL using the <tt>https</tt> scheme.
</dd>
<dt>login_hint</dt>
<dd>
OPTIONAL.
Hint to the Authorization Server
about the login identifier the End-User might use to log in.
If the client receives a value for this string-valued parameter,
it MUST include it in the Authentication Request
as the <tt>login_hint</tt> parameter value.
</dd>
<dt>target_link_uri</dt>
<dd>
OPTIONAL.
URL that the RP is requested to redirect to after authentication.
RPs MUST verify the value of the
<tt>target_link_uri</tt> to prevent being used as
an open redirector to external sites.
</dd>
</dl>
</blockquote>
<p>
</p>
<p>
The parameters can either be passed as query parameters using
the HTTP <tt>GET</tt> method
or be passed as HTML form values that are auto-submitted in the User Agent,
and thus are transmitted via the HTTP <tt>POST</tt> method.
</p>
<p>
Other parameters MAY be sent, if defined by extensions.
Any parameters used that are not understood MUST be ignored by the Client.
</p>
<p>
Clients SHOULD employ frame busting and other techniques to prevent
End-Users from being logged in by third party sites without their knowledge
through attacks such as Clickjacking.
Refer to Section 4.4.1.9 of <a class="info" href="#RFC6819">[RFC6819]<span> (</span><span
class="info">Lodderstedt, T., McGloin, M., and P. Hunt, “OAuth 2.0 Threat Model and Security Considerations,” January&nbsp;2013.</span><span>)</span></a>
for more details.
</p>
<a name="Claims"></a><br>
<hr>
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<a name="rfc.section.5"></a>
<h3>5.&nbsp;
Claims</h3>
<p>
This section specifies how the Client can obtain Claims about the End-User
and the Authentication event.
It also defines a standard set of basic profile Claims.
Pre-defined sets of Claims can be requested using specific scope values
or individual Claims can be requested using the
<tt>claims</tt> request parameter.
The Claims can come directly from the OpenID Provider
or from distributed sources as well.
</p>
<a name="StandardClaims"></a><br>
<hr>
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<a name="rfc.section.5.1"></a>
<h3>5.1.&nbsp;
Standard Claims</h3>
<p>This specification defines a set of standard Claims.
They can be requested to be returned either in the
UserInfo Response, per <a class="info" href="#UserInfoResponse">Section&nbsp;5.3.2<span> (</span><span
class="info">Successful UserInfo Response</span><span>)</span></a>,
or in the ID Token, per <a class="info" href="#IDToken">Section&nbsp;2<span> (</span><span
class="info">ID Token</span><span>)</span></a>.
</p><br>
<hr class="insert">
<a name="ClaimTable"></a>
<table class="full" align="center" border="0" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="2">
<colgroup>
<col align="left">
<col align="left">
<col align="left">
</colgroup>
<tbody>
<tr>
<th align="left">Member</th>
<th align="left">Type</th>
<th align="left">Description</th>
</tr>
<tr>
<td align="left">sub</td>
<td align="left">string</td>
<td align="left">Subject - Identifier for the End-User at the Issuer.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td align="left">name</td>
<td align="left">string</td>
<td align="left">
End-User's full name in displayable form including all name parts,
possibly including titles and suffixes,
ordered according to the End-User's locale and preferences.
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td align="left">given_name</td>
<td align="left">string</td>
<td align="left">
Given name(s) or first name(s) of the End-User.
Note that in some cultures, people can have multiple given names;
all can be present, with the names being separated by space characters.
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td align="left">family_name</td>
<td align="left">string</td>
<td align="left">
Surname(s) or last name(s) of the End-User.
Note that in some cultures, people can have multiple family names
or no family name;
all can be present, with the names being separated by space characters.
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td align="left">middle_name</td>
<td align="left">string</td>
<td align="left">
Middle name(s) of the End-User.
Note that in some cultures, people can have multiple middle names;
all can be present, with the names being separated by space characters.
Also note that in some cultures, middle names are not used.
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td align="left">nickname</td>
<td align="left">string</td>
<td align="left">Casual name of the End-User that may or may not be the same as the
<tt>given_name</tt>. For instance, a <tt>nickname</tt> value of <tt>Mike</tt>
might be returned alongside a <tt>given_name</tt>
value of <tt>Michael</tt>.
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td align="left">preferred_username</td>
<td align="left">string</td>
<td align="left">Shorthand name by which the End-User wishes to be referred to at the RP, such as
<tt>janedoe</tt> or <tt>j.doe</tt>.
This value MAY be any valid JSON string including
special characters such as <tt>@</tt>,
<tt>/</tt>, or whitespace.
The RP MUST NOT rely upon this value being unique,
as discussed in <a class="info" href="#ClaimStability">Section&nbsp;5.7<span> (</span><span
class="info">Claim Stability and Uniqueness</span><span>)</span></a>.
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td align="left">profile</td>
<td align="left">string</td>
<td align="left">
URL of the End-User's profile page.
The contents of this Web page SHOULD be about the End-User.
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td align="left">picture</td>
<td align="left">string</td>
<td align="left">
URL of the End-User's profile picture.
This URL MUST refer to an image file
(for example, a PNG, JPEG, or GIF image file),
rather than to a Web page containing an image.
Note that this URL SHOULD specifically reference
a profile photo of the End-User
suitable for displaying when describing the End-User,
rather than an arbitrary photo taken by the End-User.
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td align="left">website</td>
<td align="left">string</td>
<td align="left">
URL of the End-User's Web page or blog.
This Web page SHOULD contain information published by the End-User
or an organization that the End-User is affiliated with.
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td align="left">email</td>
<td align="left">string</td>
<td align="left">
End-User's preferred e-mail address.
Its value MUST conform to the <a class="info"
href="#RFC5322">RFC
5322<span> (</span><span class="info">Resnick, P., Ed., “Internet Message Format,” October&nbsp;2008.</span><span>)</span></a>
[RFC5322]
addr-spec syntax.
The RP MUST NOT rely upon this value being unique,
as discussed in <a class="info" href="#ClaimStability">Section&nbsp;5.7<span> (</span><span
class="info">Claim Stability and Uniqueness</span><span>)</span></a>.
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td align="left">email_verified</td>
<td align="left">boolean</td>
<td align="left">
True if the End-User's e-mail address has been verified; otherwise false.
When this Claim Value is <tt>true</tt>,
this means that the OP took affirmative steps
to ensure that this e-mail address was controlled by the End-User
at the time the verification was performed.
The means by which an e-mail address is verified is context-specific,
and dependent upon the trust framework or contractual agreements
within which the parties are operating.
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td align="left">gender</td>
<td align="left">string</td>
<td align="left"> End-User's gender. Values defined by this
specification are <tt>female</tt> and
<tt>male</tt>. Other values MAY be used
when neither of the defined values are applicable.
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td align="left">birthdate</td>
<td align="left">string</td>
<td align="left">End-User's birthday, represented as an
<a class="info" href="#ISO8601-2004">ISO 8601:2004<span> (</span><span
class="info">International Organization for Standardization, “ISO 8601:2004. Data elements and interchange formats - Information interchange - Representation of dates and times,” 2004.</span><span>)</span></a>
[ISO86012004] <tt>YYYY-MM-DD</tt>
format. The year MAY be <tt>0000</tt>, indicating that it is omitted.
To represent only the year, <tt>YYYY</tt> format is allowed. Note that
depending on the underlying platform's date related function, providing just year can
result in varying month and day, so the implementers need to take this factor into account
to correctly process the dates.
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td align="left">zoneinfo</td>
<td align="left">string</td>
<td align="left">String from zoneinfo <a class="info"
href="#zoneinfo">[zoneinfo]<span> (</span><span
class="info">Public Domain, “The tz database,” June&nbsp;2011.</span><span>)</span></a> time zone
database representing the End-User's time zone.
For example, <tt>Europe/Paris</tt> or
<tt>America/Los_Angeles</tt>.
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td align="left">locale</td>
<td align="left">string</td>
<td align="left">End-User's locale, represented as a
<a class="info"
href="#RFC5646">BCP47<span> (</span><span
class="info">Phillips, A. and M. Davis, “Tags for Identifying Languages,” September&nbsp;2009.</span><span>)</span></a>
[RFC5646] language tag.
This is typically an <a class="info" href="#ISO639-1">ISO
639-1 Alpha-2<span> (</span><span class="info">International Organization for Standardization, “ISO 639-1:2002. Codes for the representation of names of languages -- Part 1: Alpha-2 code,” 2002.</span><span>)</span></a>
[ISO6391]
language code in
lowercase and an <a class="info" href="#ISO3166-1">ISO
3166-1 Alpha-2<span> (</span><span class="info">International Organization for Standardization, “ISO 3166-1:1997. Codes for the representation of names of countries and their subdivisions -- Part 1: Country codes,” 1997.</span><span>)</span></a>
[ISO31661]
country code in uppercase, separated by a dash. For example,
<tt>en-US</tt> or <tt>fr-CA</tt>.
As a compatibility note, some implementations have used an underscore
as the separator rather than a dash, for example,
<tt>en_US</tt>; Relying Parties MAY choose to
accept this locale syntax as well.
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td align="left">phone_number</td>
<td align="left">string</td>
<td align="left">
End-User's preferred telephone number. <a class="info"
href="#E.164">E.164<span> (</span><span
class="info">International Telecommunication Union, “E.164: The international public telecommunication numbering plan,” 2010.</span><span>)</span></a>
[E.164]
is RECOMMENDED as the format of this Claim,
for example, <tt>+1 (425) 555-1212</tt>
or <tt>+56 (2) 687 2400</tt>.
If the phone number contains an extension, it is RECOMMENDED that
the extension be represented using the
<a class="info" href="#RFC3966">RFC
3966<span> (</span><span class="info">Schulzrinne, H., “The tel URI for Telephone Numbers,” December&nbsp;2004.</span><span>)</span></a>
[RFC3966] extension syntax,
for example, <tt>+1 (604) 555-1234;ext=5678</tt>.
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td align="left">phone_number_verified</td>
<td align="left">boolean</td>
<td align="left">
True if the End-User's phone number has been verified; otherwise false.
When this Claim Value is <tt>true</tt>,
this means that the OP took affirmative steps
to ensure that this phone number was controlled by the End-User
at the time the verification was performed.
The means by which a phone number is verified is context-specific,
and dependent upon the trust framework or contractual agreements
within which the parties are operating.
When true, the <tt>phone_number</tt>
Claim MUST be in E.164 format
and any extensions MUST be represented in RFC 3966 format.
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td align="left">address</td>
<td align="left">JSON object</td>
<td align="left">
End-User's preferred postal address.
The value of the <tt>address</tt> member is
a JSON <a class="info"
href="#RFC4627">[RFC4627]<span> (</span><span
class="info">Crockford, D., “The application/json Media Type for JavaScript Object Notation (JSON),” July&nbsp;2006.</span><span>)</span></a>
structure containing some or all of
the members defined in <a class="info"
href="#AddressClaim">Section&nbsp;5.1.1<span> (</span><span
class="info">Address Claim</span><span>)</span></a>.
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td align="left">updated_at</td>
<td align="left">number</td>
<td align="left">
Time the End-User's information was last updated.
Its value is a JSON number representing the number of seconds from
1970-01-01T0:0:0Z as measured in UTC until the date/time.
</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<br clear="all">
<table border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" align="center">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td align="center"><font face="monaco, MS Sans Serif" size="1"><b>&nbsp;Table 1: Registered Member Definitions&nbsp;</b></font><br>
</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<hr class="insert">
<a name="AddressClaim"></a><br>
<hr>
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<a name="rfc.section.5.1.1"></a>
<h3>5.1.1.&nbsp;
Address Claim</h3>
<p>
The Address Claim represents a physical mailing address.
Implementations MAY return only a subset of the
fields of an <tt>address</tt>, depending upon
the information available and the End-User's privacy
preferences. For
example, the <tt>country</tt> and <tt>region</tt> might be returned without returning
more fine-grained address information.
</p>
<p>
Implementations MAY return just the full address
as a single string in the formatted sub-field,
or they MAY return just the individual component
fields using the other sub-fields,
or they MAY return both.
If both variants are returned,
they SHOULD be describing the same address,
with the formatted address indicating how the
component fields are combined.
</p>
<p>
</p>
<blockquote class="text">
<dl>
<dt>formatted</dt>
<dd>
Full mailing address,
formatted for display or use on a mailing label.
This field MAY contain multiple lines, separated by newlines.
Newlines can be represented either as
a carriage return/line feed pair ("\r\n") or as
a single line feed character ("\n").
</dd>
<dt>street_address</dt>
<dd>
Full street address component,
which MAY include house number, street name,
Post Office Box, and multi-line extended street
address information.
This field MAY contain multiple lines, separated by newlines.
Newlines can be represented either as
a carriage return/line feed pair ("\r\n") or as
a single line feed character ("\n").
</dd>
<dt>locality</dt>
<dd>
City or locality component.
</dd>
<dt>region</dt>
<dd>
State, province,
prefecture, or region component.
</dd>
<dt>postal_code</dt>
<dd>
Zip code or
postal code component.
</dd>
<dt>country</dt>
<dd>
Country name component.
</dd>
</dl>
</blockquote>
<p>
</p>
<a name="AdditionalClaims"></a><br>
<hr>
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<a name="rfc.section.5.1.2"></a>
<h3>5.1.2.&nbsp;
Additional Claims</h3>
<p>
While this specification defines only a small set of Claims as
standard Claims, other Claims MAY be used in conjunction
with the standard Claims.
When using such Claims, it is RECOMMENDED that
collision-resistant names be used for the Claim Names,
as described in the
<a class="info" href="#JWT">JSON Web Token
(JWT)<span> (</span><span class="info">Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, “JSON Web Token (JWT),” July&nbsp;2014.</span><span>)</span></a>
[JWT] specification.
Alternatively, Private Claim Names can be safely used
when naming conflicts are unlikely to arise,
as described in the JWT specification.
Or, if specific additional Claims will have broad and general applicability,
they can be registered with Registered Claim Names,
per the JWT specification.
</p>
<a name="ClaimsLanguagesAndScripts"></a><br>
<hr>
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<a name="rfc.section.5.2"></a>
<h3>5.2.&nbsp;
Claims Languages and Scripts</h3>
<p>
Human-readable Claim Values and Claim Values that reference human-readable values
MAY be represented in multiple languages and scripts.
To specify the languages and scripts, <a class="info"
href="#RFC5646">BCP47<span> (</span><span
class="info">Phillips, A. and M. Davis, “Tags for Identifying Languages,” September&nbsp;2009.</span><span>)</span></a>
[RFC5646] language tags are added to member names,
delimited by a <tt>#</tt> character. For example,
<tt>family_name#ja-Kana-JP</tt> expresses the
Family Name in Katakana in Japanese, which is commonly used to index
and represent the phonetics of the Kanji representation of the same
represented as <tt>family_name#ja-Hani-JP</tt>.
As another example, both <tt>website</tt> and
<tt>website#de</tt> Claim Values might be returned,
referencing a Web site in an unspecified language and a Web site
in German.
</p>
<p>
Since Claim Names are case sensitive, it is strongly RECOMMENDED
that language tag values used in Claim Names be spelled using the
character case with which they are registered in the
<a class="info" href="#IANA.Language">IANA Language Subtag
Registry<span> (</span><span class="info">Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA), “Language Subtag Registry,” 2005.</span><span>)</span></a>
[IANA.Language].
In particular, normally language names are spelled with lowercase characters,
region names are spelled with uppercase characters, and
scripts are spelled with mixed case characters.
However, since BCP47 language tag values are case insensitive,
implementations SHOULD interpret the language tag values supplied
in a case insensitive manner.
</p>
<p>
Per the recommendations in BCP47, language tag values for Claims
SHOULD only be as specific as necessary.
For instance, using <tt>fr</tt> might be sufficient
in many contexts, rather than <tt>fr-CA</tt> or
<tt>fr-FR</tt>.
Where possible, OPs SHOULD try to match requested Claim locales with
Claims it has. For instance, if the Client asks for a Claim with
a <tt>de</tt> (German) language tag and the OP
has a value tagged with <tt>de-CH</tt> (Swiss German)
and no generic German value, it would be appropriate for the OP
to return the Swiss German value to the Client.
(This intentionally moves as much of the complexity of language tag
matching to the OP as possible, to simplify Clients.)
</p>
<p>
OpenID Connect defines the following Authorization Request parameter
to enable specify the preferred languages and scripts to be used
for the returned Claims:
</p>
<blockquote class="text">
<dl>
<dt>claims_locales</dt>
<dd>
OPTIONAL.
End-User's preferred languages and scripts for Claims being returned,
represented as a space-separated list of
<a class="info"
href="#RFC5646">BCP47<span> (</span><span
class="info">Phillips, A. and M. Davis, “Tags for Identifying Languages,” September&nbsp;2009.</span><span>)</span></a>
[RFC5646] language tag values,
ordered by preference.
An error SHOULD NOT result if some or all of the requested locales
are not supported by the OpenID Provider.
</dd>
</dl>
</blockquote>
<p>
</p>
<p>
When the OP determines, either through the
<tt>claims_locales</tt> parameter,
or by other means, that the End-User and Client are
requesting Claims in only one set of languages and scripts,
it is RECOMMENDED that OPs return Claims without language tags
when they employ this language and script.
It is also RECOMMENDED that Clients be written in a manner
that they can handle and utilize Claims using language tags.
</p>
<a name="UserInfo"></a><br>
<hr>
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<a name="rfc.section.5.3"></a>
<h3>5.3.&nbsp;
UserInfo Endpoint</h3>
<p>
The UserInfo Endpoint is an OAuth 2.0 Protected Resource that
returns Claims about the authenticated End-User.
To obtain the requested Claims about the End-User, the Client
makes a request to the UserInfo Endpoint
using an Access Token obtained through OpenID Connect Authentication.
These Claims are normally represented by a JSON object that contains
a collection of name and value pairs for the Claims.
</p>
<p>
Communication with the UserInfo Endpoint MUST utilize TLS.
See <a class="info"
href="#TLSRequirements">Section&nbsp;16.17<span> (</span><span
class="info">TLS Requirements</span><span>)</span></a> for more information on using TLS.
</p>
<p>
The UserInfo Endpoint MUST support the use of the
HTTP <tt>GET</tt> and
HTTP <tt>POST</tt> methods
defined in <a class="info" href="#RFC2616">RFC
2616<span> (</span><span class="info">Fielding, R., Gettys, J., Mogul, J., Frystyk, H., Masinter, L., Leach, P., and T. Berners-Lee, “Hypertext Transfer Protocol -- HTTP/1.1,” June&nbsp;1999.</span><span>)</span></a>
[RFC2616].
</p>
<p>The UserInfo Endpoint MUST accept Access Tokens as
<a class="info" href="#RFC6750">OAuth 2.0 Bearer Token
Usage<span> (</span><span class="info">Jones, M. and D. Hardt, “The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework: Bearer Token Usage,” October&nbsp;2012.</span><span>)</span></a>
[RFC6750].
</p>
<p>The UserInfo Endpoint SHOULD support the use of
<a class="info" href="#CORS">Cross Origin Resource Sharing
(CORS)<span> (</span><span
class="info">Opera Software ASA, “Cross-Origin Resource Sharing,” July&nbsp;2010.</span><span>)</span></a>
[CORS] and
or other methods as appropriate to enable Java Script Clients to access the endpoint.
</p>
<a name="UserInfoRequest"></a><br>
<hr>
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<a name="rfc.section.5.3.1"></a>
<h3>5.3.1.&nbsp;
UserInfo Request</h3>
<p>
The Client sends the UserInfo Request using either
HTTP <tt>GET</tt> or HTTP <tt>POST</tt>.
The Access Token obtained
from an OpenID Connect Authentication Request MUST be sent as a Bearer Token,
per Section 2 of <a class="info" href="#RFC6750">OAuth 2.0
Bearer Token Usage<span> (</span><span class="info">Jones, M. and D. Hardt, “The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework: Bearer Token Usage,” October&nbsp;2012.</span><span>)</span></a>
[RFC6750].
</p>
<p>
It is RECOMMENDED that the request use the
HTTP <tt>GET</tt> method and
the Access Token be sent using the
<tt>Authorization</tt> header field.
</p>
<p>
The following is a non-normative example of a UserInfo Request:
</p>
<div style="display: table; width: 0; margin-left: 3em; margin-right: auto"><pre> GET /userinfo HTTP/1.1
Host: server.example.com
Authorization: Bearer SlAV32hkKG
</pre>
</div>
<a name="UserInfoResponse"></a><br>
<hr>
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<a name="rfc.section.5.3.2"></a>
<h3>5.3.2.&nbsp;
Successful UserInfo Response</h3>
<p>
The UserInfo Claims MUST be returned as the members of a JSON object
unless a signed or encrypted response was requested during Client Registration.
The Claims defined in <a class="info" href="#StandardClaims">Section&nbsp;5.1<span> (</span><span
class="info">Standard Claims</span><span>)</span></a> can be returned,
as can additional Claims not specified there.
</p>
<p>
For privacy reasons, OpenID Providers MAY elect to not return
values for some requested Claims.
</p>
<p>
If a Claim is not returned, that Claim Name SHOULD be
omitted from the JSON object representing the Claims; it
SHOULD NOT be present with a null or empty string value.
</p>
<p>
The <tt>sub</tt> (subject) Claim
MUST always be returned in the UserInfo Response.
</p>
<p>
NOTE: Due to the possibility of token substitution attacks
(see <a class="info" href="#TokenSubstitution">Section&nbsp;16.11<span> (</span><span
class="info">Token Substitution</span><span>)</span></a>),
the UserInfo Response is not guaranteed to be about the
End-User identified by the <tt>sub</tt> (subject)
element of the ID Token.
The <tt>sub</tt> Claim in the UserInfo Response
MUST be verified to exactly match the
<tt>sub</tt> Claim in the ID Token;
if they do not match, the UserInfo Response values MUST NOT be used.
</p>
<p>
Upon receipt of the UserInfo Request, the UserInfo Endpoint MUST
return the JSON Serialization of the UserInfo Response as in
<a class="info"
href="#JSONSerialization">Section&nbsp;13.3<span> (</span><span
class="info">JSON Serialization</span><span>)</span></a> in the HTTP response
body unless a
different format was specified during Registration
<a class="info" href="#OpenID.Registration">[OpenID.Registration]<span> (</span><span
class="info">Sakimura, N., Bradley, J., and M. Jones, “OpenID Connect Dynamic Client Registration 1.0,” November&nbsp;2014.</span><span>)</span></a>.
The UserInfo Endpoint MUST return a content-type header to indicate
which format is being returned.
The content-type of the HTTP response MUST be <tt>application/json</tt> if the response body is a text
JSON object;
the response body SHOULD be encoded using UTF-8.
</p>
<p>
If the UserInfo Response is
signed and/or encrypted, then the Claims are returned in a JWT and the
content-type MUST be <tt>application/jwt</tt>.
The response MAY be encrypted without also being signed.
If both signing and encryption are requested,
the response MUST be signed then encrypted,
with the result being a Nested JWT, as defined in <a class="info"
href="#JWT">[JWT]<span> (</span><span
class="info">Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, “JSON Web Token (JWT),” July&nbsp;2014.</span><span>)</span></a>.
</p>
<p>
If signed, the UserInfo Response
SHOULD contain the Claims
<tt>iss</tt> (issuer)
and <tt>aud</tt> (audience) as members.
The <tt>iss</tt> value SHOULD be the OP's Issuer Identifier URL.
The <tt>aud</tt> value SHOULD be or include the RP's Client ID value.
</p>
<p>The following is a non-normative example
of a UserInfo Response:
</p>
<div style="display: table; width: 0; margin-left: 3em; margin-right: auto"><pre> HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/json
{
"sub": "248289761001",
"name": "Jane Doe",
"given_name": "Jane",
"family_name": "Doe",
"preferred_username": "j.doe",
"email": "janedoe@example.com",
"picture": "http://example.com/janedoe/me.jpg"
}
</pre>
</div>
<a name="UserInfoError"></a><br>
<hr>
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<a name="rfc.section.5.3.3"></a>
<h3>5.3.3.&nbsp;
UserInfo Error Response</h3>
<p>
When an error condition occurs, the UserInfo Endpoint returns
an Error Response as defined in Section 3 of
<a class="info" href="#RFC6750">OAuth 2.0 Bearer Token
Usage<span> (</span><span class="info">Jones, M. and D. Hardt, “The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework: Bearer Token Usage,” October&nbsp;2012.</span><span>)</span></a>
[RFC6750].
(HTTP errors unrelated to RFC 6750 are returned to the User Agent using the
appropriate HTTP status code.)
</p>
<p>The following is a non-normative example
of a UserInfo Error Response:
</p>
<div style="display: table; width: 0; margin-left: 3em; margin-right: auto"><pre> HTTP/1.1 401 Unauthorized
WWW-Authenticate: error="invalid_token",
error_description="The Access Token expired"
</pre>
</div>
<a name="UserInfoResponseValidation"></a><br>
<hr>
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<a name="rfc.section.5.3.4"></a>
<h3>5.3.4.&nbsp;
UserInfo Response Validation</h3>
<p>
The Client MUST validate the UserInfo Response as follows:
</p>
<p>
</p>
<ol class="text">
<li>Verify that the OP that responded was the intended OP
through a TLS server certificate check, per
<a class="info" href="#RFC6125">RFC 6125<span> (</span><span
class="info">Saint-Andre, P. and J. Hodges, “Representation and Verification of Domain-Based Application Service Identity within Internet Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509 (PKIX) Certificates in the Context of Transport Layer Security (TLS),” March&nbsp;2011.</span><span>)</span></a>
[RFC6125].
</li>
<li>If the Client has provided a
<tt>userinfo_encrypted_response_alg</tt>
parameter during Registration, decrypt the UserInfo Response
using the keys specified during Registration.
</li>
<li>If the response was signed, the Client SHOULD validate the
signature according to <a class="info" href="#JWS">JWS<span> (</span><span
class="info">Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, “JSON Web Signature (JWS),” July&nbsp;2014.</span><span>)</span></a>
[JWS].
</li>
</ol>
<p>
</p>
<a name="ScopeClaims"></a><br>
<hr>
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<a name="rfc.section.5.4"></a>
<h3>5.4.&nbsp;
Requesting Claims using Scope Values</h3>
<p>
OpenID Connect Clients use <tt>scope</tt> values,
as defined in Section 3.3 of <a class="info" href="#RFC6749">OAuth
2.0<span> (</span><span
class="info">Hardt, D., “The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework,” October&nbsp;2012.</span><span>)</span></a>
[RFC6749],
to specify what
access privileges are being requested for Access Tokens. The scopes associated
with Access Tokens determine what resources will be available when they are
used to access OAuth 2.0 protected endpoints.
Protected Resource endpoints MAY perform different actions and
return different information based on the scope values and other parameters
used when requesting the presented Access Token.
</p>
<p>
For OpenID Connect, scopes
can be used to request that specific sets of information
be made available as Claim Values.
</p>
<p>
Claims requested by the following scopes are treated by Authorization Servers
as Voluntary Claims.
</p>
<p>
OpenID Connect defines the following <tt>scope</tt> values
that are used to request Claims:
</p>
<p>
</p>
<blockquote class="text">
<dl>
<dt>profile</dt>
<dd>
OPTIONAL. This scope value
requests access to the End-User's default profile Claims,
which are:
<tt>name</tt>,
<tt>family_name</tt>,
<tt>given_name</tt>,
<tt>middle_name</tt>,
<tt>nickname</tt>,
<tt>preferred_username</tt>,
<tt>profile</tt>,
<tt>picture</tt>,
<tt>website</tt>,
<tt>gender</tt>,
<tt>birthdate</tt>,
<tt>zoneinfo</tt>,
<tt>locale</tt>, and
<tt>updated_at</tt>.
</dd>
<dt>email</dt>
<dd>
OPTIONAL. This scope value requests access to
the <tt>email</tt> and
<tt>email_verified</tt> Claims.
</dd>
<dt>address</dt>
<dd>
OPTIONAL. This scope value requests access to
the <tt>address</tt> Claim.
</dd>
<dt>phone</dt>
<dd>
OPTIONAL. This scope value requests access to
the <tt>phone_number</tt> and
<tt>phone_number_verified</tt> Claims.
</dd>
</dl>
</blockquote>
<p>
</p>
<p>Multiple scope values MAY be used by creating a space delimited, case
sensitive list of ASCII scope values.
</p>
<p>
The Claims requested by the
<tt>profile</tt>,
<tt>email</tt>,
<tt>address</tt>, and
<tt>phone</tt> scope values
are returned from the UserInfo Endpoint,
as described in <a class="info" href="#UserInfoResponse">Section&nbsp;5.3.2<span> (</span><span
class="info">Successful UserInfo Response</span><span>)</span></a>,
when a <tt>response_type</tt> value is used
that results in an Access Token being issued.
However, when no Access Token is issued
(which is the case for the <tt>response_type</tt>
value <tt>id_token</tt>),
the resulting Claims are returned in the ID Token.
</p>
<p>In some cases, the End-User will be given the option to
have the OpenID Provider decline to provide some or all
information requested by RPs.
To minimize the amount of information that the End-User is being asked
to disclose, an RP can elect to
only request a subset of the information available from the
UserInfo Endpoint.
</p>
<p>
</p>
<p>
The following is a non-normative example of an unencoded
<tt>scope</tt> request:
</p>
<div style="display: table; width: 0; margin-left: 3em; margin-right: auto"><pre> scope=openid profile email phone
</pre>
</div>
<a name="ClaimsParameter"></a><br>
<hr>
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<a name="rfc.section.5.5"></a>
<h3>5.5.&nbsp;
Requesting Claims using the "claims" Request Parameter</h3>
<p>
OpenID Connect defines the following Authorization Request parameter
to enable requesting individual Claims
and specifying parameters that apply to the requested Claims:
</p>
<blockquote class="text">
<dl>
<dt>claims</dt>
<dd>
OPTIONAL.
This parameter is used to request that specific Claims be returned.
The value is a JSON object listing the requested Claims.
</dd>
</dl>
</blockquote>
<p>
</p>
<p>
The <tt>claims</tt> Authentication Request
parameter requests that specific Claims
be returned from the UserInfo Endpoint and/or in the ID Token.
It is represented as a JSON object containing lists of Claims being requested
from these locations.
Properties of the Claims being requested MAY also be specified.
</p>
<p>
Support for the <tt>claims</tt> parameter is OPTIONAL.
Should an OP not support this parameter and an RP uses it,
the OP SHOULD return a set of Claims to the RP that it believes would
be useful to the RP and the End-User using whatever heuristics it
believes are appropriate.
The <tt>claims_parameter_supported</tt>
Discovery result indicates whether the OP supports this parameter.
</p>
<p>
The <tt>claims</tt> parameter value is represented
in an OAuth 2.0 request as UTF-8 encoded JSON
(which ends up being form-urlencoded when passed as an OAuth parameter).
When used in a Request Object value, per <a class="info"
href="#RequestObject">Section&nbsp;6.1<span> (</span><span
class="info">Passing a Request Object by Value</span><span>)</span></a>,
the JSON is used as the value of the
<tt>claims</tt> member.
</p>
<p>
The top-level members of the Claims request JSON object are:
</p>
<blockquote class="text">
<dl>
<dt>userinfo</dt>
<dd>
OPTIONAL.
Requests that the listed individual Claims be returned
from the UserInfo Endpoint.
If present, the listed Claims are being requested to be added to
any Claims that are being requested using
<tt>scope</tt> values.
If not present, the Claims being requested from the UserInfo Endpoint
are only those requested using <tt>scope</tt> values.
</dd>
<dt></dt>
<dd>
When the <tt>userinfo</tt> member is used,
the request MUST also use a <tt>response_type</tt>
value that results in an Access Token being issued to the Client
for use at the UserInfo Endpoint.
</dd>
<dt>id_token</dt>
<dd>
OPTIONAL.
Requests that the listed individual Claims be returned
in the ID Token.
If present, the listed Claims are being requested to be added to
the default Claims in the ID Token.
If not present, the default ID Token Claims are requested,
as per the ID Token definition in <a class="info"
href="#IDToken">Section&nbsp;2<span> (</span><span
class="info">ID Token</span><span>)</span></a>
and per the additional per-flow ID Token requirements in Sections
<a class="info"
href="#CodeIDToken">3.1.3.6<span> (</span><span
class="info">ID Token</span><span>)</span></a>,
<a class="info"
href="#ImplicitIDToken">3.2.2.10<span> (</span><span
class="info">ID Token</span><span>)</span></a>,
<a class="info"
href="#HybridIDToken">3.3.2.11<span> (</span><span
class="info">ID Token</span><span>)</span></a>,
and <a class="info" href="#HybridIDToken2">3.3.3.6<span> (</span><span
class="info">ID Token</span><span>)</span></a>.
</dd>
</dl>
</blockquote>
<p>
Other members MAY be present.
Any members used that are not understood MUST be ignored.
</p>
<p>
</p>
<p>An example Claims request is as follows:
</p>
<div style="display: table; width: 0; margin-left: 3em; margin-right: auto"><pre> {
"userinfo":
{
"given_name": {"essential": true},
"nickname": null,
"email": {"essential": true},
"email_verified": {"essential": true},
"picture": null,
"http://example.info/claims/groups": null
},
"id_token":
{
"auth_time": {"essential": true},
"acr": {"values": ["urn:mace:incommon:iap:silver"] }
}
}
</pre>
</div>
Note that a Claim that is not in the standard set defined in
<a class="info"
href="#StandardClaims">Section&nbsp;5.1<span> (</span><span
class="info">Standard Claims</span><span>)</span></a>, the (example)
<tt>http://example.info/claims/groups</tt> Claim,
is being requested.
Using the <tt>claims</tt> parameter is the only
way to request Claims outside the standard set.
It is also the only way to request specific combinations of the
standard Claims that cannot be specified using scope values.
<a name="IndividualClaimsRequests"></a><br>
<hr>
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<a name="rfc.section.5.5.1"></a>
<h3>5.5.1.&nbsp;
Individual Claims Requests</h3>
<p>
The <tt>userinfo</tt> and
<tt>id_token</tt> members of the
<tt>claims</tt> request both are JSON objects
with the names of the individual Claims being requested as the member names.
The member values MUST be one of the following:
</p>
<blockquote class="text">
<dl>
<dt>null</dt>
<dd>
Indicates that this Claim is being requested in the default manner.
In particular, this is a Voluntary Claim.
For instance, the Claim request:
<div style="display: table; width: 0; margin-left: 3em; margin-right: auto"><pre> "given_name": null
</pre>
</div>
requests the <tt>given_name</tt> Claim
in the default manner.
</dd>
<dt>JSON Object</dt>
<dd>
Used to provide additional information about the Claim being
requested. This specification defines the following members:
<blockquote class="text">
<dl>
<dt>essential</dt>
<dd>
OPTIONAL.
Indicates whether the Claim being requested is an Essential Claim.
If the value is <tt>true</tt>,
this indicates that the Claim is an Essential Claim.
For instance, the Claim request:
<div style="display: table; width: 0; margin-left: 3em; margin-right: auto"><pre> "auth_time": {"essential": true}
</pre>
</div>
can be used to specify that it is Essential to return an
<tt>auth_time</tt> Claim Value.
</dd>
<dt></dt>
<dd>
If the value is <tt>false</tt>,
it indicates that it is a Voluntary Claim.
The default is <tt>false</tt>.
</dd>
<dt></dt>
<dd>
By requesting Claims as Essential Claims,
the RP indicates to the End-User
that releasing these Claims will ensure a smooth authorization
for the specific task requested by the End-User.
Note that even if the Claims are not available because
the End-User did not authorize their release or they are not present,
the Authorization Server MUST NOT generate an error when
Claims are not returned, whether they are Essential or Voluntary,
unless otherwise specified in the description of the specific claim.
</dd>
<dt>value</dt>
<dd>
OPTIONAL.
Requests that the Claim be returned with a particular value.
For instance the Claim request:
<div style="display: table; width: 0; margin-left: 3em; margin-right: auto"><pre> "sub": {"value": "248289761001"}
</pre>
</div>
can be used to specify that the request apply to the End-User
with Subject Identifier <tt>248289761001</tt>.
</dd>
<dt></dt>
<dd>
The value of the <tt>value</tt> member
MUST be a valid value for the Claim being requested.
Definitions of individual Claims can include requirements on
how and whether the <tt>value</tt>
qualifier is to be used when requesting that Claim.
</dd>
<dt>values</dt>
<dd>
OPTIONAL.
Requests that the Claim be returned with one of a set of values,
with the values appearing in order of preference.
For instance the Claim request:
<div style="display: table; width: 0; margin-left: 3em; margin-right: auto"><pre> "acr": {"essential": true,
"values": ["urn:mace:incommon:iap:silver",
"urn:mace:incommon:iap:bronze"]}
</pre>
</div>
specifies that it is Essential that the <tt>acr</tt>
Claim be returned with either the value
<tt>urn:mace:incommon:iap:silver</tt> or
<tt>urn:mace:incommon:iap:bronze</tt>.
</dd>
<dt></dt>
<dd>
The values in the <tt>values</tt> member array
MUST be valid values for the Claim being requested.
Definitions of individual Claims can include requirements on
how and whether the <tt>values</tt>
qualifier is to be used when requesting that Claim.
</dd>
</dl>
</blockquote>
Other members MAY be defined to provide additional
information about the requested Claims.
Any members used that are not understood MUST be ignored.
</dd>
</dl>
</blockquote>
<p>
</p>
<p>
Note that when the <tt>claims</tt> request parameter
is supported, the scope values that request Claims, as defined in
<a class="info"
href="#ScopeClaims">Section&nbsp;5.4<span> (</span><span
class="info">Requesting Claims using Scope Values</span><span>)</span></a>, are effectively shorthand
methods for
requesting sets of individual Claims.
For example, using the scope value <tt>openid email</tt>
and a <tt>response_type</tt> that returns an Access Token
is equivalent to using the scope value <tt>openid</tt>
and the following request for individual Claims.
</p>
<p>
Equivalent of using the <tt>email</tt> scope value:
</p>
<div style="display: table; width: 0; margin-left: 3em; margin-right: auto"><pre> {
"userinfo":
{
"email": null,
"email_verified": null
}
}
</pre>
</div>
<a name="acrSemantics"></a><br>
<hr>
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<a name="rfc.section.5.5.1.1"></a>
<h3>5.5.1.1.&nbsp;
Requesting the "acr" Claim</h3>
<p>
If the <tt>acr</tt> Claim is requested
as an Essential Claim for the ID Token
with a <tt>values</tt> parameter requesting
specific Authentication Context Class Reference values and
the implementation supports the <tt>claims</tt> parameter,
the Authorization Server MUST return an <tt>acr</tt>
Claim Value that matches one of the requested values.
The Authorization Server MAY ask the End-User to re-authenticate
with additional factors
to meet this requirement. If this is an Essential Claim and the
requirement cannot be met, then the Authorization Server MUST
treat that outcome as a failed authentication attempt.
</p>
<p>
Note that the RP MAY request the <tt>acr</tt>
Claim as a Voluntary Claim
by using the <tt>acr_values</tt> request parameter
or by not including "essential": true in an individual
<tt>acr</tt> Claim request.
If the Claim is not Essential and a requested value
cannot be provided, the Authorization Server SHOULD return
the session's current <tt>acr</tt> as
the value of the <tt>acr</tt> Claim.
If the Claim is not Essential, the Authorization Server is not required to
provide this Claim in its response.
</p>
<p>
If the client requests the <tt>acr</tt> Claim using
both the <tt>acr_values</tt> request parameter and
an individual <tt>acr</tt> Claim request for the ID Token
listing specific requested values,
the resulting behavior is unspecified.
</p>
<a name="IndividualClaimsLanguages"></a><br>
<hr>
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<a name="rfc.section.5.5.2"></a>
<h3>5.5.2.&nbsp;
Languages and Scripts for Individual Claims</h3>
<p>
As described in <a class="info"
href="#ClaimsLanguagesAndScripts">Section&nbsp;5.2<span> (</span><span
class="info">Claims Languages and Scripts</span><span>)</span></a>,
human-readable Claim Values and Claim Values that reference human-readable values
MAY be represented in multiple languages and scripts.
Within a request for individual Claims, requested languages and scripts
for particular Claims MAY be requested by including Claim Names
that contain <tt>#</tt>-separated
<a class="info" href="#RFC5646">BCP47<span> (</span><span
class="info">Phillips, A. and M. Davis, “Tags for Identifying Languages,” September&nbsp;2009.</span><span>)</span></a>
[RFC5646] language tags
in the Claims request, using the Claim Name syntax specified in
<a class="info" href="#ClaimsLanguagesAndScripts">Section&nbsp;5.2<span> (</span><span
class="info">Claims Languages and Scripts</span><span>)</span></a>.
For example, a Family Name in Katakana in Japanese
can be requested using the Claim Name
<tt>family_name#ja-Kana-JP</tt>
and a Kanji representation of the Family Name in Japanese
can be requested using the Claim Name
<tt>family_name#ja-Hani-JP</tt>.
A German-language Web site can be requested with the Claim Name
<tt>website#de</tt>.
</p>
<p>
If an OP receives a request for human-readable Claims in a language and script
that it doesn't have, any versions of those Claims returned that don't use
the requested language and script SHOULD use a language tag in the Claim Name.
</p>
<a name="ClaimTypes"></a><br>
<hr>
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<a name="rfc.section.5.6"></a>
<h3>5.6.&nbsp;
Claim Types</h3>
<p>
Three representations of Claim Values are defined by this specification:
</p>
<p>
</p>
<blockquote class="text">
<dl>
<dt>Normal Claims</dt>
<dd>
Claims that are directly asserted by
the OpenID Provider.
</dd>
<dt>Aggregated Claims</dt>
<dd>
Claims that are asserted by a
Claims Provider other than the OpenID Provider but are returned
by OpenID Provider.
</dd>
<dt>Distributed Claims</dt>
<dd>
Claims that are asserted by a
Claims Provider other than the OpenID Provider but are returned
as references by the OpenID Provider.
</dd>
</dl>
</blockquote>
<p>
</p>
<p>
Normal Claims MUST be supported.
Support for Aggregated Claims and Distributed Claims is OPTIONAL.
</p>
<a name="NormalClaims"></a><br>
<hr>
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<a name="rfc.section.5.6.1"></a>
<h3>5.6.1.&nbsp;
Normal Claims</h3>
<p>Normal Claims are represented as members in a JSON object. The
Claim Name is the member name and the Claim Value is the member
value.
</p>
<p>The following is a non-normative response containing Normal Claims:
</p>
<div style="display: table; width: 0; margin-left: 3em; margin-right: auto"><pre> {
"name": "Jane Doe",
"given_name": "Jane",
"family_name": "Doe",
"email": "janedoe@example.com",
"picture": "http://example.com/janedoe/me.jpg"
}
</pre>
</div>
<a name="AggregatedDistributedClaims"></a><br>
<hr>
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<a name="rfc.section.5.6.2"></a>
<h3>5.6.2.&nbsp;
Aggregated and Distributed Claims</h3>
<p>Aggregated and distributed Claims are represented by
using special <tt>_claim_names</tt> and
<tt>_claim_sources</tt> members
of the JSON object containing the Claims.
</p>
<p>
</p>
<blockquote class="text">
<dl>
<dt>_claim_names</dt>
<dd>
JSON object whose member
names are the Claim Names for the Aggregated and Distributed
Claims. The member values are references to the member names
in the <tt>_claim_sources</tt> member from which
the actual Claim Values can be retrieved.
</dd>
<dt>_claim_sources</dt>
<dd>
JSON object whose
member names are referenced by the member values of the
<tt>_claim_names</tt> member. The member values
contain sets of Aggregated Claims or reference locations for
Distributed Claims. The member values can have one of the
following formats depending on whether it is providing
Aggregated or Distributed Claims:
<blockquote class="text">
<dl>
<dt>Aggregated Claims</dt>
<dd>
JSON object that MUST
contain the <tt>JWT</tt> member whose value is a <a class="info"
href="#JWT">JWT<span> (</span><span
class="info">Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, “JSON Web Token (JWT),” July&nbsp;2014.</span><span>)</span></a>
[JWT] that MUST contain all the Claims
in the <tt>_claim_names</tt> object that references the
corresponding <tt>_claim_sources</tt> member.
Other members MAY be present.
Any members used that are not understood MUST be ignored.
<blockquote class="text">
<dl>
<dt>JWT</dt>
<dd>
REQUIRED.
JWT containing Claim Values.
</dd>
</dl>
</blockquote>
</dd>
<dt></dt>
<dd>
The JWT SHOULD NOT contain a <tt>sub</tt> (subject)
Claim unless its value is an identifier for the End-User at
the Claims Provider (and not for the OpenID Provider or another party);
this typically means that a <tt>sub</tt> Claim
SHOULD NOT be provided.
</dd>
<dt>Distributed Claims</dt>
<dd>
JSON object that
contains the following members and values:
<blockquote class="text">
<dl>
<dt>endpoint</dt>
<dd>
REQUIRED.
OAuth 2.0 resource endpoint from which the associated
Claim can be retrieved. The endpoint URL MUST return
the Claim as a JWT.
</dd>
<dt>access_token</dt>
<dd>
OPTIONAL.
Access Token
enabling retrieval of the Claims from the endpoint URL
by using the <a class="info"
href="#RFC6750">OAuth
2.0 Bearer Token Usage<span> (</span><span class="info">Jones, M. and D. Hardt, “The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework: Bearer Token Usage,” October&nbsp;2012.</span><span>)</span></a>
[RFC6750]
protocol. Claims SHOULD be requested using
the Authorization Request header field and Claims Providers
MUST support this method. If the Access Token
is not available, RPs MAY need to retrieve the
Access Token out of band or use an Access Token
that was pre-negotiated between the Claims Provider and
RP, or the Claims Provider MAY reauthenticate the
End-User and/or reauthorize the RP.
</dd>
</dl>
</blockquote>
</dd>
<dt></dt>
<dd>
A <tt>sub</tt> (subject) Claim SHOULD NOT
be returned from the Claims Provider
unless its value is an identifier for the End-User at
the Claims Provider (and not for the OpenID Provider or another party);
this typically means that a <tt>sub</tt> Claim
SHOULD NOT be provided.
</dd>
</dl>
</blockquote>
</dd>
</dl>
</blockquote>
<p>
</p>
<p>
In general, it is up to the OP when it is appropriate to use
Aggregated Claims and Distributed Claims.
In some cases, information about when to use what Claim Types
might be negotiated out of band between RPs and OPs.
</p>
<a name="AggregatedExample"></a><br>
<hr>
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<a name="rfc.section.5.6.2.1"></a>
<h3>5.6.2.1.&nbsp;
Example of Aggregated Claims</h3>
<p>
In this non-normative example, Claims from Claims Provider A
are combined with other Claims held by the OpenID provider, with the
Claims from Claims Provider A being returned as Aggregated Claims.
</p>
<p>
</p>
<p>
In this example, these Claims about Jane Doe have been issued by
Claims Provider A:
</p>
<div style="display: table; width: 0; margin-left: 3em; margin-right: auto"><pre> {
"address": {
"street_address": "1234 Hollywood Blvd.",
"locality": "Los Angeles",
"region": "CA",
"postal_code": "90210",
"country": "US"},
"phone_number": "+1 (310) 123-4567"
}
</pre>
</div>
<p>
Claims Provider A signs the JSON Claims, representing them in a signed JWT:
jwt_header.jwt_part2.jwt_part3.
It is this JWT that is used by the OpenID Provider.
</p>
<p>
</p>
<p>
In this example, this JWT containing Jane Doe's Aggregated Claims
from Claims Provider A is combined with other Normal Claims,
and returned as the following set of Claims:
</p>
<div style="display: table; width: 0; margin-left: 3em; margin-right: auto"><pre> {
"name": "Jane Doe",
"given_name": "Jane",
"family_name": "Doe",
"birthdate": "0000-03-22",
"eye_color": "blue",
"email": "janedoe@example.com",
"_claim_names": {
"address": "src1",
"phone_number": "src1"
},
"_claim_sources": {
"src1": {"JWT": "jwt_header.jwt_part2.jwt_part3"}
}
}
</pre>
</div>
<a name="DistributedExample"></a><br>
<hr>
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<a name="rfc.section.5.6.2.2"></a>
<h3>5.6.2.2.&nbsp;
Example of Distributed Claims</h3>
<p>
In this non-normative example, the OpenID Provider combines
Normal Claims that it holds with references to Claims held by
two different Claims Providers, B and C, incorporating references
to some of the Claims held by B and C as Distributed Claims.
</p>
<p>
</p>
<p>
In this example, these Claims about Jane Doe are held by
Claims Provider B (Jane Doe's bank):
</p>
<div style="display: table; width: 0; margin-left: 3em; margin-right: auto"><pre> {
"shipping_address": {
"street_address": "1234 Hollywood Blvd.",
"locality": "Los Angeles",
"region": "CA",
"postal_code": "90210",
"country": "US"},
"payment_info": "Some_Card 1234 5678 9012 3456",
"phone_number": "+1 (310) 123-4567"
}
</pre>
</div>
<p>
</p>
<p>
Also in this example, this Claim about Jane Doe is held by
Claims Provider C (a credit agency):
</p>
<div style="display: table; width: 0; margin-left: 3em; margin-right: auto"><pre> {
"credit_score": 650
}
</pre>
</div>
<p>
</p>
<p>
The OpenID Provider returns Jane Doe's Claims along with references
to the Distributed Claims from Claims Provider B and Claims Provider C
by sending the Access Tokens and URLs of locations from which the
Distributed Claims can be retrieved:
</p>
<div style="display: table; width: 0; margin-left: 3em; margin-right: auto"><pre> {
"name": "Jane Doe",
"given_name": "Jane",
"family_name": "Doe",
"email": "janedoe@example.com",
"birthdate": "0000-03-22",
"eye_color": "blue",
"_claim_names": {
"payment_info": "src1",
"shipping_address": "src1",
"credit_score": "src2"
},
"_claim_sources": {
"src1": {"endpoint":
"https://bank.example.com/claim_source"},
"src2": {"endpoint":
"https://creditagency.example.com/claims_here",
"access_token": "ksj3n283dke"}
}
}
</pre>
</div>
<a name="ClaimStability"></a><br>
<hr>
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<a name="rfc.section.5.7"></a>
<h3>5.7.&nbsp;
Claim Stability and Uniqueness</h3>
<p>
The <tt>sub</tt> (subject) and
<tt>iss</tt> (issuer) Claims, used together,
are the only Claims that an RP
can rely upon as a stable identifier for the End-User,
since the <tt>sub</tt>
Claim MUST be locally unique and never reassigned within the Issuer
for a particular End-User, as described in <a class="info"
href="#IDToken">Section&nbsp;2<span> (</span><span
class="info">ID Token</span><span>)</span></a>.
Therefore, the only guaranteed unique identifier for a given End-User is the
combination of the <tt>iss</tt> Claim
and the <tt>sub</tt> Claim.
</p>
<p>
All other Claims carry no such guarantees across different issuers in terms of
stability over time or uniqueness across users, and Issuers are permitted to
apply local restrictions and policies. For instance, an Issuer MAY re-use an
<tt>email</tt> Claim Value across different
End-Users at different points in time, and the claimed
<tt>email</tt> address for a given End-User MAY change
over time.
Therefore, other Claims such as <tt>email</tt>,
<tt>phone_number</tt>, and
<tt>preferred_username</tt>
and MUST NOT be used as unique identifiers for the End-User.
</p>
<a name="JWTRequests"></a><br>
<hr>
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<a name="rfc.section.6"></a>
<h3>6.&nbsp;
Passing Request Parameters as JWTs</h3>
<p>
OpenID Connect defines the following Authorization Request parameters
to enable Authentication Requests to be signed and optionally encrypted:
</p>
<blockquote class="text">
<dl>
<dt>request</dt>
<dd>
OPTIONAL.
This parameter enables
OpenID Connect requests to be passed in a single,
self-contained parameter and to be optionally signed and/or encrypted.
The parameter value is a Request Object value,
as specified in <a class="info" href="#RequestObject">Section&nbsp;6.1<span> (</span><span
class="info">Passing a Request Object by Value</span><span>)</span></a>.
It represents the request as a JWT whose Claims
are the request parameters.
</dd>
<dt>request_uri</dt>
<dd>
OPTIONAL.
This parameter enables
OpenID Connect requests to be passed by reference, rather than by value.
The <tt>request_uri</tt> value is a URL
using the <tt>https</tt> scheme
referencing a resource containing a Request Object value,
which is a JWT containing the request parameters.
</dd>
</dl>
</blockquote>
<p>
</p>
<p>
Requests using these parameters are represented as JWTs, which are respectively
passed by value or by reference.
The ability to pass requests by reference is particularly useful for large requests.
If one of these parameters is used,
the other MUST NOT be used in the same request.
</p>
<a name="RequestObject"></a><br>
<hr>
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<a name="rfc.section.6.1"></a>
<h3>6.1.&nbsp;
Passing a Request Object by Value</h3>
<p>
The <tt>request</tt> Authorization Request parameter
enables OpenID Connect requests to be passed in a single,
self-contained parameter and to be optionally signed and/or encrypted.
It represents the request as a JWT whose Claims are the request parameters
specified in <a class="info" href="#AuthorizationEndpoint">Section&nbsp;3.1.2<span> (</span><span
class="info">Authorization Endpoint</span><span>)</span></a>.
This JWT is called a Request Object.
</p>
<p>
Support for the <tt>request</tt> parameter is OPTIONAL.
The <tt>request_parameter_supported</tt>
Discovery result indicates whether the OP supports this parameter.
Should an OP not support this parameter and an RP uses it,
the OP MUST return the <tt>request_not_supported</tt>
error.
</p>
<p>
When the <tt>request</tt> parameter is used,
the OpenID Connect request parameter values contained in the JWT
supersede those passed using the OAuth 2.0 request syntax.
However, parameters MAY also be passed using the OAuth 2.0 request syntax
even when a Request Object is used;
this would typically be done to enable a cached,
pre-signed (and possibly pre-encrypted) Request Object value
to be used containing the fixed request parameters, while parameters that
can vary with each request, such as <tt>state</tt> and
<tt>nonce</tt>, are passed as OAuth 2.0 parameters.
</p>
<p>
So that the request is a valid OAuth 2.0 Authorization Request,
values for the <tt>response_type</tt> and
<tt>client_id</tt> parameters MUST be included
using the OAuth 2.0 request syntax, since they are REQUIRED by OAuth 2.0.
The values for these parameters MUST match those in the Request Object,
if present.
</p>
<p>
Even if a <tt>scope</tt> parameter
is present in the Request Object value,
a <tt>scope</tt> parameter MUST always be passed using
the OAuth 2.0 request syntax containing the
<tt>openid</tt> scope value to indicate to the
underlying OAuth 2.0 logic that this is an OpenID Connect request.
</p>
<p>
The Request Object MAY be signed or unsigned (plaintext).
When it is plaintext, this is indicated by use of the
<tt>none</tt> algorithm <a class="info" href="#JWA">[JWA]<span> (</span><span
class="info">Jones, M., “JSON Web Algorithms (JWA),” July&nbsp;2014.</span><span>)</span></a>
in the JOSE Header. If signed, the Request Object
SHOULD contain the Claims
<tt>iss</tt> (issuer)
and <tt>aud</tt> (audience) as members.
The <tt>iss</tt> value SHOULD be the Client ID of the RP,
unless it was signed by a different party than the RP.
The <tt>aud</tt> value SHOULD be or include
the OP's Issuer Identifier URL.
</p>
<p>
The Request Object MAY also be encrypted using <a class="info"
href="#JWE">JWE<span> (</span><span
class="info">Jones, M., Rescorla, E., and J. Hildebrand, “JSON Web Encryption (JWE),” July&nbsp;2014.</span><span>)</span></a>
[JWE]
and MAY be encrypted without also being signed.
If both signing and encryption are performed, it MUST be signed then encrypted,
with the result being a Nested JWT, as defined in <a class="info"
href="#JWT">[JWT]<span> (</span><span
class="info">Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, “JSON Web Token (JWT),” July&nbsp;2014.</span><span>)</span></a>.
</p>
<p>
<tt>request</tt> and
<tt>request_uri</tt> parameters
MUST NOT be included in Request Objects.
</p>
<p>
</p>
<p>
The following is a non-normative example of the Claims in
a Request Object before base64url encoding and signing:
</p>
<div style="display: table; width: 0; margin-left: 3em; margin-right: auto"><pre> {
"iss": "s6BhdRkqt3",
"aud": "https://server.example.com",
"response_type": "code id_token",
"client_id": "s6BhdRkqt3",
"redirect_uri": "https://client.example.org/cb",
"scope": "openid",
"state": "af0ifjsldkj",
"nonce": "n-0S6_WzA2Mj",
"max_age": 86400,
"claims":
{
"userinfo":
{
"given_name": {"essential": true},
"nickname": null,
"email": {"essential": true},
"email_verified": {"essential": true},
"picture": null
},
"id_token":
{
"gender": null,
"birthdate": {"essential": true},
"acr": {"values": ["urn:mace:incommon:iap:silver"]}
}
}
}
</pre>
</div>
<p>
Signing it with the <tt>RS256</tt> algorithm
results in this Request Object value
(with line wraps within values for display purposes only):
</p>
<div style="display: table; width: 0; margin-left: 3em; margin-right: auto"><pre> eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiIsImtpZCI6ImsyYmRjIn0.ew0KICJpc3MiOiAiczZCaGRSa3
F0MyIsDQogImF1ZCI6ICJodHRwczovL3NlcnZlci5leGFtcGxlLmNvbSIsDQogInJl
c3BvbnNlX3R5cGUiOiAiY29kZSBpZF90b2tlbiIsDQogImNsaWVudF9pZCI6ICJzNk
JoZFJrcXQzIiwNCiAicmVkaXJlY3RfdXJpIjogImh0dHBzOi8vY2xpZW50LmV4YW1w
bGUub3JnL2NiIiwNCiAic2NvcGUiOiAib3BlbmlkIiwNCiAic3RhdGUiOiAiYWYwaW
Zqc2xka2oiLA0KICJub25jZSI6ICJuLTBTNl9XekEyTWoiLA0KICJtYXhfYWdlIjog
ODY0MDAsDQogImNsYWltcyI6IA0KICB7DQogICAidXNlcmluZm8iOiANCiAgICB7DQ
ogICAgICJnaXZlbl9uYW1lIjogeyJlc3NlbnRpYWwiOiB0cnVlfSwNCiAgICAgIm5p
Y2tuYW1lIjogbnVsbCwNCiAgICAgImVtYWlsIjogeyJlc3NlbnRpYWwiOiB0cnVlfS
wNCiAgICAgImVtYWlsX3ZlcmlmaWVkIjogeyJlc3NlbnRpYWwiOiB0cnVlfSwNCiAg
ICAgInBpY3R1cmUiOiBudWxsDQogICAgfSwNCiAgICJpZF90b2tlbiI6IA0KICAgIH
sNCiAgICAgImdlbmRlciI6IG51bGwsDQogICAgICJiaXJ0aGRhdGUiOiB7ImVzc2Vu
dGlhbCI6IHRydWV9LA0KICAgICAiYWNyIjogeyJ2YWx1ZXMiOiBbInVybjptYWNlOm
luY29tbW9uOmlhcDpzaWx2ZXIiXX0NCiAgICB9DQogIH0NCn0.nwwnNsk1-Zkbmnvs
F6zTHm8CHERFMGQPhos-EJcaH4Hh-sMgk8ePrGhw_trPYs8KQxsn6R9Emo_wHwajyF
KzuMXZFSZ3p6Mb8dkxtVyjoy2GIzvuJT_u7PkY2t8QU9hjBcHs68PkgjDVTrG1uRTx
0GxFbuPbj96tVuj11pTnmFCUR6IEOXKYr7iGOCRB3btfJhM0_AKQUfqKnRlrRscc8K
ol-cSLWoYE9l5QqholImzjT_cMnNIznW9E7CDyWXTsO70xnB4SkG6pXfLSjLLlxmPG
iyon_-Te111V8uE83IlzCYIb_NMXvtTIVc1jpspnTSD7xMbpL-2QgwUsAlMGzw
</pre>
</div>
<p>
The following RSA public key, represented in JWK format, can be used to
validate the Request Object signature in this
and subsequent Request Object examples
(with line wraps within values for display purposes only):
</p>
<div style="display: table; width: 0; margin-left: 3em; margin-right: auto"><pre> {
"kty":"RSA",
"kid":"k2bdc",
"n":"y9Lqv4fCp6Ei-u2-ZCKq83YvbFEk6JMs_pSj76eMkddWRuWX2aBKGHAtKlE5P
7_vn__PCKZWePt3vGkB6ePgzAFu08NmKemwE5bQI0e6kIChtt_6KzT5OaaXDF
I6qCLJmk51Cc4VYFaxgqevMncYrzaW_50mZ1yGSFIQzLYP8bijAHGVjdEFgZa
ZEN9lsn_GdWLaJpHrB3ROlS50E45wxrlg9xMncVb8qDPuXZarvghLL0HzOuYR
adBJVoWZowDNTpKpk2RklZ7QaBO7XDv3uR7s_sf2g-bAjSYxYUGsqkNA9b3xV
W53am_UZZ3tZbFTIh557JICWKHlWj5uzeJXaw",
"e":"AQAB"
}
</pre>
</div>
<a name="RequestParameter"></a><br>
<hr>
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<a name="rfc.section.6.1.1"></a>
<h3>6.1.1.&nbsp;
Request using the "request" Request Parameter</h3>
<p>The Client sends the Authorization Request to the
Authorization Endpoint.
</p>
<p>
</p>
<p>The following is a non-normative example of an
Authorization Request using the <tt>request</tt>
parameter
(with line wraps within values for display purposes only):
</p>
<div style="display: table; width: 0; margin-left: 3em; margin-right: auto"><pre> https://server.example.com/authorize?
response_type=code%20id_token
&amp;client_id=s6BhdRkqt3
&amp;redirect_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fclient.example.org%2Fcb
&amp;scope=openid
&amp;state=af0ifjsldkj
&amp;nonce=n-0S6_WzA2Mj
&amp;request=eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiIsImtpZCI6ImsyYmRjIn0.ew0KICJpc3MiOiA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.nwwnNsk1-ZkbmnvsF6zTHm8CHERFMGQPhos-EJcaH4H
h-sMgk8ePrGhw_trPYs8KQxsn6R9Emo_wHwajyFKzuMXZFSZ3p6Mb8dkxtVyjoy2
GIzvuJT_u7PkY2t8QU9hjBcHs68PkgjDVTrG1uRTx0GxFbuPbj96tVuj11pTnmFC
UR6IEOXKYr7iGOCRB3btfJhM0_AKQUfqKnRlrRscc8Kol-cSLWoYE9l5QqholImz
jT_cMnNIznW9E7CDyWXTsO70xnB4SkG6pXfLSjLLlxmPGiyon_-Te111V8uE83Il
zCYIb_NMXvtTIVc1jpspnTSD7xMbpL-2QgwUsAlMGzw
</pre>
</div>
<a name="RequestUriParameter"></a><br>
<hr>
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<a name="rfc.section.6.2"></a>
<h3>6.2.&nbsp;
Passing a Request Object by Reference</h3>
<p>
The <tt>request_uri</tt> Authorization Request parameter enables
OpenID Connect requests to be passed by reference, rather than by value.
This parameter is used identically to the
<tt>request</tt> parameter, other than that
the Request Object value is retrieved from the resource at the specified URL,
rather than passed by value.
</p>
<p>
The <tt>request_uri_parameter_supported</tt>
Discovery result indicates whether the OP supports this parameter.
Should an OP not support this parameter and an RP uses it,
the OP MUST return the <tt>request_uri_not_supported</tt>
error.
</p>
<p>
When the <tt>request_uri</tt> parameter is used,
the OpenID Connect request parameter values contained in the referenced JWT
supersede those passed using the OAuth 2.0 request syntax.
However, parameters MAY also be passed using the OAuth 2.0 request syntax
even when a <tt>request_uri</tt> is used;
this would typically be done to enable a cached,
pre-signed (and possibly pre-encrypted) Request Object value
to be used containing the fixed request parameters, while parameters that
can vary with each request, such as <tt>state</tt> and
<tt>nonce</tt>, are passed as OAuth 2.0 parameters.
</p>
<p>
So that the request is a valid OAuth 2.0 Authorization Request,
values for the <tt>response_type</tt> and
<tt>client_id</tt> parameters MUST be included
using the OAuth 2.0 request syntax, since they are REQUIRED by OAuth 2.0.
The values for these parameters MUST match those in the Request Object,
if present.
</p>
<p>
Even if a <tt>scope</tt> parameter
is present in the referenced Request Object,
a <tt>scope</tt> parameter MUST always be passed using
the OAuth 2.0 request syntax containing the
<tt>openid</tt> scope value to indicate to the
underlying OAuth 2.0 logic that this is an OpenID Connect request.
</p>
<p>
Servers MAY cache the contents of the resources referenced by Request URIs.
If the contents of the referenced resource could ever change,
the URI SHOULD include the base64url encoded SHA-256 hash of the
referenced resource contents as the fragment component of the URI.
If the fragment value used for a URI changes, that signals the server
that any cached value for that URI with the old fragment value
is no longer valid.
</p>
<p>
Note that Clients MAY pre-register
<tt>request_uri</tt> values using the
<tt>request_uris</tt> parameter defined in
Section 2.1 of the
<a class="info" href="#OpenID.Registration">OpenID Connect
Dynamic Client Registration 1.0<span> (</span><span class="info">Sakimura, N., Bradley, J., and M. Jones, “OpenID Connect Dynamic Client Registration 1.0,” November&nbsp;2014.</span><span>)</span></a>
[OpenID.Registration]
specification.
OPs can require that <tt>request_uri</tt> values used
be pre-registered with the <tt>require_request_uri_registration</tt>
discovery parameter.
</p>
<p>
The entire Request URI MUST NOT exceed 512 ASCII characters.
</p>
<p>
The contents of the resource referenced by the URL MUST be a Request Object.
The scheme used in the
<tt>request_uri</tt> value MUST be <tt>https</tt>,
unless the target Request Object is signed in a way that is verifiable by the
Authorization Server.
The <tt>request_uri</tt> value MUST be reachable by the
Authorization Server, and SHOULD be reachable by the Client.
</p>
<p>
</p>
<p>The following is a non-normative example of
the contents of a Request Object resource that can be
referenced by a <tt>request_uri</tt>
(with line wraps within values for display purposes only):
</p>
<div style="display: table; width: 0; margin-left: 3em; margin-right: auto"><pre> eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiIsImtpZCI6ImsyYmRjIn0.ew0KICJpc3MiOiAiczZCaGRSa3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.nwwnNsk1-Zkbmnvs
F6zTHm8CHERFMGQPhos-EJcaH4Hh-sMgk8ePrGhw_trPYs8KQxsn6R9Emo_wHwajyF
KzuMXZFSZ3p6Mb8dkxtVyjoy2GIzvuJT_u7PkY2t8QU9hjBcHs68PkgjDVTrG1uRTx
0GxFbuPbj96tVuj11pTnmFCUR6IEOXKYr7iGOCRB3btfJhM0_AKQUfqKnRlrRscc8K
ol-cSLWoYE9l5QqholImzjT_cMnNIznW9E7CDyWXTsO70xnB4SkG6pXfLSjLLlxmPG
iyon_-Te111V8uE83IlzCYIb_NMXvtTIVc1jpspnTSD7xMbpL-2QgwUsAlMGzw
</pre>
</div>
<a name="CreateRequestUri"></a><br>
<hr>
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<a name="rfc.section.6.2.1"></a>
<h3>6.2.1.&nbsp;
URL Referencing the Request Object</h3>
<p>
The Client stores the Request Object resource either
locally or remotely at a URL the Server can access.
This URL is the Request URI, <tt>request_uri</tt>.
</p>
<p>
If the Request Object includes requested values for Claims,
it MUST NOT be revealed to anybody but the Authorization Server.
As such, the <tt>request_uri</tt> MUST have
appropriate entropy for its lifetime.
It is RECOMMENDED that it be removed
if it is known that it will not be used again
or after a reasonable timeout
unless access control measures are taken.
</p>
<p>The following is a non-normative example
of a Request URI value
(with line wraps within values for display purposes only):
</p>
<div style="display: table; width: 0; margin-left: 3em; margin-right: auto"><pre> https://client.example.org/request.jwt#
GkurKxf5T0Y-mnPFCHqWOMiZi4VS138cQO_V7PZHAdM
</pre>
</div>
<a name="UseRequestUri"></a><br>
<hr>
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<a name="rfc.section.6.2.2"></a>
<h3>6.2.2.&nbsp;
Request using the "request_uri" Request Parameter</h3>
<p>The Client sends the Authorization Request to the
Authorization Endpoint.
</p>
<p>The following is a non-normative example
of an Authorization Request using the <tt>request_uri</tt> parameter
(with line wraps within values for display purposes only):
</p>
<div style="display: table; width: 0; margin-left: 3em; margin-right: auto"><pre> https://server.example.com/authorize?
response_type=code%20id_token
&amp;client_id=s6BhdRkqt3
&amp;request_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fclient.example.org%2Frequest.jwt
%23GkurKxf5T0Y-mnPFCHqWOMiZi4VS138cQO_V7PZHAdM
&amp;state=af0ifjsldkj&amp;nonce=n-0S6_WzA2Mj
&amp;scope=openid
</pre>
</div>
<a name="GetRequestUri"></a><br>
<hr>
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<a name="rfc.section.6.2.3"></a>
<h3>6.2.3.&nbsp;
Authorization Server Fetches Request Object</h3>
<p>Upon receipt of the Request, the Authorization Server MUST
send an HTTP <tt>GET</tt> request to the <tt>request_uri</tt>
to retrieve the referenced Request Object, unless it is already cached, and parse it
to recreate the Authorization Request parameters.
</p>
<p>Note that the RP SHOULD use a unique URI for each
request utilizing distinct parameters, or otherwise
prevent the Authorization Server from caching the <tt>request_uri</tt>.
</p>
<p>The following is a non-normative example of this fetch
process:
</p>
<div style="display: table; width: 0; margin-left: 3em; margin-right: auto"><pre> GET /request.jwt HTTP/1.1
Host: client.example.org
</pre>
</div>
<a name="RequestUriRationale"></a><br>
<hr>
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<a name="rfc.section.6.2.4"></a>
<h3>6.2.4.&nbsp;
"request_uri" Rationale</h3>
<p>
There are several reasons that one might choose to use the
<tt>request_uri</tt> parameter:
</p>
<p>
</p>
<ol class="text">
<li>
The set of request parameters can become large, and can exceed browser
URI size limitations. Passing the request parameters by reference
can solve this problem.
</li>
<li>
Passing a <tt>request_uri</tt> value, rather than
a complete request by value, can reduce request latency.
</li>
<li>
Most requests for Claims from an RP are constant.
The <tt>request_uri</tt> is a way of creating
and sometimes also signing and encrypting a constant set of
request parameters in advance.
(The <tt>request_uri</tt> value becomes an "artifact"
representing a particular fixed set of request parameters.)
</li>
<li>
Pre-registering a fixed set of request parameters at Registration time
enables OPs to cache and pre-validate the request parameters at
Registration time, meaning they need not be retrieved at request time.
</li>
<li>
Pre-registering a fixed set of request parameters at
Registration time enables OPs to vet the contents of
the request from consumer protection and other points
of views, either itself or by utilizing a third party.
</li>
</ol>
<p>
</p>
<a name="JWTRequestValidation"></a><br>
<hr>
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<a name="rfc.section.6.3"></a>
<h3>6.3.&nbsp;
Validating JWT-Based Requests</h3>
<p>
When the <tt>request</tt> or
<tt>request_uri</tt> Authorization Request parameters
are used, additional steps must be performed to validate the
Authentication Request beyond those specified in
Sections <a class="info"
href="#AuthRequestValidation">3.1.2.2<span> (</span><span
class="info">Authentication Request Validation</span><span>)</span></a>,
<a class="info"
href="#ImplicitValidation">3.2.2.2<span> (</span><span
class="info">Authentication Request Validation</span><span>)</span></a>, or
<a class="info"
href="#HybridValidation">3.3.2.2<span> (</span><span
class="info">Authentication Request Validation</span><span>)</span></a>.
These steps are to validate the JWT containing the Request Object
and to validate the Request Object itself.
</p>
<a name="EncryptedRequestObject"></a><br>
<hr>
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<a name="rfc.section.6.3.1"></a>
<h3>6.3.1.&nbsp;
Encrypted Request Object</h3>
<p>
If the Authorization Server has advertised JWE encryption algorithms
in the <tt>request_object_encryption_alg_values_supported</tt> and
<tt>request_object_encryption_enc_values_supported</tt> elements of its
Discovery document <a class="info" href="#OpenID.Discovery">[OpenID.Discovery]<span> (</span><span
class="info">Sakimura, N., Bradley, J., Jones, M., and E. Jay, “OpenID Connect Discovery 1.0,” November&nbsp;2014.</span><span>)</span></a>,
or has supplied encryption algorithms by other means,
these are used by the Client to encrypt the JWT.
</p>
<p>
The Authorization Server MUST decrypt the JWT in accordance with
the <a class="info" href="#JWE">JSON Web
Encryption<span> (</span><span class="info">Jones, M., Rescorla, E., and J. Hildebrand, “JSON Web Encryption (JWE),” July&nbsp;2014.</span><span>)</span></a>
[JWE] specification.
The result MAY be either a signed or unsigned (plaintext) Request Object.
In the former case, signature validation MUST be performed
as defined in <a class="info" href="#SignedRequestObject">Section&nbsp;6.3.2<span> (</span><span
class="info">Signed Request Object</span><span>)</span></a>.
</p>
<p>
The Authorization Server MUST return an error if decryption fails.
</p>
<a name="SignedRequestObject"></a><br>
<hr>
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<a name="rfc.section.6.3.2"></a>
<h3>6.3.2.&nbsp;
Signed Request Object</h3>
<p>
To perform Signature Validation,
the <tt>alg</tt> Header Parameter in the JOSE Header MUST match the value
of the <tt>request_object_signing_alg</tt> set during
Client Registration <a class="info" href="#OpenID.Registration">[OpenID.Registration]<span> (</span><span
class="info">Sakimura, N., Bradley, J., and M. Jones, “OpenID Connect Dynamic Client Registration 1.0,” November&nbsp;2014.</span><span>)</span></a>
or a value that was
pre-registered by other means.
The signature MUST be validated against the appropriate key
for that <tt>client_id</tt>
and algorithm.
</p>
<p>
The Authorization Server MUST return an error if signature validation fails.
</p>
<a name="RequestParameterValidation"></a><br>
<hr>
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<a name="rfc.section.6.3.3"></a>
<h3>6.3.3.&nbsp;
Request Parameter Assembly and Validation</h3>
<p>
The Authorization Server MUST assemble
the set of Authorization Request parameters to be used
from the Request Object value
and the OAuth 2.0 Authorization Request parameters
(minus the <tt>request</tt> or
<tt>request_uri</tt> parameters).
If the same parameter exists both in
the Request Object and the OAuth Authorization Request parameters,
the parameter in the Request Object is used.
Using the assembled set of Authorization Request parameters,
the Authorization Server then validates the request
the normal manner for the flow being used, as specified in
Sections <a class="info"
href="#AuthRequestValidation">3.1.2.2<span> (</span><span
class="info">Authentication Request Validation</span><span>)</span></a>,
<a class="info"
href="#ImplicitValidation">3.2.2.2<span> (</span><span
class="info">Authentication Request Validation</span><span>)</span></a>, or
<a class="info"
href="#HybridValidation">3.3.2.2<span> (</span><span
class="info">Authentication Request Validation</span><span>)</span></a>.
</p>
<a name="SelfIssued"></a><br>
<hr>
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<a name="rfc.section.7"></a>
<h3>7.&nbsp;
Self-Issued OpenID Provider</h3>
<p>
OpenID Connect supports Self-Issued OpenID Providers -
personal, self-hosted OPs that issue self-signed ID Tokens.
Self-Issued OPs use the special Issuer Identifier
<tt>https://self-issued.me</tt>.
</p>
<p>
The messages used to communicate with Self-Issued OPs are
mostly the same as those used to communicate with other OPs.
Specifications for the few additional parameters used and
for the values of some parameters in the Self-Issued case
are defined in this section.
</p>
<a name="SelfIssuedDiscovery"></a><br>
<hr>
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<a name="rfc.section.7.1"></a>
<h3>7.1.&nbsp;
Self-Issued OpenID Provider Discovery</h3>
<p>
If the input identifier for the discovery process
contains the domain self-issued.me, dynamic discovery is not performed.
Instead, then the following static configuration values are used:
</p>
<p>
</p>
<div style="display: table; width: 0; margin-left: 3em; margin-right: auto"><pre> {
"authorization_endpoint":
"openid:",
"issuer":
"https://self-issued.me",
"scopes_supported":
["openid", "profile", "email", "address", "phone"],
"response_types_supported":
["id_token"],
"subject_types_supported":
["pairwise"],
"id_token_signing_alg_values_supported":
["RS256"],
"request_object_signing_alg_values_supported":
["none", "RS256"]
}
</pre>
</div>
<p>
</p>
<p>
NOTE: The OpenID Foundation plans to host the OpenID Provider site
<tt>https://self-issued.me/</tt>,
including its WebFinger service, so that performing discovery on it
returns the above static discovery information, enabling RPs
to not need any special processing for discovery of the Self-Issued OP.
This site will be hosted on an experimental basis.
Production implementations should not take a dependency upon it
without a subsequent commitment by the OpenID Foundation
to host the site in a manner intended for production use.
</p>
<a name="SelfIssuedRegistration"></a><br>
<hr>
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<a name="rfc.section.7.2"></a>
<h3>7.2.&nbsp;
Self-Issued OpenID Provider Registration</h3>
<p>
When using a Self-Issued OP, registration is not required.
The Client can proceed without registration as if it had
registered with the OP and obtained the following
Client Registration Response:
</p>
<p>
</p>
<blockquote class="text">
<dl>
<dt>client_id</dt>
<dd>
<tt>redirect_uri</tt> value of the Client.
</dd>
<dt>client_secret_expires_at</dt>
<dd>
0
</dd>
</dl>
</blockquote>
<p>
</p>
<p>
NOTE: The OpenID Foundation plans to host the (stateless) endpoint
<tt>https://self-issued.me/registration/1.0/</tt>
that returns the response above, enabling RPs to not need
any special processing for registration with the Self-Issued OP.
This site will be hosted on an experimental basis.
Production implementations should not take a dependency upon it
without a subsequent commitment by the OpenID Foundation
to host the site in a manner intended for production use.
</p>
<a name="RegistrationParameter"></a><br>
<hr>
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<a name="rfc.section.7.2.1"></a>
<h3>7.2.1.&nbsp;
Providing Information with the "registration" Request Parameter</h3>
<p>
OpenID Connect defines the following Authorization Request parameter
to enable Clients to provide additional registration information to
Self-Issued OpenID Providers:
</p>
<blockquote class="text">
<dl>
<dt>registration</dt>
<dd>
OPTIONAL.
This parameter is used by the Client to provide information about itself
to a Self-Issued OP that would normally be provided to an OP during
Dynamic Client Registration.
The value is a JSON object containing Client metadata values,
as defined in Section 2.1 of the
<a class="info" href="#OpenID.Registration">OpenID
Connect Dynamic Client Registration 1.0<span> (</span><span class="info">Sakimura, N., Bradley, J., and M. Jones, “OpenID Connect Dynamic Client Registration 1.0,” November&nbsp;2014.</span><span>)</span></a>
[OpenID.Registration]
specification.
The <tt>registration</tt> parameter SHOULD NOT be used
when the OP is not a Self-Issued OP.
</dd>
</dl>
</blockquote>
<p>
</p>
<p>
None of this information is REQUIRED by Self-Issued OPs,
so the use of this parameter is OPTIONAL.
</p>
<p>
The <tt>registration</tt> parameter value is represented
in an OAuth 2.0 request as a UTF-8 encoded JSON object
(which ends up being form-urlencoded when passed as an OAuth parameter).
When used in a Request Object value, per <a class="info"
href="#RequestObject">Section&nbsp;6.1<span> (</span><span
class="info">Passing a Request Object by Value</span><span>)</span></a>,
the JSON object is used as the value of the
<tt>registration</tt> member.
</p>
<p>
The Registration parameters that would typically be used in requests
to Self-Issued OPs are
<tt>policy_uri</tt>,
<tt>tos_uri</tt>, and
<tt>logo_uri</tt>.
If the Client uses more than one Redirection URI, the
<tt>redirect_uris</tt>
parameter would be used to register them.
Finally, if the Client is requesting encrypted responses, it would typically use the
<tt>jwks_uri</tt>,
<tt>id_token_encrypted_response_alg</tt> and
<tt>id_token_encrypted_response_enc</tt> parameters.
</p>
<a name="SelfIssuedRequest"></a><br>
<hr>
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<a name="rfc.section.7.3"></a>
<h3>7.3.&nbsp;
Self-Issued OpenID Provider Request</h3>
<p>The Client sends the Authentication Request to the Authorization Endpoint
with the following parameters:
</p>
<p>
</p>
<blockquote class="text">
<dl>
<dt>scope</dt>
<dd>
REQUIRED.
<tt>scope</tt> parameter value,
as specified in <a class="info"
href="#AuthorizationEndpoint">Section&nbsp;3.1.2<span> (</span><span
class="info">Authorization Endpoint</span><span>)</span></a>.
</dd>
<dt>response_type</dt>
<dd>
REQUIRED. Constant string value <tt>id_token</tt>.
</dd>
<dt>client_id</dt>
<dd>
REQUIRED.
Client ID value for the Client, which in this case contains the
<tt>redirect_uri</tt> value of the Client.
Since the Client's
<tt>redirect_uri</tt> URI value is communicated
as the Client ID,
a <tt>redirect_uri</tt> parameter
is NOT REQUIRED to also be included in the request.
</dd>
<dt>id_token_hint</dt>
<dd>
OPTIONAL.
<tt>id_token_hint</tt> parameter value,
as specified in <a class="info"
href="#AuthorizationEndpoint">Section&nbsp;3.1.2<span> (</span><span
class="info">Authorization Endpoint</span><span>)</span></a>.
If the ID Token is encrypted to the Self-Issued OP,
the <tt>sub</tt> (subject)
of the signed ID Token MUST be sent as the
<tt>kid</tt> (Key ID) of the JWE.
Encrypting content to Self-Issued OPs is currently only supported when
the OP's JWK key type is <tt>RSA</tt> and the encryption
algorithm used is <tt>RSA1_5</tt>.
</dd>
<dt>claims</dt>
<dd>
OPTIONAL.
<tt>claims</tt> parameter value,
as specified in <a class="info" href="#ClaimsParameter">Section&nbsp;5.5<span> (</span><span
class="info">Requesting Claims using the "claims" Request Parameter</span><span>)</span></a>.
</dd>
<dt>registration</dt>
<dd>
OPTIONAL.
This parameter is used by the Client to provide information about itself
to a Self-Issued OP that would normally be provided to an OP during
Dynamic Client Registration,
as specified in <a class="info"
href="#RegistrationParameter">Section&nbsp;7.2.1<span> (</span><span
class="info">Providing Information with the "registration" Request Parameter</span><span>)</span></a>.
</dd>
<dt>request</dt>
<dd>
OPTIONAL.
Request Object value, as specified in <a class="info"
href="#RequestObject">Section&nbsp;6.1<span> (</span><span
class="info">Passing a Request Object by Value</span><span>)</span></a>.
The Request Object MAY be encrypted to the Self-Issued OP by the Client.
In this case, the <tt>sub</tt> (subject) of
a previously issued ID Token for this Client
MUST be sent as the <tt>kid</tt> (Key ID) of the JWE.
Encrypting content to Self-Issued OPs is currently only supported when
the OP's JWK key type is <tt>RSA</tt> and the encryption
algorithm used is <tt>RSA1_5</tt>.
</dd>
</dl>
</blockquote>
<p>
</p>
<p>
Other parameters MAY be sent.
Note that all Claims are returned in the ID Token.
</p>
<p>The entire URL MUST NOT exceed 2048 ASCII characters.
</p>
<p>
The following is a non-normative example
HTTP 302 redirect response by the Client, which triggers
the User Agent to make an Authentication Request
to the Self-Issued OpenID Provider
(with line wraps within values for display purposes only):
</p>
<div style="display: table; width: 0; margin-left: 3em; margin-right: auto"><pre> HTTP/1.1 302 Found
Location: openid://?
response_type=id_token
&amp;client_id=https%3A%2F%2Fclient.example.org%2Fcb
&amp;scope=openid%20profile
&amp;state=af0ifjsldkj
&amp;nonce=n-0S6_WzA2Mj
&amp;registration=%7B%22logo_uri%22%3A%22https%3A%2F%2F
client.example.org%2Flogo.png%22%7D
</pre>
</div>
<a name="SelfIssuedResponse"></a><br>
<hr>
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<a name="rfc.section.7.4"></a>
<h3>7.4.&nbsp;
Self-Issued OpenID Provider Response</h3>
<p>
OpenID Connect defines the following Claim
for use in Self-Issued OpenID Provider Responses:
</p>
<blockquote class="text">
<dl>
<dt>sub_jwk</dt>
<dd>
REQUIRED.
Public key used to check the signature of an ID Token
issued by a Self-Issued OpenID Provider,
as specified in <a class="info" href="#SelfIssued">Section&nbsp;7<span> (</span><span
class="info">Self-Issued OpenID Provider</span><span>)</span></a>.
The key is a bare key in JWK <a class="info"
href="#JWK">[JWK]<span> (</span><span
class="info">Jones, M., “JSON Web Key (JWK),” July&nbsp;2014.</span><span>)</span></a> format
(not an X.509 certificate value).
The <tt>sub_jwk</tt> value is a JSON object.
Use of the <tt>sub_jwk</tt> Claim
is NOT RECOMMENDED when the OP is not Self-Issued.
</dd>
</dl>
</blockquote>
<p>
</p>
<p>
The Self-Issued OpenID Provider response is the same as the normal Implicit Flow
response with the following refinements. Since it is an Implicit Flow
response, the response parameters will be returned in the URL fragment component,
unless a different Response Mode was specified.
</p>
<p>
</p>
<ol class="text">
<li>
The <tt>iss</tt> (issuer) Claim Value is
<tt>https://self-issued.me</tt>.
</li>
<li>
A <tt>sub_jwk</tt> Claim is present, with its value being
the public key used to check the signature of the ID Token.
</li>
<li>
The <tt>sub</tt> (subject) Claim
value is the base64url encoded representation of
the thumbprint of
the key in the <tt>sub_jwk</tt> Claim.
This thumbprint value is computed as
the SHA-256 hash of
the octets of the UTF-8 representation of
a JWK constructed containing only the REQUIRED members to represent the key,
with the member names sorted into lexicographic order,
and with no white space or line breaks.
For instance,
when the <tt>kty</tt> value is
<tt>RSA</tt>, the member names
<tt>e</tt>,
<tt>kty</tt>, and
<tt>n</tt>
are the ones present in the constructed JWK used
in the thumbprint computation and appear in that order;
when the <tt>kty</tt> value is
<tt>EC</tt>, the member names
<tt>crv</tt>,
<tt>kty</tt>,
<tt>x</tt>, and
<tt>y</tt>
are present in that order.
Note that this thumbprint calculation is the same as that defined in
the JWK Thumbprint <a class="info" href="#JWK.Thumbprint">[JWK.Thumbprint]<span> (</span><span
class="info">Jones, M., “JSON Web Key (JWK) Thumbprint,” July&nbsp;2014.</span><span>)</span></a>
specification.
</li>
<li>
No Access Token is returned for accessing a UserInfo Endpoint,
so all Claims returned MUST be in the ID Token.
</li>
</ol>
<p>
</p>
<a name="SelfIssuedValidation"></a><br>
<hr>
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<a name="rfc.section.7.5"></a>
<h3>7.5.&nbsp;
Self-Issued ID Token Validation</h3>
<p>
To validate the ID Token received, the Client MUST do the following:
</p>
<p>
</p>
<ol class="text">
<li>
The Client MUST validate that the value of the <tt>iss</tt> (issuer) Claim is <tt>https://self-isued.me</tt>.
If <tt>iss</tt> contains a different value,
the ID Token is not Self-Issued, and instead
it MUST be validated according to
<a class="info" href="#IDTokenValidation">Section&nbsp;3.1.3.7<span> (</span><span
class="info">ID Token Validation</span><span>)</span></a>.
</li>
<li>
The Client MUST validate that the
<tt>aud</tt> (audience) Claim
contains the value of the <tt>redirect_uri</tt>
that the Client sent in the Authentication Request as an audience.
</li>
<li>
The Client MUST validate the signature of the ID Token according to
<a class="info" href="#JWS">JWS<span> (</span><span
class="info">Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, “JSON Web Signature (JWS),” July&nbsp;2014.</span><span>)</span></a>
[JWS] using the algorithm specified in the
<tt>alg</tt> Header Parameter of the JOSE Header,
using the key in the <tt>sub_jwk</tt> Claim;
the key is a bare key in JWK format
(not an X.509 certificate value).
</li>
<li>
The <tt>alg</tt> value SHOULD be the default of
<tt>RS256</tt>.
It MAY also be <tt>ES256</tt>.
</li>
<li>
The Client MUST validate that the <tt>sub</tt> Claim
value is the base64url encoded representation of
the thumbprint of
the key in the <tt>sub_jwk</tt> Claim,
as specified in <a class="info" href="#SelfIssuedResponse">Section&nbsp;7.4<span> (</span><span
class="info">Self-Issued OpenID Provider Response</span><span>)</span></a>.
</li>
<li>
The current time MUST be before the time represented by the
<tt>exp</tt> Claim
(possibly allowing for some small leeway to account for clock skew).
</li>
<li>
The <tt>iat</tt> Claim can be used to reject tokens that
were issued too far away from the current time, limiting the amount of
time that nonces need to be stored to prevent attacks.
The acceptable range is Client specific.
</li>
<li>
If a nonce value was sent in the Authentication Request,
a <tt>nonce</tt> Claim MUST be present
and its value checked to verify that
it is the same value as the one that was sent in the Authentication Request.
The Client SHOULD check the <tt>nonce</tt> value
for replay attacks.
The precise method for detecting replay attacks is Client specific.
</li>
</ol>
<p>
</p>
<p>The following is a non-normative example of a base64url decoded
Self-Issued ID Token
(with line wraps within values for display purposes only):
</p>
<div style="display: table; width: 0; margin-left: 3em; margin-right: auto"><pre> {
"iss": "https://self-issued.me",
"sub": "NzbLsXh8uDCcd-6MNwXF4W_7noWXFZAfHkxZsRGC9Xs",
"aud": "https://client.example.org/cb",
"nonce": "n-0S6_WzA2Mj",
"exp": 1311281970,
"iat": 1311280970,
"sub_jwk": {
"kty":"RSA",
"n": "0vx7agoebGcQSuuPiLJXZptN9nndrQmbXEps2aiAFbWhM78LhWx
4cbbfAAtVT86zwu1RK7aPFFxuhDR1L6tSoc_BJECPebWKRXjBZCiFV4n3oknjhMs
tn64tZ_2W-5JsGY4Hc5n9yBXArwl93lqt7_RN5w6Cf0h4QyQ5v-65YGjQR0_FDW2
QvzqY368QQMicAtaSqzs8KJZgnYb9c7d0zgdAZHzu6qMQvRL5hajrn1n91CbOpbI
SD08qNLyrdkt-bFTWhAI4vMQFh6WeZu0fM4lFd2NcRwr3XPksINHaQ-G_xBniIqb
w0Ls1jF44-csFCur-kEgU8awapJzKnqDKgw",
"e":"AQAB"
}
}
</pre>
</div>
<a name="SubjectIDTypes"></a><br>
<hr>
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<a name="rfc.section.8"></a>
<h3>8.&nbsp;
Subject Identifier Types</h3>
<p>
A Subject Identifier is a locally unique and never
reassigned identifier within the Issuer for the End-User,
which is intended to be consumed by the Client.
Two Subject Identifier types are defined by this specification:
</p>
<blockquote class="text">
<dl>
<dt>public</dt>
<dd>
This provides the same <tt>sub</tt> (subject) value to all Clients.
It is the default if the provider has no <tt>subject_types_supported</tt>
element in its discovery document.
</dd>
<dt>pairwise</dt>
<dd>
This provides a different <tt>sub</tt>
value to each Client, so as not to enable Clients to correlate
the End-User's activities without permission.
</dd>
</dl>
</blockquote>
<p>
</p>
<p>
The OpenID Provider's Discovery document SHOULD list
its supported Subject Identifier types in the
<tt>subject_types_supported</tt> element.
If there is more than one type listed in the array, the Client MAY elect to
provide its preferred identifier type using the
<tt>subject_type</tt> parameter during Registration.
</p>
<a name="PairwiseAlg"></a><br>
<hr>
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<a name="rfc.section.8.1"></a>
<h3>8.1.&nbsp;
Pairwise Identifier Algorithm</h3>
<p>
When pairwise Subject Identifiers are used,
the OpenID Provider MUST calculate a unique
<tt>sub</tt> (subject) value for each
Sector Identifier. The Subject Identifier value MUST NOT be reversible
by any party other than the OpenID Provider.
</p>
<p>
Providers that use pairwise <tt>sub</tt> values
and support
<a class="info" href="#OpenID.Registration">Dynamic Client
Registration<span> (</span><span class="info">Sakimura, N., Bradley, J., and M. Jones, “OpenID Connect Dynamic Client Registration 1.0,” November&nbsp;2014.</span><span>)</span></a>
[OpenID.Registration]
SHOULD use the <tt>sector_identifier_uri</tt> parameter.
It provides a way for a group of websites under common administrative
control to have consistent pairwise <tt>sub</tt>
values independent of the individual domain names.
It also provides a way for Clients to change
<tt>redirect_uri</tt> domains without having to
reregister all of their users.
</p>
<p>If the Client has not provided a value for
<tt>sector_identifier_uri</tt> in
<a class="info" href="#OpenID.Registration">Dynamic Client
Registration<span> (</span><span class="info">Sakimura, N., Bradley, J., and M. Jones, “OpenID Connect Dynamic Client Registration 1.0,” November&nbsp;2014.</span><span>)</span></a>
[OpenID.Registration],
the Sector Identifier
used for pairwise identifier calculation is the host component
of the registered <tt>redirect_uri</tt>.
If there are multiple hostnames in the registered
<tt>redirect_uris</tt>, the Client MUST register a
<tt>sector_identifier_uri</tt>.
</p>
<p>When a <tt>sector_identifier_uri</tt>
is provided, the host component of that URL is used as
the Sector Identifier for the pairwise identifier calculation.
The value of the <tt>sector_identifier_uri</tt>
MUST be a URL using the <tt>https</tt> scheme that points to
a JSON file containing an array of
<tt>redirect_uri</tt> values.
The values of the registered <tt>redirect_uris</tt>
MUST be included in the elements of the array.
</p>
<p>
Any algorithm with the following properties
can be used by OpenID Providers to
calculate pairwise Subject Identifiers:
</p>
<ul class="text">
<li>
The Subject Identifier value MUST NOT be reversible
by any party other than the OpenID Provider.
</li>
<li>
Distinct Sector Identifier values MUST result in
distinct Subject Identifier values.
</li>
<li>
The algorithm MUST be deterministic.
</li>
</ul>
<p>
</p>
<p>
Three example methods are:
</p>
<ol class="text">
<li>
The Sector Identifier can be concatenated with a local account ID and a salt
value that is kept secret by the Provider. The concatenated string is then
hashed using an appropriate algorithm.
<br>
<br>
Calculate <tt>sub</tt> = SHA-256 ( sector_identifier || local_account_id || salt ).
<br>
<br>
</li>
<li>
The Sector Identifier can be concatenated with a local account ID and a salt
value that is kept secret by the Provider. The concatenated string is then
encrypted using an appropriate algorithm.
<br>
<br>
Calculate <tt>sub</tt> = AES-128 ( sector_identifier || local_account_id || salt ).
<br>
<br>
</li>
<li>
The Issuer creates a Globally Unique Identifier (GUID) for the pair of
Sector Identifier and local account ID and stores this value.
</li>
</ol>
<p>
</p>
<a name="ClientAuthentication"></a><br>
<hr>
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<a name="rfc.section.9"></a>
<h3>9.&nbsp;
Client Authentication</h3>
<p>
This section defines a set of Client Authentication methods
that are used by Clients to authenticate to the Authorization Server
when using the Token Endpoint.
During Client Registration, the RP (Client) MAY register a Client Authentication method.
If no method is registered, the default method is <tt>client_secret_basic</tt>.
</p>
<p>These Client Authentication methods are:
</p>
<p>
</p>
<blockquote class="text">
<dl>
<dt>client_secret_basic</dt>
<dd>
Clients that have received a <tt>client_secret</tt> value
from the Authorization Server authenticate with the Authorization Server
in accordance with Section 2.3.1 of <a class="info"
href="#RFC6749">OAuth
2.0<span> (</span><span
class="info">Hardt, D., “The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework,” October&nbsp;2012.</span><span>)</span></a>
[RFC6749] using the HTTP Basic authentication scheme.
</dd>
<dt>client_secret_post</dt>
<dd>
Clients that have received a <tt>client_secret</tt> value
from the Authorization Server, authenticate with the Authorization Server
in accordance with Section 2.3.1 of <a class="info"
href="#RFC6749">OAuth
2.0<span> (</span><span
class="info">Hardt, D., “The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework,” October&nbsp;2012.</span><span>)</span></a>
[RFC6749] by including the Client Credentials in the request body.
</dd>
<dt>client_secret_jwt</dt>
<dd>
Clients that have received a <tt>client_secret</tt> value
from the Authorization Server create a JWT using an
HMAC SHA algorithm, such as HMAC SHA-256.
The HMAC (Hash-based Message Authentication Code) is calculated using
the octets of the UTF-8 representation of
the <tt>client_secret</tt> as the shared key.
</dd>
<dt></dt>
<dd>
The Client authenticates in accordance with <a class="info"
href="#OAuth.JWT">JSON
Web Token (JWT) Profile for OAuth 2.0 Client Authentication and Authorization Grants<span> (</span><span
class="info">Jones, M., Campbell, B., and C. Mortimore, “JSON Web Token (JWT) Profile for OAuth 2.0 Client Authentication and Authorization Grants,” July&nbsp;2014.</span><span>)</span></a>
[OAuth.JWT] and
<a class="info" href="#OAuth.Assertions">Assertion
Framework for OAuth 2.0 Client Authentication and Authorization Grants<span> (</span><span class="info">Campbell, B., Mortimore, C., Jones, M., and Y. Goland, “Assertion Framework for OAuth 2.0 Client Authentication and Authorization Grants,” July&nbsp;2014.</span><span>)</span></a>
[OAuth.Assertions].
The JWT MUST contain the following REQUIRED Claim Values and
MAY contain the following OPTIONAL Claim Values:
</dd>
<dt></dt>
<dd>
<blockquote class="text">
<dl>
<dt>iss</dt>
<dd>
REQUIRED.
Issuer.
This MUST contain the <tt>client_id</tt> of the OAuth Client.
</dd>
<dt>sub</dt>
<dd>
REQUIRED.
Subject.
This MUST contain the <tt>client_id</tt> of the OAuth Client.
</dd>
<dt>aud</dt>
<dd>
REQUIRED.
Audience.
The <tt>aud</tt> (audience) Claim.
Value that identifies the Authorization Server as an intended audience.
The Authorization Server MUST verify that it is an intended audience
for the token.
The Audience SHOULD be the URL of the
Authorization Server's Token Endpoint.
</dd>
<dt>jti</dt>
<dd>
REQUIRED.
JWT ID.
A unique identifier for the token,
which can be used to prevent reuse of the token.
These tokens MUST only be used once,
unless conditions for reuse were negotiated between the parties;
any such negotiation is beyond the scope of this specification.
</dd>
<dt>exp</dt>
<dd>
REQUIRED.
Expiration time on or after which the ID Token MUST NOT be
accepted for processing.
</dd>
<dt>iat</dt>
<dd>
OPTIONAL.
Time at which the JWT was issued.
</dd>
</dl>
</blockquote>
</dd>
<dt></dt>
<dd>
The JWT MAY contain other Claims.
Any Claims used that are not understood MUST be ignored.
</dd>
<dt></dt>
<dd>The authentication token MUST be sent as the value of the
<a class="info" href="#OAuth.Assertions">[OAuth.Assertions]<span> (</span><span
class="info">Campbell, B., Mortimore, C., Jones, M., and Y. Goland, “Assertion Framework for OAuth 2.0 Client Authentication and Authorization Grants,” July&nbsp;2014.</span><span>)</span></a>
<tt>client_assertion</tt> parameter.
</dd>
<dt></dt>
<dd>The value of the
<a class="info" href="#OAuth.Assertions">[OAuth.Assertions]<span> (</span><span
class="info">Campbell, B., Mortimore, C., Jones, M., and Y. Goland, “Assertion Framework for OAuth 2.0 Client Authentication and Authorization Grants,” July&nbsp;2014.</span><span>)</span></a>
<tt>client_assertion_type</tt> parameter
MUST be "urn:ietf:params:oauth:client-assertion-type:jwt-bearer",
per <a class="info" href="#OAuth.JWT">[OAuth.JWT]<span> (</span><span
class="info">Jones, M., Campbell, B., and C. Mortimore, “JSON Web Token (JWT) Profile for OAuth 2.0 Client Authentication and Authorization Grants,” July&nbsp;2014.</span><span>)</span></a>.
</dd>
<dt>private_key_jwt</dt>
<dd>
Clients that have registered a public key sign a JWT using
that key.
The Client authenticates in accordance with <a class="info"
href="#OAuth.JWT">JSON
Web Token (JWT) Profile for OAuth 2.0 Client Authentication and Authorization Grants<span> (</span><span
class="info">Jones, M., Campbell, B., and C. Mortimore, “JSON Web Token (JWT) Profile for OAuth 2.0 Client Authentication and Authorization Grants,” July&nbsp;2014.</span><span>)</span></a>
[OAuth.JWT] and
<a class="info" href="#OAuth.Assertions">Assertion
Framework for OAuth 2.0 Client Authentication and Authorization Grants<span> (</span><span class="info">Campbell, B., Mortimore, C., Jones, M., and Y. Goland, “Assertion Framework for OAuth 2.0 Client Authentication and Authorization Grants,” July&nbsp;2014.</span><span>)</span></a>
[OAuth.Assertions].
The JWT MUST contain the following REQUIRED Claim Values and
MAY contain the following OPTIONAL Claim Values:
</dd>
<dt></dt>
<dd>
<blockquote class="text">
<dl>
<dt>iss</dt>
<dd>
REQUIRED.
Issuer.
This MUST contain the <tt>client_id</tt> of the OAuth Client.
</dd>
<dt>sub</dt>
<dd>
REQUIRED.
Subject.
This MUST contain the <tt>client_id</tt> of the OAuth Client.
</dd>
<dt>aud</dt>
<dd>
REQUIRED.
Audience.
The <tt>aud</tt> (audience) Claim.
Value that identifies the Authorization Server as an intended audience.
The Authorization Server MUST verify that it is an intended audience
for the token.
The Audience SHOULD be the URL of the
Authorization Server's Token Endpoint.
</dd>
<dt>jti</dt>
<dd>
REQUIRED.
JWT ID.
A unique identifier for the token,
which can be used to prevent reuse of the token.
These tokens MUST only be used once,
unless conditions for reuse were negotiated between the parties;
any such negotiation is beyond the scope of this specification.
</dd>
<dt>exp</dt>
<dd>
REQUIRED.
Expiration time on or after which the ID Token MUST NOT be
accepted for processing.
</dd>
<dt>iat</dt>
<dd>
OPTIONAL.
Time at which the JWT was issued.
</dd>
</dl>
</blockquote>
</dd>
<dt></dt>
<dd>
The JWT MAY contain other Claims.
Any Claims used that are not understood MUST be ignored.
</dd>
<dt></dt>
<dd>The authentication token MUST be sent as the value of the
<a class="info" href="#OAuth.Assertions">[OAuth.Assertions]<span> (</span><span
class="info">Campbell, B., Mortimore, C., Jones, M., and Y. Goland, “Assertion Framework for OAuth 2.0 Client Authentication and Authorization Grants,” July&nbsp;2014.</span><span>)</span></a>
<tt>client_assertion</tt> parameter.
</dd>
<dt></dt>
<dd>The value of the
<a class="info" href="#OAuth.Assertions">[OAuth.Assertions]<span> (</span><span
class="info">Campbell, B., Mortimore, C., Jones, M., and Y. Goland, “Assertion Framework for OAuth 2.0 Client Authentication and Authorization Grants,” July&nbsp;2014.</span><span>)</span></a>
<tt>client_assertion_type</tt> parameter
MUST be "urn:ietf:params:oauth:client-assertion-type:jwt-bearer",
per <a class="info" href="#OAuth.JWT">[OAuth.JWT]<span> (</span><span
class="info">Jones, M., Campbell, B., and C. Mortimore, “JSON Web Token (JWT) Profile for OAuth 2.0 Client Authentication and Authorization Grants,” July&nbsp;2014.</span><span>)</span></a>.
</dd>
<dt></dt>
<dd>
<p>
For example
(with line wraps within values for display purposes only):
</p>
<div style="display: table; width: 0; margin-left: 3em; margin-right: auto"><pre> POST /token HTTP/1.1
Host: server.example.com
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
grant_type=authorization_code&amp;
code=i1WsRn1uB1&amp;
client_id=s6BhdRkqt3&amp;
client_assertion_type=
urn%3Aietf%3Aparams%3Aoauth%3Aclient-assertion-type%3Ajwt-bearer&amp;
client_assertion=PHNhbWxwOl ... ZT
</pre>
</div>
</dd>
<dt>none</dt>
<dd>
The Client does not authenticate itself at the Token Endpoint,
either because it uses only the Implicit Flow (and so does not use the Token Endpoint)
or because it is a Public Client with no Client Secret or other authentication mechanism.
</dd>
</dl>
</blockquote>
<p>
</p>
<a name="SigEnc"></a><br>
<hr>
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<a name="rfc.section.10"></a>
<h3>10.&nbsp;
Signatures and Encryption</h3>
<p>
Depending on the transport through which the messages are sent, the
integrity of the message might not be guaranteed and the originator of the
message might not be authenticated. To mitigate these risks,
ID Token, UserInfo Response, Request Object,
and Client Authentication JWT values can utilize
<a class="info" href="#JWS">JSON Web Signature
(JWS)<span> (</span><span class="info">Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, “JSON Web Signature (JWS),” July&nbsp;2014.</span><span>)</span></a>
[JWS] to sign their contents.
To achieve message confidentiality, these values can also use
<a class="info" href="#JWE">JSON Web Encryption
(JWE)<span> (</span><span class="info">Jones, M., Rescorla, E., and J. Hildebrand, “JSON Web Encryption (JWE),” July&nbsp;2014.</span><span>)</span></a>
[JWE] to encrypt their contents.
</p>
<p>
When the message is both signed and encrypted, it MUST be
signed first and then encrypted, per <a class="info"
href="#SigningOrder">Section&nbsp;16.14<span> (</span><span
class="info">Signing and Encryption Order</span><span>)</span></a>,
with the result being a Nested JWT, as specified in <a class="info"
href="#JWT">[JWT]<span> (</span><span
class="info">Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, “JSON Web Token (JWT),” July&nbsp;2014.</span><span>)</span></a>.
Note that all JWE encryption methods perform integrity checking.
</p>
<p>
The OP advertises its supported signing and encryption algorithms
in its Discovery document,
or may supply this information by other means.
The RP declares its required signing and encryption algorithms
in its Dynamic Registration request,
or may communicate this information by other means.
</p>
<p>
The OP advertises its public keys
via its Discovery document,
or may supply this information by other means.
The RP declares its public keys
via its Dynamic Registration request,
or may communicate this information by other means.
</p>
<a name="Signing"></a><br>
<hr>
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<a name="rfc.section.10.1"></a>
<h3>10.1.&nbsp;
Signing</h3>
<p>
The signing party MUST select a signature algorithm
based on the algorithms supported by the recipient.
</p>
<p>
</p>
<blockquote class="text">
<dl>
<dt>Asymmetric Signatures</dt>
<dd>
When using RSA or ECDSA Signatures,
the <tt>alg</tt> Header Parameter value
of the JOSE Header MUST be set to an appropriate algorithm
as defined in <a class="info" href="#JWA">JSON Web
Algorithms<span> (</span><span
class="info">Jones, M., “JSON Web Algorithms (JWA),” July&nbsp;2014.</span><span>)</span></a> [JWA].
The private key used to sign the content MUST be associated with
a public key used for signature verification published by the sender
in its JWK Set document.
If there are multiple keys in the referenced JWK Set document, a
<tt>kid</tt> value MUST be provided in the JOSE Header.
The key usage of the respective keys MUST support signing.
</dd>
<dt>Symmetric Signatures</dt>
<dd>
When using MAC-based signatures,
the <tt>alg</tt> Header Parameter value
of the JOSE Header MUST be set to a MAC algorithm,
as defined in <a class="info" href="#JWA">JSON Web
Algorithms<span> (</span><span
class="info">Jones, M., “JSON Web Algorithms (JWA),” July&nbsp;2014.</span><span>)</span></a> [JWA].
The MAC key used is
the octets of the UTF-8 representation of
the <tt>client_secret</tt> value.
See <a class="info" href="#SymmetricKeyEntropy">Section&nbsp;16.19<span> (</span><span
class="info">Symmetric Key Entropy</span><span>)</span></a> for a discussion of
entropy requirements for <tt>client_secret</tt> values.
Symmetric signatures MUST NOT be used by public (non-confidential) Clients
because of their inability to keep secrets.
</dd>
</dl>
</blockquote>
<p>
</p>
<p>
See <a class="info" href="#NeedForSignedRequests">Section&nbsp;16.20<span> (</span><span
class="info">Need for Signed Requests</span><span>)</span></a> for Security Considerations
about the need for signed requests.
</p>
<a name="RotateSigKeys"></a><br>
<hr>
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<a name="rfc.section.10.1.1"></a>
<h3>10.1.1.&nbsp;
Rotation of Asymmetric Signing Keys</h3>
<p>Rotation of signing keys can be accomplished with the following approach. The signer publishes
its keys in a JWK Set at its <tt>jwks_uri</tt> location
and includes the <tt>kid</tt> of the
signing key in the JOSE Header of each message
to indicate to the verifier which key is to be used to validate the signature. Keys can be rolled over
by periodically adding new keys to the JWK Set at the <tt>jwks_uri</tt> location.
The signer can begin using a new key at its
discretion and signals the change to the verifier using the <tt>kid</tt> value.
The verifier knows to go back to the <tt>jwks_uri</tt> location
to re-retrieve the keys when it sees an unfamiliar
<tt>kid</tt> value. The JWK Set document at the <tt>jwks_uri</tt>
SHOULD retain recently decommissioned signing keys for a reasonable period of time to facilitate a
smooth transition.
</p>
<a name="Encryption"></a><br>
<hr>
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<a name="rfc.section.10.2"></a>
<h3>10.2.&nbsp;
Encryption</h3>
<p>
The encrypting party MUST select an encryption algorithm
based on the algorithms supported by the recipient.
</p>
<p>
</p>
<blockquote class="text">
<dl>
<dt>Asymmetric Encryption: RSA</dt>
<dd>
The public key to which the content was encrypted MUST be
a public key used for encryption published by the recipient
in its JWK Set document.
If there are multiple keys in the referenced JWK Set document, a
<tt>kid</tt> value MUST be provided in the JOSE Header.
Use the supported RSA encryption algorithm to encrypt a random
Content Encryption Key to be used for encrypting
the signed JWT.
The key usage of the respective keys MUST include encryption.
</dd>
<dt>Asymmetric Encryption: Elliptic Curve</dt>
<dd>
Create an ephemeral Elliptic Curve public key for the <tt>epk</tt>
element of the JOSE Header.
The other public key used for the key agreement computation MUST be
a public key published by the recipient
in its JWK Set document.
If there are multiple keys in the referenced JWK Set document, a
<tt>kid</tt> value MUST be provided in the JOSE Header.
Use the ECDH-ES algorithm to agree upon a
Content Encryption Key to be used for encrypting
the signed JWT.
The key usage of the respective keys MUST support encryption.
</dd>
<dt>Symmetric Encryption</dt>
<dd>
The symmetric encryption key is derived from the
<tt>client_secret</tt> value by
using a left truncated SHA-2 hash of
the octets of the UTF-8 representation of
the <tt>client_secret</tt>.
For keys of 256 or fewer bits, SHA-256 is used;
for keys of 257-384 bits, SHA-384 is used;
for keys of 385-512 bits, SHA-512 is used.
The hash value MUST be left truncated to the appropriate bit length
for the AES key wrapping or direct encryption algorithm used,
for instance, truncating the SHA-256 hash
to 128 bits for <tt>A128KW</tt>.
If a symmetric key with greater than 512 bits is needed, a different method
of deriving the key from the <tt>client_secret</tt>
would have to be defined by an extension.
Symmetric encryption MUST NOT be used by public (non-confidential) Clients
because of their inability to keep secrets.
</dd>
</dl>
</blockquote>
<p>
</p>
<p>
See <a class="info" href="#NeedForEncryptedRequests">Section&nbsp;16.21<span> (</span><span
class="info">Need for Encrypted Requests</span><span>)</span></a> for Security Considerations
about the need for encrypted requests.
</p>
<a name="RotateEncKeys"></a><br>
<hr>
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<a name="rfc.section.10.2.1"></a>
<h3>10.2.1.&nbsp;
Rotation of Asymmetric Encryption Keys</h3>
<p>
Rotating encryption keys necessarily uses a different process than the one for signing keys because
the encrypting party starts the process and thus cannot rely on
a change in <tt>kid</tt> as a signal
that keys need to change. The encrypting party
still uses the <tt>kid</tt> Header Parameter in the JWE
to tell the decrypting party which private key to use to decrypt, however, the encrypting party
needs to first select the most appropriate key from those provided in the JWK Set at
the recipient's <tt>jwks_uri</tt> location.
</p>
<p>
To rotate keys, the decrypting party can publish new keys
at its <tt>jwks_uri</tt> location
and remove from the JWK Set those that are being decommissioned.
The <tt>jwks_uri</tt> SHOULD include a <tt>Cache-Control</tt>
header in the response that contains a <tt>max-age</tt> directive,
as defined in <a class="info" href="#RFC2616">RFC
2616<span> (</span><span class="info">Fielding, R., Gettys, J., Mogul, J., Frystyk, H., Masinter, L., Leach, P., and T. Berners-Lee, “Hypertext Transfer Protocol -- HTTP/1.1,” June&nbsp;1999.</span><span>)</span></a>
[RFC2616],
which enables the encrypting party to safely cache the JWK Set and not have to re-retrieve
the document for every encryption event. The decrypting party SHOULD remove decommissioned keys
from the JWK Set referenced by <tt>jwks_uri</tt>
but retain them internally for some reasonable
period of time, coordinated with the cache duration, to facilitate a smooth transition between keys
by allowing the encrypting party some time to obtain the new keys. The cache duration SHOULD also
be coordinated with the issuance of new signing keys, as described in <a class="info"
href="#RotateSigKeys">Section&nbsp;10.1.1<span> (</span><span
class="info">Rotation of Asymmetric Signing Keys</span><span>)</span></a>.
</p>
<a name="OfflineAccess"></a><br>
<hr>
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<a name="rfc.section.11"></a>
<h3>11.&nbsp;
Offline Access</h3>
<p>
OpenID Connect defines the following <tt>scope</tt> value
to request offline access:
</p>
<blockquote class="text">
<dl>
<dt>offline_access</dt>
<dd>
OPTIONAL. This scope value requests
that an OAuth 2.0 Refresh Token be issued that can be used to
obtain an Access Token that grants access to the End-User's
UserInfo Endpoint even when the End-User is not present (not logged in).
</dd>
</dl>
</blockquote>
<p>
</p>
<p>
When offline access is requested, a <tt>prompt</tt>
parameter value of <tt>consent</tt> MUST be used
unless other conditions for processing the request permitting offline access
to the requested resources are in place.
The OP MUST always obtain consent to returning a Refresh Token
that enables offline access to the requested resources.
A previously saved user consent is not always sufficient to grant offline access.
</p>
<p>
Upon receipt of a scope parameter containing the
<tt>offline_access</tt> value, the Authorization Server:
</p>
<ul class="text">
<li>
MUST ensure that the prompt parameter contains
<tt>consent</tt>
unless other conditions for processing the request permitting offline access
to the requested resources are in place;
unless one or both of these conditions are fulfilled, then
it MUST ignore the <tt>offline_access</tt> request,
</li>
<li>
MUST ignore the <tt>offline_access</tt> request
unless the Client is using a <tt>response_type</tt>
value that would result in an Authorization Code being returned,
</li>
<li>
MUST explicitly receive or have consent for all Clients when
the registered <tt>application_type</tt>
is <tt>web</tt>,
</li>
<li>
SHOULD explicitly receive or have consent for all Clients when
the registered <tt>application_type</tt>
is <tt>native</tt>.
</li>
</ul>
<p>
The use of Refresh Tokens is not exclusive to the
<tt>offline_access</tt> use case.
The Authorization Server MAY grant Refresh Tokens
in other contexts that are beyond the scope of this specification.
</p>
<a name="RefreshTokens"></a><br>
<hr>
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<a name="rfc.section.12"></a>
<h3>12.&nbsp;
Using Refresh Tokens</h3>
<p>
A request to the Token Endpoint can also use a Refresh Token
by using the <tt>grant_type</tt> value
<tt>refresh_token</tt>,
as described in Section 6 of
<a class="info" href="#RFC6749">OAuth 2.0<span> (</span><span
class="info">Hardt, D., “The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework,” October&nbsp;2012.</span><span>)</span></a>
[RFC6749].
This section defines the behaviors for OpenID Connect
Authorization Servers when Refresh Tokens are used.
</p>
<a name="RefreshingAccessToken"></a><br>
<hr>
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<a name="rfc.section.12.1"></a>
<h3>12.1.&nbsp;
Refresh Request</h3>
<p>
To refresh an Access Token, the Client MUST
authenticate to the Token Endpoint using the authentication method registered
for its <tt>client_id</tt>, as documented in
<a class="info"
href="#ClientAuthentication">Section&nbsp;9<span> (</span><span
class="info">Client Authentication</span><span>)</span></a>.
The Client sends the parameters via HTTP <tt>POST</tt>
to the Token Endpoint using
Form Serialization, per <a class="info"
href="#FormSerialization">Section&nbsp;13.2<span> (</span><span
class="info">Form Serialization</span><span>)</span></a>.
</p>
<p>
The following is a non-normative example of a
Refresh Request
(with line wraps within values for display purposes only):
</p>
<div style="display: table; width: 0; margin-left: 3em; margin-right: auto"><pre> POST /token HTTP/1.1
Host: server.example.com
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
client_id=s6BhdRkqt3
&amp;client_secret=some_secret12345
&amp;grant_type=refresh_token
&amp;refresh_token=8xLOxBtZp8
&amp;scope=openid%20profile
</pre>
</div>
<p>
The Authorization Server MUST validate the Refresh Token,
MUST verify that it was issued to the Client,
and must verify that the Client successfully authenticated
it has a Client Authentication method.
</p>
<a name="RefreshTokenResponse"></a><br>
<hr>
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<a name="rfc.section.12.2"></a>
<h3>12.2.&nbsp;
Successful Refresh Response</h3>
<p>
Upon successful validation of the Refresh Token,
the response body is the Token Response of <a class="info"
href="#TokenResponse">Section&nbsp;3.1.3.3<span> (</span><span
class="info">Successful Token Response</span><span>)</span></a>
except that it might not contain an <tt>id_token</tt>.
</p>
<p>
If an ID Token is returned as a result of a token refresh request,
the following requirements apply:
</p>
<ul class="text">
<li>
its <tt>iss</tt> Claim Value MUST be the same as
in the ID Token issued when the original authentication occurred,
</li>
<li>
its <tt>sub</tt> Claim Value MUST be the same as
in the ID Token issued when the original authentication occurred,
</li>
<li>
its <tt>iat</tt> Claim MUST represent
the time that the new ID Token is issued,
</li>
<li>
its <tt>aud</tt> Claim Value MUST be the same as
in the ID Token issued when the original authentication occurred,
</li>
<li>
if the ID Token contains an <tt>auth_time</tt> Claim,
its value MUST represent the time of the original authentication - not
the time that the new ID token is issued,
</li>
<li>
its <tt>azp</tt> Claim Value MUST be the same as
in the ID Token issued when the original authentication occurred;
if no <tt>azp</tt> Claim was present in the original
ID Token, one MUST NOT be present in the new ID Token, and
</li>
<li>
otherwise, the same rules apply as apply when issuing an ID Token
at the time of the original authentication.
</li>
</ul>
<p>
</p>
<p>
The following is a non-normative example of a
Refresh Response:
</p>
<div style="display: table; width: 0; margin-left: 3em; margin-right: auto"><pre> HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/json
Cache-Control: no-store
Pragma: no-cache
{
"access_token": "TlBN45jURg",
"token_type": "Bearer",
"refresh_token": "9yNOxJtZa5",
"expires_in": 3600
}
</pre>
</div>
<a name="RefreshErrorResponse"></a><br>
<hr>
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<a name="rfc.section.12.3"></a>
<h3>12.3.&nbsp;
Refresh Error Response</h3>
<p>If the Refresh Request is invalid or unauthorized, the
Authorization Server returns the
Token Error Response as defined in Section 5.2 of <a class="info"
href="#RFC6749">OAuth
2.0<span> (</span><span
class="info">Hardt, D., “The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework,” October&nbsp;2012.</span><span>)</span></a>
[RFC6749].
</p>
<a name="Serializations"></a><br>
<hr>
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<a name="rfc.section.13"></a>
<h3>13.&nbsp;
Serializations</h3>
<p>
Messages are serialized using one of the following methods:
</p>
<ol class="text">
<li>Query String Serialization
</li>
<li>Form Serialization
</li>
<li>JSON Serialization
</li>
</ol>
<p>
This section describes the syntax of these serialization methods;
other sections describe when they can and must be used.
Note that not all methods can be used for all messages.
</p>
<a name="QuerySerialization"></a><br>
<hr>
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<a name="rfc.section.13.1"></a>
<h3>13.1.&nbsp;
Query String Serialization</h3>
<p>In order to serialize the parameters using the Query String
Serialization, the Client constructs the string by adding the
parameters and values to the query component of a URL using the <tt>application/x-www-form-urlencoded</tt> format as
defined by <a class="info" href="#W3C.REC-html401-19991224">[W3C.REChtml40119991224]<span> (</span><span
class="info">Raggett, D., Hors, A., and I. Jacobs, “HTML 4.01 Specification,” December&nbsp;1999.</span><span>)</span></a>.
Query String Serialization is typically used in
HTTP <tt>GET</tt> requests.
The same serialization method is also used when adding
parameters to the fragment component of a URL.
</p>
<p>
The following is a non-normative example of this serialization
(with line wraps within values for display purposes only):
</p>
<div style="display: table; width: 0; margin-left: 3em; margin-right: auto"><pre> GET /authorize?
response_type=code
&amp;scope=openid
&amp;client_id=s6BhdRkqt3
&amp;redirect_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fclient.example.org%2Fcb HTTP/1.1
Host: server.example.com
</pre>
</div>
<a name="FormSerialization"></a><br>
<hr>
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<a name="rfc.section.13.2"></a>
<h3>13.2.&nbsp;
Form Serialization</h3>
<p>Parameters and their values are Form Serialized by adding the
parameter names and values to the entity body of the HTTP request using
the <tt>application/x-www-form-urlencoded</tt> format
as defined by <a class="info" href="#W3C.REC-html401-19991224">[W3C.REChtml40119991224]<span> (</span><span
class="info">Raggett, D., Hors, A., and I. Jacobs, “HTML 4.01 Specification,” December&nbsp;1999.</span><span>)</span></a>.
Form Serialization is typically used in HTTP <tt>POST</tt> requests.
</p>
<p>
The following is a non-normative example of this serialization
(with line wraps within values for display purposes only):
</p>
<div style="display: table; width: 0; margin-left: 3em; margin-right: auto"><pre> POST /authorize HTTP/1.1
Host: server.example.com
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
response_type=code
&amp;scope=openid
&amp;client_id=s6BhdRkqt3
&amp;redirect_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fclient.example.org%2Fcb
</pre>
</div>
<a name="JSONSerialization"></a><br>
<hr>
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<a name="rfc.section.13.3"></a>
<h3>13.3.&nbsp;
JSON Serialization</h3>
<p>
The parameters are serialized into a JSON object structure by adding each
parameter at the highest structure level. Parameter names and string
values are represented as JSON strings.
Numerical values are represented as JSON numbers.
Boolean values are represented as JSON booleans.
Omitted parameters and parameters with no value SHOULD be omitted
from the object and not represented by
a JSON <tt>null</tt> value, unless otherwise specified.
A parameter MAY have a JSON object or a JSON array as its value.
</p>
<p>
The following is a non-normative example of this serialization:
</p>
<div style="display: table; width: 0; margin-left: 3em; margin-right: auto"><pre> {
"access_token": "SlAV32hkKG",
"token_type": "Bearer",
"expires_in": 3600,
"refresh_token": "8xLOxBtZp8"
}
</pre>
</div>
<a name="StringOps"></a><br>
<hr>
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<a name="rfc.section.14"></a>
<h3>14.&nbsp;
String Operations</h3>
<p>
Processing some OpenID Connect messages requires comparing
values in the messages to known values. For example, the Claim
Names returned by the UserInfo Endpoint might be compared to
specific Claim Names such as <tt>sub</tt>. Comparing Unicode strings,
however, has significant security implications.
</p>
<p>
Therefore, comparisons between JSON strings and other Unicode
strings MUST be performed as specified below:
</p>
<ol class="text">
<li>
Remove any JSON applied escaping to produce an array of
Unicode code points.
</li>
<li>
Unicode Normalization <a class="info"
href="#USA15">[USA15]<span> (</span><span
class="info">Davis, M., Whistler, K., and M. Dürst, “Unicode Normalization Forms,” 09&nbsp;2009.</span><span>)</span></a>
MUST NOT
be applied at any point to either the JSON string or to
the string it is to be compared against.
</li>
<li>
Comparisons between the two strings MUST be performed as a
Unicode code point to code point equality comparison.
</li>
</ol>
<p>
</p>
<p>
In several places, this specification uses space delimited
lists of strings. In all such cases, a single ASCII space
character (0x20) MUST be used as the delimiter.
</p>
<a name="ImplementationConsiderations"></a><br>
<hr>
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<a name="rfc.section.15"></a>
<h3>15.&nbsp;
Implementation Considerations</h3>
<p>
This specification defines features used by both Relying Parties and
OpenID Providers.
It is expected that some OpenID Providers will require
static, out-of-band configuration of RPs using them,
whereas others will support dynamic usage by RPs without
a pre-established relationship between them.
For that reason, the mandatory-to-implement features for OPs
are listed below in two groups:
the first for all OPs and the second for "Dynamic" OpenID Providers.
</p>
<a name="ServerMTI"></a><br>
<hr>
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<a name="rfc.section.15.1"></a>
<h3>15.1.&nbsp;
Mandatory to Implement Features for All OpenID Providers</h3>
<p>
All OpenID Providers MUST implement the following features defined in this specification.
This list augments the set of features that are already listed elsewhere
as being "REQUIRED" or are described with a "MUST",
and so is not, by itself, a comprehensive set of implementation requirements for OPs.
</p>
<p>
</p>
<blockquote class="text">
<dl>
<dt>Signing ID Tokens with RSA SHA-256</dt>
<dd>
OPs MUST support signing ID Tokens with the RSA SHA-256 algorithm
(an <tt>alg</tt> value of
<tt>RS256</tt>),
unless the OP only supports returning ID Tokens from the Token Endpoint
(as is the case for the Authorization Code Flow)
and only allows Clients to register specifying
<tt>none</tt> as the requested ID Token signing algorithm.
</dd>
<dt>Prompt Parameter</dt>
<dd>
OPs MUST support the <tt>prompt</tt> parameter,
as defined in <a class="info"
href="#AuthorizationEndpoint">Section&nbsp;3.1.2<span> (</span><span
class="info">Authorization Endpoint</span><span>)</span></a>, including the specified
user interface behaviors such as <tt>none</tt>
and <tt>login</tt>.
</dd>
<dt>Display Parameter</dt>
<dd>
OPs MUST support the <tt>display</tt> parameter,
as defined in <a class="info"
href="#AuthorizationEndpoint">Section&nbsp;3.1.2<span> (</span><span
class="info">Authorization Endpoint</span><span>)</span></a>.
(Note that the minimum level of support required for this parameter is
simply that its use must not result in an error.)
</dd>
<dt>Preferred Locales</dt>
<dd>
OPs MUST support requests for preferred languages and scripts
for the user interface and for Claims via the
<tt>ui_locales</tt> and
<tt>claims_locales</tt> request parameters,
as defined in <a class="info"
href="#AuthorizationEndpoint">Section&nbsp;3.1.2<span> (</span><span
class="info">Authorization Endpoint</span><span>)</span></a>.
(Note that the minimum level of support required for these parameters is
simply to have their use not result in errors.)
</dd>
<dt>Authentication Time</dt>
<dd>
OPs MUST support returning the time at which the End-User authenticated
via the <tt>auth_time</tt> Claim, when requested,
as defined in <a class="info" href="#IDToken">Section&nbsp;2<span> (</span><span
class="info">ID Token</span><span>)</span></a>.
</dd>
<dt>Maximum Authentication Age</dt>
<dd>
OPs MUST support enforcing a maximum authentication age
via the <tt>max_age</tt> parameter,
as defined in <a class="info"
href="#AuthorizationEndpoint">Section&nbsp;3.1.2<span> (</span><span
class="info">Authorization Endpoint</span><span>)</span></a>.
</dd>
<dt>Authentication Context Class Reference</dt>
<dd>
OPs MUST support requests for specific
Authentication Context Class Reference values
via the <tt>acr_values</tt> parameter,
as defined in <a class="info"
href="#AuthorizationEndpoint">Section&nbsp;3.1.2<span> (</span><span
class="info">Authorization Endpoint</span><span>)</span></a>.
(Note that the minimum level of support required for this parameter is
simply to have its use not result in an error.)
</dd>
</dl>
</blockquote>
<p>
</p>
<a name="DynamicMTI"></a><br>
<hr>
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<a name="rfc.section.15.2"></a>
<h3>15.2.&nbsp;
Mandatory to Implement Features for Dynamic OpenID Providers</h3>
<p>
In addition to the features listed above,
OpenID Providers supporting dynamic establishment of relationships with RPs
that they do not have a pre-configured relationship with
MUST also implement the following features defined in this and related specifications.
</p>
<p>
</p>
<blockquote class="text">
<dl>
<dt>Response Types</dt>
<dd>
These OpenID Providers MUST support the
<tt>id_token</tt> Response Type and
all that are not Self-Issued OPs MUST also support the
<tt>code</tt> and
<tt>id_token&nbsp;token</tt> Response Types.
</dd>
<dt>Discovery</dt>
<dd>
These OPs MUST support Discovery,
as defined in
<a class="info" href="#OpenID.Discovery">OpenID Connect
Discovery 1.0<span> (</span><span class="info">Sakimura, N., Bradley, J., Jones, M., and E. Jay, “OpenID Connect Discovery 1.0,” November&nbsp;2014.</span><span>)</span></a>
[OpenID.Discovery].
</dd>
<dt>Dynamic Registration</dt>
<dd>
These OPs MUST support Dynamic Client Registration,
as defined in
<a class="info" href="#OpenID.Registration">OpenID
Connect Dynamic Client Registration 1.0<span> (</span><span class="info">Sakimura, N., Bradley, J., and M. Jones, “OpenID Connect Dynamic Client Registration 1.0,” November&nbsp;2014.</span><span>)</span></a>
[OpenID.Registration].
</dd>
<dt>UserInfo Endpoint</dt>
<dd>
All dynamic OPs that issue Access Tokens MUST support the UserInfo Endpoint,
as defined in <a class="info" href="#UserInfo">Section&nbsp;5.3<span> (</span><span
class="info">UserInfo Endpoint</span><span>)</span></a>.
(Self-Issued OPs do not issue Access Tokens.)
</dd>
<dt>Public Keys Published as Bare Keys</dt>
<dd>
These OPs MUST publish their public keys as bare JWK keys
(which MAY also be accompanied by X.509 representations of those keys).
</dd>
<dt>Request URI</dt>
<dd>
These OPs MUST support requests made using a Request Object value
that is retrieved from a Request URI that is provided
with the <tt>request_uri</tt> parameter,
as defined in <a class="info"
href="#AuthorizationEndpoint">Section&nbsp;3.1.2<span> (</span><span
class="info">Authorization Endpoint</span><span>)</span></a>.
</dd>
</dl>
</blockquote>
<p>
</p>
<a name="DiscoReg"></a><br>
<hr>
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<a name="rfc.section.15.3"></a>
<h3>15.3.&nbsp;
Discovery and Registration</h3>
<p>Some OpenID Connect installations can use a pre-configured set of
OpenID Providers and/or Relying Parties. In those cases, it might not be
necessary to support dynamic discovery of information about identities
or services or dynamic registration of Clients.
</p>
<p>However, if installations choose to support unanticipated
interactions between Relying Parties and OpenID Providers that do not
have pre-configured relationships, they SHOULD accomplish this by
implementing the facilities defined in the <a class="info"
href="#OpenID.Discovery">OpenID
Connect Discovery 1.0<span> (</span><span class="info">Sakimura, N., Bradley, J., Jones, M., and E. Jay, “OpenID Connect Discovery 1.0,” November&nbsp;2014.</span><span>)</span></a>
[OpenID.Discovery] and <a class="info"
href="#OpenID.Registration">OpenID
Connect Dynamic Client Registration 1.0<span> (</span><span class="info">Sakimura, N., Bradley, J., and M. Jones, “OpenID Connect Dynamic Client Registration 1.0,” November&nbsp;2014.</span><span>)</span></a>
[OpenID.Registration]
specifications.
</p>
<a name="RPMTI"></a><br>
<hr>
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<a name="rfc.section.15.4"></a>
<h3>15.4.&nbsp;
Mandatory to Implement Features for Relying Parties</h3>
<p>
In general, it is up to Relying Parties which features they use
when interacting with OpenID Providers.
However, some choices are dictated by the nature of their OAuth Client,
such as whether it is a Confidential Client, capable of keeping secrets,
in which case the Authorization Code Flow may be appropriate,
or whether it is a Public Client, for instance, a
User Agent Based Application or a statically registered Native Application,
in which case the Implicit Flow may be appropriate.
</p>
<p>
When using OpenID Connect features, those listed as being
"REQUIRED" or are described with a "MUST" are
mandatory to implement, when used by a Relying Party.
Likewise, those features that are described as "OPTIONAL"
need not be used or supported unless they provide value
in the particular application context.
Finally, when interacting with OpenID Providers that support Discovery,
the OP's Discovery document can be used to dynamically determine
which OP features are available for use by the RP.
</p>
<p>
</p>
<a name="ImplementationNotes"></a><br>
<hr>
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<a name="rfc.section.15.5"></a>
<h3>15.5.&nbsp;
Implementation Notes</h3>
<a name="CodeNotes"></a><br>
<hr>
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<a name="rfc.section.15.5.1"></a>
<h3>15.5.1.&nbsp;
Authorization Code Implementation Notes</h3>
<p>
When using the Authorization Code or Hybrid flows,
an ID Token is returned from the Token Endpoint
in response to a Token Request using an Authorization Code.
Some implementations may choose to encode state about
the ID Token to be returned in the Authorization Code value.
Others may use the Authorization Code value
as an index into a database storing this state.
</p>
<a name="NonceNotes"></a><br>
<hr>
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<a name="rfc.section.15.5.2"></a>
<h3>15.5.2.&nbsp;
Nonce Implementation Notes</h3>
<p>
The <tt>nonce</tt> parameter value needs to include
per-session state and be unguessable to attackers.
One method to achieve this for Web Server Clients is to store a cryptographically random value
as an HttpOnly session cookie and use a cryptographic hash of the value
as the <tt>nonce</tt> parameter.
In that case, the <tt>nonce</tt> in the returned
ID Token is compared to the hash of the session cookie
to detect ID Token replay by third parties.
A related method applicable to JavaScript Clients is to store the cryptographically random value
in HTML5 local storage and use a cryptographic hash of this value.
</p>
<a name="FragmentNotes"></a><br>
<hr>
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<a name="rfc.section.15.5.3"></a>
<h3>15.5.3.&nbsp;
Redirect URI Fragment Handling Implementation Notes</h3>
<p>
When response parameters are returned in the Redirection URI fragment value,
the Client needs to have the User Agent parse the fragment encoded values
and pass them to on to the Client's processing logic for consumption.
User Agents that have direct access to cryptographic APIs may be able to be
self-contained, for instance, with all Client code being written in JavaScript.
</p>
<p>
However, if the Client does not run entirely in the User Agent,
one way to achieve this
is to post them to a Web Server Client for validation.
</p>
<p>The following is an example of a JavaScript file that a Client might host at its
<tt>redirect_uri</tt>. This is loaded by the redirect from
the Authorization Server. The fragment component is parsed and then sent by <tt>POST</tt> to a URI
that will validate and use the information received.
</p>
<p>Following is a non-normative example of a
Redirect URI response:
</p>
<div style="display: table; width: 0; margin-left: 3em; margin-right: auto"><pre> GET /cb HTTP/1.1
Host: client.example.org
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: text/html
&lt;script type="text/javascript"&gt;
// First, parse the query string
var params = {}, postBody = location.hash.substring(1),
regex = /([^&amp;=]+)=([^&amp;]*)/g, m;
while (m = regex.exec(postBody)) {
params[decodeURIComponent(m[1])] = decodeURIComponent(m[2]);
}
// And send the token over to the server
var req = new XMLHttpRequest();
// using POST so query isn't logged
req.open('POST', 'https://' + window.location.host +
'/catch_response', true);
req.setRequestHeader('Content-Type',
'application/x-www-form-urlencoded');
req.onreadystatechange = function (e) {
if (req.readyState == 4) {
if (req.status == 200) {
// If the response from the POST is 200 OK, perform a redirect
window.location = 'https://'
+ window.location.host + '/redirect_after_login'
}
// if the OAuth response is invalid, generate an error message
else if (req.status == 400) {
alert('There was an error processing the token')
} else {
alert('Something other than 200 was returned')
}
}
};
req.send(postBody);
</pre>
</div>
<a name="CompatibilityNotes"></a><br>
<hr>
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<a name="rfc.section.15.6"></a>
<h3>15.6.&nbsp;
Compatibility Notes</h3>
<a name="PreFinalIETFSpecs"></a><br>
<hr>
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<a name="rfc.section.15.6.1"></a>
<h3>15.6.1.&nbsp;
Pre-Final IETF Specifications</h3>
<p>
Implementers should be aware that
this specification uses several IETF specifications that are
not yet final specifications. Those specifications are:
</p>
<ul class="text">
<li><a class="info" href="#JWT">JSON Web Token (JWT) draft
-25<span> (</span><span class="info">Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, “JSON Web Token (JWT),” July&nbsp;2014.</span><span>)</span></a>
[JWT]
</li>
<li><a class="info" href="#JWS">JSON Web Signature (JWS) draft
-31<span> (</span><span class="info">Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, “JSON Web Signature (JWS),” July&nbsp;2014.</span><span>)</span></a>
[JWS]
</li>
<li><a class="info" href="#JWE">JSON Web Encryption (JWE) draft
-31<span> (</span><span class="info">Jones, M., Rescorla, E., and J. Hildebrand, “JSON Web Encryption (JWE),” July&nbsp;2014.</span><span>)</span></a>
[JWE]
</li>
<li><a class="info" href="#JWK">JSON Web Key (JWK) draft
-31<span> (</span><span class="info">Jones, M., “JSON Web Key (JWK),” July&nbsp;2014.</span><span>)</span></a>
[JWK]
</li>
<li><a class="info" href="#JWA">JSON Web Algorithms draft
-31<span> (</span><span
class="info">Jones, M., “JSON Web Algorithms (JWA),” July&nbsp;2014.</span><span>)</span></a> [JWA]
</li>
<li><a class="info" href="#OAuth.Assertions">Assertion Framework
for OAuth 2.0 Client Authentication and Authorization Grants draft -17<span> (</span><span class="info">Campbell, B., Mortimore, C., Jones, M., and Y. Goland, “Assertion Framework for OAuth 2.0 Client Authentication and Authorization Grants,” July&nbsp;2014.</span><span>)</span></a>
[OAuth.Assertions]
</li>
<li><a class="info" href="#OAuth.JWT">JSON Web Token (JWT)
Profile for OAuth 2.0 Client Authentication and Authorization Grants draft -10<span> (</span><span class="info">Jones, M., Campbell, B., and C. Mortimore, “JSON Web Token (JWT) Profile for OAuth 2.0 Client Authentication and Authorization Grants,” July&nbsp;2014.</span><span>)</span></a>
[OAuth.JWT]
</li>
</ul>
<p>
</p>
<p>
While every effort will be made to prevent breaking
changes to these specifications, should they occur,
OpenID Connect implementations should continue to use the
specifically referenced draft versions above in preference
to the final versions, unless using a possible future
OpenID Connect profile or specification that
updates some or all of these references.
</p>
<a name="GoogleIss"></a><br>
<hr>
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<a name="rfc.section.15.6.2"></a>
<h3>15.6.2.&nbsp;
Google "iss" Value</h3>
<p>
Implementers may want to be aware that,
as of the time of this writing,
Google's deployed OpenID Connect implementation issues ID Tokens
that omit the required <tt>https://</tt>
scheme prefix from the <tt>iss</tt> (issuer)
Claim Value.
Relying Party implementations wishing to work with Google
will therefore need to have code to work around this,
until such time as their implementation is updated.
Any such workaround code should be written in a manner
that will not break at such point Google adds the
missing prefix to their issuer values.
</p>
<a name="RelatedSpecs"></a><br>
<hr>
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<a name="rfc.section.15.7"></a>
<h3>15.7.&nbsp;
Related Specifications and Implementer's Guides</h3>
<p>
These related OPTIONAL specifications MAY be used in
combination with this specification to provide additional functionality:
</p>
<ul class="text">
<li>
<a class="info" href="#OpenID.Discovery">OpenID Connect
Discovery 1.0<span> (</span><span class="info">Sakimura, N., Bradley, J., Jones, M., and E. Jay, “OpenID Connect Discovery 1.0,” November&nbsp;2014.</span><span>)</span></a>
[OpenID.Discovery] -
Defines how Relying Parties dynamically discover information about OpenID Providers
</li>
<li>
<a class="info" href="#OpenID.Registration">OpenID Connect
Dynamic Client Registration 1.0<span> (</span><span class="info">Sakimura, N., Bradley, J., and M. Jones, “OpenID Connect Dynamic Client Registration 1.0,” November&nbsp;2014.</span><span>)</span></a>
[OpenID.Registration] -
Defines how Relying Parties dynamically register with OpenID Providers
</li>
<li>
<a class="info" href="#OpenID.Session">OpenID Connect
Session Management 1.0<span> (</span><span class="info">Sakimura, N., Bradley, J., Jones, M., de Medeiros, B., Mortimore, C., and E. Jay, “OpenID Connect Session Management 1.0,” November&nbsp;2014.</span><span>)</span></a>
[OpenID.Session] -
Defines how to manage OpenID Connect sessions, including logout functionality
</li>
<li>
<a class="info" href="#OAuth.Post">OAuth 2.0 Form Post
Response Mode<span> (</span><span class="info">Jones, M. and B. Campbell, “OAuth 2.0 Form Post Response Mode,” February&nbsp;2014.</span><span>)</span></a>
[OAuth.Post] -
Defines how to return OAuth 2.0 Authorization Response parameters
(including OpenID Connect Authentication Response parameters)
using HTML form values that are auto-submitted by the User Agent
using HTTP <tt>POST</tt>
</li>
</ul>
<p>
</p>
<p>
These implementer's guides are intended to serve as self-contained references
for implementers of basic Web-based Relying Parties:
</p>
<ul class="text">
<li><a class="info" href="#OpenID.Basic">OpenID Connect Basic
Client Implementer's Guide 1.0<span> (</span><span class="info">Sakimura, N., Bradley, J., Jones, M., de Medeiros, B., and C. Mortimore, “OpenID Connect Basic Client Implementer's Guide 1.0,” November&nbsp;2014.</span><span>)</span></a>
[OpenID.Basic] -
Implementer's guide containing a subset of this specification
that is intended for use by basic
Web-based Relying Parties using the
OAuth Authorization Code Flow
</li>
<li><a class="info" href="#OpenID.Implicit">OpenID Connect
Implicit Client Implementer's Guide 1.0<span> (</span><span class="info">Sakimura, N., Bradley, J., Jones, M., de Medeiros, B., and C. Mortimore, “OpenID Connect Implicit Client Implementer's Guide 1.0,” November&nbsp;2014.</span><span>)</span></a>
[OpenID.Implicit] -
Implementer's guide containing a subset of this specification
that is intended for use by basic
Web-based Relying Parties using the
OAuth Implicit Flow
</li>
</ul>
<p>
</p>
<a name="Security"></a><br>
<hr>
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<a name="rfc.section.16"></a>
<h3>16.&nbsp;
Security Considerations</h3>
<p>
This specification references the security considerations defined in
Section 10 of <a class="info" href="#RFC6749">OAuth
2.0<span> (</span><span
class="info">Hardt, D., “The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework,” October&nbsp;2012.</span><span>)</span></a>
[RFC6749], and
Section 5 of <a class="info" href="#RFC6750">OAuth 2.0 Bearer
Token Usage<span> (</span><span class="info">Jones, M. and D. Hardt, “The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework: Bearer Token Usage,” October&nbsp;2012.</span><span>)</span></a>
[RFC6750].
Furthermore, the <a class="info" href="#RFC6819">OAuth 2.0
Threat Model and Security
Considerations<span> (</span><span class="info">Lodderstedt, T., McGloin, M., and P. Hunt, “OAuth 2.0 Threat Model and Security Considerations,” January&nbsp;2013.</span><span>)</span></a>
[RFC6819] specification provides an extensive list of threats and controls
that apply to this specification as well,
given that it is based upon OAuth 2.0.
<a class="info" href="#ISO29115">ISO/IEC
29115<span> (</span><span class="info">International Organization for Standardization, “ISO/IEC 29115:2013 -- Information technology - Security techniques - Entity authentication assurance framework,” March&nbsp;2013.</span><span>)</span></a>
[ISO29115]
also provides threats and controls that
implementers need to take into account.
Implementers are highly advised to
read these references in detail and apply the countermeasures described therein.
</p>
<p>
In addition, the following list of attack vectors and remedies are
also considered.
</p>
<a name="RequestDisclosure"></a><br>
<hr>
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<a name="rfc.section.16.1"></a>
<h3>16.1.&nbsp;
Request Disclosure</h3>
<p>If appropriate measures are not taken, a request might be disclosed to
an attacker, posing security and privacy threats.
</p>
<p>In addition to what is stated in Section 5.1.1 of <a class="info"
href="#RFC6819">[RFC6819]<span> (</span><span
class="info">Lodderstedt, T., McGloin, M., and P. Hunt, “OAuth 2.0 Threat Model and Security Considerations,” January&nbsp;2013.</span><span>)</span></a>,
this standard provides a way to provide the confidentiality of the request
end to end through the
use of <tt>request</tt> or <tt>request_uri</tt>
parameters, where the content of the <tt>request</tt>
is an encrypted JWT with the appropriate key and cipher.
This protects even against a compromised User Agent
in the case of indirect request.
</p>
<a name="ServerMasquerading"></a><br>
<hr>
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<a name="rfc.section.16.2"></a>
<h3>16.2.&nbsp;
Server Masquerading</h3>
<p>A malicious Server might masquerade as the legitimate server
using various means. To detect such an attack, the Client needs to authenticate
the server.
</p>
<p>In addition to what is stated in Section 5.1.2 of <a class="info"
href="#RFC6819">[RFC6819]<span> (</span><span
class="info">Lodderstedt, T., McGloin, M., and P. Hunt, “OAuth 2.0 Threat Model and Security Considerations,” January&nbsp;2013.</span><span>)</span></a>,
this standard provides a way to authenticate the Server through either the
use of Signed or Encrypted JWTs
with an appropriate key and cipher.
</p>
<a name="TokenManufacture"></a><br>
<hr>
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<a name="rfc.section.16.3"></a>
<h3>16.3.&nbsp;
Token Manufacture/Modification</h3>
<p>
An Attacker might generate a bogus token or modify the token contents
(such as Claims values or the signature)
of an existing parseable token, causing the RP to grant
inappropriate access to the Client. For example, an Attacker might modify
the parseable token to extend the validity period; a Client might modify the
parseable token to have access to information that they should not be able to view.
</p>
<p>There are two ways to mitigate this attack:
</p>
<p>
</p>
<ol class="text">
<li>The token can be digitally signed by the OP. The Relying
Party SHOULD validate the digital signature to verify that it was
issued by a legitimate OP.
</li>
<li>The token can be sent over a protected channel such as TLS.
See <a class="info" href="#TLSRequirements">Section&nbsp;16.17<span> (</span><span
class="info">TLS Requirements</span><span>)</span></a> for more information on using TLS.
In this specification, the token is always sent over a TLS protected channel.
Note however, that this measure is only a defense against third party attackers
and is not applicable to the case where the Client is the attacker.
</li>
</ol>
<p>
</p>
<a name="AccessTokenDisclosure"></a><br>
<hr>
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<a name="rfc.section.16.4"></a>
<h3>16.4.&nbsp;
Access Token Disclosure</h3>
<p>
Access Tokens are credentials used to access Protected
Resources, as defined in Section 1.4 of
<a class="info" href="#RFC6749">OAuth 2.0<span> (</span><span
class="info">Hardt, D., “The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework,” October&nbsp;2012.</span><span>)</span></a>
[RFC6749]. Access Tokens represent
an End-User's authorization and MUST NOT be exposed to
unauthorized parties.
</p>
<a name="ResponseDisclosure"></a><br>
<hr>
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<a name="rfc.section.16.5"></a>
<h3>16.5.&nbsp;
Server Response Disclosure</h3>
<p>
The server response might contain authentication data and Claims
that include sensitive Client information. Disclosure of the
response contents can make the Client vulnerable to other types of
attacks.
</p>
<p>
The server response disclosure can be mitigated in the following two
ways:
</p>
<ol class="text">
<li>Using the <tt>code</tt> Response Type.
The response is sent over a TLS protected
channel, where the Client is authenticated by the
<tt>client_id</tt> and
<tt>client_secret</tt>.
</li>
<li>For other Response Types,
the signed response can be encrypted with the Client's
public key or a shared secret as an encrypted JWT
with an appropriate key and cipher.
</li>
</ol>
<p>
</p>
<a name="ServerResponseRepudiation"></a><br>
<hr>
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<a name="rfc.section.16.6"></a>
<h3>16.6.&nbsp;
Server Response Repudiation</h3>
<p>A response might be repudiated by the server if the proper mechanisms are not in place.
For example, if a Server does not digitally sign a response, the Server can claim that it was not
generated through the services of the Server.
</p>
<p>To mitigate this threat, the response MAY be digitally signed by
the Server using a key that supports non-repudiation. The Client SHOULD validate
the digital signature to verify that it was issued by a legitimate
Server and its integrity is intact.
</p>
<a name="RequestRepudation"></a><br>
<hr>
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<a name="rfc.section.16.7"></a>
<h3>16.7.&nbsp;
Request Repudiation</h3>
<p>Since it is possible for a
compromised or malicious Client to send a request to the wrong party,
a Client that was authenticated
using only a bearer token can repudiate any transaction.
</p>
<p>To mitigate this threat, the Server MAY require that the
request be digitally signed by
the Client using a key that supports non-repudiation.
The Server SHOULD validate
the digital signature to verify that it was issued by a legitimate
Client and the integrity is intact.
</p>
<a name="AccessTokenRedirect"></a><br>
<hr>
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<a name="rfc.section.16.8"></a>
<h3>16.8.&nbsp;
Access Token Redirect</h3>
<p>An Attacker uses the Access Token generated for one resource to
obtain access to a second resource.
</p>
<p>To mitigate this threat, the Access Token SHOULD be audience
and scope restricted. One way of implementing it is to include
the identifier of the resource for whom it was generated as audience.
The resource verifies that
incoming tokens include its identifier as the audience of the
token.
</p>
<a name="TokenReuse"></a><br>
<hr>
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<a name="rfc.section.16.9"></a>
<h3>16.9.&nbsp;
Token Reuse</h3>
<p>An Attacker attempts to use a one-time use token such as
an Authorization Code that has already
been used once with the intended Resource.
To mitigate this threat, the token SHOULD include a timestamp
and a short validity lifetime.
The Relying Party then checks the timestamp and lifetime values
to ensure that the token is currently valid.
</p>
<p>Alternatively, the server MAY record the state of the use of
the token and check the status for each request.
</p>
<a name="AuthCodeCapture"></a><br>
<hr>
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<a name="rfc.section.16.10"></a>
<h3>16.10.&nbsp;
Eavesdropping or Leaking Authorization Codes (Secondary Authenticator Capture)</h3>
<p>In addition to the attack patterns described in
Section 4.4.1.1 of <a class="info"
href="#RFC6819">[RFC6819]<span> (</span><span
class="info">Lodderstedt, T., McGloin, M., and P. Hunt, “OAuth 2.0 Threat Model and Security Considerations,” January&nbsp;2013.</span><span>)</span></a>,
an Authorization Code can be captured in the User Agent where the TLS
session is terminated if the User Agent is infected by malware.
However, capturing it is not useful as long as either
Client Authentication or an encrypted response is used.
</p>
<a name="TokenSubstitution"></a><br>
<hr>
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<a name="rfc.section.16.11"></a>
<h3>16.11.&nbsp;
Token Substitution</h3>
<p>
Token Substitution is a class of attacks in which a malicious user
swaps various tokens, including swapping an Authorization Code for
a legitimate user with another token that the attacker has.
One means of accomplishing this is for the attacker to copy
a token out one session and use it in an HTTP message for
a different session, which is easy to do when the token is
available to the browser; this is known as the "cut and paste" attack.
</p>
<p>
The Implicit Flow of <a class="info" href="#RFC6749">OAuth
2.0<span> (</span><span
class="info">Hardt, D., “The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework,” October&nbsp;2012.</span><span>)</span></a>
[RFC6749]
is not designed to mitigate this risk. In Section 10.16,
it normatively requires that any use of the authorization
process as a form of delegated End-User authentication to the
Client MUST NOT use the Implicit Flow without employing
additional security mechanisms that enable the Client to
determine whether the ID Token and Access Token were issued for its use.
</p>
<p>
In OpenID Connect, this is mitigated through mechanisms
provided through the ID Token. The ID Token is a signed
security token that provides Claims such as
<tt>iss</tt> (issuer),
<tt>sub</tt> (subject),
<tt>aud</tt> (audience),
<tt>azp</tt> (authorized party),
<tt>at_hash</tt> (access token hash), and
<tt>c_hash</tt> (code hash). Using the ID Token,
the Client is capable of detecting the Token Substitution Attack.
</p>
<p>
The <tt>c_hash</tt> in the ID Token enables
Clients to prevent Authorization Code substitution.
The <tt>at_hash</tt> in the ID Token enables
Clients to prevent Access Token substitution.
</p>
<p>
Also, a malicious user may attempt to impersonate a more
privileged user by subverting the communication channel
between the Authorization Endpoint and Client, or the Token Endpoint
and Client, for example by swapping the Authorization Code
or reordering the messages, to convince the Token Endpoint
that the attacker's authorization grant corresponds to a grant
sent on behalf of a more privileged user.
</p>
<p>
For the HTTP binding defined by this specification, the
responses to Token Requests are bound to the corresponding
requests by message order in HTTP, as both the response
containing the token and requests are protected by TLS, which
will detect and prevent packet reordering.
</p>
<p>
When designing another binding of this specification to a
protocol incapable of strongly binding Token Endpoint
requests to responses, additional mechanisms to
address this issue MUST be utilized. One such mechanism could
be to include an ID Token with a <tt>c_hash</tt>
Claim in the token request and response.
</p>
<a name="TimingAttack"></a><br>
<hr>
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<a name="rfc.section.16.12"></a>
<h3>16.12.&nbsp;
Timing Attack</h3>
<p>A timing attack enables the attacker to
obtain an unnecessary large amount of information through the elapsed time
differences in the code paths taken by successful and unsuccessful decryption operations or
successful and unsuccessful signature validation of a message.
It can be used to reduce the effective key length of the
cipher used.
</p>
<p>Implementations SHOULD NOT terminate the validation process
at the instant of the finding an error but SHOULD continue
running until all the octets have been processed to avoid this attack.
</p>
<a name="OtherCryptoAttacks"></a><br>
<hr>
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<a name="rfc.section.16.13"></a>
<h3>16.13.&nbsp;
Other Crypto Related Attacks</h3>
<p>There are various crypto related attacks possible depending on the
method used for encryption and signature / integrity checking.
Implementers need to consult the Security Considerations
for the <a class="info" href="#JWT">JWT<span> (</span><span
class="info">Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, “JSON Web Token (JWT),” July&nbsp;2014.</span><span>)</span></a>
[JWT] specification and
specifications that it references
to avoid the vulnerabilities
identified in these specifications.
</p>
<a name="SigningOrder"></a><br>
<hr>
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<a name="rfc.section.16.14"></a>
<h3>16.14.&nbsp;
Signing and Encryption Order</h3>
<p>
Signatures over encrypted text are not considered valid
in many jurisdictions.
Therefore, for integrity and non-repudiation,
this specification requires signing
the plain text JSON Claims, when signing is performed.
If both signing and encryption are desired, it is performed on
the JWS containing the signed Claims,
with the result being a Nested JWT, as specified in <a class="info"
href="#JWT">[JWT]<span> (</span><span
class="info">Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, “JSON Web Token (JWT),” July&nbsp;2014.</span><span>)</span></a>.
Note that since all JWE encryption algorithms provide integrity protection,
there is no need to separately sign the encrypted content.
</p>
<a name="IssuerIdentifier"></a><br>
<hr>
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<a name="rfc.section.16.15"></a>
<h3>16.15.&nbsp;
Issuer Identifier</h3>
<p>OpenID Connect supports multiple Issuers per Host and Port combination.
The issuer returned by discovery MUST exactly match the value of
<tt>iss</tt> in the ID Token.
</p>
<p>
OpenID Connect treats the path component of any Issuer URI as
being part of the Issuer Identifier. For instance, the subject
"1234" with an Issuer Identifier of "https://example.com" is not
equivalent to the subject "1234" with an Issuer Identifier of
"https://example.com/sales".
</p>
<p>
It is RECOMMENDED that only a single Issuer per host be used.
However, if a host supports multiple tenants,
multiple Issuers for that host may be needed.
</p>
<a name="ImplicitFlowThreats"></a><br>
<hr>
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<a name="rfc.section.16.16"></a>
<h3>16.16.&nbsp;
Implicit Flow Threats</h3>
<p>In the Implicit Flow, the Access Token is returned in the
fragment component of the Client's <tt>redirect_uri</tt> through HTTPS, thus it is
protected between the OP and the User Agent, and between the User Agent and the
RP. The only place it can be captured is the User Agent where the
TLS session is terminated, which is possible if the User Agent is
infected by malware or under the control of a malicious party.
</p>
<a name="TLSRequirements"></a><br>
<hr>
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<a name="rfc.section.16.17"></a>
<h3>16.17.&nbsp;
TLS Requirements</h3>
<p>
Implementations MUST support TLS.
Which version(s) ought to be implemented will vary over
time, and depend on the widespread deployment and known
security vulnerabilities at the time of implementation.
At the time of this writing,
TLS version 1.2 <a class="info" href="#RFC5246">[RFC5246]<span> (</span><span
class="info">Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, “The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2,” August&nbsp;2008.</span><span>)</span></a>
is the most recent version, but has very limited actual
deployment, and might not be readily available in
implementation toolkits.
TLS version 1.0 <a class="info" href="#RFC2246">[RFC2246]<span> (</span><span
class="info">Dierks, T. and C. Allen, “The TLS Protocol Version 1.0,” January&nbsp;1999.</span><span>)</span></a>
is the most widely deployed version, and will give the
broadest interoperability.
</p>
<p>
To protect against information disclosure and tampering,
confidentiality protection MUST be applied using TLS
with a ciphersuite that provides confidentiality and
integrity protection.
</p>
<p>
Whenever TLS is used, a TLS server certificate check
MUST be performed, per <a class="info" href="#RFC6125">RFC
6125<span> (</span><span class="info">Saint-Andre, P. and J. Hodges, “Representation and Verification of Domain-Based Application Service Identity within Internet Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509 (PKIX) Certificates in the Context of Transport Layer Security (TLS),” March&nbsp;2011.</span><span>)</span></a>
[RFC6125].
</p>
<a name="TokenLifetime"></a><br>
<hr>
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<a name="rfc.section.16.18"></a>
<h3>16.18.&nbsp;
Lifetimes of Access Tokens and Refresh Tokens</h3>
<p>Access Tokens might not be revocable by the Authorization Server.
Access Token lifetimes SHOULD therefore be kept to single use or
very short lifetimes.
</p>
<p>
If ongoing access to the UserInfo Endpoint or other Protected Resources is required,
a Refresh Token can be used. The Client can then exchange the Refresh Token at
the Token Endpoint for a fresh short-lived Access Token that can be used to
access the resource.
</p>
<p>
The Authorization Server SHOULD clearly identify long-term grants to the User
during Authorization.
The Authorization Server SHOULD provide a mechanism for the End-User to revoke
Access Tokens and Refresh Tokens granted to a Client.
</p>
<a name="SymmetricKeyEntropy"></a><br>
<hr>
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<a name="rfc.section.16.19"></a>
<h3>16.19.&nbsp;
Symmetric Key Entropy</h3>
<p>
In <a class="info"
href="#Signing">Section&nbsp;10.1<span> (</span><span
class="info">Signing</span><span>)</span></a> and <a class="info"
href="#Encryption">Section&nbsp;10.2<span> (</span><span
class="info">Encryption</span><span>)</span></a>, keys are derived
from the <tt>client_secret</tt> value.
Thus, when used with symmetric signing or encryption operations,
<tt>client_secret</tt> values MUST contain
sufficient entropy to generate cryptographically strong keys.
Also, <tt>client_secret</tt> values MUST also contain
at least the minimum of number of octets required for MAC keys for the
particular algorithm used.
So for instance, for <tt>HS256</tt>, the
<tt>client_secret</tt> value MUST contain
at least 32 octets (and almost certainly SHOULD contain more,
since <tt>client_secret</tt> values are
likely to use a restricted alphabet).
</p>
<a name="NeedForSignedRequests"></a><br>
<hr>
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<a name="rfc.section.16.20"></a>
<h3>16.20.&nbsp;
Need for Signed Requests</h3>
<p>
In some situations, Clients might need to use signed requests to ensure that
the desired request parameters are delivered to the OP without having
been tampered with. For instance, the <tt>max_age</tt>
and <tt>acr_values</tt> provide more assurance about
the nature of the authentication performed when delivered in signed requests.
</p>
<a name="NeedForEncryptedRequests"></a><br>
<hr>
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<a name="rfc.section.16.21"></a>
<h3>16.21.&nbsp;
Need for Encrypted Requests</h3>
<p>
In some situations, knowing the contents of an OpenID Connect request can,
in and of itself, reveal sensitive information about the End-User.
For instance, knowing that the Client is requesting a particular Claim or
that it is requesting that a particular authentication method be used
can reveal sensitive information about the End-User.
OpenID Connect enables requests to be encrypted to the OpenID Provider
to prevent such potentially sensitive information from being revealed.
</p>
<a name="Privacy"></a><br>
<hr>
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<a name="rfc.section.17"></a>
<h3>17.&nbsp;
Privacy Considerations</h3>
<a name="PII"></a><br>
<hr>
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<a name="rfc.section.17.1"></a>
<h3>17.1.&nbsp;
Personally Identifiable Information</h3>
<p>The UserInfo Response typically contains Personally Identifiable
Information (PII). As such, End-User consent for the release of the information
for the specified purpose should be obtained at or prior to the
authorization time in accordance with relevant regulations. The purpose
of use is typically registered in association with the <tt>redirect_uris</tt>.
</p>
<p>Only necessary UserInfo data should be stored at the Client and the
Client SHOULD associate the received data with the purpose of use
statement.
</p>
<a name="AccessMonitoring"></a><br>
<hr>
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<a name="rfc.section.17.2"></a>
<h3>17.2.&nbsp;
Data Access Monitoring</h3>
<p>
The Resource Server SHOULD make End-Users' UserInfo access logs
available to them so that they can monitor who accessed their data.
</p>
<a name="Correlation"></a><br>
<hr>
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<a name="rfc.section.17.3"></a>
<h3>17.3.&nbsp;
Correlation</h3>
<p>To protect the End-User from a possible correlation among Clients, the
use of a Pairwise Pseudonymous Identifier (PPID) as the
<tt>sub</tt> (subject) SHOULD be considered.
</p>
<a name="OfflineAccessPrivacy"></a><br>
<hr>
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<a name="rfc.section.17.4"></a>
<h3>17.4.&nbsp;
Offline Access</h3>
<p>
Offline access enables access to Claims when the user is not present,
posing greater privacy risk than the Claims transfer when the user is present.
Therefore, it is prudent to obtain explicit consent for
offline access to resources.
This specification mandates the use of the <tt>prompt</tt>
parameter to obtain consent unless it is already known that the
request complies with the conditions for processing the request in each jurisdiction.
</p>
<p>
When an Access Token is returned via the User Agent
using the Implicit Flow or Hybrid Flow, there is
a greater risk of it being exposed to an attacker, who could
later use it to access the UserInfo endpoint.
If the Access Token does not enable offline access and the server
can differentiate whether the Client request has been made
offline or online, the risk will be substantially reduced.
Therefore, this specification mandates ignoring
the offline access request when the Access Token is
transmitted through the User Agent.
Note that differentiating between online and offline access
from the server can be difficult especially for native clients.
The server may well have to rely on heuristics.
Also, the risk of exposure for the Access Token delivered
through the User Agent for the Response Types of
<tt>code&nbsp;token</tt> and
<tt>token</tt> is the same.
Thus, the implementations should be prepared to detect
whether the Access Token was issued through the User Agent
or directly from the Token Endpoint and deny offline access
if the token was issued through the User Agent.
</p>
<p>
Note that although these provisions require an explicit
consent dialogue through the <tt>prompt</tt> parameter,
the mere fact that the user pressed an "accept" button etc.,
might not constitute a valid consent.
Developers should be aware that for the act of consent to
be valid, typically, the impact of the terms have to be
understood by the End-User, the consent must be freely given
and not forced (i.e., other options have to be available),
and the terms must fair and equitable.
In general, it is advisable for the service to follow the
required privacy principles in each jurisdiction and rely on
other conditions for processing the request than simply explicit consent,
as online self-service "explicit consent" often does not
form a valid consent in some jurisdictions.
</p>
<a name="IANA"></a><br>
<hr>
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<a name="rfc.section.18"></a>
<h3>18.&nbsp;
IANA Considerations</h3>
<a name="ClaimsRegistry"></a><br>
<hr>
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<a name="rfc.section.18.1"></a>
<h3>18.1.&nbsp;
JSON Web Token Claims Registration</h3>
<p>
This specification registers the Claims defined in
<a class="info"
href="#StandardClaims">Section&nbsp;5.1<span> (</span><span
class="info">Standard Claims</span><span>)</span></a> and <a class="info"
href="#IDToken">Section&nbsp;2<span> (</span><span
class="info">ID Token</span><span>)</span></a> in the IANA
JSON Web Token Claims registry
defined in <a class="info" href="#JWT">[JWT]<span> (</span><span
class="info">Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, “JSON Web Token (JWT),” July&nbsp;2014.</span><span>)</span></a>.
</p>
<a name="ClaimsContents"></a><br>
<hr>
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<a name="rfc.section.18.1.1"></a>
<h3>18.1.1.&nbsp;
Registry Contents</h3>
<p>
</p>
<ul class="text">
<li>
Claim Name: <tt>name</tt>
</li>
<li>
Claim Description: Full name
</li>
<li>
Change Controller: OpenID Foundation Artifact Binding Working Group - openid-specs-ab@lists.openid.net
</li>
<li>
Specification Document(s): <a class="info"
href="#StandardClaims">Section&nbsp;5.1<span> (</span><span
class="info">Standard Claims</span><span>)</span></a> of this document
</li>
</ul>
<p>
</p>
<p>
</p>
<ul class="text">
<li>
Claim Name: <tt>given_name</tt>
</li>
<li>
Claim Description: Given name(s) or first name(s)
</li>
<li>
Change Controller: OpenID Foundation Artifact Binding Working Group - openid-specs-ab@lists.openid.net
</li>
<li>
Specification Document(s): <a class="info"
href="#StandardClaims">Section&nbsp;5.1<span> (</span><span
class="info">Standard Claims</span><span>)</span></a> of this document
</li>
</ul>
<p>
</p>
<p>
</p>
<ul class="text">
<li>
Claim Name: <tt>family_name</tt>
</li>
<li>
Claim Description: Surname(s) or last name(s)
</li>
<li>
Change Controller: OpenID Foundation Artifact Binding Working Group - openid-specs-ab@lists.openid.net
</li>
<li>
Specification Document(s): <a class="info"
href="#StandardClaims">Section&nbsp;5.1<span> (</span><span
class="info">Standard Claims</span><span>)</span></a> of this document
</li>
</ul>
<p>
</p>
<p>
</p>
<ul class="text">
<li>
Claim Name: <tt>middle_name</tt>
</li>
<li>
Claim Description: Middle name(s)
</li>
<li>
Change Controller: OpenID Foundation Artifact Binding Working Group - openid-specs-ab@lists.openid.net
</li>
<li>
Specification Document(s): <a class="info"
href="#StandardClaims">Section&nbsp;5.1<span> (</span><span
class="info">Standard Claims</span><span>)</span></a> of this document
</li>
</ul>
<p>
</p>
<p>
</p>
<ul class="text">
<li>
Claim Name: <tt>nickname</tt>
</li>
<li>
Claim Description: Casual name
</li>
<li>
Change Controller: OpenID Foundation Artifact Binding Working Group - openid-specs-ab@lists.openid.net
</li>
<li>
Specification Document(s): <a class="info"
href="#StandardClaims">Section&nbsp;5.1<span> (</span><span
class="info">Standard Claims</span><span>)</span></a> of this document
</li>
</ul>
<p>
</p>
<p>
</p>
<ul class="text">
<li>
Claim Name: <tt>preferred_username</tt>
</li>
<li>
Claim Description: Shorthand name by which the End-User wishes to be referred to
</li>
<li>
Change Controller: OpenID Foundation Artifact Binding Working Group - openid-specs-ab@lists.openid.net
</li>
<li>
Specification Document(s): <a class="info"
href="#StandardClaims">Section&nbsp;5.1<span> (</span><span
class="info">Standard Claims</span><span>)</span></a> of this document
</li>
</ul>
<p>
</p>
<p>
</p>
<ul class="text">
<li>
Claim Name: <tt>profile</tt>
</li>
<li>
Claim Description: Profile page URL
</li>
<li>
Change Controller: OpenID Foundation Artifact Binding Working Group - openid-specs-ab@lists.openid.net
</li>
<li>
Specification Document(s): <a class="info"
href="#StandardClaims">Section&nbsp;5.1<span> (</span><span
class="info">Standard Claims</span><span>)</span></a> of this document
</li>
</ul>
<p>
</p>
<p>
</p>
<ul class="text">
<li>
Claim Name: <tt>picture</tt>
</li>
<li>
Claim Description: Profile picture URL
</li>
<li>
Change Controller: OpenID Foundation Artifact Binding Working Group - openid-specs-ab@lists.openid.net
</li>
<li>
Specification Document(s): <a class="info"
href="#StandardClaims">Section&nbsp;5.1<span> (</span><span
class="info">Standard Claims</span><span>)</span></a> of this document
</li>
</ul>
<p>
</p>
<p>
</p>
<ul class="text">
<li>
Claim Name: <tt>website</tt>
</li>
<li>
Claim Description: Web page or blog URL
</li>
<li>
Change Controller: OpenID Foundation Artifact Binding Working Group - openid-specs-ab@lists.openid.net
</li>
<li>
Specification Document(s): <a class="info"
href="#StandardClaims">Section&nbsp;5.1<span> (</span><span
class="info">Standard Claims</span><span>)</span></a> of this document
</li>
</ul>
<p>
</p>
<p>
</p>
<ul class="text">
<li>
Claim Name: <tt>email</tt>
</li>
<li>
Claim Description: Preferred e-mail address
</li>
<li>
Change Controller: OpenID Foundation Artifact Binding Working Group - openid-specs-ab@lists.openid.net
</li>
<li>
Specification Document(s): <a class="info"
href="#StandardClaims">Section&nbsp;5.1<span> (</span><span
class="info">Standard Claims</span><span>)</span></a> of this document
</li>
</ul>
<p>
</p>
<p>
</p>
<ul class="text">
<li>
Claim Name: <tt>email_verified</tt>
</li>
<li>
Claim Description: True if the e-mail address has been verified; otherwise false
</li>
<li>
Change Controller: OpenID Foundation Artifact Binding Working Group - openid-specs-ab@lists.openid.net
</li>
<li>
Specification Document(s): <a class="info"
href="#StandardClaims">Section&nbsp;5.1<span> (</span><span
class="info">Standard Claims</span><span>)</span></a> of this document
</li>
</ul>
<p>
</p>
<p>
</p>
<ul class="text">
<li>
Claim Name: <tt>gender</tt>
</li>
<li>
Claim Description: Gender
</li>
<li>
Change Controller: OpenID Foundation Artifact Binding Working Group - openid-specs-ab@lists.openid.net
</li>
<li>
Specification Document(s): <a class="info"
href="#StandardClaims">Section&nbsp;5.1<span> (</span><span
class="info">Standard Claims</span><span>)</span></a> of this document
</li>
</ul>
<p>
</p>
<p>
</p>
<ul class="text">
<li>
Claim Name: <tt>birthdate</tt>
</li>
<li>
Claim Description: Birthday
</li>
<li>
Change Controller: OpenID Foundation Artifact Binding Working Group - openid-specs-ab@lists.openid.net
</li>
<li>
Specification Document(s): <a class="info"
href="#StandardClaims">Section&nbsp;5.1<span> (</span><span
class="info">Standard Claims</span><span>)</span></a> of this document
</li>
</ul>
<p>
</p>
<p>
</p>
<ul class="text">
<li>
Claim Name: <tt>zoneinfo</tt>
</li>
<li>
Claim Description: Time zone
</li>
<li>
Change Controller: OpenID Foundation Artifact Binding Working Group - openid-specs-ab@lists.openid.net
</li>
<li>
Specification Document(s): <a class="info"
href="#StandardClaims">Section&nbsp;5.1<span> (</span><span
class="info">Standard Claims</span><span>)</span></a> of this document
</li>
</ul>
<p>
</p>
<p>
</p>
<ul class="text">
<li>
Claim Name: <tt>locale</tt>
</li>
<li>
Claim Description: Locale
</li>
<li>
Change Controller: OpenID Foundation Artifact Binding Working Group - openid-specs-ab@lists.openid.net
</li>
<li>
Specification Document(s): <a class="info"
href="#StandardClaims">Section&nbsp;5.1<span> (</span><span
class="info">Standard Claims</span><span>)</span></a> of this document
</li>
</ul>
<p>
</p>
<p>
</p>
<ul class="text">
<li>
Claim Name: <tt>phone_number</tt>
</li>
<li>
Claim Description: Preferred telephone number
</li>
<li>
Change Controller: OpenID Foundation Artifact Binding Working Group - openid-specs-ab@lists.openid.net
</li>
<li>
Specification Document(s): <a class="info"
href="#StandardClaims">Section&nbsp;5.1<span> (</span><span
class="info">Standard Claims</span><span>)</span></a> of this document
</li>
</ul>
<p>
</p>
<p>
</p>
<ul class="text">
<li>
Claim Name: <tt>phone_number_verified</tt>
</li>
<li>
Claim Description: True if the phone number has been verified; otherwise false
</li>
<li>
Change Controller: OpenID Foundation Artifact Binding Working Group - openid-specs-ab@lists.openid.net
</li>
<li>
Specification Document(s): <a class="info"
href="#StandardClaims">Section&nbsp;5.1<span> (</span><span
class="info">Standard Claims</span><span>)</span></a> of this document
</li>
</ul>
<p>
</p>
<p>
</p>
<ul class="text">
<li>
Claim Name: <tt>address</tt>
</li>
<li>
Claim Description: Preferred postal address
</li>
<li>
Change Controller: OpenID Foundation Artifact Binding Working Group - openid-specs-ab@lists.openid.net
</li>
<li>
Specification Document(s): <a class="info"
href="#StandardClaims">Section&nbsp;5.1<span> (</span><span
class="info">Standard Claims</span><span>)</span></a> of this document
</li>
</ul>
<p>
</p>
<p>
</p>
<ul class="text">
<li>
Claim Name: <tt>updated_at</tt>
</li>
<li>
Claim Description: Time the information was last updated
</li>
<li>
Change Controller: OpenID Foundation Artifact Binding Working Group - openid-specs-ab@lists.openid.net
</li>
<li>
Specification Document(s): <a class="info"
href="#StandardClaims">Section&nbsp;5.1<span> (</span><span
class="info">Standard Claims</span><span>)</span></a> of this document
</li>
</ul>
<p>
</p>
<p>
</p>
<ul class="text">
<li>
Claim Name: <tt>azp</tt>
</li>
<li>
Claim Description: Authorized party - the party to which the ID Token was issued
</li>
<li>
Change Controller: OpenID Foundation Artifact Binding Working Group - openid-specs-ab@lists.openid.net
</li>
<li>
Specification Document(s): <a class="info" href="#IDToken">Section&nbsp;2<span> (</span><span
class="info">ID Token</span><span>)</span></a> of this document
</li>
</ul>
<p>
</p>
<p>
</p>
<ul class="text">
<li>
Claim Name: <tt>nonce</tt>
</li>
<li>
Claim Description: Value used to associate a Client session with an ID Token
</li>
<li>
Change Controller: OpenID Foundation Artifact Binding Working Group - openid-specs-ab@lists.openid.net
</li>
<li>
Specification Document(s): <a class="info" href="#IDToken">Section&nbsp;2<span> (</span><span
class="info">ID Token</span><span>)</span></a> of this document
</li>
</ul>
<p>
</p>
<p>
</p>
<ul class="text">
<li>
Claim Name: <tt>auth_time</tt>
</li>
<li>
Claim Description: Time when the authentication occurred
</li>
<li>
Change Controller: OpenID Foundation Artifact Binding Working Group - openid-specs-ab@lists.openid.net
</li>
<li>
Specification Document(s): <a class="info" href="#IDToken">Section&nbsp;2<span> (</span><span
class="info">ID Token</span><span>)</span></a> of this document
</li>
</ul>
<p>
</p>
<p>
</p>
<ul class="text">
<li>
Claim Name: <tt>at_hash</tt>
</li>
<li>
Claim Description: Access Token hash value
</li>
<li>
Change Controller: OpenID Foundation Artifact Binding Working Group - openid-specs-ab@lists.openid.net
</li>
<li>
Specification Document(s): <a class="info" href="#IDToken">Section&nbsp;2<span> (</span><span
class="info">ID Token</span><span>)</span></a> of this document
</li>
</ul>
<p>
</p>
<p>
</p>
<ul class="text">
<li>
Claim Name: <tt>c_hash</tt>
</li>
<li>
Claim Description: Code hash value
</li>
<li>
Change Controller: OpenID Foundation Artifact Binding Working Group - openid-specs-ab@lists.openid.net
</li>
<li>
Specification Document(s): <a class="info"
href="#HybridIDToken">Section&nbsp;3.3.2.11<span> (</span><span
class="info">ID Token</span><span>)</span></a> of this document
</li>
</ul>
<p>
</p>
<p>
</p>
<ul class="text">
<li>
Claim Name: <tt>acr</tt>
</li>
<li>
Claim Description: Authentication Context Class Reference
</li>
<li>
Change Controller: OpenID Foundation Artifact Binding Working Group - openid-specs-ab@lists.openid.net
</li>
<li>
Specification Document(s): <a class="info" href="#IDToken">Section&nbsp;2<span> (</span><span
class="info">ID Token</span><span>)</span></a> of this document
</li>
</ul>
<p>
</p>
<p>
</p>
<ul class="text">
<li>
Claim Name: <tt>amr</tt>
</li>
<li>
Claim Description: Authentication Methods References
</li>
<li>
Change Controller: OpenID Foundation Artifact Binding Working Group - openid-specs-ab@lists.openid.net
</li>
<li>
Specification Document(s): <a class="info" href="#IDToken">Section&nbsp;2<span> (</span><span
class="info">ID Token</span><span>)</span></a> of this document
</li>
</ul>
<p>
</p>
<p>
</p>
<ul class="text">
<li>
Claim Name: <tt>sub_jwk</tt>
</li>
<li>
Claim Description: Public key used to check the signature of an ID Token
</li>
<li>
Change Controller: OpenID Foundation Artifact Binding Working Group - openid-specs-ab@lists.openid.net
</li>
<li>
Specification Document(s): <a class="info"
href="#SelfIssuedResponse">Section&nbsp;7.4<span> (</span><span
class="info">Self-Issued OpenID Provider Response</span><span>)</span></a> of this document
</li>
</ul>
<p>
</p>
<a name="OAuthParametersRegistry"></a><br>
<hr>
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<a name="rfc.section.18.2"></a>
<h3>18.2.&nbsp;
OAuth Parameters Registration</h3>
<p>
This specification registers the following parameters
in the IANA
OAuth Parameters registry
defined in <a class="info" href="#RFC6749">RFC
6749<span> (</span><span
class="info">Hardt, D., “The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework,” October&nbsp;2012.</span><span>)</span></a>
[RFC6749].
</p>
<a name="ParametersContents"></a><br>
<hr>
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<a name="rfc.section.18.2.1"></a>
<h3>18.2.1.&nbsp;
Registry Contents</h3>
<p>
</p>
<ul class="text">
<li>Parameter name: <tt>nonce</tt>
</li>
<li>Parameter usage location: Authorization Request
</li>
<li>Change controller: OpenID Foundation Artifact Binding Working Group - openid-specs-ab@lists.openid.net
</li>
<li>Specification document(s): <a class="info"
href="#AuthorizationEndpoint">Section&nbsp;3.1.2<span> (</span><span
class="info">Authorization Endpoint</span><span>)</span></a> of this document
</li>
<li>Related information: None
</li>
</ul>
<p>
</p>
<p>
</p>
<ul class="text">
<li>Parameter name: <tt>display</tt>
</li>
<li>Parameter usage location: Authorization Request
</li>
<li>Change controller: OpenID Foundation Artifact Binding Working Group - openid-specs-ab@lists.openid.net
</li>
<li>Specification document(s): <a class="info"
href="#AuthorizationEndpoint">Section&nbsp;3.1.2<span> (</span><span
class="info">Authorization Endpoint</span><span>)</span></a> of this document
</li>
<li>Related information: None
</li>
</ul>
<p>
</p>
<p>
</p>
<ul class="text">
<li>Parameter name: <tt>prompt</tt>
</li>
<li>Parameter usage location: Authorization Request
</li>
<li>Change controller: OpenID Foundation Artifact Binding Working Group - openid-specs-ab@lists.openid.net
</li>
<li>Specification document(s): <a class="info"
href="#AuthorizationEndpoint">Section&nbsp;3.1.2<span> (</span><span
class="info">Authorization Endpoint</span><span>)</span></a> of this document
</li>
<li>Related information: None
</li>
</ul>
<p>
</p>
<p>
</p>
<ul class="text">
<li>Parameter name: <tt>max_age</tt>
</li>
<li>Parameter usage location: Authorization Request
</li>
<li>Change controller: OpenID Foundation Artifact Binding Working Group - openid-specs-ab@lists.openid.net
</li>
<li>Specification document(s): <a class="info"
href="#AuthorizationEndpoint">Section&nbsp;3.1.2<span> (</span><span
class="info">Authorization Endpoint</span><span>)</span></a> of this document
</li>
<li>Related information: None
</li>
</ul>
<p>
</p>
<p>
</p>
<ul class="text">
<li>Parameter name: <tt>ui_locales</tt>
</li>
<li>Parameter usage location: Authorization Request
</li>
<li>Change controller: OpenID Foundation Artifact Binding Working Group - openid-specs-ab@lists.openid.net
</li>
<li>Specification document(s): <a class="info"
href="#AuthorizationEndpoint">Section&nbsp;3.1.2<span> (</span><span
class="info">Authorization Endpoint</span><span>)</span></a> of this document
</li>
<li>Related information: None
</li>
</ul>
<p>
</p>
<p>
</p>
<ul class="text">
<li>Parameter name: <tt>claims_locales</tt>
</li>
<li>Parameter usage location: Authorization Request
</li>
<li>Change controller: OpenID Foundation Artifact Binding Working Group - openid-specs-ab@lists.openid.net
</li>
<li>Specification document(s): <a class="info"
href="#ClaimsLanguagesAndScripts">Section&nbsp;5.2<span> (</span><span
class="info">Claims Languages and Scripts</span><span>)</span></a> of this document
</li>
<li>Related information: None
</li>
</ul>
<p>
</p>
<p>
</p>
<ul class="text">
<li>Parameter name: <tt>id_token_hint</tt>
</li>
<li>Parameter usage location: Authorization Request
</li>
<li>Change controller: OpenID Foundation Artifact Binding Working Group - openid-specs-ab@lists.openid.net
</li>
<li>Specification document(s): <a class="info"
href="#AuthorizationEndpoint">Section&nbsp;3.1.2<span> (</span><span
class="info">Authorization Endpoint</span><span>)</span></a> of this document
</li>
<li>Related information: None
</li>
</ul>
<p>
</p>
<p>
</p>
<ul class="text">
<li>Parameter name: <tt>login_hint</tt>
</li>
<li>Parameter usage location: Authorization Request
</li>
<li>Change controller: OpenID Foundation Artifact Binding Working Group - openid-specs-ab@lists.openid.net
</li>
<li>Specification document(s): <a class="info"
href="#AuthorizationEndpoint">Section&nbsp;3.1.2<span> (</span><span
class="info">Authorization Endpoint</span><span>)</span></a> of this document
</li>
<li>Related information: None
</li>
</ul>
<p>
</p>
<p>
</p>
<ul class="text">
<li>Parameter name: <tt>acr_values</tt>
</li>
<li>Parameter usage location: Authorization Request
</li>
<li>Change controller: OpenID Foundation Artifact Binding Working Group - openid-specs-ab@lists.openid.net
</li>
<li>Specification document(s): <a class="info"
href="#AuthorizationEndpoint">Section&nbsp;3.1.2<span> (</span><span
class="info">Authorization Endpoint</span><span>)</span></a> of this document
</li>
<li>Related information: None
</li>
</ul>
<p>
</p>
<p>
</p>
<ul class="text">
<li>Parameter name: <tt>claims</tt>
</li>
<li>Parameter usage location: Authorization Request
</li>
<li>Change controller: OpenID Foundation Artifact Binding Working Group - openid-specs-ab@lists.openid.net
</li>
<li>Specification document(s): <a class="info"
href="#ClaimsParameter">Section&nbsp;5.5<span> (</span><span
class="info">Requesting Claims using the "claims" Request Parameter</span><span>)</span></a> of this
document
</li>
<li>Related information: None
</li>
</ul>
<p>
</p>
<p>
</p>
<ul class="text">
<li>Parameter name: <tt>registration</tt>
</li>
<li>Parameter usage location: Authorization Request
</li>
<li>Change controller: OpenID Foundation Artifact Binding Working Group - openid-specs-ab@lists.openid.net
</li>
<li>Specification document(s): <a class="info"
href="#RegistrationParameter">Section&nbsp;7.2.1<span> (</span><span
class="info">Providing Information with the "registration" Request Parameter</span><span>)</span></a> of
this document
</li>
<li>Related information: None
</li>
</ul>
<p>
</p>
<p>
</p>
<ul class="text">
<li>Parameter name: <tt>request</tt>
</li>
<li>Parameter usage location: Authorization Request
</li>
<li>Change controller: OpenID Foundation Artifact Binding Working Group - openid-specs-ab@lists.openid.net
</li>
<li>Specification document(s): <a class="info"
href="#JWTRequests">Section&nbsp;6<span> (</span><span
class="info">Passing Request Parameters as JWTs</span><span>)</span></a> of this document
</li>
<li>Related information: None
</li>
</ul>
<p>
</p>
<p>
</p>
<ul class="text">
<li>Parameter name: <tt>request_uri</tt>
</li>
<li>Parameter usage location: Authorization Request
</li>
<li>Change controller: OpenID Foundation Artifact Binding Working Group - openid-specs-ab@lists.openid.net
</li>
<li>Specification document(s): <a class="info"
href="#JWTRequests">Section&nbsp;6<span> (</span><span
class="info">Passing Request Parameters as JWTs</span><span>)</span></a> of this document
</li>
<li>Related information: None
</li>
</ul>
<p>
</p>
<p>
</p>
<ul class="text">
<li>Parameter name: <tt>id_token</tt>
</li>
<li>Parameter usage location: Authorization Response,
Access Token Response
</li>
<li>Change controller: OpenID Foundation Artifact Binding Working Group - openid-specs-ab@lists.openid.net
</li>
<li>Specification document(s): <a class="info"
href="#TokenResponse">Section&nbsp;3.1.3.3<span> (</span><span
class="info">Successful Token Response</span><span>)</span></a> of this document
</li>
<li>Related information: None
</li>
</ul>
<p>
</p>
<a name="OAuthErrorRegistry"></a><br>
<hr>
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<a name="rfc.section.18.3"></a>
<h3>18.3.&nbsp;
OAuth Extensions Error Registration</h3>
<p>
This specification registers the following errors
in the IANA
OAuth Extensions Error registry
defined in <a class="info" href="#RFC6749">RFC
6749<span> (</span><span
class="info">Hardt, D., “The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework,” October&nbsp;2012.</span><span>)</span></a>
[RFC6749].
</p>
<a name="ErrorContents"></a><br>
<hr>
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<a name="rfc.section.18.3.1"></a>
<h3>18.3.1.&nbsp;
Registry Contents</h3>
<p>
</p>
<ul class="text">
<li>Error name: <tt>interaction_required</tt>
</li>
<li>Error usage location: Authorization Endpoint
</li>
<li>Related protocol extension: OpenID Connect
</li>
<li>Change controller: OpenID Foundation Artifact Binding Working Group - openid-specs-ab@lists.openid.net
</li>
<li>Specification document(s): <a class="info"
href="#AuthError">Section&nbsp;3.1.2.6<span> (</span><span
class="info">Authentication Error Response</span><span>)</span></a> of this document
</li>
</ul>
<p>
</p>
<p>
</p>
<ul class="text">
<li>Error name: <tt>login_required</tt>
</li>
<li>Error usage location: Authorization Endpoint
</li>
<li>Related protocol extension: OpenID Connect
</li>
<li>Change controller: OpenID Foundation Artifact Binding Working Group - openid-specs-ab@lists.openid.net
</li>
<li>Specification document(s): <a class="info"
href="#AuthError">Section&nbsp;3.1.2.6<span> (</span><span
class="info">Authentication Error Response</span><span>)</span></a> of this document
</li>
</ul>
<p>
</p>
<p>
</p>
<ul class="text">
<li>Error name: <tt>account_selection_required</tt>
</li>
<li>Error usage location: Authorization Endpoint
</li>
<li>Related protocol extension: OpenID Connect
</li>
<li>Change controller: OpenID Foundation Artifact Binding Working Group - openid-specs-ab@lists.openid.net
</li>
<li>Specification document(s): <a class="info"
href="#AuthError">Section&nbsp;3.1.2.6<span> (</span><span
class="info">Authentication Error Response</span><span>)</span></a> of this document
</li>
</ul>
<p>
</p>
<p>
</p>
<ul class="text">
<li>Error name: <tt>consent_required</tt>
</li>
<li>Error usage location: Authorization Endpoint
</li>
<li>Related protocol extension: OpenID Connect
</li>
<li>Change controller: OpenID Foundation Artifact Binding Working Group - openid-specs-ab@lists.openid.net
</li>
<li>Specification document(s): <a class="info"
href="#AuthError">Section&nbsp;3.1.2.6<span> (</span><span
class="info">Authentication Error Response</span><span>)</span></a> of this document
</li>
</ul>
<p>
</p>
<p>
</p>
<ul class="text">
<li>Error name: <tt>invalid_request_uri</tt>
</li>
<li>Error usage location: Authorization Endpoint
</li>
<li>Related protocol extension: OpenID Connect
</li>
<li>Change controller: OpenID Foundation Artifact Binding Working Group - openid-specs-ab@lists.openid.net
</li>
<li>Specification document(s): <a class="info"
href="#AuthError">Section&nbsp;3.1.2.6<span> (</span><span
class="info">Authentication Error Response</span><span>)</span></a> of this document
</li>
</ul>
<p>
</p>
<p>
</p>
<ul class="text">
<li>Error name: <tt>invalid_request_object</tt>
</li>
<li>Error usage location: Authorization Endpoint
</li>
<li>Related protocol extension: OpenID Connect
</li>
<li>Change controller: OpenID Foundation Artifact Binding Working Group - openid-specs-ab@lists.openid.net
</li>
<li>Specification document(s): <a class="info"
href="#AuthError">Section&nbsp;3.1.2.6<span> (</span><span
class="info">Authentication Error Response</span><span>)</span></a> of this document
</li>
</ul>
<p>
</p>
<p>
</p>
<ul class="text">
<li>Error name: <tt>request_not_supported</tt>
</li>
<li>Error usage location: Authorization Endpoint
</li>
<li>Related protocol extension: OpenID Connect
</li>
<li>Change controller: OpenID Foundation Artifact Binding Working Group - openid-specs-ab@lists.openid.net
</li>
<li>Specification document(s): <a class="info"
href="#AuthError">Section&nbsp;3.1.2.6<span> (</span><span
class="info">Authentication Error Response</span><span>)</span></a> of this document
</li>
</ul>
<p>
</p>
<p>
</p>
<ul class="text">
<li>Error name: <tt>request_uri_not_supported</tt>
</li>
<li>Error usage location: Authorization Endpoint
</li>
<li>Related protocol extension: OpenID Connect
</li>
<li>Change controller: OpenID Foundation Artifact Binding Working Group - openid-specs-ab@lists.openid.net
</li>
<li>Specification document(s): <a class="info"
href="#AuthError">Section&nbsp;3.1.2.6<span> (</span><span
class="info">Authentication Error Response</span><span>)</span></a> of this document
</li>
</ul>
<p>
</p>
<p>
</p>
<ul class="text">
<li>Error name: <tt>registration_not_supported</tt>
</li>
<li>Error usage location: Authorization Endpoint
</li>
<li>Related protocol extension: OpenID Connect
</li>
<li>Change controller: OpenID Foundation Artifact Binding Working Group - openid-specs-ab@lists.openid.net
</li>
<li>Specification document(s): <a class="info"
href="#AuthError">Section&nbsp;3.1.2.6<span> (</span><span
class="info">Authentication Error Response</span><span>)</span></a> of this document
</li>
</ul>
<p>
</p>
<a name="rfc.references"></a><br>
<hr>
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<a name="rfc.section.19"></a>
<h3>19.&nbsp;
References</h3>
<a name="rfc.references1"></a><br>
<hr>
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<h3>19.1.&nbsp;Normative References</h3>
<table width="99%" border="0">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="author-text" valign="top"><a name="CORS">[CORS]</a></td>
<td class="author-text">Opera Software ASA, “<a href="http://www.w3.org/TR/access-control/">Cross-Origin
Resource Sharing</a>,” July&nbsp;2010.
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="author-text" valign="top"><a name="E.164">[E.164]</a></td>
<td class="author-text">International Telecommunication Union, “<a
href="http://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-E.164-201011-I/en">E.164: The international public telecommunication
numbering plan</a>,” 2010.
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="author-text" valign="top"><a name="IANA.Language">[IANA.Language]</a></td>
<td class="author-text">Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA), “<a
href="http://www.iana.org/assignments/language-subtag-registry">Language Subtag Registry</a>,” 2005.
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="author-text" valign="top"><a name="ISO29115">[ISO29115]</a></td>
<td class="author-text">International Organization for Standardization, “<a
href="http://www.iso.org/iso/iso_catalogue/catalogue_tc/catalogue_detail.htm?csnumber=45138">ISO/IEC
29115:2013 --
Information technology - Security techniques - Entity authentication
assurance framework</a>,” ISO/IEC&nbsp;29115, March&nbsp;2013.
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="author-text" valign="top"><a name="ISO3166-1">[ISO3166-1]</a></td>
<td class="author-text">International Organization for
Standardization, “<a href="http://www.w3.org/WAI/ER/IG/ert/iso639.htm">ISO 3166-1:1997. Codes for the
representation of names of
countries and their subdivisions -- Part 1: Country codes</a>,” 1997.
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="author-text" valign="top"><a name="ISO639-1">[ISO639-1]</a></td>
<td class="author-text">International Organization for
Standardization, “ISO 639-1:2002. Codes for the representation of names of
languages -- Part 1: Alpha-2 code,” 2002.
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="author-text" valign="top"><a name="ISO8601-2004">[ISO8601-2004]</a></td>
<td class="author-text">International Organization for
Standardization, “ISO 8601:2004. Data elements and interchange formats - Information interchange -
Representation of dates and times,” 2004.
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="author-text" valign="top"><a name="JWA">[JWA]</a></td>
<td class="author-text">Jones, M., “<a href="http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-jose-json-web-algorithms">JSON
Web Algorithms (JWA)</a>,” draft-ietf-jose-json-web-algorithms (work in progress), July&nbsp;2014 (<a
href="http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-jose-json-web-algorithms-31">HTML</a>).
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="author-text" valign="top"><a name="JWE">[JWE]</a></td>
<td class="author-text">Jones, M., Rescorla, E., and J. Hildebrand, “<a
href="http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-jose-json-web-encryption">JSON Web Encryption (JWE)</a>,”
draft-ietf-jose-json-web-encryption (work in progress), July&nbsp;2014 (<a
href="http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-jose-json-web-encryption-31">HTML</a>).
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="author-text" valign="top"><a name="JWK">[JWK]</a></td>
<td class="author-text">Jones, M., “<a href="http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-jose-json-web-key">JSON Web
Key (JWK)</a>,” draft-ietf-jose-json-web-key (work in progress), July&nbsp;2014 (<a
href="http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-jose-json-web-key-31">HTML</a>).
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="author-text" valign="top"><a name="JWS">[JWS]</a></td>
<td class="author-text">Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, “<a
href="http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-jose-json-web-signature">JSON Web Signature (JWS)</a>,”
draft-ietf-jose-json-web-signature (work in progress), July&nbsp;2014 (<a
href="http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-jose-json-web-signature-31">HTML</a>).
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="author-text" valign="top"><a name="JWT">[JWT]</a></td>
<td class="author-text">Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, “<a
href="http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-json-web-token">JSON Web Token (JWT)</a>,”
draft-ietf-oauth-json-web-token (work in progress), July&nbsp;2014 (<a
href="http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-json-web-token-25">HTML</a>).
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="author-text" valign="top"><a name="OAuth.Assertions">[OAuth.Assertions]</a></td>
<td class="author-text">Campbell, B., Mortimore, C., Jones, M., and Y. Goland, “<a
href="http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-assertions">Assertion Framework for OAuth 2.0 Client
Authentication and Authorization Grants</a>,” draft-ietf-oauth-assertions (work in progress), July&nbsp;2014
(<a href="http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-assertions-17">HTML</a>).
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="author-text" valign="top"><a name="OAuth.JWT">[OAuth.JWT]</a></td>
<td class="author-text">Jones, M., Campbell, B., and C. Mortimore, “<a
href="http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-jwt-bearer">JSON Web Token (JWT) Profile for OAuth 2.0
Client Authentication and Authorization Grants</a>,” draft-ietf-oauth-jwt-bearer (work in progress), July&nbsp;2014
(<a href="http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-jwt-bearer-10">HTML</a>).
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="author-text" valign="top"><a name="OAuth.Responses">[OAuth.Responses]</a></td>
<td class="author-text">de Medeiros, B., Ed., Scurtescu, M., Tarjan, P., and M. Jones, “<a
href="http://openid.net/specs/oauth-v2-multiple-response-types-1_0.html">OAuth 2.0 Multiple Response
Type Encoding Practices</a>,” February&nbsp;2014.
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="author-text" valign="top"><a name="OpenID.Discovery">[OpenID.Discovery]</a></td>
<td class="author-text">Sakimura, N., Bradley, J., Jones, M., and E. Jay, “<a
href="http://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-discovery-1_0.html">OpenID Connect Discovery 1.0</a>,”
November&nbsp;2014.
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="author-text" valign="top"><a name="OpenID.Registration">[OpenID.Registration]</a></td>
<td class="author-text">Sakimura, N., Bradley, J., and M. Jones, “<a
href="http://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-registration-1_0.html">OpenID Connect Dynamic Client
Registration 1.0</a>,” November&nbsp;2014.
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="author-text" valign="top"><a name="RFC2119">[RFC2119]</a></td>
<td class="author-text"><a href="mailto:sob@harvard.edu">Bradner, S.</a>, “<a
href="http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2119">Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels</a>,”
BCP&nbsp;14, RFC&nbsp;2119, March&nbsp;1997 (<a href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119.txt">TXT</a>, <a
href="http://xml.resource.org/public/rfc/html/rfc2119.html">HTML</a>, <a
href="http://xml.resource.org/public/rfc/xml/rfc2119.xml">XML</a>).
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="author-text" valign="top"><a name="RFC2246">[RFC2246]</a></td>
<td class="author-text"><a href="mailto:tdierks@certicom.com">Dierks, T.</a> and <a
href="mailto:callen@certicom.com">C. Allen</a>, “<a href="http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2246">The TLS
Protocol Version 1.0</a>,” RFC&nbsp;2246, January&nbsp;1999 (<a
href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2246.txt">TXT</a>).
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="author-text" valign="top"><a name="RFC2616">[RFC2616]</a></td>
<td class="author-text"><a href="mailto:fielding@ics.uci.edu">Fielding, R.</a>, <a href="mailto:jg@w3.org">Gettys,
J.</a>, <a href="mailto:mogul@wrl.dec.com">Mogul, J.</a>, <a href="mailto:frystyk@w3.org">Frystyk, H.</a>,
<a href="mailto:masinter@parc.xerox.com">Masinter, L.</a>, <a href="mailto:paulle@microsoft.com">Leach,
P.</a>, and <a href="mailto:timbl@w3.org">T. Berners-Lee</a>, “<a
href="http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2616">Hypertext Transfer Protocol -- HTTP/1.1</a>,” RFC&nbsp;2616,
June&nbsp;1999 (<a href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2616.txt">TXT</a>, <a
href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2616.ps">PS</a>, <a
href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2616.pdf">PDF</a>, <a
href="http://xml.resource.org/public/rfc/html/rfc2616.html">HTML</a>, <a
href="http://xml.resource.org/public/rfc/xml/rfc2616.xml">XML</a>).
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="author-text" valign="top"><a name="RFC3339">[RFC3339]</a></td>
<td class="author-text"><a href="mailto:GK@ACM.ORG">Klyne, G., Ed.</a> and <a
href="mailto:chris.newman@sun.com">C. Newman</a>, “<a href="http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3339">Date and
Time on the Internet: Timestamps</a>,” RFC&nbsp;3339, July&nbsp;2002 (<a
href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc3339.txt">TXT</a>, <a
href="http://xml.resource.org/public/rfc/html/rfc3339.html">HTML</a>, <a
href="http://xml.resource.org/public/rfc/xml/rfc3339.xml">XML</a>).
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="author-text" valign="top"><a name="RFC3966">[RFC3966]</a></td>
<td class="author-text">Schulzrinne, H., “<a href="http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3966">The tel URI for Telephone
Numbers</a>,” RFC&nbsp;3966, December&nbsp;2004 (<a href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc3966.txt">TXT</a>).
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="author-text" valign="top"><a name="RFC3986">[RFC3986]</a></td>
<td class="author-text"><a href="mailto:timbl@w3.org">Berners-Lee, T.</a>, <a href="mailto:fielding@gbiv.com">Fielding,
R.</a>, and <a href="mailto:LMM@acm.org">L. Masinter</a>, “<a href="http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3986">Uniform
Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax</a>,” STD&nbsp;66, RFC&nbsp;3986, January&nbsp;2005 (<a
href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc3986.txt">TXT</a>, <a
href="http://xml.resource.org/public/rfc/html/rfc3986.html">HTML</a>, <a
href="http://xml.resource.org/public/rfc/xml/rfc3986.xml">XML</a>).
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="author-text" valign="top"><a name="RFC4627">[RFC4627]</a></td>
<td class="author-text">Crockford, D., “<a href="http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4627">The application/json Media
Type for JavaScript Object Notation (JSON)</a>,” RFC&nbsp;4627, July&nbsp;2006 (<a
href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4627.txt">TXT</a>).
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="author-text" valign="top"><a name="RFC5246">[RFC5246]</a></td>
<td class="author-text">Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, “<a href="http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246">The Transport
Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2</a>,” RFC&nbsp;5246, August&nbsp;2008 (<a
href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5246.txt">TXT</a>).
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="author-text" valign="top"><a name="RFC5322">[RFC5322]</a></td>
<td class="author-text"><a href="mailto:presnick@qualcomm.com">Resnick, P., Ed.</a>, “<a
href="http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5322">Internet Message Format</a>,” RFC&nbsp;5322, October&nbsp;2008
(<a href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5322.txt">TXT</a>, <a
href="http://xml.resource.org/public/rfc/html/rfc5322.html">HTML</a>, <a
href="http://xml.resource.org/public/rfc/xml/rfc5322.xml">XML</a>).
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="author-text" valign="top"><a name="RFC5646">[RFC5646]</a></td>
<td class="author-text">Phillips, A. and M. Davis, “<a href="http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5646">Tags for
Identifying Languages</a>,” BCP&nbsp;47, RFC&nbsp;5646, September&nbsp;2009 (<a
href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5646.txt">TXT</a>).
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="author-text" valign="top"><a name="RFC6125">[RFC6125]</a></td>
<td class="author-text">Saint-Andre, P. and J. Hodges, “<a href="http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6125">Representation
and Verification of Domain-Based Application Service Identity within Internet Public Key Infrastructure
Using X.509 (PKIX) Certificates in the Context of Transport Layer Security (TLS)</a>,” RFC&nbsp;6125, March&nbsp;2011
(<a href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6125.txt">TXT</a>).
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="author-text" valign="top"><a name="RFC6711">[RFC6711]</a></td>
<td class="author-text">Johansson, L., “<a href="http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6711">An IANA Registry for Level
of Assurance (LoA) Profiles</a>,” RFC&nbsp;6711, August&nbsp;2012 (<a
href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6711.txt">TXT</a>).
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="author-text" valign="top"><a name="RFC6749">[RFC6749]</a></td>
<td class="author-text">Hardt, D., “<a href="http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749">The OAuth 2.0 Authorization
Framework</a>,” RFC&nbsp;6749, October&nbsp;2012 (<a
href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6749.txt">TXT</a>).
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="author-text" valign="top"><a name="RFC6750">[RFC6750]</a></td>
<td class="author-text">Jones, M. and D. Hardt, “<a href="http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6750">The OAuth 2.0
Authorization Framework: Bearer Token Usage</a>,” RFC&nbsp;6750, October&nbsp;2012 (<a
href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6750.txt">TXT</a>).
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="author-text" valign="top"><a name="RFC6819">[RFC6819]</a></td>
<td class="author-text">Lodderstedt, T., McGloin, M., and P. Hunt, “<a
href="http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6819">OAuth 2.0 Threat Model and Security Considerations</a>,” RFC&nbsp;6819,
January&nbsp;2013 (<a href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6819.txt">TXT</a>).
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="author-text" valign="top"><a name="USA15">[USA15]</a></td>
<td class="author-text"><a href="mailto:markdavis@google.com">Davis, M.</a>, <a href="mailto:ken@unicode.org">Whistler,
K.</a>, and M. Dürst, “Unicode Normalization Forms,” Unicode Standard Annex&nbsp;15, 09&nbsp;2009.
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="author-text" valign="top"><a name="W3C.REC-html401-19991224">[W3C.REC-html401-19991224]</a></td>
<td class="author-text">Raggett, D., Hors, A., and I. Jacobs, “<a
href="http://www.w3.org/TR/1999/REC-html401-19991224">HTML 4.01 Specification</a>,” World Wide Web
Consortium Recommendation&nbsp;REC-html401-19991224, December&nbsp;1999 (<a
href="http://www.w3.org/TR/1999/REC-html401-19991224">HTML</a>).
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="author-text" valign="top"><a name="zoneinfo">[zoneinfo]</a></td>
<td class="author-text">Public Domain, “<a href="http://www.twinsun.com/tz/tz-link.htm">The tz database</a>,”
June&nbsp;2011.
</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<a name="rfc.references2"></a><br>
<hr>
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<h3>19.2.&nbsp;Informative References</h3>
<table width="99%" border="0">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="author-text" valign="top"><a name="JWK.Thumbprint">[JWK.Thumbprint]</a></td>
<td class="author-text"><a href="mailto:mbj@microsoft.com">Jones, M.</a>, “<a
href="http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-jones-jose-jwk-thumbprint">JSON Web Key (JWK) Thumbprint</a>,”
draft-jones-jose-jwk-thumbprint (work in progress), July&nbsp;2014 (<a
href="http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-jones-jose-jwk-thumbprint-01">HTML</a>).
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="author-text" valign="top"><a name="OAuth.Post">[OAuth.Post]</a></td>
<td class="author-text">Jones, M. and B. Campbell, “<a
href="http://openid.net/specs/oauth-v2-form-post-response-mode-1_0.html">OAuth 2.0 Form Post Response
Mode</a>,” February&nbsp;2014.
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="author-text" valign="top"><a name="OpenID.2.0">[OpenID.2.0]</a></td>
<td class="author-text">OpenID Foundation, “OpenID Authentication 2.0,” December&nbsp;2007 (<a
href="http://openid.net/specs/openid-authentication-2_0.txt">TXT</a>, <a
href="http://openid.net/specs/openid-authentication-2_0.html">HTML</a>).
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="author-text" valign="top"><a name="OpenID.Basic">[OpenID.Basic]</a></td>
<td class="author-text">Sakimura, N., Bradley, J., Jones, M., de Medeiros, B., and C. Mortimore, “<a
href="http://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-basic-1_0.html">OpenID Connect Basic Client Implementer's
Guide 1.0</a>,” November&nbsp;2014.
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="author-text" valign="top"><a name="OpenID.Implicit">[OpenID.Implicit]</a></td>
<td class="author-text">Sakimura, N., Bradley, J., Jones, M., de Medeiros, B., and C. Mortimore, “<a
href="http://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-implicit-1_0.html">OpenID Connect Implicit Client
Implementer's Guide 1.0</a>,” November&nbsp;2014.
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="author-text" valign="top"><a name="OpenID.PAPE">[OpenID.PAPE]</a></td>
<td class="author-text"><a href="mailto:david@sixapart.com">Recordon, D.</a>, <a
href="mailto:mbj@microsoft.com">Jones, M.</a>, <a href="mailto:johnny.bufu@gmail.com">Bufu, J., Ed.</a>,
<a href="mailto:cygnus@janrain.com">Daugherty, J., Ed.</a>, and <a href="mailto:n-sakimura@nri.co.jp">N.
Sakimura</a>, “OpenID Provider
Authentication Policy Extension 1.0,” December&nbsp;2008 (<a
href="http://openid.net/specs/openid-provider-authentication-policy-extension-1_0.txt">TXT</a>, <a
href="http://openid.net/specs/openid-provider-authentication-policy-extension-1_0.html">HTML</a>).
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="author-text" valign="top"><a name="OpenID.Session">[OpenID.Session]</a></td>
<td class="author-text">Sakimura, N., Bradley, J., Jones, M., de Medeiros, B., Mortimore, C., and E. Jay, “<a
href="http://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-session-1_0.html">OpenID Connect Session Management 1.0</a>,”
November&nbsp;2014.
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="author-text" valign="top"><a name="RFC4949">[RFC4949]</a></td>
<td class="author-text">Shirey, R., “<a href="http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4949">Internet Security Glossary,
Version 2</a>,” RFC&nbsp;4949, August&nbsp;2007 (<a href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4949.txt">TXT</a>).
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="author-text" valign="top"><a name="X.1252">[X.1252]</a></td>
<td class="author-text">International Telecommunication Union, “<a
href="http://www.itu.int/rec/dologin_pub.asp?lang=e&id=T-REC-X.1252-201004-I!!PDF-E&type=items">ITU-T
Recommendation X.1252 -- Cyberspace security -- Identity management
-- Baseline identity management terms and definitions</a>,” ITU-T&nbsp;X.1252, November&nbsp;2010.
</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<a name="AuthorizationExamples"></a><br>
<hr>
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<a name="rfc.section.A"></a>
<h3>Appendix A.&nbsp;
Authorization Examples</h3>
<p>
The following are non-normative examples of Authorization Requests with
different <tt>response_type</tt> values and their responses
(with line wraps within values for display purposes only):
</p>
<a name="codeExample"></a><br>
<hr>
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<a name="rfc.section.A.1"></a>
<h3>A.1.&nbsp;
Example using response_type=code</h3>
<div style="display: table; width: 0; margin-left: 3em; margin-right: auto"><pre> GET /authorize?
response_type=code
&amp;client_id=s6BhdRkqt3
&amp;redirect_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fclient.example.org%2Fcb
&amp;scope=openid%20profile%20email
&amp;nonce=n-0S6_WzA2Mj
&amp;state=af0ifjsldkj HTTP/1.1
Host: server.example.com
HTTP/1.1 302 Found
Location: https://client.example.org/cb?
code=Qcb0Orv1zh30vL1MPRsbm-diHiMwcLyZvn1arpZv-Jxf_11jnpEX3Tgfvk
&amp;state=af0ifjsldkj
</pre>
</div>
<a name="id_tokenExample"></a><br>
<hr>
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<a name="rfc.section.A.2"></a>
<h3>A.2.&nbsp;
Example using response_type=id_token</h3>
<div style="display: table; width: 0; margin-left: 3em; margin-right: auto"><pre> GET /authorize?
response_type=id_token
&amp;client_id=s6BhdRkqt3
&amp;redirect_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fclient.example.org%2Fcb
&amp;scope=openid%20profile%20email
&amp;nonce=n-0S6_WzA2Mj
&amp;state=af0ifjsldkj HTTP/1.1
Host: server.example.com
HTTP/1.1 302 Found
Location: https://client.example.org/cb#
id_token=eyJraWQiOiIxZTlnZGs3IiwiYWxnIjoiUlMyNTYifQ.ewogImlz
cyI6ICJodHRwOi8vc2VydmVyLmV4YW1wbGUuY29tIiwKICJzdWIiOiAiMjQ4
Mjg5NzYxMDAxIiwKICJhdWQiOiAiczZCaGRSa3F0MyIsCiAibm9uY2UiOiAi
bi0wUzZfV3pBMk1qIiwKICJleHAiOiAxMzExMjgxOTcwLAogImlhdCI6IDEz
MTEyODA5NzAsCiAibmFtZSI6ICJKYW5lIERvZSIsCiAiZ2l2ZW5fbmFtZSI6
ICJKYW5lIiwKICJmYW1pbHlfbmFtZSI6ICJEb2UiLAogImdlbmRlciI6ICJm
ZW1hbGUiLAogImJpcnRoZGF0ZSI6ICIwMDAwLTEwLTMxIiwKICJlbWFpbCI6
ICJqYW5lZG9lQGV4YW1wbGUuY29tIiwKICJwaWN0dXJlIjogImh0dHA6Ly9l
eGFtcGxlLmNvbS9qYW5lZG9lL21lLmpwZyIKfQ.rHQjEmBqn9Jre0OLykYNn
spA10Qql2rvx4FsD00jwlB0Sym4NzpgvPKsDjn_wMkHxcp6CilPcoKrWHcip
R2iAjzLvDNAReF97zoJqq880ZD1bwY82JDauCXELVR9O6_B0w3K-E7yM2mac
AAgNCUwtik6SjoSUZRcf-O5lygIyLENx882p6MtmwaL1hd6qn5RZOQ0TLrOY
u0532g9Exxcm-ChymrB4xLykpDj3lUivJt63eEGGN6DH5K6o33TcxkIjNrCD
4XB1CKKumZvCedgHHF3IAK4dVEDSUoGlH9z4pP_eWYNXvqQOjGs-rDaQzUHl
6cQQWNiDpWOl_lxXjQEvQ
&amp;state=af0ifjsldkj
</pre>
</div>
<p>
The value of the <tt>id_token</tt> parameter is the ID Token,
which is a signed JWT,
containing three base64url encoded segments separated by period ('.') characters.
The first segment represents the JOSE Header.
Base64url decoding it will result in the following set of Header Parameters:
</p>
<div style="display: table; width: 0; margin-left: 3em; margin-right: auto"><pre> {"kid":"1e9gdk7","alg":"RS256"}
</pre>
</div>
<p>
The <tt>alg</tt> value represents the algorithm
that was used to sign the JWT, in this case
<tt>RS256</tt>, representing RSASSA-PKCS-v1_5 using SHA-256.
The <tt>kid</tt> value is a key identifier used
in identifying the key to be used to verify the signature.
If the <tt>kid</tt> value is unknown to the RP,
it needs to retrieve the contents of the OP's JWK Set again
to obtain the OP's current set of keys.
</p>
<p>
The second segment represents the Claims in the ID Token.
Verifying and decoding the ID Token will yield the following Claims:
</p>
<div style="display: table; width: 0; margin-left: 3em; margin-right: auto"><pre> {
"iss": "http://server.example.com",
"sub": "248289761001",
"aud": "s6BhdRkqt3",
"nonce": "n-0S6_WzA2Mj",
"exp": 1311281970,
"iat": 1311280970,
"name": "Jane Doe",
"given_name": "Jane",
"family_name": "Doe",
"gender": "female",
"birthdate": "0000-10-31",
"email": "janedoe@example.com",
"picture": "http://example.com/janedoe/me.jpg"
}
</pre>
</div>
<p>
The third segment represents the ID Token signature,
which is verified as described in <a class="info" href="#JWS">[JWS]<span> (</span><span
class="info">Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, “JSON Web Signature (JWS),” July&nbsp;2014.</span><span>)</span></a>.
</p>
<a name="id_token-tokenExample"></a><br>
<hr>
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<a name="rfc.section.A.3"></a>
<h3>A.3.&nbsp;
Example using response_type=id_token&nbsp;token</h3>
<div style="display: table; width: 0; margin-left: 3em; margin-right: auto"><pre> GET /authorize?
response_type=id_token%20token
&amp;client_id=s6BhdRkqt3
&amp;redirect_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fclient.example.org%2Fcb
&amp;scope=openid%20profile%20email
&amp;nonce=n-0S6_WzA2Mj
&amp;state=af0ifjsldkj HTTP/1.1
Host: server.example.com
HTTP/1.1 302 Found
Location: https://client.example.org/cb#
access_token=jHkWEdUXMU1BwAsC4vtUsZwnNvTIxEl0z9K3vx5KF0Y
&amp;token_type=Bearer
&amp;id_token=eyJraWQiOiIxZTlnZGs3IiwiYWxnIjoiUlMyNTYifQ.ewogIml
zcyI6ICJodHRwOi8vc2VydmVyLmV4YW1wbGUuY29tIiwKICJzdWIiOiAiMjQ
4Mjg5NzYxMDAxIiwKICJhdWQiOiAiczZCaGRSa3F0MyIsCiAibm9uY2UiOiA
ibi0wUzZfV3pBMk1qIiwKICJleHAiOiAxMzExMjgxOTcwLAogImlhdCI6IDE
zMTEyODA5NzAsCiAiYXRfaGFzaCI6ICI3N1FtVVB0alBmeld0RjJBbnBLOVJ
RIgp9.F9gRev0Dt2tKcrBkHy72cmRqnLdzw9FLCCSebV7mWs7o_sv2O5s6zM
ky2kmhHTVx9HmdvNnx9GaZ8XMYRFeYk8L5NZ7aYlA5W56nsG1iWOou_-gji0
ibWIuuf4Owaho3YSoi7EvsTuLFz6tq-dLyz0dKABMDsiCmJ5wqkPUDTE3QTX
jzbUmOzUDli-gCh5QPuZAq0cNW3pf_2n4zpvTYtbmj12cVcxGIMZby7TMWES
RjQ9_o3jvhVNcCGcE0KAQXejhA1ocJhNEvQNqMFGlBb6_0RxxKjDZ-Oa329e
GDidOvvp0h5hoES4a8IuGKS7NOcpp-aFwp0qVMDLI-Xnm-Pg
&amp;state=af0ifjsldkj
</pre>
</div>
<p>
Verifying and decoding the ID Token will yield the following Claims:
</p>
<div style="display: table; width: 0; margin-left: 3em; margin-right: auto"><pre> {
"iss": "http://server.example.com",
"sub": "248289761001",
"aud": "s6BhdRkqt3",
"nonce": "n-0S6_WzA2Mj",
"exp": 1311281970,
"iat": 1311280970,
"at_hash": "77QmUPtjPfzWtF2AnpK9RQ"
}
</pre>
</div>
<a name="code-id_tokenExample"></a><br>
<hr>
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<a name="rfc.section.A.4"></a>
<h3>A.4.&nbsp;
Example using response_type=code&nbsp;id_token</h3>
<div style="display: table; width: 0; margin-left: 3em; margin-right: auto"><pre> GET /authorize?
response_type=code%20id_token
&amp;client_id=s6BhdRkqt3
&amp;redirect_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fclient.example.org%2Fcb
&amp;scope=openid%20profile%20email
&amp;nonce=n-0S6_WzA2Mj
&amp;state=af0ifjsldkj HTTP/1.1
Host: server.example.com
HTTP/1.1 302 Found
Location: https://client.example.org/cb#
code=Qcb0Orv1zh30vL1MPRsbm-diHiMwcLyZvn1arpZv-Jxf_11jnpEX3Tgfvk
&amp;id_token=eyJraWQiOiIxZTlnZGs3IiwiYWxnIjoiUlMyNTYifQ.ewogIml
zcyI6ICJodHRwOi8vc2VydmVyLmV4YW1wbGUuY29tIiwKICJzdWIiOiAiMjQ
4Mjg5NzYxMDAxIiwKICJhdWQiOiAiczZCaGRSa3F0MyIsCiAibm9uY2UiOiA
ibi0wUzZfV3pBMk1qIiwKICJleHAiOiAxMzExMjgxOTcwLAogImlhdCI6IDE
zMTEyODA5NzAsCiAiY19oYXNoIjogIkxEa3RLZG9RYWszUGswY25YeENsdEE
iCn0.XW6uhdrkBgcGx6zVIrCiROpWURs-4goO1sKA4m9jhJIImiGg5muPUcN
egx6sSv43c5DSn37sxCRrDZZm4ZPBKKgtYASMcE20SDgvYJdJS0cyuFw7Ijp
_7WnIjcrl6B5cmoM6ylCvsLMwkoQAxVublMwH10oAxjzD6NEFsu9nipkszWh
sPePf_rM4eMpkmCbTzume-fzZIi5VjdWGGEmzTg32h3jiex-r5WTHbj-u5HL
7u_KP3rmbdYNzlzd1xWRYTUs4E8nOTgzAUwvwXkIQhOh5TPcSMBYy6X3E7-_
gr9Ue6n4ND7hTFhtjYs3cjNKIA08qm5cpVYFMFMG6PkhzLQ
&amp;state=af0ifjsldkj
</pre>
</div>
<p>
Verifying and decoding the ID Token will yield the following Claims:
</p>
<div style="display: table; width: 0; margin-left: 3em; margin-right: auto"><pre> {
"iss": "http://server.example.com",
"sub": "248289761001",
"aud": "s6BhdRkqt3",
"nonce": "n-0S6_WzA2Mj",
"exp": 1311281970,
"iat": 1311280970,
"c_hash": "LDktKdoQak3Pk0cnXxCltA"
}
</pre>
</div>
<a name="code-tokenExample"></a><br>
<hr>
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<a name="rfc.section.A.5"></a>
<h3>A.5.&nbsp;
Example using response_type=code&nbsp;token</h3>
<div style="display: table; width: 0; margin-left: 3em; margin-right: auto"><pre> GET /authorize?
response_type=code%20token
&amp;client_id=s6BhdRkqt3
&amp;redirect_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fclient.example.org%2Fcb
&amp;scope=openid%20profile%20email
&amp;nonce=n-0S6_WzA2Mj
&amp;state=af0ifjsldkj HTTP/1.1
Host: server.example.com
HTTP/1.1 302 Found
Location: https://client.example.org/cb#
code=Qcb0Orv1zh30vL1MPRsbm-diHiMwcLyZvn1arpZv-Jxf_11jnpEX3Tgfvk
&amp;access_token=jHkWEdUXMU1BwAsC4vtUsZwnNvTIxEl0z9K3vx5KF0Y
&amp;token_type=Bearer
&amp;state=af0ifjsldkj
</pre>
</div>
<a name="code-id_token-tokenExample"></a><br>
<hr>
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<a name="rfc.section.A.6"></a>
<h3>A.6.&nbsp;
Example using response_type=code&nbsp;id_token&nbsp;token</h3>
<div style="display: table; width: 0; margin-left: 3em; margin-right: auto"><pre> GET /authorize?
response_type=code%20id_token%20token
&amp;client_id=s6BhdRkqt3
&amp;redirect_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fclient.example.org%2Fcb
&amp;scope=openid%20profile%20email
&amp;nonce=n-0S6_WzA2Mj
&amp;state=af0ifjsldkj HTTP/1.1
Host: server.example.com
HTTP/1.1 302 Found
Location: https://client.example.org/cb#
code=Qcb0Orv1zh30vL1MPRsbm-diHiMwcLyZvn1arpZv-Jxf_11jnpEX3Tgfvk
&amp;access_token=jHkWEdUXMU1BwAsC4vtUsZwnNvTIxEl0z9K3vx5KF0Y
&amp;token_type=Bearer
&amp;id_token=eyJraWQiOiIxZTlnZGs3IiwiYWxnIjoiUlMyNTYifQ.ewogIml
zcyI6ICJodHRwOi8vc2VydmVyLmV4YW1wbGUuY29tIiwKICJzdWIiOiAiMjQ
4Mjg5NzYxMDAxIiwKICJhdWQiOiAiczZCaGRSa3F0MyIsCiAibm9uY2UiOiA
ibi0wUzZfV3pBMk1qIiwKICJleHAiOiAxMzExMjgxOTcwLAogImlhdCI6IDE
zMTEyODA5NzAsCiAiY19oYXNoIjogIkxEa3RLZG9RYWszUGswY25YeENsdEE
iCn0.XW6uhdrkBgcGx6zVIrCiROpWURs-4goO1sKA4m9jhJIImiGg5muPUcN
egx6sSv43c5DSn37sxCRrDZZm4ZPBKKgtYASMcE20SDgvYJdJS0cyuFw7Ijp
_7WnIjcrl6B5cmoM6ylCvsLMwkoQAxVublMwH10oAxjzD6NEFsu9nipkszWh
sPePf_rM4eMpkmCbTzume-fzZIi5VjdWGGEmzTg32h3jiex-r5WTHbj-u5HL
7u_KP3rmbdYNzlzd1xWRYTUs4E8nOTgzAUwvwXkIQhOh5TPcSMBYy6X3E7-_
gr9Ue6n4ND7hTFhtjYs3cjNKIA08qm5cpVYFMFMG6PkhzLQ
&amp;state=af0ifjsldkj
</pre>
</div>
<p>
Verifying and decoding the ID Token will yield the following Claims:
</p>
<div style="display: table; width: 0; margin-left: 3em; margin-right: auto"><pre> {
"iss": "http://server.example.com",
"sub": "248289761001",
"aud": "s6BhdRkqt3",
"nonce": "n-0S6_WzA2Mj",
"exp": 1311281970,
"iat": 1311280970,
"at_hash": "77QmUPtjPfzWtF2AnpK9RQ",
"c_hash": "LDktKdoQak3Pk0cnXxCltA"
}
</pre>
</div>
<a name="ExampleRSAKey"></a><br>
<hr>
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<a name="rfc.section.A.7"></a>
<h3>A.7.&nbsp;
RSA Key Used in Examples</h3>
<p>
The following RSA public key, represented in JWK format, can be used to
validate the ID Token signatures in the above examples
(with line wraps within values for display purposes only):
</p>
<div style="display: table; width: 0; margin-left: 3em; margin-right: auto"><pre> {
"kty":"RSA",
"kid":"1e9gdk7",
"n":"w7Zdfmece8iaB0kiTY8pCtiBtzbptJmP28nSWwtdjRu0f2GFpajvWE4VhfJA
jEsOcwYzay7XGN0b-X84BfC8hmCTOj2b2eHT7NsZegFPKRUQzJ9wW8ipn_aD
JWMGDuB1XyqT1E7DYqjUCEOD1b4FLpy_xPn6oV_TYOfQ9fZdbE5HGxJUzeku
GcOKqOQ8M7wfYHhHHLxGpQVgL0apWuP2gDDOdTtpuld4D2LK1MZK99s9gaSj
RHE8JDb1Z4IGhEcEyzkxswVdPndUWzfvWBBWXWxtSUvQGBRkuy1BHOa4sP6F
KjWEeeF7gm7UMs2Nm2QUgNZw6xvEDGaLk4KASdIxRQ",
"e":"AQAB"
}
</pre>
</div>
<a name="Acknowledgements"></a><br>
<hr>
<table summary="layout" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" class="TOCbug" align="right">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<a name="rfc.section.B"></a>
<h3>Appendix B.&nbsp;
Acknowledgements</h3>
<p>As a successor version of OpenID, this specification heavily relies
on ideas explored in <a class="info" href="#OpenID.2.0">OpenID
Authentication 2.0<span> (</span><span class="info">OpenID Foundation, “OpenID Authentication 2.0,” December&nbsp;2007.</span><span>)</span></a>
[OpenID.2.0]. Please
refer to Appendix C of OpenID Authentication 2.0 for the full list of
the contributors for that specification.
</p>
<p>
In addition, the OpenID Community would like to thank the following people for
their contributions to this specification:
</p>
<p>
</p>
<blockquote class="text">
<p>Naveen Agarwal (naa@google.com), Google
</p>
<p>Amanda Anganes (aanganes@mitre.org), MITRE
</p>
<p>Casper Biering (cb@peercraft.com), Peercraft
</p>
<p>John Bradley (ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com), Ping Identity
</p>
<p>Tim Bray (tbray@textuality.com), Google
</p>
<p>Johnny Bufu (jbufu@janrain.com), Janrain
</p>
<p>Brian Campbell (bcampbell@pingidentity.com), Ping Identity
</p>
<p>Blaine Cook (romeda@gmail.com), Independent
</p>
<p>Breno de Medeiros (breno@google.com), Google
</p>
<p>Pamela Dingle (pdingle@pingidentity.com), Ping Identity
</p>
<p>Vladimir Dzhuvinov (vladimir@nimbusds.com), Nimbus Directory Services
</p>
<p>George Fletcher (george.fletcher@corp.aol.com), AOL
</p>
<p>Roland Hedberg (roland.hedberg@adm.umu.se), University of Umea
</p>
<p>Ryo Ito (ryo.ito@mixi.co.jp), mixi, Inc.
</p>
<p>Edmund Jay (ejay@mgi1.com), Illumila
</p>
<p>Michael B. Jones (mbj@microsoft.com), Microsoft
</p>
<p>Torsten Lodderstedt (t.lodderstedt@telekom.de), Deutsche Telekom
</p>
<p>Nov Matake (nov@matake.jp), Independent
</p>
<p>Chuck Mortimore (cmortimore@salesforce.com), Salesforce
</p>
<p>Anthony Nadalin (tonynad@microsoft.com), Microsoft
</p>
<p>Hideki Nara (hdknr@ic-tact.co.jp), Tact Communications
</p>
<p>Axel Nennker (axel.nennker@telekom.de), Deutsche Telekom
</p>
<p>David Recordon (dr@fb.com), Facebook
</p>
<p>Justin Richer (jricher@mitre.org), MITRE
</p>
<p>Nat Sakimura (n-sakimura@nri.co.jp), Nomura Research Institute, Ltd.
</p>
<p>Luke Shepard (lshepard@fb.com), Facebook
</p>
<p>Andreas Åkre Solberg (andreas.solberg@uninett.no), UNINET
</p>
<p>Paul Tarjan (pt@fb.com), Facebook
</p>
</blockquote>
<p>
</p>
<a name="Notices"></a><br>
<hr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<a name="rfc.section.C"></a>
<h3>Appendix C.&nbsp;
Notices</h3>
<p>Copyright (c) 2014 The OpenID Foundation.
</p>
<p>
The OpenID Foundation (OIDF) grants to any Contributor, developer,
implementer, or other interested party a non-exclusive, royalty free,
worldwide copyright license to reproduce, prepare derivative works from,
distribute, perform and display, this Implementers Draft or
Final Specification solely for the purposes of (i) developing
specifications, and (ii) implementing Implementers Drafts and
Final Specifications based on such documents, provided that attribution
be made to the OIDF as the source of the material, but that such attribution
does not indicate an endorsement by the OIDF.
</p>
<p>
The technology described in this specification was
made available from contributions from various sources,
including members of the OpenID Foundation and others.
Although the OpenID Foundation has taken steps to help ensure
that the technology is available for distribution, it takes
no position regarding the validity or scope of any intellectual
property or other rights that might be claimed to pertain to
the implementation or use of the technology described in
this specification or the extent to which any license under
such rights might or might not be available; neither does it
represent that it has made any independent effort to identify
any such rights. The OpenID Foundation and the contributors
to this specification make no (and hereby expressly disclaim any)
warranties (express, implied, or otherwise), including implied
warranties of merchantability, non-infringement, fitness for
a particular purpose, or title, related to this specification,
and the entire risk as to implementing this specification is
assumed by the implementer. The OpenID Intellectual
Property Rights policy requires contributors to offer
a patent promise not to assert certain patent claims against
other contributors and against implementers. The OpenID Foundation invites
any interested party to bring to its attention any copyrights,
patents, patent applications, or other proprietary rights
that may cover technology that may be required to practice
this specification.
</p>
<a name="rfc.authors"></a><br>
<hr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="TOCbug"><a href="#toc">&nbsp;TOC&nbsp;</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<h3>Authors' Addresses</h3>
<table width="99%" border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="author-text">&nbsp;</td>
<td class="author-text">Nat Sakimura</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="author-text">&nbsp;</td>
<td class="author-text">Nomura Research Institute, Ltd.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="author" align="right">Email:&nbsp;</td>
<td class="author-text"><a href="mailto:n-sakimura@nri.co.jp">n-sakimura@nri.co.jp</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="author" align="right">URI:&nbsp;</td>
<td class="author-text"><a href="http://nat.sakimura.org/">http://nat.sakimura.org/</a></td>
</tr>
<tr cellpadding="3">
<td>&nbsp;</td>
<td>&nbsp;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="author-text">&nbsp;</td>
<td class="author-text">John Bradley</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="author-text">&nbsp;</td>
<td class="author-text">Ping Identity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="author" align="right">Email:&nbsp;</td>
<td class="author-text"><a href="mailto:ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com">ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="author" align="right">URI:&nbsp;</td>
<td class="author-text"><a href="http://www.thread-safe.com/">http://www.thread-safe.com/</a></td>
</tr>
<tr cellpadding="3">
<td>&nbsp;</td>
<td>&nbsp;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="author-text">&nbsp;</td>
<td class="author-text">Michael B. Jones</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="author-text">&nbsp;</td>
<td class="author-text">Microsoft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="author" align="right">Email:&nbsp;</td>
<td class="author-text"><a href="mailto:mbj@microsoft.com">mbj@microsoft.com</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="author" align="right">URI:&nbsp;</td>
<td class="author-text"><a href="http://self-issued.info/">http://self-issued.info/</a></td>
</tr>
<tr cellpadding="3">
<td>&nbsp;</td>
<td>&nbsp;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="author-text">&nbsp;</td>
<td class="author-text">Breno de Medeiros</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="author-text">&nbsp;</td>
<td class="author-text">Google</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="author" align="right">Email:&nbsp;</td>
<td class="author-text"><a href="mailto:breno@google.com">breno@google.com</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="author" align="right">URI:&nbsp;</td>
<td class="author-text"><a href="http://stackoverflow.com/users/311376/breno">http://stackoverflow.com/users/311376/breno</a>
</td>
</tr>
<tr cellpadding="3">
<td>&nbsp;</td>
<td>&nbsp;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="author-text">&nbsp;</td>
<td class="author-text">Chuck Mortimore</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="author-text">&nbsp;</td>
<td class="author-text">Salesforce</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="author" align="right">Email:&nbsp;</td>
<td class="author-text"><a href="mailto:cmortimore@salesforce.com">cmortimore@salesforce.com</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="author" align="right">URI:&nbsp;</td>
<td class="author-text"><a href="https://twitter.com/cmort">https://twitter.com/cmort</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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